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
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THE

HISTORY

OF

HENRI DE LA TOUR

D'AUVERGNE,

Viscount de TURENNE,

Marshal-General of FRANCE;

Containing the AUTHORITIES,

IN THREE PARTS.

VOL. II.



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THESE Memoirs, written with the Marshal de Turenne's own hand, were composed after the Peace of the Pyrenees. The great Simplicity of the Style shews, that the Author preserved his Character in every thing. In this Work we shall not only find well concerted Plans for the Operations of the Campaigns, the deep Designs of an able General, the Motives of his Conduct, the Obstacles he meets with, and the means whereby he surmounts them: but we shall observe an uncommon CANDOUR in owning his Mistakes without the least regard to Self-love; a GENEROSITY which carefully draws a Veil over the Faults of his Rivals and even of his Enemies; a Modesty which avoids mentioning his greatest Exploits, or but lightly touches upon them: in a word, all the Characteristicks of a sublime Soul, to which, whatever is GREAT and BEAUTIFULL is become so natural, that it knows not its own Worth, and thinks it does nothing but what is common,

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at the very time when it is performing Wonders.

Such is the Picture which the Marshal has undesignedly drawn of himself in the original Pieces which follow, and which are here presented to the Publick to prove the Truth of the History of his Life given in the preceding Volume.



MEMOIRS

OF THE

Viscount de TURENNE.

BOOK I,

Of the Wars in GERMANY.

AFTER the Duke d'Enguien had besieged and taken Thionville, * he marched with five or six thousand men to the Banks of the Rhine, and join'd the Army in Germany, commanded by the Marshal de Guebriant. Some time after the Duke d'Enguien returned to Paris, and M. de Guebriant besieged Rotewil†, where he was mortally wounded, and died a few days after. An. 1643.

M. de Ranitzau, who commanded the Prince's Troops, having the command of the whole Army, after the taking of Rotewil, marched to Dutlingue §; where he was defeated by the Bavarian Army, and taken prisoner. All the German horse, with little loss, retired as far as the Rhine; but the foot, that had been left in Rotewil, surrendered at discretion, and those that were in the body of the Army were almost quite dispersed.

M. de Turenne being returned from the siege of Trin to Paris, Cardinal Mazarin, who began to sit at the helm, sent for him, and told him, that the King appointed him to command in Germany; so he got himself ready to set out three or four days after, though he was very much out of order by the remains of a fit of sickness, which had lasted since the end of the siege of Brisac, yet, without hindering

B

dering

¶ August the 10th. † November the 19th. § December the 24th.

dering him from being in the field every summer. As the defeat of the King's Army, and the taking of Rotewil, happen'd in the month of December, the enemy undertook nothing else that Campaign, and M. de Turenne being arriv'd at Colmar, sent for the Officers to come there, to consider how to compleat the Army again *.

An. 1644 — Alsace being too much ruin'd, in the month of January he entered the mountains of Lorrain, where he put the Army into quarters: he enlarged them afterwards, by the taking of two small places, called Luxuel and Vesoul in Franche-Comté, where he left three or four Regiments. At the same time some money was received from the Court, with which, and the help of the quarters, the Army, that is to say the horse, was put in a good condition; but as for the foot, it was a very hard matter to compleat them again during the winter.

M. de Turenne going to Brisac, found that M. d'Erlac, the Governor, was retired to a country house he had in Switzerland, and had left a letter, (which was deliver'd to M. de Turenne when he entered the castle,) wherein he acquainted him, that believing the Minister had some jealousy of him, he had left the place, which he deliver'd up to him, desiring him to send him his wife. M. de Turenne was a little surprized at M. d'Erlac's conduct, in parting with so good a Government out of an ill grounded suspicion; but thinking it would be below him to take advantage of what M. d'Erlac had done, by possessing himself of his Government, he sent M. de Tracy to him, to desire he would return; and three or four days after, M. d'Erlac returned to his command, which M. de Turenne delivered up to him, and in a few days after left the place*. I have mention'd this as a thing very surprizing, that a wise man, like M. d'Erlac, (who had been settled in Brisac by the Duke of Weymar, and was thought to have the command of a Town which the Court look'd upon with a jealous eye) should leave it, and put another in possession of it in an instant, without any reason.

M. de

* M. de Turenne passes over in silence here his generous efforts in compleating the Army again; but the Abbot Raquenot, who had it from the Cardinal de Bouillon, and Fremont de Ablancourt give an account of them, and it was by this that the Viscount first made himself known to the Weymarians.

† The action was so much the more generous, that the Viscount had earnestly wished to be Governor of that place.

M. de Turenne passed the winter in the mountains of Lor- An. 1644.
rain, and in the spring, having learnt that there were two
thousand horse under the command of the Baron de Merci,
Major General, beyond the black Forest, in two villages at
the source of the Danube, he passed the Rhine at Brisac,
and having sent M. Rosen before, with four or five Regi-
ments, he defeated those horse, and took three or four hun-
dred prisoners, and a great many officers; the rest fled to
the Bavarian Army, which was blocking up a castle called
Hokenwiel, which they had a mind to starve, or bring to
capitulate; the place being almost impregnable because of
its situation.

In the month of May, the Bavarians finding themselves
in a very good condition, by reason of the good quarters
they had had, and the great number of soldiers they had
obliged to lift themselves with them after the defeat of the
last winter, came and laid siege to Fribourg, which is a-
bout five leagues from Brisac, on the edge of the mountains
of the Black Forest. Besides the garrison, which consisted
of three or four hundred men, M. de Turenne had thrown
in as many, drawn out of the French foot. Having an ac-
count that the enemy was before that place, he immedi-
ately gave orders for the Army to assemble near Brisac, where
he passed the Rhine, hoping to find the enemy divided.

The King's Army consisted then of about five thousand
horse, and four or five thousand foot, with fifteen or twen-
ty pieces of cannon. So great a number of cannon could not
have been carry'd, if the Army had had a long march to
make; but as the enemy was within five or six leagues,
we made a shift to do it. The Army having passed
the night at Brisac, then march'd with all speed, and came
within two leagues of the enemy, who quickly ordered
back the foragers. M. de Merci had not intelligence of
the Army's crossing the River at Brisac so soon as he might have
had: As there was but that only place where the Rhine
could be passed, it would have been easy to have had advice
of it by parties which ought always to be kept near a passage;
but in war, accidents frequently happen to the most expe-
rienced Generals, against whom a great deal might be said,
if experience did not shew, that the most able are those
only who commit the fewest mistakes. The King's Army
advanced towards that of the Bavarians, and found them
drawn up in order of battle in a plain near Fribourg; they

An. 1644. had had time only to mind the siege of the place, where they had been eight days, but not to possess themselves of the advantageous posts, which they had neglected, not thinking that the King's Army could be in a condition to come up with them so soon. M. de Turenne seeing that a hill, which commanded the plain where their Army was, and which could open a communication with Fribourg, was not possessed by the enemy, ordered the Regiments of Montausier and Mezieres, which made a Battalion of a thousand men, to march thither, and caused the rest of the foot to advance, in order to sustain them.

The enemy perceiving that we were marching towards that hill, order'd fifteen or twenty Musketeers, who were upon guard on the declivity of the hill, to get up to the top of it; they got there before the two French Regiments, and fired upon them as they were marching up: the French, who did not see the back side of the hill, and who imagin'd that all the enemy's infantry were advancing up the hill, took the alarm, and marching in disorder through very rugged places, two ensigns began to come down with their colours, and presently the whole Battalion, instead of going up, went along the side of the hill, and the enemy had time to give them a second fire, upon which, the whole Battalion gave ground and came down. M. de Turenne, who was below, and ordering other Regiments to follow up, seeing the Battalion he had sent return in confusion, and that it had given the enemy time to send more foot up the hill, desisted from that attempt, and began to retire to a rising ground, about three or four hundred paces from thence, to draw up his troops in order of battle. For some time there was a little confusion, of which the enemy might have taken advantage, if they had not been intent upon making themselves masters of the Hill.

M. de Turenne incamp'd upon the rising ground, caused the two ensigns that had given the alarm to be broke, and continued some time in that post in sight of the enemy, who carry'd on the siege. There were likewise some skirmishes, and a brisk engagement of the cavalry, wherein seven or eight hundred of the enemy's horse were routed; but the Army of the enemy being much stronger than the King's, M. de Mercî * who was General of it, continu'd the siege, and M. de Turenne having lost this first opportunity,

* The Count de Mercî, the Baron's brother.

tunity, did not think proper to run any hazard for relieving An. 1644. the place, but retir'd about a league and a half from thence at the time that the Town was capitulating. There were in it six or seven hundred men, commanded by M. de Kaniowski, who retired to Brisac, after the Capitulation.

M. de Turenne had advice at that time, that the Duke d'Enguien had orders to march to Brisac with his Army, which consisted of six thousand foot and three thousand horse*: this Prince having passed the Rhine, came to M. de Turenne's Camp, which was about four or five leagues from Brisac.

After the taking of Fribourg, the enemy's Army had continued in their Camp: Parties were sent out to view it, as also all the roads both through the hills and the woods, in order to get betwixt Fribourg and the Bavarians, and that way to march down into the plain. The Duke d'Enguien resolved to attack with his Army some posts where M. de Merci had three or four Regiments of foot upon a rising ground at the head of his Camp, and ordered M. de Turenne to march with the Army he commanded, through the woods and hills, to endeavour to enter the plain where the enemy were, and attack them in the flank: It was resolved to begin the attack three hours before night.

The Prince having caus'd the rising ground to be attack'd by his foot, they were at first beat back, but going thither himself with great resolution, and with a body that sustained those who had been repuls'd, he carry'd those posts, defeated the three or four Regiments, consisting of above two thousand men, † but lost a great many of his own men, and it growing dark, he halted in the same place.

M. de Turenne at the head of his Army entered the defile, and advanced towards the plain, where the enemy were in order of battle; first he drove them from a wood, and then from a hedge, and beat them from post to post to the entrance of the plain. The Bavarians lost a great many men, and retired about forty or fifty paces from our foot, having

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* The Marquis de Mouslaie says, there were four thousand horse in the Duke d'Enguien's Army.

† M. de la Moissai and Puffendorf, make Merci's Army amount to fifteen thousand men, whereas, according to the last, there were nine thousand foot; there must then have been more than three thousand killed in this action, since there were only two thousand five hundred at the Viscount's attack, twelve hundred the second day, and very few the third, and yet, according to the Viscount, of all Merci's Army, only six thousand retired.

An. 1644 all their horse, and a body of foot of the second line, to sustain them. The two Armies continued thus facing one another, the Bavarians not daring to come to a close engagement again with those Regiments that were ready to receive them with their pikes, and the French not daring to enter further into the plain, having no horse to sustain them.

In this posture did both Armies fight above two hours before night, with great loss on both sides: the King's foot had behind them the wood, which gave them a fair opportunity to retreat; but they never recoiled, though it was not possible to bring above one Squadron of horse to sustain them, for want of room to draw up.

The night did not put an end to the fight, but the Troops on both sides remained for seven hours continually firing at the distance of forty paces till it was day. In this place, above fifteen hundred of the King's Army were killed; and of the enemy, upwards of two thousand five hundred: M. de Roqueserviere, SERGEANT DE BATAILLE*, was mortally wounded: M. d'Aumont, Lieutenant General, acted his part there exceeding well.

A little before day the enemy's fire was observ'd to diminish; the reason was, that they had left only some few men to fire, that their retreat might not be perceived; their Army marching to a hill near Fribourg. They had reason to be afraid, that the Prince having been prevented by the night from advancing further, would attack them at break of day in the plain, on his side. As soon as any thing could be seen at the distance of a hundred paces, we sent some soldiers into the plain, who reported that the enemy were retired; and day-light advancing, M. de Turenne marched down into the plain, and saw the Prince entering it likewise on his side. The Armies being join'd, the Prince did not think fit to march that day to the hill, where the Bavarians had again encamp'd, and which was not above a league from their former Camp: he only went to take a view pretty near the hill, where the enemy having already planted their cannon, fired several shot at those who advanced.

'Tis certain, had the Prince marched up to them, he would have found them in great confusion; but the foot of the King's Army were so dispirited by fighting the whole night,

* This was formerly a General Officer, who, in the day of battle, receiv'd from the General the plan of the disposition of the whole Army.

night, and by the great number of officers and soldiers An. 1644. killed or wounded, that they were not in a condition to undertake any considerable action. That day was spent in the Camp, and 'twas reported, that the most part of the General Officers of the enemy's Army were for making use of that opportunity to retire by the hills behind Fribourg, and leave a garrison there; but M. de Merci carry'd it against them; he continu'd there, and caused some trees to be cut down, in order to hinder any approach, and ordered some small works to be made in the most advantageous places.

The next morning early, the Army, commanded by M. de Turenne, having the van-guard, he detached seven or eight hundred musqueteers, commanded by M. de l'Echelle, SERJENT DE BATAILLE of the Prince's Army, (who did the duty of M. de Roqueserviere, who was wounded in the last action) and eight or ten Squadrons of horse, under the command of M. Deubatel *, Lieutenant General, with four small field pieces, which marched at the head of the said detachment: as they came near the hill where the enemy was, they perceiv'd some musketeers that were guarding some advantageous posts, and who retired to their respective bodies when they were pressed hard, while the enemy fired a great many cannon shot.

The march being very short, when M. de Turenne's Army was in this situation, it was but eight o' clock in the morning, so that they had a great deal of time, being the middle of summer. It was resolv'd, that by opening a great way to the right, they should make room for the Prince's Army (which the Marshal de Gramont commanded under him) in order to double to the left, and then put themselves in such a disposition, that the hill might be attack'd in several places at the same time. All the enemy's troops, both horse and foot, having retired in close order towards the hill, after a very sharp skirmish, the King's Army halted: the cannon from the hill did but little mischief, because the French were not in a defile.

In the mean while, an officer of Flextein, who was detached with fifty horse to view the disposition of the enemy from a rising ground near the King's Army, came and told M. de Turenne, that he saw a great confusion amongst the Bavarians, and that their baggage was marching. M. de

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Turenne

* Perhaps 'tis the same, whom the Marquis de Mouslaie calls du Tubale.

An. 1644. Turenne told it to the Prince, who thinking it would be easie to know what there was in that report, and that it might be useful for making the disposition for the attack, he went thither, taking M. de Turenne with him, who told the Troops as he pass'd before them, that he should return immediately, and that it was necessary before the attack, to wait the arrival of the Prince's Troops.

There were about two thousand paces from the place where the troops of the right were, to the rising ground where that Officer of Flextein had been. As we were viewing the disposition of the enemy's Army, which seem'd to be in great confusion, we heard them make a great volley of small shot, and at the same time a noise of trumpets and kettle-drums. M. d'Espenan, who commanded the Prince's infantry, coming to the hill, and seeing a small advanc'd work, in which the enemy had some musketeers, and by which it had not been thought necessary to begin an attack, sent some foot to make themselves masters of it, without waiting either the Prince's, or the Marshal de Gramont's orders; thinking, as I believe, that the thing would not have had so great a consequence, or, perhaps, to raise his own character in the world by some little action: this was what oblig'd the enemy to make so great a volley from the hill, upon those troops that were advancing at that time.

The body of M. Doubatel's van-guard, where M. de l'Echelle was, (to whom M. de Turenne had spoken, in going with the Prince, and told them expressly, that they must not stir from their post, and that he would return immediately) began to march towards the hill, and having passed some trees which the enemy had cut down, advanced towards a work, where M. de Merci was with his whole body of foot, who, not being attack'd but on that side, because the enterprize was without orders, opposed them with his whole force. This was the condition in which the Prince and M. de Turenne found their troops on their return, having galloped full speed upon hearing the noise.

There was not a man of the Prince's Army come, but the few musketeers M. d'Espenan had employ'd to take that work, and M. de Turenne's foot, which in all made not three thousand men, were not engag'd against that fort, but were at a great distance from it, without having orders for what they were to do. The Prince staid with that first body, which

which was already beat back, close to the enemy's redoubt, and so, as may easily be judg'd, very much expos'd, there being no horse to sustain them but Flextein's Regiment, which continued under the fire of the enemy's whole foot with wonderful resolution, and lost the half of the men. An. 1644.

M. de Turenne went to his own body of foot that were not engag'd, in order to help the retreat of those who had attack'd, or in case they were not quite repuls'd, and there was room for doing it, to make an attack: as he was advancing, the situation of the affair shew'd, that all that he had to do, was to halt a little out of musket shot, and wait for the Prince's foot.

We continu'd in this posture a pretty while, it requiring a long time to make the disposition for an attack, in rugged and hilly ground. Then the Prince thought fit that M. de Turenne should march with his infantry, the Marshal de Gramont was to have charged the enemy in the flank, or to have sustain'd with the horse, if the attack had succeeded. We march'd straight to the fall of trees which was in the middle of the hill, and opposite to the left of the Prince's Army. The Regiments of horse of M. de Turenne and Traci, sustain'd the Prince's foot, who were repulsed after a very obstinate fight, where those horse performed wonders, in bearing the fire without moving.

M. de Turenne, who had M. Tournon with him, sent word several times to the Prince, that whatever his troops might suffer, he would endeavour not to retire altogether till it was night. 'Tis certain, could the enemy have made a right judgment of the confusion of the King's troops, the whole Army had been ruin'd, at least all the foot. Those of M. de Turenne were also led on to that hill at the time that those of the Prince were attacking, but the soldiers were so disheartned, that they advanced very little towards the enemy.

This battle lasted two full hours, and ended with the day, the enemy not stirring from their posts. The Bavarians lost a great many men, and among the rest, Gaspard de Mercj, Major General, the Count's brother; but their loss was not so great as that of the King's Armies, whereof the foot were almost entirely ruin'd: nevertheless, as the enemy had lost almost the half of their foot two days before, and had suffer'd pretty much on this occasion, they had

An. 1644. had but a small number of foot left. Had it not been for that accident of M. d'Espenan's attacking contrary to orders, which put all in confusion, and if the foot of the King's two Armies had attack'd the hill a-breast, according to the disposition that was going to be made, the enemy's Army would have been undone, and unable to resist. In the French Army there were a great many Officers killed; M. de l'Echelle and M. de Mauvilli, SERJENTS DE BATAILLE, with almost all the Commanders of the different bodies of the horse, and some of those who commanded the foot.

Night having parted the two Armies, which were but fifty paces from each other, (the most advanc'd bodies, at least) that of the King returned to its former Camp. A vast number of wounded were sent to Brisac, and provisions ordered from thence, and a day or two after, there came an account, that the enemy's Army having decamp'd from that hill, and left a Garrison in Fribourg, was marching into the SCHWARTZ-WELT, which is the Black Forest, in order to get into the Country of Wirtemberg. As the Country, through which they were oblig'd to pass, is full of very narrow ways, where it is with great difficulty that baggage can follow, it was resolv'd to march with the whole Army in order to surprize the enemy; and for that end, M. Rosen was detach'd with eight Squadrons, and set out three or four hours before the Army. As he was an excellent Officer, and of great experience, he had orders either to attack some Troops which the enemy had detach'd to make their march the more easy, or to stop the body of the Army by harassing it, and thereby give time for the King's Army to come up.

The King's Army march'd at the break of day, leaving the baggage with a guard, and followed M. de Rosen's rout, who had set out about midnight. After a march of five or six hours in a rugged Country, and where the troopers were often oblig'd to dismount and file off, the Army got upon a little rising ground. The Prince was with the main body, and M. de Turenne's Army had the van-guard. We saw M. de Rosen's Troops in a valley, about a quarter of a league off; and upon the top of a hill, (which M. de Rosen could not see, because he was in the bottom) five or six thousand men at most, which was the enemy's whole Army, that were retiring. A little after, M. de Rosen with his eight Squadrons, consisting of full six hundred horse, began

began to follow the enemy, and get up that hill, which An. 1644. was pretty long. M. de Turenne, by order of the Prince, sent immediately a Gentleman, called la Berge, to tell M. de Rosen, that it was the enemy's whole Army that were marching upon the hill: before he got to M. de Rosen, who saw only some Troops of the rear-guard, Rosen was advanc'd so near, that M. deMerci perceiving he was not sustained, and that the foremost Troops of the King's Army were a quarter of a league from him, and were filing off one by one, to form the first Squadron, (which takes up a great deal of time) fac'd about upon M. de Rosen with the whole body of his Troops; but some of the enemy's Squadrons advancing before their foot, M. de Rosen beat them back, and following them in order, three or four Battalions fired upon him, which stopped his detachment, however, without putting them in confusion: seeing himself very near the enemy's main body, and their front very much larger than his own, he began to retire. Two or three Squadrons of the second line sustained those of the first, that were very little moved by so great a fire, and after having lost four or five Standards, they retired very slowly in good order.

The enemy's horse durst not pursue them briskly, for fear of going too far from their foot; or else, because being as yet stunn'd with the battles of the preceding days, their main design was to retire without fighting. Rosen's foremost Squadrons being sustained by those of the second line, and the whole body of the enemy's horse and foot continuing to march against them, and being between forty and fifty paces from one another, they retired five or six hundred paces, mix'd with the enemy, who made more use of the fire of their foot than of their horse. It was one of the most remarkable actions I ever saw, for the intrepidity of Troops in the midst of so much danger; a degree of bravery to which none but those who have been in many battles, and have had both good and bad success, can arrive. The enemy who saw that there were already two Squadrons of the van-guard of the King's Army formed upon the rising ground, where I said they were filing off, began to halt, and a little after, to retire.

Rosen's horse that had been repulsed, not being in a condition to pursue the enemy, because there was not a body of the King's Army that had passed the defile strong enough to sustain them, made a halt, and M. de Mercî retired to a wood

An. 1644. a wood about twelve or fifteen hundred paces from the place of action, from whence he directed his march through the hills towards the Country of Wirtemberg.

There came intelligence, that some of the enemy's heavy baggage, with three or four hundred horse, was about a league off, and taking a different rout from that of M. de Mercî's Army: M. Doubaret, who was Lieutenant General of the German horse, went thither with four or five Regiments; and when the enemy's Troops, that were guarding that baggage, saw them, they retired towards the body of their Army, and lost few of their men; all the baggage was plundered, but a part of the horses that were carrying it, escaped. The King's Army lay that night in the hills without advancing: as all that were left of the foot were accustomed to receive their bread, and not to shift for it, like the old Troops that have served long in Germany, it was not possible to follow the enemy into the Country of Wirtemberg, where the King had no Magazines, and therefore it was resolved to keep near the Rhine. After having sent M. de Palluau, Major General in the Prince's Army, to take a little Castle that might incommode Fribourg, the Army marched back by the same road that it had come, and lay near the same Camp from whence it had marched to pursue the enemy on the hill. Many of the Officers were for attacking Fribourg, where the enemy had left five or six hundred men in Garrison, and for putting an end to the Campaign by that siege. Affairs being in such a situation, that if the Army had continu'd yet some days before Fribourg, the want of forage would have oblig'd the horse to repass the Rhine, it was thought, that the humour the enemy was in, and their distance from the banks of the Rhine, ought to suggest greater designs than the retaking of Fribourg; so the Prince thought fit, that M. de Turenne should go to Brisac, to consult with M. d'Erlac, the Governor, how to send down the Rhine artillery, ammunition, and provisions, in order to attack Philipsbourg, whilst the Army should march through the Marquisate of Baden, leaving the Rhine upon the left, in order to invest the place; this was put in execution; and the boats being loaded, and three or four hundred musketeers put on board for escorting them, they came down the Rhine, the Garrison of Strasbourg having let them pass under their bridge. The Army having left all their wounded, which was a great number, at Brisac, began

to march towards Philipsbourg; and having no account of the enemy, who were in quarters above twenty leagues from thence, refreshing themselves, safeguards were sent into a great many small towns, and into some, the baggage of some Regiments of horse, with the troopers on foot, and the march was continued to invest Philipsbourg with the foot, which in all consisted not of above five thousand men, and with such of the horse as were in a condition to serve; the rest, as I have already observ'd, having been sent into quarters.

There were in the place six or seven hundred foot, and about eighty horse: a few days were spent in making a road for going to the boats that were coming from Brisac; the banks of the Rhine being full of wood and little islands. As soon as the cannon, ammunition, and provisions were landed, two trenches were open'd, one by the Prince's Army, and the other by M. de Turenne's.

The second or third day, the besieged made a sally upon the Prince's trench, and surprized those that were in the head of it, but they soon recovered themselves; the foot were so dispirited by the late actions at Fribourg, that the siege of a place which made a vigorous defence, would certainly not have been attended with success. The two trenches were carry'd on to the counterscarp with very little loss: M. de Tournon, Major General in the Prince's Army, was killed there; he was a Gentleman of great accomplishments, and there was not a young man that had more ambition and merit.

The enemy made no resistance at their counterscarp, which was not pallisadoed, nor in a state to make any defence; but as they had a *fausse-braie*, a ditch full of water, pretty large and deep, and a great many cannon, they imagin'd that they should keep the besiegers a long time from passing the ditch; but as we had abundance of fascines, and that the cannon had been pointed from the two sides of the counterscarp, in order to fire on the flanks, the gallery was advanc'd, that is to say, the bank of fascines, (which was not cover'd as in Holland) pretty near their *fausse-braie*; which the enemy perceiving, and that the next day the body of the place would be attack'd, they beat the chamade.

During the siege, as soon as a bridge had been made upon the Rhine, with the boats that came from Brisac, twelve or fifteen hundred men were sent over to the other side of the Rhine, who took Germesheim, where there was a small

Gar-

An. 1644. Garrison: then they advanc'd to Spires, which is about two or three leagues from thence; the Town is very large, but having no Garrison, it surrendered, there not being on that side of the Rhine, any body of the enemy's Troops.

The Governor of Philipsbourg having capitulated upon the usual conditions, that the Garrison should march out with their arms, and be conducted to Hailbronn, an Imperial Town twelve leagues from thence, the Prince enter'd Philipsbourg with the Marshal de Gramont. The next day after the taking of the place, M. de Turenne passed the Rhine with all the German horse, and a detachment of five hundred musketeers, and having intelligence that the Spaniards, who were in possession of Frankendal, a Town belonging to the Elector Palatine, three leagues from Spires, were expecting some horse from Luxembourg, he sent thither M. de Flextein with three Regiments, who met Colonel Savari with five hundred horse, who had a mind to enter the place; he took him prisoner, and defeated a party of his men. M. de Turenne continu'd his march towards Worms, which surrender'd, there being no Garrison in the place; and having march'd on, Oppenheim also surrender'd. Fearing that the enemy might put some Troops into Mentz, which is the most considerable post upon the Rhine, because of the neighbourhood of Frankfort, and the communication it has with the Hessians, he marched day and night without baggage, and in the morning came pretty near the place, in which he knew there was neither Imperial nor Bavarian Garrison, but only some men that the Chapter maintain'd: he quickly sent a trumpet with a Gentleman, to speak with the Gentlemen of the Chapter.

At the same time M. de Turenne had an account, that there were a thousand Dragoons of the Bavarian Army, under the command of Colonel Wolfs, who was on the other side of the Rhine, and was demanding boats from the Chapter, in order to enter the place; which oblig'd him to draw nearer to the Town with his Troops, and to send other messengers to the Gentlemen of the Chapter, to press them to depute some persons to come and treat, which was done. M. de Turenne told them, that if they did not immediately send word to the Bavarian Troops to retire, he would treat no more, and that if he saw the smallest boat pass to the other side of the river, he would order the Town to be attack'd on all sides. They resolved to capitulate,
having

having no head to make them take a vigorous resolution. An. 1644.
 The Bavarian Dragoons presently retired, and M. de Turenne sent an account to the Prince at Philipsbourg, of the situation of affairs, who in all haste came to him, accompany'd by a great many Officers; he sign'd the capitulation, which was as advantageous to the Chapter and the Citizens as they could desire. The Elector, who was in the Emperor's Interest, upon hearing of the siege of Philipsbourg, had retired to Frankfort. There was a little place called Bingen, four leagues from Mentz, in the Circle of the lower Rhine, which surrender'd at the same time; and twelve or fifteen leagues from thence, safeguards were received, except in the Castle of Creutznac, where there were two hundred men.

The Prince staid four or five days at Mentz, and received there an Envoy from the Landgraves of Hesse, and a great many Deputies from places in the neighbourhood; and having left there three or four hundred men, under the command of the Viscount de Courval, who were put into the Citadel, which was good for nothing, and to which a great many works have been added since, he returned to the Army, which was at Philipsbourg, whither were brought back all the Troops that M. de Turenne had carry'd to Mentz: a few men were also left at Oppenheim in the Castle, and two or three hundred in Worms.

No stronger Garrisons were put in those places, because there was no enemy on that side of the Rhine, except in the Town of Frankendale, where there were seven or eight hundred men. M. de Lorraine had left only three or four hundred men in Landau, which is an Imperial City four leagues from Philipsbourg; the Prince thought fit to send M. d'Aumont, Lieutenant General in M. de Turenne's Army, with a detachment of three or four thousand men, and four pieces of cannon, to take it. The next day after opening the trenches, M. d'Aumont received a mortal wound, of which he died, after having been carry'd to Spires. He had served five or six years in France as Major General, and had been only made Lieutenant General that Campaign in Germany. He was a man of great Quality, brought up at Court, was an excellent Officer, and knew well how to raise his fortune; he lived in good terms with M. de Turenne, and died with a great deal of resolution.

Upon

An. 1644. Upon the news of his death at Philipsbourg, the Prince thought fit to send M. de Turenne to the siege, where there had been few men kill'd, and the place surrender'd two or three days after; the Prince came there during the siege. The Garrison was sent into some Castles, which M. de Lorraine held in the hills; and two or three hundred men being left in the Town, all the rest join'd again the body of the Army at Philipsbourg, the Government whereof the Prince obtain'd from the Court for M. d'Espéran. The month of October being pretty far advanc'd, the Prince retired into France with his Army, passing through Keyserflouter and Deux-Ponts, and marching straight to Metz, and he left behind him only some new Regiments of foot, the soldiers whereof were, with great difficulty, kept together by the Officers of the German Army, the French Officers having been dismiss'd. All the French horse, which had for some time before been in a bad case, and five or six of the oldest Regiments returned home. M. de Turenne staid at Philipsbourg with the Army, and order'd a strict guard to be kept upon the bridge, that, as soon as the Prince had pass'd with those he had a mind to take with him, none else might have that liberty.

Some days after, M. de Merici, who commanded the Bavarian Army, which had been refreshed and recruited in the Country of Wirtemberg, finding that the Prince, with a good part of the Army, was returned to France, got his Troops together again, marched towards Heidelberg, and sent to surprize some Dragoons that M. de Turenne had put into Mannheim, which is a large Town upon the Rhine, almost demolish'd: then he caus'd some Troops to pass the Rhine, and made as if he design'd to lay a bridge of boats over it, in hopes to draw the King's Army to cover all those new conquer'd places, where there were but small Garrisons, such as Spire, Worms, and Mentz, and so evacuate Philipsbourg, which he then intended to attack, lodging himself between the Rhine and the Town, which is easy to be done, there being not above the distance of a musket shot from the one to the other.

M. de Turenne finding that it was necessary to repass the Rhine, in order to cover those places, left two thousand foot in a Camp under Philipsbourg, to prevent the siege of it, and taking with him a detachment of musketeers, with all his horse, he repass'd the Rhine; marched to Spire, and immediately sent a thousand horse into Worms and Mentz, to reinforce those Garrisons. The

The town of Frankendal, which is betwixt Spire and An. 1644: Worms, very much disturbed the communication of those two places. M. de Turenne was afraid, that M. de Merci, repassing the Rhine at Manheim, might make use of it as a magazine, and draw out of it cannon and ammunition in order to retake Worms and Mentz, which indeed might have been very easily done; but M. de Merci did not do it, for reasons that cannot easily be guessed; the best of which I believe is, that the Bavarian Army were always afraid of passing the Rhine, and of being undone for want of forrage and provisions, which was so great, that from Philipsburg to Mentz on this side of the Rhine, there was nothing sowed, and nothing for horses to eat but in the towns. Besides, the garrisons of Worms and Mentz were so weak, that they would not have held out two days; but it often happens that one does not know the state of things; which hindered M. de Merci from making his whole Body of Troops pass the Rhine: There were but few of them that came to this side, and the main Body continued betwixt Heidelberg and Manheim.

Matters remained for some days in that situation; and M. de Turenne finding that there was no danger of the Bavarian Army's passing the Rhine, and that all his Horse were perishing for want of forrage, kept only three or four regiments of horse, without baggage, which he put into the towns, and furnished them with straw, but very little oats, and sent away all the rest of his horse into the hills of Lorrain, having written to Court that directions might be given to provide them with winter-quarters in that Country, and in the Bishopricks of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, keeping all the foot with him in Germany, and leaving a body of two thousand men under Philipsburg; until he should know that the Bavarian Army was separated; which was not till the month of December.

Not long after M. de Turenne had sent away those horse, he had intelligence, that M. de Lorrain was passing the Moselle with five or six thousand men, and had invested a Squadron of horse in Castelaun, and another in Simeren, two small Towns in the Hundstruck, about four or five leagues from the Moselle, whither M. de Turenne had sent those two squadrons to get forrage. That of Castelaun continued in that little place, which was not attacked; that of Simeren retired to Mentz with little loss.

An. 1644. M. de Turenne, who was no longer in a condition to bring back his cavalry, (quarter'd in Lorrain) nor even to take with him those of his horse he had posted in the towns of the Rhine, M. de Merci being still on the other side with his main body, marched towards Mentz with four or five hundred horse, and understood by the way, that M. de Lorrain had attacked Bacharach, which is a small town upon the Rhine, where there was a garrison of a hundred men. M. de Turenne was not in a condition to relieve it; yet he was willing to make M. de Lorrain believe that he was marching thither with a good body of men. Being arrived near to Binghen, which is but about three leagues from it, he sent parties and safe-guards into several places to prepare provisions for the Army, and even made some of his guards get into the castle, who cried out to the Lorrainers, that the Army was coming. M. de Lorrain raised the siege, and retired to the other side of the Moselle. Two hundred men had remained in the castle of Creutznac, which overlooks a very pretty town; and that castle being a very considerable post betwixt the Rhine and the Moselle, M. de Turenne thought, that by lodging his foot in the town, and having quarters and provisions, he might conveniently enough besiege it during the winter. He staid there with a thousand foot and two hundred horse; and in fifteen or sixteen days the castle surrendered, after a pretty good defence.

About the middle of the month of December, the troops were quartered in Lorrain, Alsace, and along the Rhine, where the Country was so ruined, that in twenty leagues there could not be found forrage for one horse, except in the great towns that were become very poor by quartering the Lorrainers, and in a small castle here and there, where some man of quality lived, whom we would not entirely ruin.

An. 1645. M. de Turenne thought fit not to go to Court during the winter, that he might be in a condition to take the field the sooner; and the Cardinal having approved of it, he staid at Spire: from thence he sent to desire M. de la Ferté, Governor of Lorrain, to pay the troops with all expedition their winter quarters. M. de la Ferté did it most punctually in all the places of his government, and ordered three months pay to be given them. Thus the horse, amounting to five thousand, and the foot to five or six

fix thousand, with twelve or fifteen pieces of cannon, a-An. 1645: about the end of the month of March were ready to re-
 pass the Rhine, upon a bridge of boats that was made at
 Spires.

M. de Turenne had made all the haste he could to take the field, because a body of three or four thousand men had been detached from the Bavarian Army, in order to strengthen that of the Emperor, under the command of M. de Bauschemberg, General of the artillery, and of John de Wert at the battle of Tabor, where M. Torstenson defeated and took prisoner General Hatzfelt, after having, in the beginning of the same year, ruined the Emperor's Army* in several engagements, by a series of conduct, founded upon great experience, and accompanied with great courage and judgment; which is much superior to the gaining of a pitched battle. The King's Army then having passed the Rhine, three or four days were spent in marching towards Phortzheim, a small town in the Country of Wirtemberg, about three or four leagues from the Neckar, on the other side of which was M. de Merci, with a body, I think, of six or seven thousand men, not having hastened his recruits, and suffering his troops to refresh themselves in places at some distance, till the season should be advanced, and the grass being grown, make it more convenient for his Army to assemble. M. de Turenne having learnt that there were fords in the river, marched early in the morning, and as soon as he arrived there, incamped, not over-against the place where the enemy lay, but two leagues lower, and passed it without any difficulty.

M. de Merci, who did not think that his Army was in a condition to fight, retired towards Suabia; and M. de Turenne pursuing his march, passed near Hailbron, where the enemy had a garrison, and arrived at Suabeschal before M. de Merci, who had his Quarter-Masters at the gates of the town: but as M. de Turenne made his dragoons quickly advance, the Citizens opened the gates, as they always do to the strongest, and to whoever arrives first. As he had advanced to the gates of the town with his horse only, and had left his foot three leagues from thence with his baggage, which had not been able to fol-

* This Army was commanded by General Galas.

An. 1645. low, because of the long march; he was afraid that M. de Merci having intelligence of the separation, might send to attack the foot, with which there had staid but two regiments of horse. So after having left his dragoons to guard the gate, he returned speedily in the night time to the place, where he thought he should find the foot. M. de Merci, not doubting but it was the whole Army that had come to Suabeschal, had continued his march farther towards Dinkespuhel and Feuchtwang. However, upon the arrival of the foot, we continued to follow the enemy, leaving the baggage in the town: but had it not been the fear we were in for the foot, and had the horse marched directly after M. de Merci, I am persuaded, they would have stopped him in his march, till the foot had had time to come up, and that we might have fought him with great advantage. We only pursued the enemy five or six leagues, without any encounter but with some small parties. M. de Turenne being returned to Suabeschal, staid there two or three days; from whence he marched towards the river of Tauber at Mariendal, about which there are several small towns, from whence he might be furnished with a good quantity of provisions. He halted there, that he might have the Country of Hesse behind him, whence in the summer he hoped to draw some troops, in order to advance into Germany. As he also seemed to be removing farther from the enemy, who were about Feuchtwang, he thought, that they would divide in order to refresh themselves, having all the Upper Palatinate and Bavaria free behind them.

When the Army was arrived at Mariendal, as it was about the end of April, and as there was yet no grass, M. de Turenne was much importuned to allow the horse to disperse themselves into the little towns, where they should leave their baggage on the first order, repairing speedily to the place of rendezvous. To speak the truth, M. de Turenne's too easy compliance that the cavalry might not suffer for want of forrage, his great desire that they might quickly put themselves in a good condition, several of the Officers promising to buy horses in their quarters for their dismounted men, and likewise the distance from the enemy, who were near ten leagues from thence, the parties reporting that they were separated, MADE HIM UNADVISEDLY

WISEDLY RESOLVE * to send them into little close places. An. 1645.
 However he kept the foot and the cannon half a league from Mariendal, and sent M. Rosen with four or five regiments to Rotemburg upon the Tauber, which is above four leagues from Mariendal; but the other regiments were two or three leagues farther off.

The day after the order was given for separating, M. de Turenne finding, that the separation of the enemy was not so certain as it ought to have been before the taking of such a resolution, sent orders to M. Rosen to draw near again with the regiments; and except those that were two leagues farther off, and the new regiment of Rosen, and that of Voufvors (which were a great way off, the one appointed to observe the Bavarian Army, and the other posted towards Franconia, because of the garrison of Schweinfurt) he caused all the other regiments to return. The new regiment of Rosen did not make haste enough to rejoin the Army, and that of Voufvors scarce heard of the battle.

M. de Turenne being almost certain, that the enemy would take the rout, which he was informed they did, the day before the battle he rode out with the grand guard three leagues upon the road, by which the Enemy might attack him. Being returned very late, and M. Rosen having joined him with above the half of the horse, about two hours after mid-night he had intelligence by a party, that the enemy, with the whole body of the Army, had left Feuchtwang, and were marching straight to him; it was the second of May. At the same time, he sent orders to the regiments of cavalry, that were two or three leagues off, to march, and ordered M. Rosen to mount a horse-back and go to the grand guard, and with all expedition to draw together, on this side of the wood, all the troops that were near it. Notwithstanding this order, M. Rosen passed the wood, which might be five or six hundred paces cross, and sent for the cavalry to come and join him on the other side of the wood; which surely he never would have done, had he thought that the enemy's Army was so near; for 'tis certain, had the cavalry joined him on this side of the wood, the King's Army might have retired without fighting.

* This is the way of great men; they ingenuously confess their mistakes when the truth requires it.

An. 1645. M. de Turenne, who had not staid above a quarter of an hour to give his orders to all the troops, mounted a horse-back, and not finding the grand guard, followed it through the wood; and being on the other side, he saw seven or eight regiments of his horse, which were all that had got together, and which M. Rosen was drawing up in order of battle; and looking farther, he saw the enemy's van-guard coming out of another wood in a pretty large front, about a short quarter of a league from him. Tho' it was a very surprizing thing, and presaged no good event, he judged there was nothing to be done, but to draw up in order of battle a part of the Army, as if the whole had been there, not having as yet a sufficient number of men got together to march up to the enemy, his foot but beginning to join him. The enemy was too near for him to alter his disposition, and draw up behind the wood. He therefore turned his thoughts wholly to make the best advantage of the ground; and there being a little wood on the right of the plain where the horse were, there he posted his foot, which were not above three thousand men. M. de Smitberg and M. du Passage commanded them; and as that place served for a right wing, he contented himself with leaving two squadrons behind that wood, and put all the rest of his horse in one line, except two squadrons, of which he form'd a second line at the left of the great wood. M. Rosen posted himself on the right wing of that line, and M. de Turenne on the left.

In this disposition we waited for the enemy, who in a short time marched down into the plain; and placing their foot between the two wings of their horse, M. de Merci, who was General of the Army, put himself at the head of it, and marched straight to the wood, having by that means so posted his left wing, that it could not act till he was master of the wood: but as he could not at first see the situation of the place, he put his Army in order of battle in the usual manner. When he was about a hundred paces from the wood, and before the infantry had made any discharge, M. de Turenne marched with his horse to encounter the enemy's right wing, all the Squadrons whereof were broke, and the second line was shaken. At the same time, the enemy's foot advancing towards the little wood, those of the King's Army gave only one fire, and ran confusedly into the wood. Thus the enemy's left wing found

found means to advance by the favour of the wood which An. 1645. their foot had gained. The horse of the King's Army, who saw before them but three squadrons of the enemy's reserve, the first and second line being in confusion, perceived that all their own foot had thrown down their arms, and that the enemy's squadrons were drawing up behind them. At the same time, they began to fall into confusion, which was very soon followed by an entire defeat. M. de Rosen was taken prisoner, having performed his duty exceeding well, as all the horse had likewise done. M. de Turenne retired into the great wood, having been strongly pressed by two Troopers to ask quarter, and having made his way through it, attended by two or three persons, he found on the other side of the wood three regiments of horse arrived, to wit, Duras's, Beauveau's, and Traci's; unluckily a great many of the Troopers having caused their horses to be blooded, on account of the season, the regiments could not mount a horse-back soon enough to come to the battle.

To these regiments joined twelve or fifteen hundred horse of the regiments that had been routed, and M. de Turenne having drawn them up in order of battle, would have charged the enemy, if they had immediately passed the wood: but seeing that they took abundance of time to put themselves in order again after the battle, and that all his foot were ruined, and that he had only three regiments who had not fought, he chose rather to save what remained, though he did it with a great deal of difficulty. He therefore ordered M. de Beauveau to march with his regiment and with all the German horse that had escaped the battle, strait to the Main, and to halt at the entrance into the Country of Hesse; which might be fifteen or sixteen leagues from thence: He himself staid with the two regiments of Duras and Traci, in order to manage the retreat, and to give the rest time to pass the Tauber (where there were several fords) which they accordingly did. As soon as he saw all those horse far enough off to be out of danger, he thought of retiring likewise himself. The enemy seeing those two regiments retiring alone, came from all quarters to intercept them: but M. de Turenne retired in pretty good order to the Tauber, which was in the same plain, and the enemy, who would have followed us by the same ford by which we passed, were twice or thrice beat
C 4 back.

An. 1645. back. But they having at length found several other fords, the two regiments, after having lost some of their standards, were obliged to make the best of their way in small parties. These two regiments, particularly that of Duras, which had the rear-guard in this action, behaved themselves with all the boldness and intrepidity imaginable. M. de Turenne retired at first with fifteen or twenty Officers and Troopers, and shortly after with a troop of a hundred or a hundred and fifty horse; with which having marched the whole night and forded the Main, the next day towards the evening he rejoined his cavalry near Hesse. The enemy took a great part of the foot, all the baggage, ten pieces of cannon, and twelve or fifteen hundred horse and Officers of horse M. de Montausier, M. de Smitberg, and M. du Passage were taken, and the enemy continued some days without stirring.

M. de Turenne thinking that he might be pursued by a body of horse, staid a day or two in a wood with twelve or fifteen hundred horse: but seeing no enemy appear, he advanced quite to the frontiers of Hesse, whither the Landgraves quickly sent to him M. Geis, who commanded her troops, with two of her Counsellors, to endeavour to persuade him to retire towards the Rhine, alledging, that thereby he would secure the places he had left ungarrisoned, and that he would the sooner be able to join the troops that were to be sent from France to reinforce him. But these Counsellors concealed the chief reason that moved the Landgraves to wish that the Army would march towards the Rhine; which was, the fear of drawing the war into her own Country, and her unwillingness to send her Army so soon into the field: but M. de Turenne, who knew that what he did was the only way to get all the Hessian troops to join him, and make M. Koningmark quit his quarters, persisted in his resolution, and sent her word, that if the enemy should march in pursuit of him, he would retire quite through the Country of Hesse, and that whatever might happen, he would not march towards the Rhine, and would sooner chuse to go towards the Country of Brunswick. He likewise signified the same to M. Koningmark, who was in his quarters ten or twelve leagues beyond Cassel upon the Weser. This General had the same intentions with the Hessians, not to take the field so soon, and did not desire that the War should be drawn into those parts;

parts; but M. de Turenne's steddiness made him resolve to An. 1645. comply and join him.

M. de Turenne having made his troops retire into the Country of Waldeck, went to Cassel, where he was received by the Landgraves with a great deal of civility, and found that all that had been told him of her was true, that she shewed great judgment, courage, and conduct in all her actions. She caused her troops to be drawn together, which consisted of six thousand men, leaving her towns well garrisoned, and M. Koningmark, who had above four thousand, advanced also without loss of time.

M. de Turenne having an account, that M. de Merci was drawing near, and had attacked Kirchaim*, a little town at the entrance of Hesse, sent word to the Governor, that if he could hold out five or six days, he should be relieved, which made him resolve not to surrender, tho' a pretty large breach had been made. The French having join'd M. Koningmark and the Hessians, marched straight to the enemy, who raised the siege the tenth or twelfth day after the battle of Mariendal. M. de Turenne had about three or four thousand horse, and only twelve or fifteen hundred foot left, which he had got together. The enemy being retired towards Franconia, the three Armies staid some days in the Country of the Landgrave of Darmstat; during which time an account was brought, that the Duke d'Enguien, with seven or eight thousand men, was marching towards the Rhine, which obliged M. de Turenne, together with M. Koningmark and the Hessians, to march into the Country of Darmstat, and from thence into the Bergstras in order to join him.

M. d'Enguien passed the Rhine near Spire, and it was resolved, that the united Armies should march towards the Neckar, and endeavour to be at Hailbron before the enemy. A van-guard, consisting of a great body of horse, marched in all haste within a league of Hailbron, where they saw the enemy's Army, which was arriving on the other side of the Neckar, and drawing up in order of battle in some vineyards upon the side of a hill; which made the van-guard halt. The foot being a good way behind, upon their arrival the Armies encamped there that

* The name of the town besieged could not be read in the original, but Pufendorf calls it Kirchaim.

An. 1645. night. Finding that Hailbron could not be attacked, nor the Neckar passed at that place, all the enemy's Army being on the opposite side, we marched to Vimpsen, a small town upon the Neckar, two leagues below Hailbron; a battery was immediately raised, and the town surrendered. I think there were not above three hundred men in the place.

The enemy seeing, that by this means we had a passage over the Neckar, left a strong garrison in Hailbron, and retired to Feuchtwang, where they incamped and made some intrenchments. The King's Army leaving a few men in Vimpsen, passed the Neckar. M. Koningmark finding that the enemy had retired a good way off, and glad to command apart in Franconia, pretended to be displeased with the Prince, without any just ground, separated from him without taking leave, marched two days towards the Main without stopping, and we heard no more news of him. He is a man brought up in war, accustomed to great commands, vain and selfish, and who will have every thing depend so much upon him, that he can hardly be brought to agree with his superiors, and always inclines to separate from them. With all this, he is a man of great talents for war, and has most worthily served the Crown of Sweden. M. de Turenne had all the reason in the world to be satisfied with his manner of acting, while he received orders from him, before the Arrival of the Prince.

After the departure of Koningmark, the Hessians remaining with us, we marched to Rotemburg upon the Tauber, where we staid some days. M. de Merci retired farther into the Country towards Dinkepsuhel, where he left three or four hundred men, and incamped three or four leagues from thence behind the woods. A few days after, the King's Army arrived near Dinkepsuhel, and formed a design to attack it; a detachment of Musketees was ordered to advance among the ruins of some houses, where they opened some trenches: but before midnight, an Officer that had been prisoner and had made his escape from the Bavarian Army, came and told M. de Turenne, that M. de Merci, thinking that the King's Army would be intent upon the siege of Dinkepsuhel, was marching by night, and was but two leagues off, behind the woods. M. de Turenne went immediately to acquaint
M. d'En-

M. d'Enguien with the news, who resolved to leave all the baggage with two or three regiments of horse, and to march presently with the whole Army in quest of M. de Merci. An. 1645.

We set out an hour after midnight. M. de Turenne had the van-guard, and we crossed a wood. M. d'Enguien was there, and had left the Marshal de Gramont with his Army in the rear-guard. As we were going out of the wood we saw, for by this time there was day-light enough, a small troop of Bavarians; and a little after, as we were driving them back, we discovered some of the enemy's squadrons, who having seen the head of our van-guard, retired in all haste towards the body of their Army, whereof these squadrons were the van-guard: So that if we had not set out too soon, we had found the enemy on their march, and consequently in a very bad posture. They halted behind several ponds, and presently drew up in order of battle, and having planted their cannon, began to make some works on their front, and intrench themselves.

The King's Army, as they went out of the wood, drew up likewise in order of battle; but could not march up to the enemy but through defiles. We brought up our cannon, which galled them pretty much; but theirs that were already planted, did us a great deal more mischief. The whole day was spent in canonading one another, with great loss on both sides. The next morning, two hours before day, the King's Army retired by the same road it had come, which was by a defile in the wood. The enemy pursued only with some horse, and there happened but one skirmish, though they had once an opportunity to have defeated a part of our rear-guard. We repassed the wood, and went to join the baggage near Dinkeispuhel, where we incamped: but not judging it advisable to stop at so inconsiderable a place, we resolved to march to Nordlingen, and get there before the enemy; which was very easy to be done. The next day the Army decamp'd betimes in the morning, and after a two or three hours march, arrived about nine a clock in the plain near Nordlingen: no enemy appearing there, we resolved to halt, and had some thoughts of incamping, but no orders were yet given for unloading the baggage, or pitching the tents. As M. de Turenne was advancing into the plain with a small guard, and while the Prince was out not far off with another, he

An. 1645. fell upon a German party that were marauding, and brought away two or three prisoners, who reported that the enemy's Army was passing a rivulet a league from thence in order to draw near to Nordlingen. M. de Turenne immediately joined the Prince, and having learnt that there was no rivulet betwixt the place where the enemy was passing and that where we were, orders were sent to the Army that no man should stir from his post. The Prince and M. de Turenne advanced still with a few men, in order to reconnoitre and have a greater certainty of what the enemy were a doing, and whether they continued their march. The plain is so open, and stretches so far, that there was no danger in advancing with a few men.

M. de Merci, who commanded the Bavarian Army, to which a body of six or seven thousand Imperialists, commanded by General Gleen, had joined, being come to the banks of a rivulet about nine a clock in the morning; and judging, as it was true, that the King's Army was incamped near Nordlingen, and that we intended to besiege it; thought that by passing that rivulet without baggage, he might with safety draw near Nordlingen, because of the hills and some advantages he might take with his Army: he likewise imagined that we would not attack him that day, and so he should have time to intrench himself, which he was wont to do very expeditiously, having commonly following his Army no other carriages but the ammunition waggons, and those in which were the tools and implements. He continued his march, and posted himself three or four hundred paces from the rivulet upon a hill*, which, at the place he stopp'd, was pretty high, but sloped insensibly towards a village†. In order to make the best use of the place, according to the strength of his Army and the situation of the ground, he began to draw up his right wing, composed of a body of Imperialists and some of his own troops, from that part of the hill which was nearest the rivulet, to the village, having two regiments of foot and his cannon in the place where his right wing began. From the place where the right wing terminated, the foot extended in order of battle behind the village, and in the action almost all of them fought, in order to defend it; but at first it was possessed only by a

* Called Vineberg.

† Called Allerheim.

detachment

detachment of Musketeers in the Church and upon the steeple. Next to the foot, which were in two lines, as were the horse, the left wing, composed of the Bavarian horse, and commanded by M. John de Wert, ended at a little castle, situated upon a rising ground *, round which there were some foot that closed the left of the Army, as the two regiments of foot above-mentioned closed the right. The space betwixt the village and the castle was a plain which might well contain twelve or thirteen Squadrons. This was the disposition that M. de Merci made, as well for fighting, as for incamping, if we had not attacked him.

The Prince having perceived that the enemy's Army was passing the rivulet, sent orders to the troops to get themselves ready to march, and being confirmed by the scouts, and by what he himself saw, that the enemy was not unwilling to fight, he passed the place, behind which he would have had a great advantage, and sent orders for the whole Army to march. About twelve a clock, the Army advanced into the great plain, and about four a clock the two Armies came in sight of one another. It took up a good deal of time to extend and put ourselves in a posture of fighting. That village, which was before the enemy's Army, justly made it doubtful, whether it were better to attack it, or march towards the two wings with the horse only: but as 'tis not very safe to attack wings, without at the same time charging the foot posted in the center, it was not judged proper, whatever difficulty there might be in attacking the village, to charge with the horse, without the foot's marching in the same front; and as the village was above four hundred paces more advanced than the place where the enemy's Army was, it was thought best to halt with the two wings, while the foot should attack and make themselves masters of the nearest houses of that village, or at least of some of them. For that end, our cannon were brought up, that we might not be annoy'd by those of the enemy, without annoying them with ours: but as cannon that are planted have a great advantage over those that march, because the horses must always be put to the carriages in order to advance, whereby a great deal of

* Pufendorf and others say, that the castle was upon a little hill called the hill of Allerheim.

An. 1645. time is lost, those of the enemy did a great deal more damage than ours.

In this disposition the infantry of the King's Army marched straight to the village; the right wing being opposite to the enemy's left wing in the plain, and the left wing to the enemy's right, which was upon that hill, from which there was an insensible descent to the village. Our foot found but little resistance at the nearest houses, but as they advanced farther, three or four regiments of the enemy (one part of which possessed the Church-yard, and the other had made holes for firing out of the houses) gave so great a fire, that they halted all on a sudden, and began to give way. We sent some regiments to their assistance; and M. de Merci, who was behind the village, caused his men to be sustained by other troops. Thus the fight became very obstinate, with great loss on both sides; but less on that of the enemy, because they were lodged in the houses; and even while their first line was fighting in the village, the second was not idle upon the hill. These expedients did not succeed; but they shewed a great deal of skill and presence of mind in the General. The Prince came often into the village; he received a great many shot in his cloaths, and had two horses wounded under him. He left the Marshal de Gramont on the right wing of his horse. M. de Turenne also did what he could to make the foot that were in the village near his wing to advance. M. de Bellenave, Major-General of his Army, was killed there. M. de Castelaun, Quarter-Master General of that of the Prince, was very dangerously wounded, as well as a great number of Officers. In the heat, and about the end of this battle, M. de Merci, General of the Bavarian Army, received a musket shot, of which he died on the spot; and I imagine, that when the enemy's left wing, commanded by John de Wert, advanced against the Prince's horse, they knew nothing of his death: the battle having lasted above an hour in the village, where some squadrons were employ'd to sustain the foot, the enemy's left wing began to march.

It has often been said, that there was a fault committed in passing a few ditches that were betwixt the two wings, but I don't think there was any great matter in that; for the whole right wing of the King's Army was in order of battle, and saw before it the left of the enemy, which advanced

vanced at a slow pace to engage and found but small resistance. Although the Marshal de Gramont did all that could be done, he was taken prisoner, not having been able to get either the first or second line to do their duty*.

The Prince, who was very near the village, went to the wing where M. de Turenne commanded, who seeing that the attack of the village did not succeed, and that the horse of the enemy's left wing were marching up to the French horse, advanced with his wing towards the hill, and having discoursed a moment with the Prince, told him, that if he would be pleased to sustain him with some squadrons of the second line and with the Hessians, he would go and charge the enemy: the Prince having consented, M. de Turenne continued his march up the hill at the head of Flextein's regiment. Being within a hundred paces of the enemy, and turning about, he saw that all the French horse [*of the right wing*] and the foot that had been beat out of the village, were entirely broke and scattered in the plain.

As M. de Turenne was continuing his march up the hill with eight or nine squadrons abreast, the foot, which the enemy had at the two extremities of the wing, gave a fire, and the cannon had time to give three or four discharges, the first with ball, and the last with cartridge-shot, with which M. de Turenne's horse was wounded, and he himself received a shot in his cuirass, and the Colonel and some of the other Officers of Flextein's regiment were wounded before it attacked a regiment of horse that faced it. Notwithstanding this, the whole wing having marched abreast, broke the whole first line of the enemy, some squadrons making more, some less, resistance; and the enemy's second line sustaining the first that was broke, the fight was very obstinate. We had only one or two squadrons in the second line; and the Hessians, who made the body of reserve, were a little too far off: for which reason we were driven back a little, but without being routed; for our squadrons continued still in good order, and some of them had even the advantage of those of the enemy; but their numbers made them too strong for us.

The Hessians came up, and the Prince at their head

* The Viscount's historian has added here some circumstances, which he found in the Marshal de Gramont's memoirs.

An. 1654. acted with no less courage than conduct. When the Weymarian horse saw the Hessians approach, they rally'd, and we all at once charged the whole body of the enemy's horse, who had formed themselves into one line; we broke it; all the cannon upon the hill were taken; the regiments of foot that were with the right wing were defeated, and Gleen, the General of the Emperor's Army, was made prisoner.

On the other hand, all the Prince's horse, both of the first and second line, and even his reserve, commanded by the Chevalier de Chabot, and all the foot, who being beat out of the village, had fled to the plain, were entirely routed: John de Wert leaving the victory on that side to be pursued by two regiments, who drove our troops two leagues even to the baggage, returned to sustain his right wing, or to stop their flight. If, instead of returning by the place where he had been first posted, and leaving the village on the left hand, he had marched into the plain against the Weymarian and Hessian horse, we should not have been in a condition to have made the least resistance, and our left wing, thus hemm'd in, would have been very easily put into confusion.

The sun was already set when M. de Wert's horse began to return behind the village; and night coming on presently, the two wings that had beat what was before them, stood in order of battle facing each other; and as the horse of the King's Army were a little farther advanced than the village, some of the enemy's regiments that were in the church-yard and the church, surrendered to M. de Turenne, and came forth without arms at twilight, not knowing that their own troops were not five hundred paces off.

The cavalry of both Armies continued a part of the night very near one another in the plain, their advanced guards not being fifty paces from each other. About an hour after midnight, the enemy's Army began to retire, without having any more reason for it than that of the King, except that they had lost their General. We heard no great noise, for they had no baggage. I believe they carried away but four small pieces of cannon; all the rest, which were twelve or fifteen, remained upon the field of battle. At break of day not one of the enemy was to be seen; we understood that they had retired towards

Donawert,

Donawert, a small town (four leagues off) where there is An. 1645. a bridge upon the Danube. M. de Turenne pursued them within sight of Donawert, with two or three thousand horse.

The whole right wing of the King's Army was beat, and all the infantry were put intirely into confusion, except three Hessian battalions that made the reserve, and I believe there were at least three or four thousand foot killed upon the spot. Of the enemy's Army, the whole right wing was beat, three or four regiments of foot, that were mixt with it, were routed, two surrendered in the church; a great many men were killed in the village, and almost all their cannon was taken. As for the loss of men, I believe the King's Army lost more than the enemy. On the one side, the Marshal de Gramont was taken, and on the other General Gleen, and a very great number of Officers, and many standards. Our German cavalry of the old corps behaved exceedingly well, as also the regiments of Duras and Traci.

It was some days before we could draw together above twelve or fifteen hundred of all the French foot. After having staid a day or two near Nordlingen, the Prince knowing that the citizens were the strongest there, and that the garrison consisted but of four hundred men, resolved to attack it: The Citizens desired to capitulate the very first night, and the garrison was sent to the enemy's Army; but I think their arms were taken from them. We staid seven or eight days at Nordlingen, which is a pretty large and fine town, where we greatly refreshed ourselves: we found there some arms, harness, abundance of horses for the baggage, and plenty of medicines for the wounded. After having left there a very small garrison, we marched to attack Dinkepsuhel, which held out but three days. When we were going to approach the Neckar and the Rhine, because of the state of the Army, and in order to receive some money, the Prince was taken ill near Dinkepsuhel, but followed the Army almost to Hailbron, from whence he was escorted by a party of horse to Philipsburg, where he was very ill: from thence he returned to France, leaving the Marshal de Gramont to command his Army, which continued united with that of Germany, commanded by M. de Turenne. We encamped near Hailbron; as the enemy had there a thousand men in garrison, and had

An. 1645 also thrown in some foot, we did not think our selves in a condition to besiege it, but we continued eight or ten days about the place, waiting for some convoys of provisions from Philipsburg, and for money. Upon the arrival of these convoys, we advanced with the Army thro' the County of Hohenloe as far as Suabeschal, with a view to stay there till winter; and after driving the Bavarian Army to the other side of the Danube, to take up our quarters in Suabia. The enemy's Army at first kept pretty near the Danube; but in a little time, it came and encamped within five or six leagues of us, in order to hinder us from foraging. We continued twelve or fifteen days in this situation, till the month of October was pretty near spent.

In the beginning of the campaign, the Swedes had gain'd the battle of Tabor, and after that had besieged Brin. They there met with so stout a resistance, that they ruined their Army, and were forced to separate from Ragotski*, Prince of Transilvania, who had come to their relief, and with whose assistance they had not been able to take the place. The siege of Brin, a town pretty near Vienna, had obliged the Emperor's Army to cover his hereditary Countries; but when the siege was raised, the Swedish Army retired towards Silesia, in order to refresh themselves. It was at this time, that the Duke of Bavaria finding that towards the beginning of winter the King's Army was advancing into Germany; and being afraid that we would take up our quarters there, sent to demand assistance from the Emperor, threatening to come to an agreement with the King, if his Imperial Majesty did not quickly send him a strong reinforcement. The Archduke marched with six or seven thousand horse and some Dragoons, taking no infantry with him, because of the length of the way, and for the sake of expedition: and being covered by the Danube on the right, by long marches he came to Donawert.

The King's Army was still incamped near Suabeschal; and we learnt by an Officer, who had been prisoner, that a considerable body of the Emperor's Army was coming to join that of Bavaria; which made M. de Turenne and

* He separated from the Swedes, made peace with the Emperor, and retired into Hungary according to Pusendorf, *De rebus Suesicis*.

the Marshal de Gramont think it necessary to retire to-
wards the Neckar, and from thence to the Rhine. Some
hours after, the same news was confirmed by some ca-
valry that were at Dinkespuhel, which still more hasten-
ed the march. We decamped four hours before night,
the baggage having been sent away five or six hours before;
we marched through the County of Hohenloe towards the
Neckar, over-against Vimpfen, where we had left a gar-
rison since the taking of it; and tho' the river was scarce
fordable, in one night and a day, the whole Army passed
it by swimming, the horse carrying the foot behind them:
the great front breaking the current, made it less rapid,
though deep. We lost some baggage, but few men, and
we got near Vimpfen. As we were afraid that the ene-
my might pass at Hailbron, and meet the King's Army on
the march, we made haste to get to Philipsburg.

John de Wert, who had passed at Hailbron with a bo-
dy of horse, not daring to attack the Army, though it was
upon the long march, we got under Philipsburg, where we
halted two days: as there were as yet no boats for making
a bridge over the Rhine, M. de Turenne thinking, that
only M. de Wert's body of horse had passed the Neckar;
and that the rest of the Imperial and Bavarian Armies would
not advance when they should know that the King's Army
was under Philipsburg, said to the Marshal de Gramont,
that the Army might march towards Graben, two leagues
from thence, and that he hop'd still to take up his quar-
ters without repassing the Rhine. The Marshal agreed to
it, being unwilling to make any difficulty about what might
facilitate the means of wintering in Germany, and even
intending at his return to France, to leave with M. de Tu-
renne what Troops of the Prince's Army he should desire:
so without repassing the Rhine, we marched towards Gra-
ben, two leagues from Philipsburg; and having halted a
whole day, we had intelligence about the evening, that
the enemy's whole Army was marching towards Philips-
burg. As there was only that passage for repassing the
Rhine, we began our march in the beginning of the night,
and at break of day, as the rear-guard of the King's Army
was drawing near to Philipsburg, the enemy's van-guard
was seen entering the plain, half a league from the town.
At the same time we drew up the Army close betwixt the
place and the Rhine, and began to intrench our selves
there.

An. 1645. The Archduke, with the body of Imperialists and the whole Bavarian Army, incamped about half a league from the town, where he remained two days: during which time, we caused some boats to come from Spire; but not having enough to make a bridge, we made only the cavalry and baggage to pass by favour of the intrenchment and the cannon of the place, which the enemy seeing, they marched towards Vimpsen, where we had left M. de Rochepaire with six hundred men, and the heavy cannon of the Army. M. de Turenne, who had remained under Philipsburg with all his infantry and a few horse, as soon as a sufficient number of boats was come, caused a bridge to be made, sent orders for his cavalry to return immediately to Philipsburg, and begged of the Marshal de Gramont, who was gone to Landau, to send him all the French horse that were there; which he did: but there came not above five hundred of the German horse, a part of them having refused their Officers to march: So the design could not succeed. Had it not been for this accident, we should have routed the whole infantry of the enemy, who took Vimpsen in seven or eight days by capitulation, and then retired into their quarters.

The Imperial and Bavarian Armies being separated, M. de Turenne repassed the Rhine; he did not think it fit to punish the German regiments, the whole corps being guilty; and besides, 'tis certain, that when he sent them the order to return to the Rhine, he did not think they were so far from it, as the place where his orders found them. The Marshal de Gramont returned to France with all the Prince's Army; and M. de Turenne knowing that the Flanders Army was very much employ'd, and that there were no Troops in Luxemburg, resolv'd in the month of November to go to Triers, where he understood there was a very small garrison; and not being able to take with him above fifteen hundred foot and all the horse, he wrote to the Cardinal, begging him to order some regiments of the Prince's Army that were near Metz to be sent him; which he did: but there was not found above seven or eight hundred foot that could march. Two or three pieces of cannon were with great difficulty brought to him through the Hundstruck. M. de Turenne, after having sent word to the Elector of Triers, who was at Coblentz, to come to Triers, drew near the place, and having invested

vested it on the Luxembourg side with a body of horse, it surrendered the second night after opening the trenches.

M. de Turenne re-established the Elector in the city, An. 1646. and staid there seven or eight days; he caused a redoubt to be made near the bridge, wherein he left five hundred men; quartered his troops along the Moselle, and returned to the castle of Obervesel upon the Rhine; before which castle he had left M. de Tot, Major General: after a pretty long blockade, that castle surrendered; all the Army having been quartered along the Rhine and the Moselle, and some horse sent into Lorraine, M. de Turenne in the beginning of February returned to Court.

Cardinal Mazarin was then at the helm of affairs: the King was very young, and the Queen Mother had an intire confidence in the Cardinal. As M. de Turenne lived in good intelligence with him, his Eminence approved of almost all his plans for the campaigns, and especially in a war far from the Court, like that of Germany. Thus he had approved of M. de Turenne's concerting with M. Torstenson, General of the Swedes, the junction of the Armies of France and Sweden at the opening of the next campaign, in order to remedy the inconveniencies, which, by experience, had been found almost inevitable during their separation. The two Armies still acting separately, one towards the hereditary Countries, and the other along the Rhine or in the Circle of Swabia; the Imperial and Bavarian Armies being in the middle, mutually sent succours to each other as either of them happen'd to be press'd, and rendered all the advantages we gain'd by battles almost fruitless. As the chief benefit that can be reaped from victories is the gaining a Country to quarter in, the increasing our own Army, and diminishing that of the enemy; which, if we have a little patience, dwindles away by degrees: We could not reap this benefit, because the mutual assistance the enemy's two Armies sent one to another, made us lose all these advantages; whereas the French and Swedish Armies joining, might take such measures as not to separate again, but according to the motions of the enemy's Armies, and within such a distance as to be able

An. 1646. to reunite, when those of the enemy should do the same :
 ——— So M. de Turenne concerted with M. Torstenson, that about the month of May he should come with the Swedish Army into Hesse, and that the King's Army passing the Rhine under Mentz, should join it towards the County of Nassau.

The gout, and a long indisposition obliged M. Torstenson to retire into Sweden, after having acquired, since the death of M. Banier, all the reputation that a great man can have by the gaining of many battles, by the ruining an enemy's great Army, which he brought to nothing, and by a general esteem of his prudence, courage, and ability : He left the command of the Army to M. Wrangel, who having spent a part of the winter in taking some small towns towards Westphalia, in the beginning of the spring came into Hesse.

M. de Turenne staid six weeks at Court : M. de Bouillon his Brother was at Rome, and his affairs not being as yet adjusted, the Cardinal offered M. de Turenne the Dutchy of Chateau-Tierri, which was to be reckoned as part of the equivalent for Sedan, assuring him, that his acceptance of it should not prejudice his Brother's affairs, and that another domaine should be given him in place thereof ; but M. de Turenne, being persuaded that this would retard, if it did not put an entire stop to the conclusion of the exchange of Sedan, it was agreed between him and the Cardinal, that he should take nothing untill his Brother's affairs were concluded. In the month of April M. de Turenne returned to the Rhine, assembled his whole Army in the beginning of May, and sent down a bridge of boats near to Bracharach, in order to march his Army, and join the Swedes in Hesse. After all measures had been concerted for that junction, Cardinal Mazarin sent to him a Gentleman, named Saint Aignan, to tell him, that the Duke of Bavaria having given his word to the Plenipotentiaries at Munster, that his Army should not join that of the Emperor, if the King's Army did not pass the Rhine, the King ordered him not to cross that river. The same Gentleman signified to him, that the Court was for besieging Luxembourg. M. de Turenne, thinking that this would be the intire ruin of the affairs of Germany, contented himself with not passing the Rhine, that he

might not so quickly act contrary to an express order; and two days after that Gentleman was returned, the bridge of boats broke by a great swelling of the river. An. 1646.

While the bridge was a mending, M. de Turenne was informed, that the Imperial and Bavarian Armies having joined in Franconia, were marching straight against the Swedes in Hesse, and judged that it was impossible for him to join them by passing the bridge of Bacharach. Understanding that there was no other passage over the Rhine but at the towns possessed by the States of Holland, he sent some regiments of foot to Mentz, where he left M. du Passage, set out two days after he heard of the enemy's march, sent word to the Cardinal, by a Secretary, of the resolution he had taken, and went and pass'd the Moselle at a ford five or six leagues above Coblenz, and from thence marched through the Countries of Cologne and Meurs to Rhinberg, and then to Wesel, having sent a Gentleman to the Prince of Orange and the States to desire of them liberty to pass.

It took twelve or fourteen days to march from the place where he set out to Wesel, where he found Madam de Longueville, who was going to Munster; he marched two days with the Army the same road with that Princess, and from thence passing by Lipstad, where there was a Hessian garrison, he sent to give M. Wrangel (who was on the frontiers of Hesse) notice of the time he could join him. The Army had for above a month made very long marches, during which time the Imperial and Bavarian Armies had come up with the Swedes, but durst not attack them, because of the advantageous posts they had taken. There were some slight engagements, but none of any moment; and M. Wrangel conducted himself with great prudence and resolution. As the enemy understood that the French Army was advancing, they retired five or six leagues from the Swedes, and incamped near Fridberg, a small town, into which they put two or three hundred men. The King's Army joined that of the Swedes, who, upon its arrival, drew themselves up in order of battle. There were above ten thousand horse and six or seven thousand foot, and sixty pieces of cannon. M. de Turenne supped at M. Wrangel's quarters with a great deal of joy, and we having staid but one day in this place, because of the want of forrage, the King's Army took the van-

An. 1646. guard the first day, and M. de Turenne gave the word : afterwards he gave it in writing for one week, and M. Wrangel for the other, thus sending it one to the other by some Adjutant, without ever having the least disagreement. In two days we came near the enemy, who were incamped in the place above-mentioned. We heard them fire three volleys, on account of the day, which I think was the Emperor's birth-day, and by the discharge we found that their body was considerable. They had full fourteen thousand horse, ten thousand foot, and above fifty pieces of cannon. We advanced within a quarter of a league of them, but did not think it fit to attack them in a camp, where, tho' they were but slightly intrenched, they were very advantageously posted.

The same day that we came near them, after some skirmishes, we incamped close by the walls of Fridberg, where they had three or four hundred men in garrison. As those of the town, about twilight, fired upon some Soldiers who, while the Army was incamping, went to fetch wood, I doubt not but the enemy thought that we were making approaches with a design to besiege the place, the taking of which would have been very easy : but at the beginning of the night, M. de Turenne and M. Wrangel having confer'd together upon what would be best to do, they debated for some time whether they should not march through the Bergstras, leaving Francfort on the left hand, and endeavour to arrive at Hailbron before the enemy, and so have an entrance into the Country of Wirtenberg. At last it was judged, that the enemy having a shorter way to go, would get there before us ; and having the Danube and a plentiful Country still behind them, would not fail to lay waste the Country they passed through. On the contrary, the French and Swedish Armies having nothing behind them but the banks of the Rhine, which is a Country intirely laid waste, would in the beginning of winter be forced to take up each with its old quarters, and to leave to the Imperial and Bavarian Armies theirs, which, besides the hereditary Countries, the Circles of Swabia, Franconia, and Bavaria, (which, beyond comparison, are better than the banks of the Rhine) are the Countries of Thuringia and Brunswick, whither the French and Swedish Armies were wont to retire. Such a difference proves a great advantage for the next campaign, because new Soldiers will

will readily come to serve in Armies that are in plentiful Countries, and because there the old ones quickly recover their vigour. After some suspense, it was resolved, that a thousand horse, with five hundred Dragoons should be sent to take possession of the post of Bonnameis, which is a little market-town two leagues from Francfort upon the small river of Nid, which being passed without opposition from the enemy, we might get to the river of Main as soon as they, or fight them on the march, if they should take that rout.

The troops being arrived at Bonnameis, and finding there only some Dragoons that defended the passage, they possessed themselves of the place. A body of the enemy's horse, commanded by M. de Wert, being come a little too late, and seeing the post taken, halted pretty near it. The French and Swedish Armies marched the next morning three hours before day: the French had the van-guard, and in the night-time and at day-break marched along by the Army of the enemy, who seem'd to be irresolute, and only put themselves under Arms. The Archduke has been blamed for being so long without coming to some resolution, and indeed it cost him very dear: for while he remained in his camp, we were still marching; and having found the post of Bonnameis possessed by those we had sent before, the pass was immediately ordered to be mended, and M. de Wert, who had advanced in order to take possession of it, began to retire towards the main body of the enemy's Army.

In the mean time we passed, though with great difficulty, at several places, and M. Koningsmark having found a passage on the left hand, which the French Army had left, in order to be able to pass in a greater front, he broke a great many of M. de Wert's squadrons that were retiring. As it was but two a clock in the afternoon, although we had marched six leagues with a great Army and a vast deal of baggage, we marched three leagues more that day, still with a design to stop the enemy's way to the Main; which succeeded by the Archduke's slowness in coming to a resolution: So that in the evening we came to a place betwixt Francfort and Hanaw, which put it out of the enemy's power to retire towards the Main without fighting.

The

An. 1646. The Army having set out two hours before day in the month of August, had marched nine leagues. As the baggage had been ordered to keep all together to the right hand, and as it was covered, we were in no great pain about it, and it arrived the next day. So the enemy, with all the troops of the Empire, in one day found themselves in such a situation, that it was no longer in their power to march either into Franconia, Swabia or Bavaria, having the whole confederate Army betwixt them and those Countries. But as we were afraid, that by the favour of a small river that runs towards Hanaw, they might still march towards Aschaffenburg, which is upon the Main; we marched the next morning before day with a part of the Army, ordering the rest to follow, though very much fatigued by the march of the preceding day; and we came to a little town upon that rivulet. The enemy had put some men therein, and the place being pretty near the rear of their camp, they seem'd to be going to march, in order to get to Aschaffenburg: but as they saw our Army pass betimes in the morning, they halted in their camp with their baggage ready loaded, drew their troops out of that little town, and with some detachments defended the rivulet upon which it is situated.

About noon the whole French and Swedish Armies came near that rivulet, and having brought up some cannon, and made an Imperial squadron retire, which suffer'd the fire with incredible patience, the enemy once more continued quiet in their camp. Thus was the face of affairs intirely changed in one day. As there was a little wood that covered the camp of the Imperialists, we could not easily perceive their motions: as soon as they saw that we had got the start of them, they made their baggage march towards Fridberg, and at twilight followed the same rout going towards Hesse, in all appearance with a design, if they had been pursued, to march towards Westphalia or Cologne. We considered for some time what resolution we should take, whether to pursue them, or to take advantage of the opportunity to make our selves masters of some considerable posts in the Circles of Franconia, Swabia, and Bavaria. 'Tis certain, that in the first case we should have drove them very near to Cologne, and made them suffer considerable loss in their retreat: but as the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria would then have had
time

time to send orders into the above-mentioned Countries; An. 1646. and as there was no time to be lost, affairs sometimes changing in a quarter of an hour, it was resolved to march towards the Main.

M. de Turenne caused M. du Passage, whom he had left at Mentz, with two thousand men, when he made that great tour by Wesel, to join him, and marched to Alschaffenburg, where there is a fine passage over the Main, and wherein there were two hundred men who surrendered immediately. After having passed the Main, the French Army took to the right, and the Swedish to the left, keeping at the distance of about eight or ten leagues from one another. The first besieged Schorndorf, which they took in three days, and marched to Lawingen, upon the Danube, where there was no garrison: the other took Nordlinghen, and marched to Donawert, where they passed the Danube, as the French did at Lawingen, having bridges at both those places, and finding provisions in abundance every where. The Swedes left a garrison in Nordlinghen, and the French in Schorndorf and Lawingen, as they marched along, and without staying in those towns. The Swedes crossed the Lech upon the bridge of Rain, which is but three or four leagues from Donawert, and invested the place, into which the Duke of Bavaria had put twelve or fifteen hundred militia, called hunters, because they wear green coats.

M. de Turenne understanding that there were no troops in Ausburg, sent M. de Beauveau with five hundred horse in order to parley with the citizens, having passed himself at Lawingen with the Army. The citizens admitted M. de Beauveau into the town, his men staying at the gate, and began to propose the conditions upon which they would put themselves into the hands of the French and Swedes. In the mean time M. Wrangel, who had begun his approaches at Rain, and had met with some resistance, as it usually happens in the first days, when one has to do with militia, sent to desire M. de Turenne to march thither in all haste, who thinking that the citizens of Ausburg might, perhaps, protract the Treaty, while one of the Armies was engaged in the Siege of Rain, marched immediately thither, and called back M. de Beauveau: as the Swedes had opened their trench three or four days before.

An. 1646. fore, he opened one that evening he came there: the second or third night, being very near a bastion, the besieged having beat the chamade on his side which was the farthest advanced, the garrison marched out to the number of near two thousand men, who had fired a great deal, but had made a very poor defence.

During the siege of Rain, M. Wrangel discoursed frequently with M. de Turenne upon the question, who should put a Governor into Ausburg: he declared himself content to share the garrison; but added, that the late King of Sweden having been in possession of the place, the Swedes seem'd to have a better right to command there than the French. I believe the apprehension that the French, when masters of the town, would appoint some person to command in it, was one of the chief reasons that made M. Wrangel so pressing with M. de Turenne to come to Rain: however there was no sharp contest betwixt M. de Turenne and M. Wrangel about the matter; and I believe we should have agreed to have decided by lot who should put a Governor into the town: but upon the surrender of Rain, wherein the Swedes put a garrison, we learnt, that Royer having left Memmingen, had got into Ausburg with twelve or fifteen hundred men: however we marched thither, in order to see if we could invest it within the seven or eight days that it must take the Imperial and Bavarian Armies to enter Bavaria, they having taken their rout through Thuringia * and the upper Palatinate. We repass'd the Lech, invested Ausburg, and opened two trenches on the French side, and one on that of the Swedes. We found that the ditch was both very broad and very deep, and the difficulties of passing it were so much the greater, that we wanted all things necessary, as often happens in a campaign Army. We had not lost above five or six hundred men, and were already upon the brink of the ditch, when we understood that the Imperial and Bavarian Armies were within two leagues of us. We had daily heard what marches they made, and they had made less haste than they ought to have done. We resolv'd not to raise the siege but in the last extremity. We plainly saw, that if the enemy's

* Pufendorf says through Franconia: Thuringia seems to be a great way about for an Army that was in haste.

Army advanced to the river, we could not keep the posts betwixt the river and the town, and so the place would be relieved: but as one always hopes that an enemy will not do every thing that it can do, we determined to wait till they had resolved to march thither before we rais'd the siege. We burnt a great many villages, in order to hinder their approach, thro' fear of wanting forrage. The same day that the Imperial and Bavarian Armies arrived, M. de Turenne and M. Wrangel passed the river on their side with two thousand horse, with some infantry behind them, in order to skirmish with the Imperialists in the plain, and hinder them from advancing to the river. In hopes that this expedient would succeed, we made the regiment of Turenne intrench themselves on the other side the river, who in ten hours time raised a fort, upon which they planted some cannon. The enemy repulsed some of our troops that were in the wood at the head of the fort, yet durst not attack it; but night coming on, they extended themselves in order to incamp all along the river: the space was so narrow betwixt the river and the town, that we could not continue there but in a trench; and this we had made when the enemy had no Army near us: but when the enemy arrived upon the banks of the Lech, we could stay no longer there, nor even defend either the passage of the river or the trench, being betwixt two fires, one from the Army, the other from the town.

At twilight, we drew the men out of the trench, and brought the whole Army together betwixt the Swedish and French quarters. We drew the cannon from the batteries, and, at break of day, having sent the baggage with the wounded and with the heavy cannon into a plain about a league from Ausburg, where they were to halt, two hours after sun-rising, we began to march; the enemy at the same time entering the town by the side towards the river, (which was fordable) and which we had quitted: nothing remarkable happened. When we had retired a league from the town, we drew up in order of battle, and fired two cannon shot, to shew that we were resolved to fight, if the enemy had a mind to advance. This stratagem is of more use for encouraging the common Soldiers, than men of better understanding, who well know, that when an Army, with a great many cannon and much baggage, dislodges from before a town, and marches over

An. 1646. large plains; it may be attacked with advantage. After having continued the whole day in that place, we marched and incamped two leagues from Ausburg; and the next day, having sent away the baggage, we marched within a league and a half of Lawingen, where we resolved to incamp, in order to fortify the place: and indeed the French and Swedes undertook each to make four ravelins round the town, which is in a very fine situation, and has only walls without any rampart, but has a bridge upon the Danube. Two or three thousand men were sent thither every day to work, who, in twelve or fifteen days made all those ravelins capable of defence; and M. de Turenne put into the place M. de Grotius with eight hundred men of his Army.

In the mean while the Imperial and Bavarian Armies, commanded by the Archduke, were between Ausburg and Landsberg, whither the Duke of Bavaria sent a great number of horses to remount the cavalry; some arms, shoes, and clothes for the infantry. In the beginning of November the two Armies advanced towards Memmingen, with a design to draw near Ulm, and from thence to get provisions by the means of the towns of Hailbron, Tübingen, and Ausburg, which they possessed in Swabia and the Country of Wirtemberg; and having a superior force to that of the French and Swedes, they hoped to advance to us who had consumed all our forrage about Lawingen, and to make us retire into Franconia, leaving to them all the quarters of Swabia, Lawingen, Rain, Schorendorf, and Nordlingen so deserted, that in winter they might make themselves masters of them without sieges. Thus the whole campaign would have been rendered fruitless, it being now the beginning of winter, which is the decisive time in Germany, because whoever is then in possession of a Country, is secure of the means of refreshing and recruiting his Army.

M. de Turenne and M. Wrangel plainly foreseeing, that the good or bad success of the affairs of Germany depended upon what resolution they should take, resolved, though the Army was very much diminished by fatigue and the loss of horses, the want of arms and clothes among the foot, and notwithstanding the snow and bad roads, to march to the enemy near Memmingen, and either to fight them, or when in sight of them, to consider what other

measures

measures might be proper to take. With this view, we An. 1646. left the neighbourhood of Lawingen, contrary to the opinion of the most part of the Officers, and the belief of the whole Army, who imagined that we would return into Swabia, and from thence into Franconia. We made a small day's march forwards, and the next day advanced within a league of the enemy, who continued in their post. As they had great defiles and morasses before them, we did not think it fit to attack them, but marched towards Landsberg and Bavaria. We left two thousand horse a whole day in sight of the enemy, in order to conceal our march, and to make them believe that we were going to attack them, and thereby prevent them from opposing our passage. 'Tis affirmed, that nothing ever provoked the Duke of Bavaria to such a degree, or excited him so much to make peace, as to see the Army of the Confederates in the beginning of winter send parties to the gates of Munick, and to have no news of the Imperial Army or his own, for which he had been at so great an expence, and which he believed, as it was true, much superiour to ours.

We marched a part of the day along the enemy's Army, and having sent the baggage towards the Lech, we then marched in great haste very near to Landsberg, where we found the enemy's bridge, which was not broke. We made some troops with all speed pass over it; and having learnt that there were but a hundred horse in Landsberg, which is a very sorry place, and that all the enemy's provisions were there, it was summoned and forced to surrender: without loss of time, that night and the day following the whole Army passed over the bridge, which the enemy had left; and we sent three thousand horse to the gates of Munick, where the Duke of Bavaria was, who no longer had any communication with his Army.

The enemy having discovered, tho' late enough, that we were marching towards the Lech, had a mind to follow; but they heard, that we had passed the river, and that Landsberg was taken. They were very much puzzled what resolution to take: at last they advanced towards Ausburg, and then, for want of provisions and forrage, they retired into Bavaria, and the French and Swedish Armies staid about Landsberg near five weeks.

An. 1646. The Duke of Bavaria would not see the Archduke, who ~~the~~ marched towards Ratisbone with the Imperial Army, and left the Bavarian Army in their own Country. The Elector exasperated, resolved then to make peace, and to leave the whole Empire to the Confederates, provided he might preserve his own Dominions. This resolution, to which necessity had reduced him, would have had a happy issue, had it not been for the measures which the affairs of Flanders obliged Cardinal Mazarine to take, and for the cabals of some Monks under the influence of Rome, who pretended, that the ruin of the House of Austria would be the ruin of the Catholick Religion in Germany; which, however, was only a false colour, for the King would have maintain'd the Catholics in Germany just as the House of Austria had done; would have kept the Swedes from making any alteration in the constitutions of the Empire, and would have granted to the Protestants the same Liberties they enjoy'd under the House of Austria.

At length we left Landsberg, and returned towards Memmingen, with a design to subsist on this side of the Danube as long as we could, that the Country on the other side might be the better able to support us till the spring. In the mean time, M. d'Hocquincourt took the castle of Tubingen by M. de Turenne's order, who having learnt that the enemy had some troops near Rain, M. Wrangel and he went thither with five or six thousand horse, and defeated seven or eight hundred of the enemy. M. Wrangel advanced also near to Lindaw, but did not think proper to besiege it.

At this time, the Duke of Bavaria having caused his proposal of coming to an accommodation with the confederate Crowns to be made at Munster, M. de Croissi came to confer with M. de Turenne; and Ulm having been pitched upon for the negotiation, M. de Bauschemberg, General of the Artillery, came thither on the part of the Duke of Bavaria, and M. de Traci and M. de Croissi on the part of the King. The Armies continued for some time pretty near the place of conference: at last it was concluded, that the Duke of Bavaria should deliver up Hailbron* to the King, and Memmingen to the Swedes,

* The Viscount's Historian has thought fit here to follow the articles of the treaty of Ulm, quoted in the collection of treaties and negotiations.

and engag'd entirely to forsake the Emperor's interest, not An. 1646. to assist him with his Troops, and to give passage and provisions to those of the King, that they might march into the hereditary Countries.

The Emperor had now only four or five thousand foot, and five or six thousand horse: on the other hand, the French and Swedish Armies being recruited, amounted to thirteen or fourteen thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse. It being the middle of winter, and there being a great distance from Swabia to the hereditary Countries, we could not make use of this advantage till the spring.

The peace being made with the Duke of Bavaria, the An. 1647. King's Troops went into quarters in those Countries, which, of the conquests they had made with the Swedes the preceding campaign, fell to their share. As the Emperor's Army was very much weakened by the separation of that of Bavaria, it retired into the hereditary Countries, not so much for refreshment, as to be at a distance from the Confederates.

The weakness of the enemy induced the Court to draw the Army out of Germany, having been solicited thereto by the partisans of Bavaria, who suggested, that the continuation of the war against the Emperor tended to the entire ruin of the Catholick Religion; that the Swedes alone would reap advantage by the fall of the Empire; that the King, by withdrawing his Army, would leave matters in that equal balance, which France ought to desire; so that neither the House of Austria nor the Swedes would be Masters: and that the Duke of Bavaria seeing them both weakened, and preserving his own Army, would always make the balance incline to what side France should desire. The need the King had of troops in Flanders, because of the great number of forces that had been sent under the Prince into Catalonia, also induced him to take this resolution. M. de Turenne on the other hand, had by several messengers remonstrated, that the ruin of the House of Austria would be almost certain by the reunion of the French and Swedish Armies, and by the separation of the Bavarians from that of the Emperor, which was thereby almost reduced to nothing: that the fear France was in of making the Swedes too powerful, might be easily removed, by the division that might be made of the conquests; that France possessing one part of Germany,

and

An. 1647. and preserving the friendship of the Duke of Bavaria, would make herself arbitress of affairs in Germany; that should the Army march out of it, the Duke of Bavaria would be left master there, and in a condition to turn his forces against the Swedes whenever he pleased.

Notwithstanding all these reasons, M. de Turenne had orders to march into Flanders; he had plainly foreseen, that the German cavalry would hardly be persuaded to follow him, because there was five or six months pay due to them. This he had represented to the Court, which not being in a condition to give any considerable sum, promised only one month's pay, and even this, because of the difficulty the Merchants made of accepting the bills of exchange, was not ready at the time the Army was to march. In order to remedy this evil, M. de Turenne sent the cavalry into good quarters, divided the whole Country among them, treated them in the best manner he could, and marched with the French infantry to take Hockst and Stanheim, and other small places, which secured his conquests along the Rhine. After which he received an express order to march without loss of time into Flanders. M. de Turenne thought that the chief Officers of the German cavalry had reason to be satisfied, he having made M. de Flextein a Major General, given the Government of Schorendorf to M. de Roufmaorns, and obtain'd from the Court for M. Rosen, who had lately got out of prison, the commission of Lieutenant General of the horse, which M. Doubatel had. The rendezvous of the Army was at Philipsburg, where it passed the Rhine without any reluctance; and we marched betwixt Strasbourg and Saverne, where M. Rosen, who had not stirred from home since his getting out of prison, came to M. de Turenne.

The repose that the cavalry had had in their quarters, the neighbourhood of M. Rosen's house, whither the Officers went from time to time, and the distance M. de Turenne was at, who could not have an eye upon them, made a great many Officers use abundance of arguments against marching into Flanders. M. Rosen also encouraged them in this opposition, not, perhaps, that he desired an intire mutiny, but that the great reluctancy the Germans should shew to march into Flanders, might oblige the Court to pay what was due to them, or let them continue in Germany. The next day after M. Rosen arrived,

orders were given to all the regiments to pass the mountain of Saverne; and M. de Turenne having M. Rosen with him, had an account on the way towards Saverne, that the old regiment of Rosen refused to march: he sent to them M. Rosen, of whom he had not the least suspicion, and then he went himself; but not being able to prevail with them, he passed the mountain with the foot, and sent orders for all the horse to march, being persuaded, that if he should halt for the mutiny of that regiment, this stop would give occasion to the rest to do the same. None of the German horse passed but the regiment of Turenne: the old regiment of Rosen having presently sent to the other German regiments, they all joined it in two hours. The next day, the chief Officers of the Army came to M. de Turenne and demanded all the pay that was due. He gave them to understand, that it was impossible for them to have any money before the opening of the campaign; but if they would march, he promised them to get full assurance from the Court for their compleat payment. They returned with this answer. The day following, he sent M. Rosen and M. de Traci to represent to them the prejudice which their non-compliance would occasion to the King's affairs, and the hindrance it might give to the payment of what was due to them, if they should let the campaign pass without doing any service to France.

When M. Rosen and M. de Traci came to the cavalry, those of the Officers who had been the most intimate with M. Rosen, remonstrated to him, that the affair was come to that pass, that there was no accommodation to be hoped; and that if he did not resolve to put himself at their head, they would choose another, and so he would remain amongst the French without being in any consideration. M. Rosen determined to stay with them, alledging, that the troops kept him by force; but M. de Traci returned to M. de Turenne; who, when he saw, the same night, M. Rosen's baggage go to join the mutinous cavalry, doubted no longer of his being in concert with the Germans. The next day, his manner of acting, in sending orders over all the Country, and getting himself to be acknowledged as General by the troops, very plainly discovered his design. He sent to Strashbourg for boats, which the Inhabitants granted him, because he had threatened to burn all their villages

An. 1647. villages if they refused; then he marched in order to repass the Rhine. M. de Turenne having been informed of his proceedings, marched nine German leagues in one day, with three thousand foot, the four French regiments of horse, and his own German regiment, and came up with the Mutineers as they were beginning to pass the River. They being extremely surprized at the quickness of his march, and to see him so near them, deputed some Officers to him, who said, that if he would suffer the horse to repass the Rhine, as they had promised them, that then they would do whatever M. de Turenne should command them: he was for some time in suspense, whether he should charge them, or suffer them to repass the Rhine; they were in such confusion, that there was no danger in chusing the first; even the conduct of M. Rosen, whom M. de Turenne had always treated so kindly, deserved a just resentment; but the promise which the cavalry made of returning to the King's service, and M. de Turenne's averseness from taking a private revenge, made him consent to suffer the Mutineers to repass the Rhine; after which they divided themselves into several cabals. M. Rosen having no longer the command of them, a part of the Officers was willing to return to the King's service; but the private men would not follow them, and fearing to be punished, chose some Troopers to command them, and no more obeyed their Officers.

In the mean time, the campaign going on in Flanders, M. de Turenne sent thither the four regiments of French horse that he had with him, and went accompanied by twelve or fifteen persons, to the place where the Germans were, imagining, that in the confusion they were in, no body would have authority enough among them to be able to put an affront upon him. He crossed the bridge of Strasbourg, and went to M. Rosen's quarters, where four regiments of horse were lodged. M. Rosen came to meet him with a great many Officers, who were very much embarrassed at first. M. de Turenne went and dined with him at an inn at the end of the bridge of Strasbourg, with a design to bring him to this side of the bridge, and then to seize upon him; but the great number of Officers who were with M. Rosen, having prevented M. de Turenne from putting his design in execution, he resolved to go and lodge at M. Rosen's quarters, and to wait a more favourable

favourable opportunity. The regiments that were at M. An. 1647. Rosen's quarters, hearing of M. de Turenne's coming, mounted their horses, and retired in great confusion; but being assured, that M. de Turenne was to lodge in their quarters without any troops with him, they came back towards the evening. M. de Turenne supped at M. Rosen's, with a great many Officers; and amidst wine and good cheer, every thing seemed to be forgot. Although the Troopers were in the same quarters with the Officers, they nevertheless had Deputies (so they called them) chosen from among themselves to command them, and the Officers had no longer any share in the resolutions they took. About midnight M. de Turenne was informed, that the Troopers were for marching towards the Marquisate of Baden, in order to be farther from the bridge of Strasbourg. Being resolved to go along with them, he marched with all the Officers at the head of the squadrons, and sent the Quarter-Masters with the guard to the place where they were to lodge, there not being any Officer that had authority over them, which, to any man who did not know the bottom of it, would have seemed a mere contrivance to conceal some intention different from what appeared.

We marched two days in this manner; and the third, as they then intended to stop, all the troops, at nine a clock in the morning, appeared at the head-quarters, from whence they sent Deputies to M. de Turenne, to demand what was due to them. He mounted on horse-back, went to them, and at the head of the squadrons told them, that to demand ready money, was to demand what was impossible, but that by repassing the Rhine, they would go and meet their payment. They asked M. de Turenne whether he would engage his word for it; he having no mind to oblige himself to any thing but what he could perform, would promise nothing more than the month's pay that was ready, and to do his best to procure them payment of the rest. After this answer, they made as if they would have seized M. de Turenne's person; but he plainly seeing that there was no likelihood of that, remained with them, and ordered them to return to their quarters, from whence they had come in the morning. M. Rosen, who was always with M. Turenne, was daily losing his credit with all the chief Officers of this corps: as they did not apply

An. 1647. themselves any more to him for orders, he was very much displeased with them, and endeavoured to persuade M. de Turenne to retire to Stolhoffen, representing to him the danger he was in, and that he might from thence send his orders with the same authority as when present. M. de Turenne would not leave the troops, and always lodged at M. Rosen's quarters, having no equipage, and only four persons with him, in order to remove all suspicion. Besides, M. Rosen's credit was not so great, but that it might be easily seen that the troops would not protect him, tho' he should be put under arrest.

We arrived within eight leagues of Philipsburg, at a little town called Etlingen, which was guarded by a regiment of the Mutineers foot. M. de Turenne caused a hundred Musketeers to come in the night from Philipsburg; ordered them to be by break of day at the opening of the gate, whither he went himself, no body being up in the quarter, left fifty of them at the gate, commanded the guard to lay down their arms, and sent the other fifty to M. Rosen's. After they had made him get up, he ordered him to be carried streight to Philipsburg, causing him to be put into a boat upon the Rhine about two leagues from the quarters. At the same time he sent for all the Officers who commanded the regiments of horse, acquainted them that he had put M. Rosen under arrest, and ordered them to acknowledge him no more. The Officers all paid M. de Turenne an entire obedience, and promised to do whatever he should command them. Nevertheless the mutiny continued among the private men; but after the seizing of M. Rosen, there was no body left to command them: all the Officers, even to the Corporals, remained with M. de Turenne; nay, two regiments returned to their duty, and would not follow the rest, who marched towards Franconia, having chosen some Commanders from among themselves.

M. de Turenne, with all the Officers and some squadrons, followed them; and after two days march, he overtook them in the valley of Tauber. As it was a close Country, he was not afraid to draw near them, although they were much superior in number; they imagining that he durst not attack them, began to file off in order to gain a hill. M. de Turenne having observed them, attacked their rear-guard: the rest, who were engaged in the pass, would fain have turned back, but they were put into so great

great confusion, that we routed them entirely. M. de Turenne had like to have been taken in the first attack he made with fifteen or twenty horse: we killed two or three hundred men, and took as many prisoners. Those that had got beyond the pass made the best of their way to the Main, and except four regiments, joined the Swedes some time after.

As the campaign was not ended in Flanders, whither M. de Turenne had sent the horse he had with him after the mutiny of the Germans; he with these broken cavalry made up again all the regiments, except two, placed Officers in all the troops, and put under their command the Troopers that had been taken, or that had come and surrendered themselves after the engagement with the Mutineers. Then he marched into the Dutchy of Luxemburg with his infantry and those re-established regiments of horse; but he received orders from Court to go no farther, and only to make a diversion, by taking some sorry castles: this he did, and obliged M. Bec, with a body of four or five thousand men, to separate from the Flanders Army.

Winter approaching, and depriving both Armies of all means of undertaking any thing in that Dutchy, M. de Turenne had an account, that the state of affairs was much altered in Germany, and that the Duke of Bavaria seeing the Emperor put to straits by the Swedes, had broke the Treaty with the two Crowns, sent his Army to join that of the Emperor, driven the Swedes into the Country of Brunswick, and recovered a great extent of Country that had been conquered when the Armies of France and Sweden joined the year before. This news obliged the Court to send him orders to return into Germany. Having heard upon his march, that the garrison of Frankendal was besieging Worms, he sent a body of horse that made them raise the siege, and marched towards Mentz, and on his march took the castle of Falkstein: he caused a bridge to be made upon the Rhine near Oppenheim, and staid in the Country of Darmstat till the month of January was near spent, in expectation that the Swedes would be in a condition to march; but they wanting some time for compleating and remounting their horse, M. de Turenne was obliged to retire towards Strasburg.

An. 1648. Having had leave to go to Court, and having appointed quarters for the Army in Lorrain, he was just setting out for France, when the Landgraves of Hesse sent to him a Gentleman, who had orders to tell him, that the Swedish Army was in a condition to march, provided that of the King would repass the Rhine in order to rejoin it. It was a great hardship to be obliged to march eight days thro' the Country from whence he was come, and which was intirely ruined, with an Army very much harassed, that was expecting to have quarters in order to be refreshed: however M. de Turenne took the affair to be of such importance, that instead of going to Court, he only sent M. de Vautorte thither, with advice that he was going to repass the Rhine, and to desire assistance. He allowed ten days for repairing the artillery, sent into Switzerland for horses, in the month of February returned to Mentz, where he repassed the Rhine, and marched into Franconia to join the Swedes, although he was eight days during this march, scarce finding in his way straw for the horses. As for the infantry, because the winter was very severe, he ordered clokes to be made for them. When he was got on the other side of the Rhine, he found his strength consisted of four thousand foot, four thousand horse, and twenty pieces of cannon, with twelve or fifteen conquer'd towns in very good condition.

Some time before his passing the Rhine, M. de Turenne wrote to the Duke of Bavaria, acquainting him, that since he had declared against the Swedes, the King was resolved to break the treaty that had been made with him. M. de Turenne knew very well the design of the Court was, that he should do all he could against the Emperor; but he had no positive orders to declare war against the Duke of Bavaria. As the report was spread over all Germany, that there was still a good understanding between France and Bavaria, he thought that an open declaration would encourage the Swedes, and all the German Princes in alliance with France; and this step was approved of at Court.

The King's Army, after it had passed the Rhine, leaving the river of Main on the right, marched and joined the Swedes betwixt Hesse and Franconia. After this junction, a body of Hessians that had come with the Swedes, returned into the Country of Hesse, and the two Armies passed the Main. Those of the Emperor and Ba-
varia,

varia, that had been weakened by small Sieges in Hesse, An. 1648.
 after having driven back the Swedes, retired in great haste towards the Danube, repassed that river, and put themselves under the shelter of Ingolstat, a town belonging to the Duke of Bavaria. The French and Swedish Armies halted upon the side of the Danube, where we remained some days undetermined whither to go. M. Wrangel, who commanded the Swedish Army, had a mind to march into the Upper Palatinate: but as M. de Turenne was afraid, that the progress of the war might insensibly lead him towards Bohemia, by which means he should be too far from Swabia, which was the only place from whence necessaries for the Army could be got, was unwilling to go thither. We were some days treating upon this matter, and at length parted, because we could not agree. The Swedes marched to the borders of the Upper Palatinate, and M. de Turenne, with the King's Army, marched betwixt Franconia and the Bishoprick of Bamberg, well knowing, that the Swedes would not go alone into Bohemia, and keeping pretty near them, that he might be able to rejoin them when they should alter their minds. The mutinous Troopers, whom, I have said, we attacked near the Tauber, and who were with the Swedes, were likewise another reason for M. de Turenne not to go far from Swabia. There were at least four hundred of them that had put themselves again into the King's Army, and the Swedes fearing to lose the rest, had a mind to draw the French Army into a war far from the Rhine and the Danube, that they might thereby disgust the rest of the Germans, who would then despair of the money that might be coming to them from France, and of the quarters which M. de Turenne had promised them in Swabia. The mutinous regiments that were in the Swedish Army, every day occasioned some little disturbance between the Officers of the Armies; but nothing of it appeared in the behaviour of the Generals, who daily visited one another. To write minutely all that passed relating to this affair would be too tedious.

The Swedes seeing that the King's Army staid upon the frontiers of the Bishoprick of Bamberg, and not thinking it proper to continue longer separated from them, joined them near Rottemburg upon the Tauber, and they marched together in order to refresh themselves on the borders of
 Wirtem-

An. 1648. Wirtemberg. Having staid there about three weeks, and understanding that the Imperial and Bavarian Armies were about Ulm, we marched thither. As we came near the Danube; the enemies Armies, who were on the other side, passed a bridge near Ulm, where there was some skirmishing; and the next day they continued their rout, marching betwixt Lawingen and Ausburg, and incamped about three leagues from Lawingen, a place which the King was possessed of upon the Danube.

The French and Swedish Armies marched streight to Lawingen; where M. de Turenne, M. Wrangel, and M. Koningmark left the Army, which incamped about a league from Lawingen, took three thousand horse with them, and passed the bridge in order to reconnoitre. When we had crossed the Morass beyond Lawingen, which continues a full league, and where there is no marching but in file, we halted, and sent a party to observe what the enemy were doing: after it had been gone about two hours, it returned, and gave an account, that the enemy were incamped about a league and a half from thence, and not in the least alarmed; that all their horses were at pasture, and that it had met with no party that had discovered the three thousand horse, or could see that the confederate Armies were arrived near Lawingen. We considered for some time, whether with these three thousand horse, we should attack the grand guard, or fall upon their horses that were feeding; but it was resolved to stay that night in a covert with the three thousand horse; and to send Adjutants, with orders for the Armies to march the whole night, leaving their baggage in the quarters, and at break of day, to be at the place where we were waiting for them. This succeeded to our expectation, and about two hours after day-break, the Armies being arrived; and that of the King having the van-guard, we marched streight to the enemy's camp, and sent a detachment of a thousand horse to draw them to a battle. As we came near their camp, we saw it was on fire, and that there were about thirty squadrons halting, and some baggage filing off through a wood. While we were advancing briskly, some of these squadrons drew near the wood, and the thousand detached horse began to skirmish with them; but as there were some foot in the wood, and as the enemy's squadrons wheeled about very opportunely, they gave them-

selves

selves little trouble about the detachment, which was very An. 1648.
 often beat back. Turenne's regiment of horse advancing
 to sustain the detachment, charged the enemy's foot on
 the edge of the wood; and having killed some of them;
 their horse fell into confusion. This was the rear-guard
 of Montecuculi, who commanded a wing of the Empe-
 ror's Army. No man could behave better than he did in
 this retreat: but as the horse of the French and Swedish
 Armies came up on all sides, it was impossible but that
 they must put into confusion that rear-guard, which was
 driven thro' the wood. Melander, General of the Em-
 peror's Army, led into a plain on the other side of the
 wood; two thousand Musketeers, some horse and cannon,
 in order to sustain that rear-guard, and for some time he
 put a stop to our horse: at last Melander was killed; and
 his cavalry beat back into another wood beyond the plain.
 His foot were on the edge of this wood; but the Swedes
 with their horse taking the road to the left, got into the
 middle of the wood; and cut off their retreat that way,
 they then would have retired by the plain; but the horse
 of the King's Army met them there: so that in the plain
 and in the wood the enemy lost this body of infantry,
 with eight pieces of cannon, a great many colours, and a
 part of their baggage. We pursued them an hour and a
 half after Melander was killed; and after their horse had
 again got themselves a little into order, for the main-body
 of their infantry was above four leagues behind; we saw
 on the other side of a very deep rivulet six or seven Squa-
 drons of the enemy that halted; we found no other pas-
 sage but what they were guarding, which was very nar-
 row. When we had halted, we saw three battalions of
 foot coming to intrench themselves there; and upon the
 rising grounds, a great way from thence, we saw some
 troops and baggage quite in disorder. We waited for the
 cannon; in order to dislodge the enemy's horse and foot
 that were intrenching themselves: but though we fired
 fifteen or twenty pieces of cannon against those foot and
 horse, and killed above half of them upon the spot, yet
 the enemy did not leave the passage. The squadrons on-
 ly shifted their ground, and we saw a squadron of six score
 or a hundred and fifty horse reduced to fifty or sixty, with-
 out moving.

An. 1648. M. de Turenne's regiment of foot endeavoured to make themselves masters of the passage, but they lost there a hundred and fifty men, and were obliged to retire, without carrying it. It was Duke Ulrick of Wirtemberg that commanded those horse as Major General, and who indeed saved the rest of the Imperial and Bavarian Armies. We grew tired with firing against him with so many cannon, which were within a small musket-shot of him. The enemy's troops that had been a little staggered at first, recovered their courage afterwards, and lost above the half of their men by cannon-shot, without shewing the least fear. In the mean time we saw the enemy's Army endeavouring to rally upon a rising ground about half a league from the passage, and sending some men to relieve the troops that had been so ill treated by the cannon: but there came only one part of them, the rest being dispersed and put to flight by the cannon-shot we fired upon them when we saw them coming in a body. As we had pursued the enemy above four leagues, and with great speed, our infantry could not come up to us till a little before night, and so could not be made use of to force the passage. As soon as it began to grow dark, the enemy retired with the remains of their Army under Ausburg, which was but about two leagues from thence, and there passed the Lech.

We halted all the next day, and then marched to the bridge of Rain, a town upon the Lech, possessed by the Duke of Bavaria, about five leagues below Ausburg. The enemy set fire to the bridge, and remained with their Army on the other side of the river in the same place where Tilly had endeavour'd to defend the passage against the King of Sweden; and we advanced our cannon, and posted Musketeers in the same spot where Gustavus had placed his. After a skirmish which lasted from noon to night, the enemy retired from their posts without noise, and marched with all their Army towards Munich. Next morning the Swedish cavalry and the King's under M. de Duras, to the number of a thousand horse crossed the river, but with great difficulty because of the badness of the ford: this detachment pursued the enemy two or three leagues, and took some of their rear guard prisoners. The Army passed at the bridge of Rain (which we repaired) and marched towards Neubourg, leaving two thousand
men

men under M. de Laval, a Major General in the King's Army, to defend the bridge. At night we encamped at Neubourg, and marched next morning towards Frisingen, which is on the river Iser. The enemy was on the other side, having abandon'd the town of Frisingen, which is on this side. We lodged there, and attempted in several places to pass the Iser. The enemy retired beyond the river Inn, after having sent a good number of their infantry into Munick, Wassembourg, and Ingolstat.

M. de Bavaria at that time quitted Munich, retired to the other side of the river Inn, and in a very advanced age and with few attendants went into the Archbishoprick of Saltzburg, where he was scarce arrived, when he thought of going into Tirol. The confederate Armies passed the Iser, and marched to the Banks of the Inn, where they could not attack Wassembourg, because of the great number of infantry which defended it. We then marched lower down along the same river to Muldorf, where we did all that was possible to pass the river: but as it is a good deal broader and deeper than the Lech or the Iser, and as we had no boats, we could never fix piles in the water, though we should have found but small resistance on the other side from the enemy, who were not above fifteen hundred or two thousand at most.

The French and Swedish Armies had never penetrated so far, and it would have been of very great consequence to have passed the river Inn, because of the Country of Obernperg, which is very near it, and is a part of the Emperor's hereditary dominions, which we should certainly have brought to revolt. We staid fifteen days at Muldorf, during which time, and since Melander's death, the Emperor had been raising a great number of recruits, and M. de Bavaria had sent a good many horses to Passaw, to remount the cavalry, where M. de Piccolomini, who was sent to command the Armies, assembled them; and having made up a very considerable body, which consisted at least of nine or ten thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse, with a great many cannon, he crossed the Danube at Passaw, and the opposite Armies were within five or six leagues of one another.

We did not think it proper to wait for the enemy upon the Inn, but rather upon the Iser, where we had the convenience of Mills; therefore we marched to Dingelsing, which

An. 1648. which is on the Iser, and there we encamped. The enemy came to Lindaw, which is on the same river, and a league and a half from Dingelsing. The French and Swedish Armies began to entrench themselves, and the latter made two bridges over the Iser with piles, which were finished in four or five days time. The Officers of the Artillery of the King's Army took example of them, and drove down piles too; so that there were three bridges made without having any boats, and that too upon a river which was very deep, and of a considerable breadth. The corn being ripe, the infantry fell to threshing it, while the cavalry went a foraging; so that there was no want among the troops. We remained four weeks in the camp, the enemy being very near, and the guards in sight of each other all the while; so that there were frequent actions on occasion of the convoys of the forrage, and by the excursions of parties*.

Mean while, the enemy's Army wasted away much more than ours. At their first arrival in this camp, they were far superior to us; but in four weeks time they had lost a world of men. M. Konigsmark, with some troops which he took along with him two days after Melander's defeat, having possessed himself of Prague, the Imperialists sent thither a few troops; but the taking of that city struck a great damp upon their spirits, and quell'd their courage exceedingly. We continued in Bavaria till such time as the bad weather, usual in the latter part of autumn, obliged the Army to retire. During our continuance there, an accident befel the Swedes by M. Wrangel's going out upon a chace near Munich; they lost some standards, seven or eight hundred horses, and a great many Officers.

After the Armies had quitted Bavaria, they repass'd the Lech, not far from Landsberg, cross'd the Danube at Donawert, and march'd to Aischstet, verging towards the Upper Palatinate. During this irruption into Bavaria, though there was much territory conquer'd, and vast variety of different interests depending, yet there was no-

* The particular account of this irruption into Bavaria insert'd into the Viscount's History, was taken from a manuscript Narrative written by an Officer who was in the service all that Campaign. It was found among the Viscount's Papers.

thing that caused the least heart-burning or uneasiness. The An. 1648. infantry was always in the centre, and the cavalry of each Army rolled from one wing to the other. The General Officers of both Armies commanded detachments in their turn, which prevented all disputes. This campaign having very much distressed the Emperor and M. de Baviere, they were impatient for a Peace, which was soon concluded at Munster. Then M. de Turenne retired with the Army to Swabia, and the Swedes marched into the Country of Nuremberg.

End of the FIRST BOOK.



MEMOIRS

OF THE

Viscount de TURENNE.

BOOK the SECOND.

Of the Wars in FRANCE.

An. 1649.

AFTER the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia, the King's Army retir'd into their quarters in Swabia and Wirtemberg, and M. de Turenne remained there during the winter. In this interval, the troubles of France grew to such a height, that the Queen convey'd the King from Paris, and the Royal Army took up its quarters all round the city, with design to starve it. The Prince of Conti, M. de Longueville, M. d'Elbeuf, M. de Bouillon, and a great many persons of quality remained in that capital, verily believing that in a minority a thing of so high a nature would never be attempted, without the participation of the Princes of the blood and the great men of the Kingdom. An Express was soon dispatch'd from the Court to M. de Turenne to know his sentiments, who did not at all disguise them. He even sent word to Cardinal Mazarin not to rely in the least upon his friendship, if he went on to act in that manner: that though he should pass the Rhine with the Army to return into France, it would be only with a design to procure a peace, and by no means to assist in support of an action which he was of opinion ought not to be undertaken so precipitately.

A Fort-

A fortnight or three weeks were spent in messages from An. 1649, the Court to the Army, and from the Army to the Court. M. de Turenne resolving not to declare, or even insinuate to the Court any thing that was not his true intention, or make the Ministers believe he would depend entirely on them, when he should arrive in France, in order to countenance an enterprize which he did not think lawful at any time, much less in a minority; especially since no body yet had taken arms against the King, or shewn any signs of open disobedience. 'Tis true, some, in company, had now and then express'd themselves with too much heat; but this rather proceeded from particular interfering interests, than any settled design of revolting against the Court.

M. de Turenne having made the Court acquainted with his sentiments, spoke to the Officers; and, except two or three regiments, they all promised to march wherever he pleased. As soon as the Court knew that he was going to pass the Rhine, they threw off the mask, and discovered themselves thoroughly; which they had not done till then, nor sent any other order, but to bring back the Army into France when the Peace should be concluded in Germany. And now came express orders from Court to all the Officers to acknowledge M. de Turenne no longer; three hundred thousand Crowns were sent to the Rhine, with a promise to pay off the four or five months pay that were due. This, together with the solicitation of M. d'Erlac, had such an effect on six German regiments, that they went over to him by night, and join'd him at Brisac. Three regiments of foot posted themselves under Philipsburg. There remained with M. de Turenne no more than half the Army, and that in a very wavering disposition, except five or six regiments. He, seeing he could not now march and carry into execution the designs he had propos'd to himself, and resolving likewise not to go to Court for the reasons afore-mentioned, gave order to some general Officers who had stuck by him, to lead off the remainder of the troops and join M. d'Erlac. Which done, he retired with fifteen or twenty friends into Holland, where he tarried a month, till he heard the treaty of Ruel was concluded: then he took ship in Zealand, landed at Diepe, and thence went post to Paris.

An. 1649. Though the accommodation was made, the parties continued in great distrust of each other. The Court had their thoughts on the campaign which was beginning in Flanders, and left affairs within the Kingdom in a very unsettled condition. M. de Turenne went to Court two days after his arrival at Paris; and as the Cardinal's design was to dissemble every thing so long as the campaign lasted, and since a coldness which was commenced between the Prince and him, made the Court not act with quite so high a hand as before, M. de Turenne was very well received there, lived as he was used to do, and began to contract a sort of Friendship with the Prince, who went not to command the Army that campaign, but took a turn into Burgundy. M. de Turenne passed the summer partly at Paris, and partly at Compeigne, where the Court resided. He received many civilities from the Cardinal, and often expostulated with him on all that had passed, but without entering into any engagement of friendship with him. The Minister, unwilling to raise any suspicion in the Prince's mind, did not talk explicitly with M. de Turenne; and M. de Turenne, not knowing how to depend upon the Cardinal in any thing he said, and seeing him always upon the reserve with him, was, of the two, more inclining to the Prince's side.

In the beginning of the campaign, the Army in Germany refused to obey M. d'Erlac; so that he was obliged to leave it. The Officers sent a deputation to Court to beg two things; the one to pay 'em their arrears, and the other to send back M. de Turenne to command them: but the Court eluded their last request. After raising the siege of Cambray, there happened nothing of any moment all the remaining part of the campaign. The King returned to Paris, and the Court was so full of factions, that his authority was greatly diminished. The Prince return'd from Burgundy, and some time afterwards he openly fell out with the Cardinal. The whole Court taking sides, M. de Turenne went to the Prince's Palace, and thereby made a publick declaration of being his friend, which engaged him afterwards to take share with him in his good or bad fortune. There were at that time divers reconcilements between the Prince and the Court with which he sided, in order to drive M. the Coadjutor to extremities. For a month or six weeks there hardly passed
a day

a day but affairs took a different turn, sometimes to the An. 1649. Prince's advantage, sometimes to his disadvantage. But as I cannot descend into the particulars of those matters, I shall only say that the Court being dissatisfied with the Prince's procedure, united it self with all such as wished him ill, who were very numerous.

Those reconcilements with the Court having drawn in An. 1650. the whole cabal, the Cardinal made use of them very artfully for his own ends, and concerted, with the chief of them, and such as had the most interest with the Duke of Orleans, what measures were best to be taken to cause the Prince to be put under arrest. He met with one very great obstacle, which was the correspondence and strict ties of friendship subsisting between the Prince and M. de la Riviere, who had a great influence on the mind of the Duke of Orleans. The Cardinal at length surmounted these difficulties; and having gain'd the Duke of Orleans, an order pass'd one council-day for seizing the persons of the Prince, the Prince of Conti, and M. de Longueville, who were carried by the King's Gendarmes to the Bois de Vincennes.

M. de Turenne had by this time plainly seen that the Prince quarrel'd with every body, and gave great occasion of disgust to the whole Court by his marrying Madame de Richlieu, and supporting Jersey against the Queen. The Cardinal was continually paying great compliments to M. de Turenne, promising him, that if he would accept of it, he should have the command of the Army in Flanders next campaign; and being inform'd that for some time past he in a manner forbore visiting the Prince (who indeed had declined communicating any more of his secrets to him) the Cardinal hoped, as he afterwards told him, that he would not over-hastily engage in the Prince's concerns. The moment that the Prince was taken into custody, the Cardinal sent M. de Ruvigni to wait on M. de Turenne, and assure him, that he need not be under any manner of apprehensions for himself, promising withal, that he should meet with no treatment but what was perfectly to his satisfaction in whatever concerned him. M. de Turenne, tho' he was persuaded he was safe enough at Court, and tho' true it was the Prince had not been over-civil to him for some time, yet being unwilling to forsake the Prince in his misfortune, set out the night he was

An. 1650. made prisoner with four Gentlemen; and having no money, went to M. de Varennes, who not only lent him six hundred pistoles, but also attended him to Stenai, where M. de Chamilli, who commanded in that town for the Prince, receiv'd M. de Turenne with much joy. Three or four days afterwards the Court sent Paris to him, to invite him to come back, with all the fair promises that could possibly be made: but as he could not be easy in his mind, if he listened to any negotiation during the Prince's misfortune, he dismiss'd Paris without giving any ear to him, and resolv'd with himself to pursue all such measures as might tend to oblige the Court to release the Prince, and to omit nothing that could produce a just dread of the misfortunes which his long imprisonment might be the occasion of.

According to this resolution, he sent to all the troops who were with the Prince, and to all the Governors whom he thought to be dissatisfied with the Court, or were his friends. Of them all, he could not bring over above twenty or thirty Officers. Among those of quality, were M. de Duras and M. de Boutteville, who were in the interest of the Prince. M. de Turenne sent also to the troops who had served under him in Germany, and who were dispersed in several places; but he could gain no more than three regiments of foot, that of the Crown, that of Turenne, and that of Passage, who quitted Lorrain, march'd in a body with their baggage, and came and joined him at Stenai. The regiment of Beauveau, horse, would have come too, and join'd their Colonel, who had repaired to M. de Turenne, in whose interests he always was; but that regiment was shut up in a town, and such of them as could get away, came and offered him their service. These troops were disposed into quarters in the neighbourhood of Stenai; M. de Turenne not being willing to press the Commandants of Stenai, Clermont and Damvillers to receive any of them, for fear it should look as if he affected to put his own men into the places belonging to the Prince, and likewise because the Commandants would not have been willing to receive them on account of the disposition and temper of their garrisons. That of Damvillers had already begun to declare against the Prince, and the Soldiers seiz'd the Chevalier de la Rochefoucault their Commandant, at the same time shouting.

ing, *Vive le Roy*. Some days afterwards, upon M. de la Ferté's approaching to Clermont, the Soldiers of the garrison made their Officers prisoners, and possessed themselves of the place which they delivered up to M. de la Ferté. Those of Stenai inclining to do the same, M. de Turenne remonstrated to M. de la Moussaye of what importance it was to secure himself of the citadel. Accordingly there were admitted into it eight companies of Turenne's regiment, which continually guarded it, and were entire masters of it till the Prince was set at liberty, and then they surrendered it up to him.

There was only this place left to support the whole party; M. de Turenne gave the command of it to M. de Varennes, in whom he always confided without the least reserve. We were fain to have recourse to the Spaniards, after having met with a disaster. The regiment of passage was defeated, as it attempted to enter Stenai; but Turenne's company of guards, commanded by Lieutenant la Berge, passed in open day, forced five hundred horse, and, with the loss of half their men, got into Stenai, after performing the most vigorous action that ever was seen. M. de Turenne desired to have a conference with the Governor of Montmédi, which he had next day. After having frankly talk'd about the manner how he came to be engaged in this affair, and the steps he further intended to take in it, he constantly found in that Governor and in the Count de Fuenfaldagne (which latter absolutely managed all things in Flanders, tho' the Archduke was there himself) a perfect sincerity, except owning their want of money, and their inability to procure any. This interview with the Governor of Montmédi was followed first with an immediate supply of fifteen hundred horse and some foot which were thrown into Dun, and next with a treaty which Madam de Longueville and M. Turenne made with the Archduke, and was ratified by the King of Spain. The aforesaid Princess, after the Prince was confined, having retired into Normandy, and from thence passing into Holland, cross'd the Country of Liege to Stenai, and took up her abode at the citadel, which was continually guarded by some Soldiers of the old garrison, and by the eight companies of Turenne's regiment, without her taking the least offence at it. M. Turenne always continued in an entire good-understanding with her

An. 1650 from the beginning to the end of the Prince's imprisonment.

To begin a negotiation, M. Turenne and the Count de Fuenfaldagne met together in the town of Marche; and the loss of Clermont and Damvillers having created some coldness in the Count, he pressed very much to have the citadel of Stenai, which was the only place the party was possessed of. Though M. Turenne's sole resource was in the Spaniards, he chose rather to hazard the breaking off the negotiation, than deliver up a place in which he might be out of their power when he had a mind to it: and as his design had always been to continue with them no longer than he was obliged thereto by the promise he had made to endeavour to obtain the Prince's enlargement, he was very desirous to stay in a place where he might be his own master. Thus after six weeks debate, he concluded nothing at Marche, tho' he staid there three whole days, together with M. de Fuenfaldagne: but the negotiation went on by means of Dom Gabriel de Toledo, who was dispatch'd to Stenai to treat with Madam de Longueville and M. Turenne. The treaty was concluded, in which M. de Fuenfaldagne promised in the name of the Catholick King, and Madame de Longueville and M. Turenne promised in their own names not to come to any agreement before the Prince was released from his confinement, and an offer made to Spain of a just, equitable, and reasonable peace.

Things being thus made an end of, preparations were made for the campaign. The Spaniards tried to oblige M. Turenne to keep with an Army in Champagne, whilst they acted in Picardy; but he well knowing that their intention was to take advantage of the divisions in France, in order to recover the places which the King kept from them; and that if he stood off with a separate body, the King's Army would fall entirely upon him, he chose rather to join the Army of Spain, in order to oblige them to attack the towns of France, or enter the Kingdom and make a diversion to the war at Bourdeaux, or to animate the Prince's friends who were in the Kingdom. After Turenne had join'd the Army of Spain, we went and laid siege to Catelet, which lasted but three days. Afterwards having intelligence that part of the horse which was in Guise had quitted it, we went and besieged it.

it seven or eight days after in presence of the King's Army, which being got together, made approaches towards that of Spain. An. 1650.

The two Armies were almost equal in number, to wit, ten or twelve thousand foot, and six or seven thousand horse each. The great rains which happened at that time, quite spoiled the roads, and the few provision-waggons which the Spaniards had, occasioned such a scarcity of bread in the Army, that the siege was carried on but slowly. At the very first the Soldiers had but one single ration of bread in three days; but towards the end, the want thereof became so great, it obliged them to raise the siege, and to retire two leagues off, whither the foot-soldiers had much ado to crawl, so weak were they grown thro' want of bread to support them.

After we had had provisions, and remained seven or eight days in this camp, we went and attack'd la Capelle, which we took in ten days time; and now harvest-time coming on, the Army march'd to Vervins; and M. Turenne advancing with two thousand horse to observe the countenance of the King's Army, which was at Marle, he was informed that it was moved from thence, and marched behind the Morasses of Liefse. He acquainted the Archduke, who was arriv'd in the camp, that if we advanced to within two leagues of Vervins, the Army of France would certainly be reduced to some very ugly circumstances, which might give room for undertaking something against it. The Archduke march'd two leagues beyond Vervins, where advice was brought that the King's Army continued to retire. M. Turenne took three thousand horse, and marched to Chateau-Porcien and Rhetel, which surrendered to him; from thence he sent to acquaint the Army of Spain that they would find sufficient subsistence on the river Aisne, whither they advanced, and put into Rhetel a garrison of eight hundred men, with Delliponti, who was highly esteem'd in Flanders, to command in it. As the continuance of the Army in the neighbourhood of the town entirely ruined all the corn, and deprived the garrison of means to subsist, M. Turenne thought it advisable to move farther off, and to march along the river Aisne, by drawing near to Paris, and the King's Army, which was retired to Rheims. His intention always was, that the Army of Spain should penetrate as far as possible

An. 1650. into the Kingdom, believing that the Prince who was in the Bois de Vincennes, would be carried to Paris, and so would no longer be at the disposal of the Court; and likewise hoping that if he was left in the Bois de Vincennes, perhaps after some lucky blow, he might oblige the Army of Spain to march even thither. M. Turenne gave the Spaniards no counsel as to the motions of their Army, but according to the marchings of the King's Army, and such as the military art allowed of; for the Armies being equal, to advise the Spaniards, in setting out from la Capelle, to march to Paris, having every thing against them in France, and nobody declaring for the Prince, would have appear'd so extravagantly hot-headed, he would have lost all credit with them.

Having therefore march'd to Neufchatel on the river Aisne, the Spaniards, not without reason, made a difficulty to pass it with their whole Army; because the King's Army being between Rheims and Soissons, behind the river Vesse, they saw no likelihood of executing any thing; and because their infantry suffered very much, being now destitute of means of having convoys come to them. M. Turenne leaving the gross of the Army at Neufchatel, took three thousand horse and five hundred Musketeers, in order to go and see the posture of the King's Army. After marching some time, he learnt that it was at Rheims, and that M. Hocquincourt was at Fismes, behind the river Vesse, with ten regiments of horse, and that there were a hundred Musketeers in the town: he went thither without loss of time; and after a great resistance at a bridge, where on the right and left, he found fording-places for the cavalry, he entirely broke all the regiments which opposed his passage, took four or five hundred prisoners, and obliged M. d'Hocquincourt, who had behaved very gallantly, to retire to Soissons not without a great deal of difficulty. The foot which was in Fismes, surrendered themselves, and M. Turenne sent the Archduke an account of what had passed; and that if he pleas'd but to advance to Fismes with the Army, it would be sure of very good subsistence there, on account of the great number of mills on the river, and vast quantities of corn and cattle.

The Army of Spain march'd thither, and M. de Boutreville was ordered to advance as far as la Ferté Milon; and he put safe-guards into that village. Seeing the Army

of

of France shut up in Rheims, a body of troops behind the Marne, and the road to Paris, free the Archduke and M. de Fuenfaldagne had certainly resolved upon marching thither, had the Prince been still at Vincennes; but news was brought that after great contests between M. le Tellier and the Duke of Orleans, who was for the Prince's being carried to the Bastile, M. le Tellier had prevailed, and that the Prince was conducted with a very small escorte to Marcouffi, within eight leagues of Paris on the road to Orleans. Then there was no longer any reason for marching to Paris with the main body of the Army, and it had been both useless and dangerous to go thither with detach'd parties, because of the King's Army which might have detached a much greater number, and have left their whole baggage in the towns; which the Army of Spain could by no means do.

Some persons were sent from Fismes to make propositions of peace. Dom Gabriel de Toledo went to Paris, and M. de Verderonne came to Fismes from the Duke of Orleans; but all to no manner of purpose. Mean while, notice came that a Treaty was concluded at Bourdeaux, whither the King went in person attended by Cardinal Mazarin. M. de Bouillon, who had the chief authority there, govern'd all affairs of the party with universal approbation, and comported himself with all the vigour, prudence and resolution that was possible in so difficult a conjuncture.

The Army of Spain lay a month at Fismes, to see whether these proposals of peace would produce any effect at Paris, or not. After that time, a Council was held for determining what town of the Frontier should be besieged in their retreat. The Spaniards had their eye upon Rocroy; but M. Turenne was rather for going to Moulon, a town on the Meuse, two leagues distant from Stenai, which serv'd greatly towards its preservation, and added somewhat to the extent of the winter-quarters on that frontier. So we detach'd the Marquis de Mafingen, Camp Master General of the Army of Spain, with three thousand foot and two thousand horse, to go and besiege Moulon. The rest of the Army remained on the river Aisne to cover the siege, and observe the King's Army, which was assembled about Chalons. As this siege drew very much into length, occasioned by the heavy rains and want

An. 1650. of artillery among the Spaniards, the Marshal du Plessis ~~who~~ commanded the King's Army, made an expeditious march by Verdun with design to relieve Mouson; which obliged the Army of Spain to repair to the siege. M. Turenne remained with three thousand horse to cover it, there being no circumvallation, and it being necessary to keep the enemy at a distance, lest they should attempt some relief. At last, after seven weeks siege in very bad weather, the town of Mouson surrendered.

After the taking of Mouson, the Army of Spain found it self very much weaken'd by the length of the siege, which had lasted almost to the end of November. M. Turenne plainly saw that if the Spanish Generals retired as they design'd into their winter-quarters, he should lose Rhétel and Chateau Porcien during the winter; and that the German troops, which the Spaniards had newly raised, would all perish by means of the bad quarters usually assigned them in Flanders. He advised the Count de Fuensaldagne to leave the whole Army between the rivers Meuse and Aisne; but not being able to prevail on him, himself continued on the frontier with five new-raised German regiments of horse, making about two thousand horse; and with two brigades of Lorrainers, one whereof was commanded by M. de Fauge, and the other by the Count de Ligneville, who had been defeated by Marshal de la Ferté. These two brigades made two thousand five hundred horse, and a thousand horse of the body which M. de Turenne had raised in Germany. As for the infantry, it consisted of two thousand five hundred men, one part Walloons and the other Lorrainers, there being no French infantry but Turenne's regiment commanded by Betbésé, that of the Crown by Rochepare, and that of Stenai commanded by the Count de Quintin. With these troops and six field-pieces, M. Turenne kept between the Meuse and the Aisne. Besides these, the Archduke left twelve hundred foot in Rhétel, and two hundred horse under the command of Delliponti, who was Serjeant Major General de Bataille, and a man of great reputation in Flanders.

The King's Army during the siege of Mouson, and some time after, remained in Champagne to refresh themselves, and there waited for all the troops which had been at Bourdeaux. When they were all got together, they made a body of between six and seven thousand horse, and eight thousand

thousand foot; and a resolution was taken to go and attack An. 1650.
Rhetel. The month of December was now pretty far spent: the Army arrived before the place on a Friday, and on Saturday they began to make the approaches: a suburb was presently taken: they approached along by the houses near the wall, and battered a tower of the gate with a twelve pounder. Then having found that the great timbers of the bridge only wanted boards on them to make it fit for service; the besiegers laid boards on them accordingly, and fell to work on the gate. They were repulsed the first time; but returning to it again, the besieged beat the chamade, and demanded a parley on Tuesday morning. The main of the Army was on the other side the river, and had left two regiments to make a false attack, which prov'd successful.

M. Turenne being informed that the King's Army was marching to the siege of Rhetel, resolved with himself to get thither three or four days after them, that he might find the Army dispersed in their quarters round the town, the trenches opened, and the cannon planted, which always much weakens an Army. After marching four days, on Tuesday he went seven long leagues to get within sight of Rhetel, having heard the cannon in the morning, and there being no likelihood the town would be so soon forced to surrender. He arrived an hour before night within a league of the town. After having driven back a party of horse, he took some prisoners, who told him the town was surrendered: he continued all night in a fighting posture, and fired off two cannon, to try if the besieged would answer him. As no noise was heard for seven or eight hours together, and the prisoners all agreed in the same story, that the town was surrendered, we no longer doubted it, and the Army returning the same way they came, went and took up their quarters four leagues off in a valley, not being able to continue in Champagne for want of water and covering.

The Tuesday on which the town surrendered, and the day after, the King's Army got together, and marched a part of the night between Wednesday and Thursday. In the morning they arrived in sight of the Croatsians whom M. de Turenne had left half a league behind him. Upon this news he immediately caused his troops to march up to the heights of Champagne; and as the King's Army

was

An. 1650. was marching in the plain, he kept along the side of them for almost an hour within half a cannon-shot of them, the Lorrainers not being arrived, who had been somewhat slow in getting out of their quarters. His forces were not indeed equal, but he had no choice left but to fight. The German regiments had the right wing, and M. de Turenne's horse the left, the Lorrainers not being yet come up. The Armies marched on for an hour in this fashion, M. de Turenne fearing nothing, because the King's infantry was not as yet near enough to make the General resolve upon marching up to him. It was not long before the Lorrainers arrived, and M. de Turenne being resolved not to give the King's Army time to put their infantry in the interval of their two wings, immediately posted the Lorrain cavalry on his left in two lines; there were twelve squadrons in the first, and eight in the second: He marched directly up to the right wing of the King's Army. M. de Beauveau, M. de Duras, M. de Bouteville, and M. de Montausier commanded the squadrons of the first lines of M. de Turenne's corps. The Lorrainers, who were commanded by their own Officers, came and doubled their ranks so expeditiously on the left, that they gave not the King's cavalry time to oppose against them any more than three squadrons; because they had all along regulated the first squadron of their right wing according to the motion of M. de Turenne's corps alone: This was likewise the cause of their having a great many squadrons near their infantry, and thereby the same advantage against M. de Turenne's cavalry, as the Lorrainers had against them.

In this disposition we marched to the charge, and the whole first line advanced, horse-head to horse-head, without firing. There were a great many Officers killed at this first charge, and almost all the squadrons of the King's Army on the first line were broken; but with so great a resistance on their side, that those of the Lorrainers were likewise almost as much broken as they. The squadrons of the King's Army which were near the foot remained entire, not having struck a stroke; but the whole first line of the Lorrainers consisting of seven squadrons, were brought into disorder by the three French who opposed them. There were likewise some squadrons which passed into the interval from one to the other.

M. de

M. de Turenne had of his troops but two squadrons of the second line, the first whereof was routed by a squadron which passed into the interval, the Colonel being killed; the other commanded by the Major moved forward, and broke two of the enemy's squadrons: all the second line of the Lorrainers mingled with the first; so that when the second line of the King's Army, which was made up of all the regiments of the old German Army, came up in good order, it found them in great confusion. M. de Turenne, who intended to lead up the squadrons of the first line to the charge, and then return to the second line, was obliged by the great resistance he met with, to mix himself in the press; so that his horse received two wounds, and thus he was in no condition to go to any place but very leisurely. Messieurs de Beauveau, de Bouteville, de Duras, and de Montausier having broke and routed the squadrons they had to do with, marched up to the mouths of the cannon, and put to flight some squadrons of the second line. Mean time, on M. de Turenne's right wing commanded by la Fauge, five German regiments had some advantage at the first onset; but afterwards all the troops were put into confusion, and began to betake themselves to flight; which gave room to some squadrons of the left wing of the King's Army to return to the right wing; and the second line marching up to the Lorrainers who were before in great confusion, they turned their backs and fled away. M. de Fauge, after he had acquitted himself very gallantly, was taken prisoner; the Count de Ligneville shot twice through the body; the Prince Palatine killed, with two other Colonels. M. de Turenne, who had marched between the Lorrainers and his own troops, found himself in the beginning of this disorder quite alone; all the Gentlemen who were with him having mingled themselves confusedly because of the great resistance: he was often known, and his horse received two more wounds, the Troopers asking him whether he would have quarter: la Berge, his Lieutenant of Guards, came up to him and joined him. They were followed by seven or eight Troopers, three whereof took M. de Turenne, and some others took his Lieutenant, but they happily cleared themselves of them; and having beat off and disabled some of their assailants, they began by little and little to retire out of the throng. M. de Turenne had now none of his troops near him,

An. 1650. him, and he was in the midst of the King's squadrons. La Berge, to prevent his being taken, was sometimes obliged to say they both belonged to the King's Army, and that those who had been for killing them were Germans who did not know them. At last, by an extraordinary piece of good-fortune, they were let go; M. de Turenne's horse had received five wounds. Soon after, he met with Lavau, Major of Beauveau's regiment, who lent him a horse, and he made his escape into the midst of the plains of Champagne, without being pursued by any body. The two wings of his Army had been broke, and all the infantry had thrown down their arms, except Turenne's regiment, which refusing quarter, threw themselves amidst the King's infantry, and all the Officers and Soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners, after they had maintain'd the fight resolutely a whole hour, without any horse to support them. Dom Estevan de Gamare, General of the Spanish artillery, happen'd to be near the foot, where he was taken, as also M. de Bouteville, and M. de Quintin, who commanded the regiment of Burgundy.

Things being in a desperate condition, M. de Turenne could not possibly retire by the shortest way to the river Aisne, because of the King's troops, who in pursuing the run-a-ways of the right wing, had intercepted his way thither; he was therefore forced to get away through the plains of Champagne, and arrived at Barleduc with five hundred horse which he had met with on his way. After having staid six hours at Bar, and given orders to the cavalry which were with him, and to M. de Duras, who arriv'd there a little while after with a hundred horse, to retire into Luxembourg, he went himself, with twelve or fifteen of the best mounted, directly to Montmedi, where he found part of the cavalry escaped from the battle, assigned them some quarters in that neighbourhood, and then sent away an express to Brussels, with an account of every thing that had passed. He sent word at the same time to Madame de Longueville at Stenai, that he was at Montmedi, and assured her, that if the King's Army, after winning the battle, marched to Stenai, he would himself repair thither immediately with the troops which he had still with him about Montmedi, which is but two leagues from Stenai. M. de Turenne did not care to go so soon to Stenai, lest the Spaniards should think he did not wholly

confide

confide in them since the loss of the battle, or else that he had so ill an opinion of affairs, that he was glad to get as soon as he could to some place where an accommodation might more easily be transacted. Knowing likewise how things stood in Flanders, he thought it better to remain in a place where the Spaniards were the masters, than to go to Stenai; because, though M. de Fuenfaldagne, on whom every thing depended in Flanders, was the support of the whole party; yet all the people of the Country, who always wish'd to see the forces of Spain employed in retaking the places which the King held in Flanders, and not in favouring the party, made use of this unlucky event to add new weight to their opinion, and discouraged M. de Fuenfaldagne. If M. de Turenne, after this misfortune, had likewise added thereto a distrustfulness by going to Stenai, M. de Fuenfaldagne had doubtless altered his measures, and he must have cast about how to bring matters to some accommodation, though a shameful one. But the thing took quite another turn; and it being known that M. de Turenne was at Montmedi, and all the Officers of the Army expressing themselves to be perfectly well satisfied with him, a power was sent him from the Archduke to dispose of all the posts of those who were killed in the battle, and to assign such quarters to his troops as he thought fit.

A short time after this, M. de Turenne went to wait on Madame de Longueville at Stenai, where they resolved together to remain in the same way of thinking till the Prince was restored to his liberty. M. de Lorrain and M. de Fuenfaldagne went afterwards to Namure, to confer with M. de Turenne. They staid there four days to give order for quartering the troops; and being returned again to Brussels, M. de Turenne would have treated with the Elector of Cologne for quarters in the Country of Liege; but not being able to agree, he led his troops to Brussels.

During this space, the disorders began afresh at Paris, and there was great likelihood of the Prince's being set at liberty. As there are numbers of people who have written particular accounts of all the cabals which were then formed, I shall say nothing of them; but only that M. de Turenne being well assured that there would quickly be a change, kept close to his troops, or in places not far from Brussels. As there was due from the Spaniards above three hundred thousand crowns to accomplish the treaty made with

An. 1651. with them, M. de Fuenfaldagne made an offer to M. de Turenne of a hundred thousand of them; but he did not think fit to take them at a time, when the posture of affairs would oblige him perhaps to look out for means to disengage himself from the Spaniards. Not long after, he learnt from the Sieur de la Berge, whom Madame de Longueville had sent to him, that the Prince was got out of Havre, and was gone to Paris. He also learnt at the same time, that Cardinal Mazarin being departed from Court, was gone to Havre, thinking to engage the Prince in his interests, and to persuade him that he gave him his liberty, though he was forced thereto by the Remonstrances of the Parliament, and the union between the Duke of Orleans and the Cardinal de Retz. Cardinal Mazarin not succeeding in this scheme, was in hopes the Queen would leave Paris with the King, and come to him on the frontiers of Champagne; but she was hindered by the guards which the Duke of Orleans and the people posted before the Palais-Royal. This obliged the Cardinal to go to Sedan, afterwards to the Country of Liege, and from thence to Cologne, from whence he returned, as shall be taken notice of hereafter.

M. Turenne who was at la Roche in Ardenne, went immediately to Stenai, to find out means to satisfy the other clause of the Spanish treaty, which was, after the Prince's enlargement, to endeavour to bring about a just, equitable, and reasonable peace. He sent word to the Count de Fuenfaldagne, that though the Prince was at liberty, which was the first article of the treaty, and that, considering a failure had been made all along as to the payment of the promised sums, a very reasonable pretext might be taken to get quit of the second article; yet the obliging manner in which he had always acted, and the certain knowledge that it was mere necessity and no ill-will which had forced him to this failure, would determine him not to depart from Stenai till after all reasonable time was allowed to labour in the execution of that second article. Being arrived at Stenai, he found letters which the Prince wrote to Madame de Longueville, by which he expressed himself earnestly desirous to see her, and passed great compliments on M. de Turenne concerning every thing that had happened.

Some few days after, Madame de Longueville set out for Paris, having sent to Brussels to let the Spaniards know, that she would labour heartily in the affair of the peace, and would shew her thankfulness for their assistance in procuring the Prince's liberty. M. de Turenne staid at Stenai, and was not at all concerned at Madame de Longueville's departing from thence: not but that there was a good-understanding between them; but not being extremely solicitous about his own private interest, he would not leave the party he was engaged in but with honour. He wrote to the Prince that he thought it highly proper that somebody of distinction should be immediately sent, with orders to labour in the business of the peace, and that it was his opinion there was no withdrawing from the Spaniards with a good grace, till he and his friends had shewn by real effects, that they had their thoughts seriously upon it, and reasonable overtures were made. The Court sent M. de Croissi to Stenai; and at the instance of M. de Turenne at Brussels, the Archduke sent M. Friquet. This negotiation was earnestly pressed, and it was proposed on the side of France, that the Duke of Orleans should go with a full power to the frontier with certain persons named, if the Archduke would repair thither with the same power from the King of Spain, which the Spaniards had always given out he had. Moreover, M. de Turenne signified to the Count de Fuenfaldagne, that satisfaction should be given to Spain with regard to Portugal and Catalonia, provided the other conditions of the peace were reasonable: but 'twas well known that there was NO FULL POWER in Flanders, and that in all probability the mighty hopes that had been conceived in Spain of civil wars in France, had banish'd all thoughts of hastily proceeding to a peace.

After two months negotiation, M. de Turenne sent word to M. de Fuenfaldagne that having done on his side every thing he had obliged himself to do in order to a peace, he was setting out for Paris: he at the same time thank'd him for the assistance he had received from the King of Spain, and the civility which he had shewn him on all occasions, and acquainted him likewise that he would give order for three or four hundred horse, which were left him after the battle of Rhetel, and which he had raised in Germany, to come to him in France.

An. 1651. During M. de Turenne's abode at Stenai, after Madame de Longueville was gone from thence, he perceived by several letters from the Prince, and the advices he had from Paris, that he often changed his mind since his releasement from prison, sometimes wishing that M. de Turenne would come away to Paris, and at other times liking better he should continue at Stenai, according to the desire he had either to be speedily re-possest of a place which M. de Turenne by his returning would restore to him, or to continue in a strict friendship with the Spaniards. When Madame de Longueville set out from Stenai, she would needs engage M. de Turenne to give her his word, to continue always in the Prince's interests: but he, believing, after he had shewn so great a disinterestedness during the Prince's confinement, he might be at liberty to act as he thought fitting, told Madame de Longueville that he could not give her his word to do as she desired; but that after he had withdrawn his people out of Stenai, yielded up the place into the Prince's hands, and satisfied the Spaniards touching the article of peace, he would repair to Paris, where he would see the Prince, and there take his measures. Accordingly M. de Turenne, after Madame de Longueville was set out, till the time he went to Paris, would observe no other rule for his behaviour, but that of giving all the time necessary for coming off well with the Spaniards touching the article of peace; having no manner of impatience to go to Paris, where however he well knew that all those of the Prince's party were taking measures for their own private interests; but he did not think that minding his own affairs, by hastening thither, could well accord with the time which he would allow to convince the Spaniards, that the obstacle of the peace proceeded from the Archduke's not having full power to treat. M. de Turenne having been fully informed herein, and convinced that it was to no purpose to continue any longer at Stenai, he set out from thence, and returned to Paris. Knowing that the Prince and a great many persons of quality would be for coming to meet him, he without the affectation of desiring him not to do it, came to Paris a day sooner than he had given out he would, not being at all fond of such sort of honours, which must needs have an ill grace, when one comes from among the enemy, and enters a place where the King and Queen reside.

At this time, the Queen was secretly governed by the counsels of the Cardinal alone, though outwardly every thing seemed to be against his returning into France. Nay, the Parliament made frequent remonstrances thereupon; but though the King and Queen gave for answer that they might depend upon it that the Cardinal would never be recalled to Court, yet all such as would obtain favours from the Queen, made their application to the Cardinal at Cologne. The Prince held frequent Councils at the Hotel de Longueville, was upon very good terms with the Duke of Orleans, and very rarely went to the Palais Royal. The Cardinal, when he caused him to be released from Havre, fancied he should make up all the differences with him. After he was arrived at Paris, he expressed a willingness to complete the Prince of Conti's marriage with Mademoiselle de Chevreuse, which was one of the conditions on which the coadjutor had employed his endeavours to procure his enlargement. When M. de Turenne arrived at Paris, the match was broke off, the Coadjutor was very ill with the Prince, who desiring the government of Guyenne for himself, and of Provence for the Prince of Conti, began to make up with the Court again, without however, as he said, having any communication with the Cardinal: but it is very certain that Madame de Longueville and the Prince of Conti did negotiate with the Minister by the means of the Princess Palatine, and did promise that the Prince should grow more easy in the point of the Cardinal's return, provided he had what he ask'd. The Prince came to see M. de Turenne as soon as ever he heard he was arrived, took him to the Louvre, and from thence to dinner with him, and afterwards there was a meeting as usual at the Hotel de Longueville; but M. de Turenne after that day never went thither any more; having easily perceived both by the advices he had at Stenai, and by what he saw at Paris, that there was nothing stirring but private interests and fair outside appearances, which might deceive such as had no clear insight into things. The Prince assured M. de Turenne that he should always be ready to do him the same service he had lately received from him, and would very fain have had him ask for something at Court, and promised to solicit it for him. Mean while, the King's troops having had good winter-quarters assign'd them, were again in a good condition, but those of M. de Turenne

An. 1651. which alone had employ'd themselves for the Prince's liberty, remained without any establishment or any quarters. The Prince offered indeed his service to speak about it, but he did not stir in it as a thing which he had much at heart.

It would require a great deal of time to speak at large of every particular changing of sides made by the principal persons of the Court, which was reduced to a very low ebb, distrusting almost all people of quality resorting thither, and not daring to execute any bold stroke by taking up, or so much as shewing the least ill-will against any person whatsoever. M. de Turenne having upon all occasions acted against the interest of Cardinal Mazarin, had no thoughts of reconciling himself with him, nor did he shew himself in any manner of haste to gain the Queen's favour; but he saw so much unsteadiness in the Prince's way of thinking, that he would enter into no new engagement with him. Nay, long after his return to Paris, Madame de Longueville desiring to know of him whether he would continue in his adherence to the Prince's interest, he told her that what he had done in time past gave him reason, seeing him at liberty, to think maturely before he engaged himself again. He always retained the same disposition, pretty often visiting the Prince, who liv'd in good intelligence with him, but who had his mind so agitated with different thoughts, that M. de Turenne was of opinion, whether he stood well or ill with the Court, he could never form any sure tie with him. Not but that the Prince express'd himself highly obliged to him, and had in reality a great esteem for him, and as much friendship as for any man whatever: but M. de Turenne considered that it was not consistent with reason to engage himself against the Court in a labyrinth of affairs, which he knew tended only to procure advantages to a small number of people, without any view to the public good.

These considerations fixed him, 'tis true, in a resolution not to join with the Prince's party since his coming out of prison; but neither did they put him upon any mean compliances with the Court. He wish'd affairs were in such a condition that M. de Bouillon and he might again be well with it, but he took no unbecoming steps thereto. During the Cardinal's absence, those who bore the greatest sway did not desire that either M. de Bouillon or M. de Turenne

renne should strongly unite with the Court; and tho' the An. 1651. Prince made great advances to the two Brothers, yet M. de Turenne was possess'd with a notion, that he had better do any thing than engage in his party, since what had pass'd; and was firmly resolv'd to live for the future a stranger to all cabals.

Some time before the Prince had the Government of Guyenne bestow'd on him, and upon the Court's making a difficulty to give that of Provence to the Prince of Conti, both sides began to grow more and more suspicious, and the cabal which supported the Prince in his pretensions, began to lose strength. The Prince seeing it could not procure for him what he desired, set himself against it, and link'd himself closer than ever with the Duke of Orleans, with the Malecontents, and with Madame de Longueville, who was dissatisfied with the Court's delaying to give the Government of Provence to the Prince of Conti, and who had no great desire to return to Normandy. All these things oblig'd the Prince to forbear going to the Queen, and he had notice given him that since this new coolness there was some private talk of a design to put him under arrest. These whisperings, joined with an alarm he had one night, that some Soldiers were seen marching towards the Hotel de Condé, oblig'd him to get away very early in the morning to St. Maur, two leagues from Paris.

That day, all such as were entirely attached to his interest went and waited on him, and M. de Turenne waited on the Queen. As, during the few days he staid at St. Maur, there was a talk of a negotiation, and many went to visit him who had given him no manner of promise, M. de Turenne went thither also: he had a discourse with him, which lasted two hours, in the park, where they both went to take the air together, and there were no compliments which the Prince did not make him, in expressing how greatly desirous he was to have him of his party, whose strength he set forth by the number of Provinces that would declare for him, and by the situation the Court was in. M. de Turenne kept steady to his first resolve, not to enter into any engagement, neither would he come to any explanation with him about the reasons which hindered him from going into this affair; which indeed were of such a nature, as made it fit he should

An. 1651. keep them to himself to govern his own conduct by, and ~~not~~ not divulge them to others, well-knowing they would have no effect, and being perfectly acquainted with the temper of the persons who were to make the cabal.

Nor long after this, the Prince returned to Paris, still upon very bad terms with the Court; and the negotiations producing no fruit, he went to Montrond with the Prince of Conti and Madame de Longueville; and at length into Guyenne, where he began to declare openly against the Court. The chief Ministers who opposed the Prince's establishments, had push'd at him as much as they could to get him out of Paris; and when he made some proposals of an accommodation, they gave an ill turn to them: This whole cabal longing for his absence, and to see things carried to extremes against him. Neither did these Gentlemen find their account in M. de Bouillon and M. de Turenne's abiding at Court. About this time, the Court went to Bourges, and from thence to Poitiers, without communicating their measures to the two brothers, out of a persuasion that this treatment would drive them into the Prince's party, or into that of the Duke of Orleans, which was forming at Paris. M. de Turenne was still of opinion to stand for some time as a cypher, rather than embark in any of these intrigues.

An. 1652. Mean time, the Duke of Orleans and the Parliament of Paris were alarmed at the return of Cardinal Mazarin, who having staid in Germany since the Prince was set at liberty, went and re-join'd the Court at Poitiers with four or five thousand men, which he had raised, and some troops which he had pick'd up on the frontier. M. de Bouillon's affair which he was soliciting the Parliament about, was at its crisis; and this kept M. de Turenne at Paris a month longer than he wish'd: for he had a mind to get to Court at the same time with Cardinal Mazarin. As soon as M. de Bouillon's affair was over, M. de Turenne going to Poitiers, perceiv'd that the Court would be so altered by the Cardinal's return, that M. de Bouillon and he would be well received there; the Cardinal having always written very much in their favour, when once he knew they were not embark'd with the Prince: whereas all who were about the King in the Cardinal's absence, made it their business to prejudice the two Brothers.

M. de Turenne found the Court wholly governed by An. 1652. the Cardinal; but affairs were in a great perplexity, as well by the war the Prince was making in Guyenne, as by the Duke of Orleans's troops which he had got together again on the river Loire. Besides, the Parliament of Paris had set a price on Cardinal Mazarin's head, and had entirely attached themselves to the Duke of Orleans. The Court quitted Poitiers, and went to Saumur, escorted by the troops which the Cardinal had brought. The Marshal Hocquincourt led them on afterwards to the walls of Angers, which surrendered after some days siege; and the bridge of Cé was likewise taken. The Court went from thence to Tours, and afterwards to Blois. At the same time M. de Nemours brought six thousand men from Flanders, consisting of the Prince's troops, and the German regiments which the Spaniards had given him. They found no difficulty in crossing through France, there being no troops to oppose them, and came and joined Gaston's troops in the neighbourhood of Orleans, which city, by Mademoiselle's arrival, kept firm to the party of the Princes.

In these circumstances the Court got together some troops which were at Montrond, and sent for more from Champagne; and M. de Turenne accepted of the command of them. 'Twas thought at Court that he would make some difficulty about Marshal Hocquincourt's joining him with the troops which had brought back Cardinal Mazarin; but seeing that there was a necessity to proceed directly to the retrieving of affairs, at a time when they were in so bad a condition, he made no manner of scruple of it; and two days afterwards, fearing lest the enemy should seize the bridge of Gergeau, he repaired thither. M. de Palluau was arrived there the day before by his order, and had broke down part of the bridge. As M. de Turenne brought thither but a handful of men, the King's Army being six or seven leagues off, he caused the bridge to be repaired to give a jealousy to the enemy, and make them believe he would attack them, not imagining that on their part they would entertain the least thoughts of forcing the bridge. This however did not hinder him from marching thither; at first there were only two hundred Musketeers of the regiment of Uxelles, without ammunition. Orders were sent to hasten the march of three or four regiments of foot

An. 1652 which were two leagues off; but while they were coming up, the enemy made their utmost effort, and carried above half the bridge. M. de Turenne, the Marshal d'Hocquincourt, and a great many Officers made a barricado in what was left them of the bridge, there being no longer any Soldiers that could fire, for want of ammunition; and the enemy's cannon all the while annoy'd them very much. M. de Longpré was wounded there with a splinter, as likewise several Officers. At last, after having maintained this post a long time against all the enemy's troops, the regiments came up, which obliged the enemy to keep on t'other side the water. The Court passed pretty near the place in their way to Sulli, and those regiments were above three hours before they arrived. So that had the enemy made a push at the barricade, they had certainly carried the bridge, and the King and Queen would have run a great risk; for the Army not being got together, they would have found some difficulty to escape. We broke down the bridge of Gergeau; and that of Gien being of great consequence, we march'd thither with the whole Army, which, two days after, crossed the river Loire there, and the Court went thither likewise to reside.

News was at the same time brought that the Prince was come from Guyenne, and had joined his Army with six or seven persons along with him; and after the rebels had made great rejoicings for his coming, he marched to Montargis, which surrendered immediately, there being no body there to defend it. His Army consisted of six or seven thousand foot, and five thousand horse, being made up of M. d'Orleans's troops, his own, and this reinforcement from Flanders. The King's Army had four or five thousand foot, and four thousand horse. It was in the month of April, and there was no means of subsisting together upon account of forrage; so that the King's Army, after passing the river Loire at Gien, marched behind the canal of Briare, that they might have a little more room to extend themselves. The Marshal d'Hocquincourt took up his Quarters at Bleneau with all his troops, and M. de Turenne with his at Briare. Next day, he went and dined at Bleneau with Marshal d'Hocquincourt, who told him, that having sent out parties to Chateaufrenard, intelligence was brought him, that the Prince was marching towards Burgundy. When M. de Turenne had left him and got
back

back to his own quarters, he had notice at seven a clock that evening by a messenger from Marshal d'Hocquincourt, that the Prince was marching directly to Bleneau; and in fact the Prince having learnt that the Marshal's quarters were a little scattered, marched strait to Chatillon, and from thence to the Canal, on which the Marshal d'Hocquincourt had posted his Dragoons: the Prince having carried that post without any resistance, passed the canal with his whole Army at the close of the day. Marshal d'Hocquincourt not believing his march could be so expeditious, and confiding that his Dragoons would have held out longer at the passage of the canal, had waited a little while before he got his troops together; but receiving advice that the Dragoons were attack'd on the canal, he sent in all haste for his cavalry, which was very near him, and marched where the alarm was. He found the Prince was actually passed; and resolving to oppose him behind a village which was a pretty way off the place where he had passed, he charged twice or thrice with his cavalry, which was broken; his infantry not having time to come to the rendezvous, retired to Bleneau. The few that were in the field were dispersed; but as it was night, the cavalry lost no great number of men: their baggage was entirely plundered; and the enemy not daring to follow them over-hastily, the Marshal d'Hocquincourt, after he had done all that was possible in the action, retiring with a good party near to Bleneau, marched along the road to St. Fargeau.

M. de Turenne, as soon as he had notice that the enemy was marching, sent in all haste to his cavalry which were in three or four villages within a league of him, and ordered them to repair between Bleneau and Ozoüer, where M. de Navailles was with four regiments. As for his part, he hastened thither with what infantry he had in his quarter. When he was got upon the heights of Ozoüer, he received advice by persons he had sent to Marshal d'Hocquincourt to let him know of his marching, that the enemy were in full march between Ozoüer and Bleneau. He saw two or three of Marshal d'Hocquincourt's quarters on fire; and it being in the night, we heard as we went aside at some little distance from the troops, the sound of the enemies drums and kettle-drums. Some would fain have flattered themselves that it was only a strong party; but it was presently notorious that the Prince's whole Ar-

An. 1652. my was there. M. de Turenne had with him no more than two regiments of horse, and two thousand foot; the whole cavalry not being as yet at the rendezvous, which was, as I have said, between Ozouër and Bleneau. Nevertheless M. de Turenne, perceiving that if he did not go and meet his cavalry, they would be intercepted by the enemy, and his Army thereby routed, and all affairs ruin'd, judged that by favour of the night he might venture this march, tho' very near the enemy, and so went towards Bleneau, in hopes to meet his cavalry on the way. We had no guides, and ever and anon listened to know whether we did not draw too near the enemy's Army. At day break M. de Turenne found himself in a large plain, and resolved to wait there for his cavalry, which he saw appear as soon as the sun arose. As soon as ever he had joined them, he chose rather to march up directly to the Prince, though inferior to him two thirds in troops, than wait for him, and give him time entirely to defeat Marshal d'Hocquincourt. Having march'd a quarter of a league into the plain, he came to a little wood, and commanded his horse and foot to halt on the hither side of it, and with six squadrons he passed beyond, and saw the Prince's whole Army advancing, having given over the pursuit of Marshal d'Hocquincourt, upon receiving advice of M. de Turenne's marching against him. The first thing M. de Turenne did was to lead back those six squadrons, well knowing that if he should attempt to fight it out with the Prince at this little wood, he had not infantry capable of standing against his; and that the Prince, after he had driven his infantry out of the wood by the fire, the cavalry alone would make but little resistance, and especially after being hurt by the fire, which they must sustain in supporting the infantry.

Before the Prince arrived in the wood, M. de Turenne withdrew all his infantry, and ranged in battalia at such a distance, that the Prince's infantry which was in the wood, could do him no damage; and withal he did this in such a manner, that the Prince could not draw up in order of battle, M. de Turenne not having left him ground to do it in. They both continued some time in presence of each other. The Prince having extended his two wings, and making as if he resolved to pass in battle-array that little wood, there being nothing to hinder his coming at

M. de

M. de Turenne, but only a small causey, which was cast An. 1652. up by the Peasants for a boundary to distinguish their properties.

Continuing some time in this posture, and the Prince's Army appearing no longer in the wood, M. de Turenne believing they were marching secretly, and might be endeavouring to reach a place at a greater distance from him, where they might draw up in order of battle, march'd along the plain towards the place whither the enemy were filing off; but the Prince thinking he was retreating, began to cause his Army to pass, which M. de Turenne observing, suddenly faced about, and return'd in battalia to the same place which he had quitted; but he hindered his men from charging the enemy. The Prince at the same time re-pass'd the causey; and M. de Turenne causing his cannon to advance, made a great execution of the troops of the enemy, who had a multitude both of Officers and Soldiers killed.

And now Marshal d'Hocquincourt being persuaded that M. de Turenne had not retreated, came up with his cavalry, instead of repassing the river Loire, as a great many persons had advised him to do. M. de Bouillon came likewise with a great number of persons of quality from the Court which was at Gien, whither some had fled, affirming that the Army was entirely defeated. Both Armies stood looking on each other till night, and then retired on both sides, the King's Army to Briare, and that of the Prince to Chatillon, who not having attack'd the infantry which was left in Bleneau, went the next night and rejoin'd the Army. Some days after, the Prince departed from Chatillon; his Army made the best of their way to Montargis, and he himself went to Paris, where he thought his presence was necessary.

The King's Army having march'd to St. Fargeau, M. de Turenne was of opinion, that if he made good haste, the Prince's Army would not in his absence so soon take a resolution to march, and that he might possibly get the start of them, put himself between Paris and the enemy, secure Corbeil and Melun for the King, prevent the recruits which were raising at Paris from coming to the Army of the Princes, cut off their communication with that capital, and thereby totally ruin their whole party.

The Court went thro' Auxerre and Sens to get to Melun,

An. 1652. lun, while the Army leaving Montargis on the left, came very near, in order to give a jealousy to the Army of the Princes; and marching day and night, arrived at Moret, where news was brought that the enemy, departing from Montgaris, intended by going thro' la Ferté to gain a rivulet which runs to Villeroi; but having dislodged too late, as M. de Turenne had foreseen, for want of leaders, and likewise delaying too long to come to a resolution, the King's Army crossed the river at Moret; and from thence marching thro' Fountainbleau, arrived at la Ferté an hour before that of the Princes, who not daring to go on to Villeroi, turned on the left to Estampes, where they put themselves under cover, after they had let the King's Army execute their design: the latter taking up their quarters at Chatres, where they took a great number of prisoners, who were going from Paris to the Rebels Army.

The Court came to Melun, and M. de Turenne was very earnest for having them go directly to Paris, where Monsieur and the Prince were without troops, and could no longer lay any stress on their Army: besides, there was in the city so great cabals against them, that the people would not have taken arms against the King supported by his Army. There were reasons which hindered them from doing this, and which were not without appearance of a just foundation: so the King went to St. Germain, where with some companies of guards and others detach'd from the Army, almost all the avenues about Paris were taken, after having defeated some parties which came out, and driven them back to the very gates of the suburbs.

The Army of the Princes remained some time at Estampes, and that of the King at Chatres. As Mademoiselle at her return from Orleans remained at Estampes two days, and advice was brought that the Army of the Princes had not been out a foraging, because they were desirous to pass in review before her; and that the same day on which she would come to Chatres in her way to Paris with a passport, the Army would go a foraging; M. de Turenne proposed to Marshal d'Hocquincourt, which he entirely approved of, to leave all the baggage at Chatres, march all night, and to be in the neighbourhood of Estampes between two and three in the morning, to see if they could undertake any thing. M. de Turenne still fancied that the Prince being absent from the Army, the General Officers would

would be in no very good posture to receive an enemy, An. 1652. and it happened accordingly: the Army of the Princes did not go to forrage, nor did Mademoiselle see the review till the morning when the King's troops approached near Estampes. The Army of the Princes was without doubt vastly stronger than the King's. We made a hasty march, in hopes to find them in the field, and Marshal d'Hocquincourt had the van. When we were got above Estampes, we saw the enemy retire into the town. We continued marching as far as the eminences of the suburb, where we saw a great number of foot and some squadrons: we at the same time perceived on a rising-ground behind the suburb a great body of horse in order of battle; but there being two or three distinct suburbs, a very large town, a Country divided by two rivulets, and a world of little hills, it was no easy matter for us to discern the enemy's true posture. We resolved to attack that suburb, where was the body of foot with an intrenchment quite round them, and a brook before them. The battle was very obstinate: the Count de Broglio, M. de Navailles, and M. de Vaubecourt behav'd mighty well, and the infantry were a long time engaged in a close fight; though the King's infantry perform'd their duty to admiration, it was Turenne's regiment alone which prevailed on the left over the enemy's infantry: A great many Officers and Soldiers of other regiments joining themselves under their colours, four or five regiments of cavalry entered the suburb, and broke the enemy's horse which supported their foot. The regiment of Uxelles was ordered to post themselves in the suburb which faced the city, where his Highness's regiment and that of Languedoc being inclosed, made vigorous efforts to regain the post, that they might afterwards second their men in the suburb: nay, once the regiment of Uxelles was so shaken, that they began to quit their post. M. de Turenne meeting with the Mestre de Camp's regiment of horse, marched with it with all diligence, to support that other regiment, and helped it to regain its post, which it kept afterwards. Marshal d'Hocquincourt did very well in the suburb; and after a fight of three hours, we entirely defeated nine regiments of infantry, and four or five squadrons of cavalry, and took two thousand prisoners, and a great number of Officers.

An. 1652. As soon as the action in the suburb was over, the enemy's cavalry, which was upon an eminence, re-entered the town: the King's Army went a league from thence, and next day to Chatres. Two days after, we quartered at Paliseau, the better to cut off all communication between Paris and the Army that was at Estampes; and some cavalry of our Army was ordered to the Court at St. Germain, with which body and some companies of guards, M. de Turenne recovered Isle-Adam, and afterwards St. Denis, where we left a garrison, and we drove before us all that came out of Paris back to the very gates, after taking a great many prisoners. The Duke of Orleans and the Prince being at Paris, could have no relief from their Army; and had nothing but some few recruits about them.

As there was now nothing but the troops left at Estampes, that could give spirit or vigour to Paris and all the other towns of the party on this side the Loire, M. de Turenne thought he must make his principal push there, and oblige them either to quit Estampes, that he might give them battle, or ruin them therein by famine. He ask'd the necessary things of the Court; but they could not furnish, by a great deal, what was wanted for tools and warlike stores. Notwithstanding this defect, M. de Turenne thought he ought not to give over his enterprize, and that his time could not be better employ'd than in endeavouring to disperse that Army, which was the foundation of the civil war. He marched therefore with the King's Army, and went and pitched on a mountain close to Estampes. Getting thither betimes in the morning, he took before night all the houses without the town, after a good deal of skirmishing.

There were in the town three or four thousand foot, and three thousand horse: M. de Turenne had six thousand foot, and four thousand horse. He lodged the troops which Marshal d'Hocquincourt had commanded, (who was gone to his government) on the right hand, under the command of M. de Navailles, and posted himself on the left, possessing all the eminences on the side of Estampes: he would not stir from a rivulet on the other side till he had made a good entrenchment there. We began to make a line against the town, which was not above a good musket-shot off: we had no occasion to make any other, there

there being no enemy to be apprehended on the side of An. 1652.
the Country. Those within the town made frequent sallies; and the work going on very slow for want of tools, we could scarce put it in a condition to hinder the horses from leaping it in almost every part. One day, as the Soldiers were at work with seven or eight squadrons to support them, the besieged made a sally, killed fourscore or a hundred of them, push'd the guard of those seven or eight squadrons, and came very forward out of the town. Almost all the horse were out a foraging; but all the Officers ran to the charge, and drove the enemy back again with great briskness. There were abundance killed on both sides.

The lines being finished, we applied ourselves to keep the enemies cavalry from going out on the other side of the town to forrage. We took our posts to shut them up in that part, and no day pass'd without some action. The corn of Beausse, which they had laid up at Estampes, subsisted the besieged some time; but at length they began to be very much put to't for forrage, when M. de Turenne heard that M. de Lorraine, who had re-assembled his troops in Alsace and Flanders, was engaged in the party of the Princes, and marching towards Paris. As he at first averr'd that he came to serve the Court, he had provisions given him throughout France for his passage. This news made M. de Turenne change all his measures; and judging that he could not better pass the campaign, than in dispersing the Army of the Princes, which a month before was stronger than the King's, and made up of old regiments, he cast about to make some attempt against the town, to see if he could not take it before M. de Lorraine approached, well knowing that so soon as ever he was within seven or eight leagues of him, he must draw off and retire. Having no artillery-equipage, the King's horses were sent him, as likewise those of the Queen, and of several persons of Quality, and a battery was begun to be raised: the enemy had before the wall which was to be battered, a large half-moon, which we carried in the night time after a sharp conflict: we remained masters of it till day-break, and then the enemy sallied out again from the town, and those who had the keeping of the half-moon, having taken a fright, the enemy regain'd it. There was no such thing as a trench to go to it, nor any cover but a little valley, which was two hundred

An. 1652. hundred paces off. All the foot were discouraged, both by the night-engagement, and by the loss of the half-moon. M. de Turenne seeing at dawn of day that the enemy neglected the lodgment of the half-moon, went away to his quarters; but hearing an alarm, he returned with all speed: he commanded his regiment of foot to go and retake the half-moon, who placing their colours at their head, without any troops to second them, march'd thro' the open field; and receiving the whole fire of the curtain, entered the ditch of the half-moon, which was tumbled down by the work in the night, mounted the top of it, fixed their colours on the parapet, entered therein, drove the enemy out, and made a lodgment. This action passed in view of the whole Army, and was thought to be one of the gallantest that had been performed since the war. The beleagued left things in this posture till two a clock in the afternoon: then they sallied afresh with four battalions and twenty squadrons of horse, designing to proceed to the battery, and retake the half-moon; but after an engagement of a very long continuance, and wherein a world of Officers and Soldiers on both sides were killed or wounded, they retired into the town, without having had any advantage. Thus we kept the half-moon, from whence we continued to demolish the fortifications of the place.

In the suburb, where the regiment of guards made their attack, a lodgment was contriving, in order to apply the miners to the walls of the town, when advice came that M. de Lorraine (having concluded his treaty with the Princes, who pressed him to hasten the relief of Estampes) was marching with all expedition to Paris; he quartered his Army along the river Seine, a little above Charenton: a bridge of boats was immediately brought him from Paris. It being now impossible for M. de Turenne to continue any longer before Estampes, having an enemy behind him, without lines of circumvallation, or means to forrage, sent to Court to let them know he was forced to raise the siege. As he was totally unprovided with artillery-equipage, horses were sent him from Court. In two or three turns, he brought away his cannon from the batteries, and carried off all the stores into a small enclosed town, two leagues from Estampes, and afterwards retired with the Army.

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When M. de Lorraine found that the siege of Estampes An. 1652. was raised, he continued in his post, and making a merit to the Princes of his having caused the raising of the siege, he at the same time began again to negotiate with the Court: but as he had acted in this manner ever since he left his own Country, no body laid any stress on his professions. M. de Turenne hearing that he was not intrench'd, but had pitch'd in a plain, after staying four days from the raising the siege of Estampes, order'd his baggage to follow him to Corbeil, where he left it. Hearing that M. de Lorraine was march'd to Villeneuve Saint George, which was a better post, he march'd on, cross'd a wood, and was informed that M. de Lorraine's whole Army having taken the alarm, was lodged on an eminence, with a rivulet before them, which was not fordable. Notwithstanding this advantage, M. de Turenne without loss of time march'd towards him. Coming to a rising-ground, over-against M. de Lorraine's camp, the rivulet between them, he sent parties along the side, to see if there was no bridge or ford: being informed that half a league from the enemy's camp, there was a bridge which might be made fit, he marched thither with all possible expedition, caused some planks to be put in order again; and having seized a house on the other side, began to cause his Soldiers to file off one after another over that bridge.

M. de Lorraine would not stir a step out of his camp, having caused six redoubts to be raised in all haste towards the plain, and being covered in the flanks by the river, a wood, and a brook. The King's troops having all passed over before night; and M. de Turenne finding that if he did not gain the bridge on the Seine which M. de Lorraine had caused to be brought up along with him, the Army from Estampes would come and join that Prince, hastened his march all night through defiles, and was at day-break with his whole Army in the plain, where there was nothing now that could hinder him from marching to the enemy's camp. Had the Army of the Princes joined that of the Lorrainers, the King's Army must not have retired, but the Court must have made use of it to escort them to Lyons. Affairs were at such a crisis, that two or three hours might have given things a new face. When day light appear'd, we were a little recovered of the disorder occasioned by our nocturnal march, and advanced, in order, directly to M. de

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Lorraine's

An. 1652. Lorrain's camp. This Prince having, as usual, negotiated away all the preceding days, sent his Captain of the Guards to M. de Turenne, as soon as he knew he was marching up to him. Mean while, he set men at work to make lines between his redoubts towards the plain. M. de Beaufort was in his camp with a thousand or twelve hundred men of the troops of the Princes. M. de Turenne presently found that this Captain of Guards only came to retard his march; and there being nothing so much to be feared as a negotiation at a distance from the Lorrainers camp, he lost not a moment's time, but advanced strait to the camp, desiring above all things to be ascertained whether the troops from Estampes were passed over the bridge, and at all adventures to attack M. de Lorrain before they joined him, the whole of affairs in France depending on this one thing.

We were within a league and a half of the camp when the Captain of the Guards arrived in the King's Army; and it was near three hours before the Army, which march'd in battalia, had got close up to M. de Lorrain's camp. Then the Captain of the Guards returned to his own master, and oftentimes came back to M. de Turenne, who would not give ear to any negotiation, unless M. de Lorrain quitted France with his Army. The King of England, who arrived in the evening in M. de Lorrain's camp, sent likewise some of his people to wait on the Duke of York, who was with M. de Turenne, who chose rather to fight, than suffer the Army from Estampes to join M. de Lorrain; but he much more desired to make him go out of France with his Army, and to separate him entirely from that of the Princes, than to hazard a doubtful battle. On the side of the plain, which was the only accessible place to come at the camp, there was a wood on the right hand, a river on the left, and in front six redoubts, which front was so narrow, that M. de Lorrain, besides three lines of cavalry, had likewise a thousand horse of reserve: his foot was in the redoubts, and five hundred Musketeers in the wood. He was stronger, by fifteen squadrons, than the King's Army, which on the other hand had fifteen hundred foot more than he. This was a situation, as appeared soon after, where a small Army could have fought a very great one to advantage: however, M. de Lorrain seeing the King's Army within half a cannon shot
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of him, and all the men detached in order to attack the wood and redoubts, and others marching directly to his bridge, which he had below him at Villeneuve S. George, sent word to M. de Turenne that he would subscribe that minute to quit France. Immediately M. de Turenne sent some infantry to take possession of the bridge on the Seine, having signified by M. de Varennes, that, before all things, he would be sure of that. Afterwards the Army was ordered to halt; and the two Generals signed the treaty, by which it was stipulated, that M. de Lorraine should immediately march with his Army, and get out of France in twelve days time, by the route which was agreed on. M. de Lorraine left the Count de Ligneville and his Captain of the Guards by way of hostage for the performance of his word; and what was still more secure, his Army took such a march as left that of the King in a possibility of hindring its joining with the Army of the Princes, in case he had a mind to break the treaty. An hour after the treaty was signed, M. de Lorraine's Army began to file off from his intrenchments, and to march in presence of the King's Army, which stood to their arms in battle-array: they pursued their route according to treaty. M. de Beaufort was allowed to go to Paris with such of the troops of the Princes as he had with him, the major part whereof came over to the King's Army while the treaty was signing. The Army from Estampes began to appear on t'other side the water; and seeing the King's Army enter the camp of M. de Lorraine, who took the road to Brie, they march'd to Paris to secure themselves, and took up their quarters at S. Cloud.

After the King's Army had staid two days at Villeneuve, they march'd to Lagni, where they crossed the river, and lodged near Dammartin, in order to hinder the passing of a body of troops, which were said to be coming from Flanders, stealing along the river Oise: nay, the Prince had seized Poissi, to give them an opportunity to join him.

The Court, after staying some time at Melun, came to Lagni, where Marshal de la Ferté came and joined us with three thousand men. We went thence to St. Denis, where the Court staid, and boats were immediately fetch'd from Pontoise to make a bridge at Epinal, to enable us to march against the Prince's Army, which was encamp'd at St.

An. 1652. Cloud. We came to an island into which we ordered some Musketeers to pass over on a bridge of boats, and then we passed over the other arm. The Prince came with some squadrons and two or three hundred Musketeers to hinder the passing; but seeing there was a great many cannon already lodged, and some Musketeers which Marshal de la Ferté had caused to entrench with all haste on t'other side the water, he retired into his camp; and when night came on, passed his Army over two bridges he had at St. Cloud, and march'd with design to go to Charenton, believing that the bridge being finish'd, the King's Army would be all night passing there, and so the river would be still between the two Armies; but the main of the Army was still on this side the water.

The Court had a false account from Paris that the Army of the Princes was already marching behind Montmartre and skirting along the Fauxbourg St. Martin: the Cardinal gave immediate notice thereof to M. de Turenne, who hastened to St. Denis in the night time, and ordered the Army to follow him: he likewise ordered those in the island to come over again without loss of time. Marshal de la Ferté, on account that all his troops had cross'd the water, could not follow till five or six hours after. So, at day-break, all the King's Army, except Marshal de la Ferté's body, ranged in battalia in the plain between St. Denis and Paris. M. de Turenne advancing with ten or a dozen horse, passed through la Chapelle, and saw the infantry of the Prince's rear and some squadrons marching close by the Fauxbourg. The gross of the enemy's Army was thought to be much farther advanced towards St. Antoine and Charenton; but the night having stop't them at the *Cours* of the Queen Mother, they could not begin their march before day-break. When therefore M. de Turenne saw the rear, he suddenly caused some squadrons of horse to advance, and ordered the rest of the Army to follow. We came up with them in the Fauxbourg S. Martin; and as their infantry was still filing off, we charg'd four or five squadrons of their rear, and broke them, and took a good number of Officers and Troopers prisoners: we continued following them all along the Fauxbourgs as far as that of St. Antoine. There was a part of their van already at Charenton; but having had the alarm, they came and ranged in order of battle near the Fauxbourg St. Antoine, where

where the rear join'd them. The Prince likewise order'd An. 1652. his cannon to turn; and as the cavalry of the King's Army advanced, he caus'd some discharges to be made at them who waited for the coming up of the infantry, which because of the great defiles there are about Paris, were somewhat long a coming, and gave the Prince time to withdraw all his troops into the Fauxbourg, where he found all the streets ready barricaded to his hands, which was of great advantage to him. These barriers the people of Paris had made, on purpose to secure themselves against the scouts of M. de Lorraine's Army, while he was at Villeneuve St. George. The Prince posted his foot behind the outmost walls, which he caus'd to be bored, that the Musketeers might fire thro' them, and in all other respects put himself in an exceeding good posture.

Though the infantry of the King's Army was come up, 'twas thought adviseable to wait for the cannon; but the importunities of several Courtiers, as if he need only to advance, and the enemy would be entirely defeated, forced M. de Turenne to order a good number of foot guards, and other regiments, with the King's Gendarmes and Light-horse, and other regiments of horse, to make the onset by two different streets. They carried the first entrenchments; but being obliged to pass one by one, and there happening some confusion in following the enemy, they met, in the broader streets, with a body of horse with the Prince along with them, and a great many persons of quality, who charging that cavalry and infantry which entered in disorder as mentioned above, drove them back, without resistance, as far as the entrance of the Fauxbourg. M. de S. Maigrin, Lieutenant of the light-horse Guards, was killed here. We likewise attack'd at the same time such of the Prince's foot as were behind the walls and in the houses: the fight was very obstinate, and we got the better of them in a great many places; but this was after the cannon came up: we even took two hundred men in one house, but the gross of the enemy's regiments continued still behind the traverses of the Fauxbourg, from whence they had drove back our men. We took from them, on the left, a barricade, which we kept, wherein a great number of their Soldiers were kill'd; but we could not proceed farther any where, the whole infantry having been very much disheartened in these attacks.

An. 1652. And indeed, the Prince himself, who was hard press'd, by mere chance got into a Fauxbourg, which was strongly barricaded, his design having been to pass at the bridge of Charenton.

We being one before another, Marshal de la Ferté's corps arrived; and then we resolv'd to make another general attack, being reinforced by those troops. But by this time the city of Paris having, at Mademoiselle's earnest request, opened their gates to the Princes Army, they march'd thro' the middle of the town, and went on to the Fauxbourg S. Jacques. The King was come from S. Denis, and staid upon an eminence till night; and when we had march'd to make this second attack, there were no troops to be met with in that Fauxbourg, which oblig'd the Army to retire with the King to St. Denis.

While the Army of the Princes lay about the suburbs of S. Jacques, there happen'd a great disorder in the town-houſe of Paris. The bad condition of the affairs of the Princes, made them press the Army of Spain to leave Flanders and come to their assistance: that Army set out from the neighbourhood of Cambrai, and passing between St. Quentin and Ham, came to Chauni, where M. d'Elbeuf having shut himself up with eight hundred horse, they made him a prisoner of war; and taking hostages, they let the Troopers go, but on foot, and took away all their equipages and horses. M. de Lorrain, who had continued on the frontier of France ever since what had pass'd at Villeneuve S. George, march'd away immediately through Champagne to join the Army of Spain, who, after they had taken Chauni, came to Fismes to join M. de Lorrain.

The Court was at S. Denis when they heard of the Spanish Army's marching, and couriers were dispatch'd into Normandy, to know whether the King would be receiv'd at Rouen; but the bad posture of his affairs, occasioned by the Spanish Army's march, gave reason to believe there would be no safety for the King at Rouen. A few days before, a treaty with the Prince had been talk'd of. M. de Turenne's opinion was, that many things should be receded from, and that in case the King's authority continu'd unhurt after the accommodation, they could not give the Prince too much to get clear of these perplexities: but whatever concessions might have been granted him, the marching

ing of the Spaniards had taken away all his inclination of An. 1652. coming to any terms of reconciliation. The Court laboured under extreme difficulties; the King's Army did not amount to above eight thousand men; that of the Princes made full five thousand at Paris, and that of the Spaniards, join'd to the Lorrainers, no less than twenty thousand. Normandy refused to receive the King. The night this news was brought, M. de Turenne was in the camp; and going next day to S. Denis, he found that a resolution was taken to go with the Court to Burgundy and Lyons, taking only two thousand men to escort them. He learnt this from M. de Ruvigni, to whom he immediately said, that all was lost if they took that course: he was sufficiently acquainted with the affairs of Flanders, to know full well that the King, by retreating beyond Paris, would give the Spaniards an opportunity to advance to Soissons and Compiègne, which would make no resistance when once the Court was departed for Lyons. He on the contrary declared it to be his opinion, that if the King would resolve to tarry on the river Oise, and his Army march to Compiègne, the whole Spanish Army would not dare to march to Paris, for fear of leaving all Flanders naked, and the King's Army between it and them; that if they sent a considerable succour to the Prince, their Army at the same time would retire into Flanders, and not stay in the heart of France but with such a body of troops as should be much superior to the King's Army. M. de Turenne therefore judg'd, that there was no safety for the State but for the King and Court to keep between Paris and the Army of Spain. He further believed that at the worst, the King with somewhat of an Army had better be in one of his places on the river Somme, than by going to Lyons, leave a certain conquest to the Spaniards from Flanders quite to Paris. The ill-will and disaffection of Normandy was likewise too apparent, and the consternation was so great in all places, that there were but few towns which would not have opened their gates to the enemy. This obliged M. de Turenne to go to the Cardinal, who instantly concurr'd with him in opinion; and then waiting on the Queen, who never thought any counsels too dangerous, it was resolved the Court should go to Pontoise, and the Army march in all haste to Compiègne. As soon as it arrived there, advice was brought by the par-

An. 1652 ties that the enemy having taken Chauni, was marching to Fismes, having join'd M. de Lorraine. Marshal de la Ferté took some cavalry, and went to Chauni, which the enemy abandon'd, it being no place to keep. He returned by Soissons, which was secured by putting some troops into it. The Spaniards being at Fismes, and there being no free communication between Paris and them, they found that if they would go thither, as the Prince earnestly begg'd they would, they could not do it but with the whole Army, which they could by no means consent to: besides, they could send no considerable detachment from them to Paris, without being met by the King's Army. All these considerations put together made them resolve to return to Flanders, and leave a body of troops with M. de Lorraine, who continued on the frontier.

About this time M. de Turenne having had advice that M. de Bouillon, who was at Pontoise with the Court, was very ill, went thither without delay: he arrived there the eighth day of his illness, which increased still more and more: his distemper took away his speech as he drew towards his end, but he still retained his understanding in a good degree. He was glad to see M. de Turenne, who, beside the strict friendship which was between them, suffered a double loss, considering how M. de Bouillon stood with the Court. He had of late made himself more particularly known as a person very capable of great affairs; and if one may be allow'd to say it, had assumed a nobler manner of acting than any body at Court; Cardinal Mazarin had a particular confidence in him; and as the Minister had got an absolute ascendant over the King and Queen, there was no way to become considerable at Court but by his means. M. de Bouillon lived to the fourteenth day of his illness, and then died, to the great grief of all such as wished well to the State. M. de Turenne was very sensibly affected with his death, having always loved him, and being perfectly well beloved by him.

When M. de Turenne was at Pontoise, news was brought that the Army of Spain was retired, and that M. de Lorraine was still with the reinforcement which the Spaniards had left him. As there was always some negotiation depending between the Court on one side, and the Princes and the Parliament on t'other, intimation was given that if Cardinal Mazarin was removed, all things would be well again.

again. This was proposed as from the Princes, and hints were dropt that he might return one day, and that 'twas only to shew to the public, that no accommodation would be brought about, unless the Minister quitted the Kingdom; since his return to Court was the pretext for the war. M. de Turenne, to whom he mentioned it very freely, did not dissuade him from the thought he had to go to Sedan; but still he advised him to say that it was with a view to return. M. de Turenne would not be in an interest which he would weaken by disowning it. Besides, he well knew that a great many people would serve themselves of the dissimulation which the Court and Cardinal had a mind should be practised, by saying he would not return, in order more openly to endeavour in good earnest to prevent his return; and except the King and Queen, who desired his return, there were but very few at Court who did not strive heartily to hinder it.

The Cardinal set out from Pontoise, things being disposed in the manner I have said; M. de Turenne and M. le Tellier went with him as far as where the Army lay, where he took a small escort to go to Sedan. M. le Tellier returned to Court, and M. de Turenne continued in the Army which afterwards advanced to Dammartin, to get between Paris and the Army of M. de Lorraine, who, in the Cardinal's absence, began to negotiate at Court. Though the Court did not entirely trust him, they hearkened nevertheless to his proposals; and as it was by no means proper for the Army to remove too far from Pontoise, where the Court was, on account of the Army of the Princes being at Paris, it did not march to Champagne to drive M. de Lorraine out of the Kingdom, by means of the towns that favoured us; but the Prince having sent some cavalry to raise the siege of Monrond, eight squadrons were sent off from the King's Army to M. de Palluau, who was before Monrond.

Mean while, M. de Lorraine, who had promised the Spaniards to join the Army of the Princes which was at Paris, entered into a Treaty with the Court, to the end that no notice might be taken of the motions of his Army. Tho' the King's Army had their eye on it, yet the assurances which he gave of a speedy accommodation, made us not act with so much distrust; so that he set out from the neighbourhood

An. 1652 hood of Chalons, and hastened his march through la Brie, in order to gain the river Seine between Corbeil and Paris. The King's Army crossed the Marne at Lagni, and tho' greatly inferior to that of M. de Lorraine, we resolved to oppose his passage to Paris. M. de Turenne was for marching next day after he had crossed the Marne, thinking that M. de Lorraine was advancing, without any certainty of it; but as people are sometimes remis, we lay by that day, and early the next we found M. de Lorraine close by Brie-Comte-Robert. Had we march'd the preceding day, we had been before-hand with him; but the vanguards being near one another at Brie-Comte-Robert, M. de Lorraine hastened to gain the post of Villeneuve, where he designed to fix himself, in order to have a communication with Paris.

M. de Turenne, who was in the van, after staying a little for Marshal de la Ferté, resolved to march on immediately to gain the post of Villeneuve S. George before M. de Lorraine. Accordingly we march'd with such diligence, that we arriv'd at the same time his Army did; but he having a rivulet to pass over, and seeing some squadrons of the King's Army on the heights of Villeneuve, he remained on t'other side, and so the King's whole Army got in the evening to the camp at Villeneuve S. George. We learn'd in the town that there were some boats which were going down to Paris; and as it was a thing of the utmost consequence to have boats either for making a bridge, or for conveying troops over the water, M. de Turenne sent and had them brought up the river with extreme difficulty over against Villeneuve S. George. The Prince advanced to Charenton, thinking M. de Lorraine was arriv'd at Villeneuve S. George, according as he had sent him word in the morning when he left his camp; having sent three or four of his people who came hurrying into the King's Army, taking it to be M. de Lorraine's, he went by another way all night long, and join'd his troops with M. de Lorraine over-against Ablon. M. de Turenne and the Marshal de la Ferté, not being able to prevent this junction, resolved to wait in the camp of Villeneuve, and see what course the enemy would take, having secured boats, and hoping that, wherever the enemy was, having a bridge on the river, they would still find some expedient to put themselves in a good posture. The thing was not without great difficulty;

difficulty; but being so near the enemy, there was nothing less safe than to endeavour a retreat. When the Prince and M. de Lorraine were join'd, they march'd to take the same road as M. de Turenne had done when he forced M. de Lorraine to a treaty. It was expected that day that they would attack the camp, as it had been thought they would the day of their junction. The King's Army had but twenty eight squadrons, and five thousand foot: the enemy had fourscore squadrons, and eight thousand foot. Instead of attacking us, they entrench'd themselves within cannon-shot towards the plain, and thought to starve the King's Army, and hinder the foragers, having left in Ablon a hundred and fifty Musketeers to cut off the communication of the river. They fancied that lodging so near with the Army, we would not attempt to get out of our camp or attack them. As we could not continue in the camp without having the river free, we resolved to go and take those hundred and fifty Musketeers. We set out in the night, and at break of day the castle was taken before the Army of the Princes could get into order. Had they remained in their first post between Villeneuve and Corbeil, it is certain that in four days time the King's Army must have retreated in great confusion to Lagni, not being able to get ammunition bread but by the means of the river.

After the bridge of boats was made, we fell to work on another, it being impossible the foragers could all have the use of one bridge; and as this place was made very desolate and ruinous by M. de Lorraine's Army some time before, the three or four first days that the Armies were in presence of each other, all the horses of that of the King liv'd upon nothing but vine-leaves; so that the Prince concluded, that cooping it up with his numerous cavalry, we could subsist in that post but a few days. He likewise made two bridges between Villeneuve and Charenton, to hinder the foragers who went in the long boyau [a particular branch of an entrenchment.] But after we had well pallisaded all our entrenchments, we sent a good part of the cavalry to forrage, who went on both sides the river; and thus the enemy could lay no certain ambushade for them. We sent M. de Vaubecourt to Corbeil with some troops, which with others from Monrond, made about two thousand in all. Thus Corbeil serv'd for a fort
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An. 1652 of mart for the forragers, who, after they had loaded, tarried in that village, and notice was sent them from the camp on which side of the river they should come back again. The Armies being so near that we could see whatever went out of the enemy's camp, the forragers of the King's Army set out in the night time, and tarried two days abroad. The troops at Corbeil enabled them to do this with ease, without which, 'tis certain, we could not have remained in the camp: likewise at the same time were sent down the river some boats loaded with hay, by which means we staid five weeks in the camp. There were oftentimes skirmishes between the Armies; but they were no considerable ones, and not any one convoy of forragers was ever met by the enemy, tho' they were every day out with part of their cavalry.

At last, the roads grew so bad by the continual rains, that the horses could not go so far for their forrage as before; so that we were obliged to think of breaking up. We had made a good number of bridges on the river below the camp on the road to Corbeil, whither we intended to retire. At the beginning of the night we marched all the baggage to Corbeil, and three hours afterwards, the whole Army decamped, and the enemy knew nothing of it till next day, when we were got to Corbeil, where M. de Vaubecourt had beforehand rais'd some redoubts on a hilly place for the reception of the Army whenever it should arrive. We staid but a day at Corbeil, and then march'd on to la Brie, in order afterwards to gain the river Marne above Paris, and endeavour to push on to the Oise, the Court being then at Mantes.

The Prince was set out from his camp some days before the march of the King's Army, on account of some indisposition, and it has been strongly averr'd, that had it not been for that, he would have attack'd us in our retreat; but certain it is, that as the retreat was managed, there could be no fighting between the camp and Corbeil. The King's Army march'd afterwards to Meaux; and crossing the river Marne, went and took post about Senlis. That of the Princes, setting out from Villeneuve S. George, took their quarters between Paris and Dammartin; and 'tis most certain that the different negotiations, and even the diversions of Paris, was what hindered the Prince from taking abundance of advantages which upon
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another occasion he would by no means have neglected. An. 1652. After some days illness, he resolved to set out with his Army and that of M. de Lorraine from Paris, and accordingly he proceeded to the frontier of Champagne: the Count de Fuenfaldagne expected him with the Army of Spain near Laon. People much wondered at his leaving Paris so lightly, it being certainly a vast advantage to such as are unhappily engaged in a war against their King, to maintain their station in that city as long as they can; but the several cabals which did not come to his point, and a little want of foresight as to what might follow upon his departure, as well as the hopes he conceiv'd of his junction with the Spaniards, determined him to quit Paris. Another thing was a strong invitation to the Prince to go thither. Envyng the manner of M. de Lorraine's living with his Army, and tired out with the affairs of the Parliament, he long'd to be in a way of living like that of M. de Lorraine. Thus march'd they together, and join'd M. de Fuenfaldagne near Laon. As we had put five hundred men of the King's Army into la Ferté Milon, they did not attack it, tho' they pass'd close by.

The King's Army, which was then about Senlis, and from whence had been sent some foot under the Count d'Estrees to put themselves into Laon, stirr'd not a step from its post, waiting to see what measures the enemy would resolve on after their junction. Paris remaining somewhat shaken by the Prince's removal, tho' M. d'Orleans continued there, the Court received different advices for their conduct, according to the different views of those who were at Paris, either to invite them thither, or to hinder their coming. The Courtiers themselves were divided in opinion upon this point, each having different thoughts; which would take up too much time to particularize. M. de Turenne observing how things went, prevail'd on Marshal de la Ferté to remain with the Army: while himself went to the Court, where the Queen asking him upon his arrival, whether he thought it proper for the King to go to Paris; there being no body present but the King and she, he counsel'd him to do it out of hand; and as he knew the state of the Army, and the want of means to raise money to put it on a good footing without being at Paris, he strenuously urg'd this reason, to which he added many others, namely, that the King's authority
was

An. 1652. was so impaired, that they would not now admit him into any large city; that if the winter was spent without going to Paris, all the Kingdom would rise; that the King having no longer any Army, nor money, nor quarters for any new levies, those he had got together would, by little and little, sink away to nothing, the Officers quitting every day, for want of subsistence. These reasons prevailed with the Queen; so that the Court left Mante, and went and lay at S. Germain, where they continued three or four days; during which there came thither Deputies from the citizens of Paris, to beg the King to repair to that capital. M. de Chateauneuf went thither too, but with a different design; for though he was for having the King go to Paris, yet he wanted to have Monsieur to be left there, who supported the cabal that opposed the Cardinal's return, and who would not reconcile himself to the Court, but conditionally that the Minister should come no more thither. M. de Chateauneuf proposed that the King should not see Gaston at first; and said, that afterwards, all those who stickled against the Cardinal's return being united in that one thing, and divided in every thing else, would concur unanimously to intreat the King not to let the Cardinal return, and would ask no other favour but that only. The King and Queen at this time sent M. d'Aligre to Paris; but he came back again to S. Germain, without having received any thing positive relating to the negotiation.

M. de Turenne and M. le Tellier were at this time the persons the Queen put most confidence in. They advised her to persist in the resolution of going to Paris, without heeding what might be Monsieur's resolution. A person of trust was indeed sent to him, to let him know the King was upon the road, and would be at Paris in the evening. This messenger returning, found the King and Queen between S. Cloud and the Bois de Boulogne, and reported that Monsieur's resolution was no other than to stay at Paris. Upon this, the Queen ordered her coach to stop, and the King being with her, the women who were in the coach were put out, and the Queen commanded three or four persons who were there to draw near and give their opinions. These were Prince Thomas, Marshal Villeroi, Marshal du Pleffis, and M. de Turenne, who was for going on, and that the King and Queen should go together as far as the Croix du Tirol; that from thence the Queen should

go to the Louvre, and the King directly to Luxembourg (Palace) where Monsieur was, to invite him to come, or even to take him with him to the Louvre, it being certain that Monsieur would not stay for that, but would get him gone, which was the thing we wanted. It had been of dangerous consequence to leave Monsieur at the Luxembourg (Palace;) for within the compass of two days, the rejoicings usual at King's entries being all over, things would change their aspect, and it had been out of the King's power to get Monsieur out of Paris, especially having on his side the specious pretext of having nothing to ask, but only that the Cardinal might come no more to Court. This was what obliged M. de Turenne to counsel the making the King's entry into Paris a means to cause Monsieur to go out of it.

The Court departed from the Bois de Boulogne in this resolution: the King got on his horse to make his entry into Paris, and sent Monsieur notice by M. Damville, what had been resolved on; who finding that the King would be entering in half an hour, sent to beseech him that he might stay there that night, and the next day he would depart very early. M. Damville came back to the King as he was riding on, and just entering the suburbs; so that in this assurance of Monsieur's departure next day, he went to the Louvre, where Cardinal de Retz and all the people of Quality then at Paris were waiting for him, whilst an incredible multitude of the populace went out to meet him.

While M. de Turenne continued at Paris, which was but five or six days, he visited Cardinal de Retz, who expressed to him how desirous he was to be reconciled to the Cardinal, and mentioned to him a match between Mademoiselle de Retz and his nephew, desiring he would break it to the Cardinal, and assuring him (M. de Turenne) that he would take him for a witness to all the circumstances of this alliance. M. de Turenne, who well knew that his intermeddling in such an affair would be of no service to him, and that it was a thing which was much more likely to produce trouble to him than any considerable benefit, told Cardinal de Retz, that he would give the Cardinal, who was at Sedan, a very exact account of every thing he had said to him, and that if there was a positive answer, he would presently acquaint him with it; but if he did not hear from him very soon, he should build nothing

An. 1652. thing upon this negotiation, and might take his measures as if he was to have no answer at all by him.

M. de Turenne was persuaded that Cardinal de Retz meant seriously to make up matters at that time, and did not doubt that if any man of great credit and interest had undertaken the thing, he might have succeeded in it: but M. de Turenne set out a few days afterwards from Paris; and Cardinal de Retz having no body of the Court whom he could trust, or who would trust him, such a suspiciousness grew up on both sides, that before two or three months were well over, measures were taken to put him in arrest; which was done one day when he came to the Louvre, where for some time he had never entered but with the greatest distrust. M. de Turenne having sent M. de Varennes to wait on the Cardinal, bid him tell him all that had passed between him and Cardinal de Retz, but received no manner of answer; so that he meddled no farther in this negotiation. He set out from Paris, and went and rejoined the Army at Senlis, after having told the King he hoped to hinder the enemy from taking their winter quarters in France.

The enemy were at Laon, from whence they set out in all haste, and invested Rhetel, which having but a few men in it, was soon taken. All the enemies Armies being join'd together, amounted to twenty-five thousand men; that of the King not exceeding ten thousand. We march'd along the Marne; and drawing near Chalons, we heard that the enemy, after the taking of Rhetel, had besieged Saint Meneshould, in which likewise was but a handful of men; but, however, they made a stout defence. When news was brought of its being taken, the King's Army was at Vitry, and durst not approach too near that of the enemy, who from S. Meneshould, march'd to Barleduc, where M. de Turenne had thrown in six hundred foot, and according to what he knew of the situation of the town and castle, an Army must divide it self to attack it; so he resolved to march to its relief, though he believed the whole Army of Spain was there with the Prince: it was however departed from S. Meneshould, had crossed the Meuse, and retired into the Luxembourg (district.) M. de Turenne, who was at Vitri when the Prince's Army sat down before Bar, march'd all night directly to S. Disier, from whence he meant to set out, after
having

having rested his troops a little, in order to go and relieve Bar, which was but three leagues off; but he heard that the lower town having been surpris'd, the castle surrendered in twenty four hours. It is certain the Prince undertook that siege without having thought much of the matter, and there was no instance of any action wherein he had expos'd his Army so inconsiderately as in this, it being very apparent that had the siege continued, as according to all appearances it might have done, he could not have saved his cannon; and it is highly probable his Army could not have retreated very easily.

M. de Turenne being inform'd that Bar was taken, and the Spanish Army no longer with the Prince, resolv'd to draw near him, and fight him at the first place that an opportunity offer'd it self. For this purpose, he march'd to Vaucouleurs, in order to be on the same side the river Meuse as the Prince was, who after he had taken the Chateau de Void, drew near Foul. Some days before this, M. d'Elbeuf had join'd the King's Army with two thousand men of the Picardy troops or new levies. With this reinforcement the Army march'd to Vaucouleurs, where it pass'd over the Meuse, that they might be on the same side with the Prince; and next day in the morning we march'd towards Void, from whence, dislodging in the night, the Prince retir'd to Commerci, which was a place he had seiz'd on, and had two good castles belonging to it. But having advice that the King's Army continued its march after him, he left a garrison in it, and retir'd along the Meuse to S. Mihiel, a large town, whose walls were half demolish'd. He look'd out for some place proper to post himself in; but not having much infantry, and having no time given him to entrench himself, he was oblig'd to retire to Damviller, a place which he held on the frontier of Luxembourg, having left a part of his infantry in Barleduc, Ligni, Void, and Commerci, which take up a whole canton of the Country. With the help of these towns, he thought to winter his Army there; or that if we attack'd one of them, sheltering himself with the other, he might very much annoy the besiegers, on account of the winter's coming on apace. But M. de Turenne, who plainly saw by the small places he took, and wherein he plac'd troops, what his intention was, kept marching on directly to him, leaving the places unattack'd; and thus in five or

An. 1652. six days space he forced him to retire into the Country of
 ——— Luxembourg.

Marshal de la * Ferte arriv'd about this time from Nanci, at S. Mihiel: this march breaking all the Prince's measures, deprived him of the hopes of wintering either in Champagne or the frontiers of Lorrain. Having separated his cavalry and infantry of all the corps which he had left in the Places, he could not rejoin them, and a part of that infantry was taken, during the winter, at discretion.

From S. Mihiel we march'd, and sat down before Ligni and Bar, whither came Cardinal Mazarin, who had continually resided at Sedan since his departure from Pontoise. We left some infantry to attack Ligni; and having carried the lower town of Bar by storm, the siege lasted ten or twelve days at the upper town and castle. The Prince came with some cavalry as far as Vaubecourt; but perceiving we were marching to him, he withdrew to Damviller. After seven or eight days siege, and a very good defence, Bar and Ligni surrendered at discretion, with seven or eight regiments which were in those two places. Then the Army march'd to S. Menesould; but the rigour of the season, and the great number of men in the place, prevented our besieging it: the frost was so vehement that abundance of Soldiers died of cold in their march. For the same reason we could not lay siege to Rhetel, it being impossible to break ground: besides, the Prince's Army, which had join'd the body brought by the Spaniards when he sat down before Bar, likewise hindered our making that siege; because the enemy who held Chateau-Portien might easily have succoured the place. Instead of going upon so considerable a siege, we undertook that of Chateau-Portien, which lasted six or seven days; the besieged sent to the Prince to know whether he would relieve them or not: the Prince who was quartered with his whole Army and that of Spain at Aubenton and Rumiigni, not above six or seven leagues distance, held a Council thereupon, and at last resolved not to march, so that Chateau-Portien surrendered. While the siege lasted, we passed almost all the nights in the open field, with the whole Army, and in the coldest weather that could possibly be.

* The Viscount here conceals Marshal de la Ferte's extravagant resentment which we have an account of by the Duke of York, who was in the action.

The enemy's Army, upon the news that Chateau-Port-^{An. 1652.} tien was taken, marched to Vervins, and took it, there being but thirty men in garrison there. The King's Army march'd strait on to Marle, and thence to Vervins, where the enemy having left but one regiment of foot, and another of horse, the place surrender'd in twelve hours time: the enemy retired into their own Country, and the King's Army had quarters assigned them in all the Provinces.

Cardinal Mazarin, who came to the Army when Bar ^{An. 1653.} began to be besieged, did not quit the Army till the siege of Vervins was over, about the end of February; after which he returned to Paris, where the King's Authority had gathered strength since his return. The seizing Cardinal de Retz, which was done in the winter, and in Cardinal Mazarin's absence, but not without his privity; nay, in pursuance of his orders, had occasion'd no manner of bustle: he was confined in the Chateau to Vincennes. There was no considerable alteration at Court during the winter: part of the Army was sent into the Provinces, and but few troops remained on the frontiers; and as it was very late before either the Spanish or the King's Army went into winter-quarters, June was almost spent before either they or we took the field. The Prince held S. Meneshould and Rhétel on the river Aisne, both of them posts very considerable, on account of affording an entrance into France, and chiefly Rhétel, there being from thence an easy access through la Capelle, which the Spaniards possessed, to the other places of the Low-Countries; and the Prince likewise had in his hands Stenai on the Meuse, which gave him a communication with the Country of Luxembourg. M. de Turenne, who was thoroughly acquainted with the consequence of that post, by the knowledge he had of it during the war he was concerned in after the Prince's imprisonment, prevailed with the Cardinal to let him assemble the Army; and go and lay siege to Rhétel, thereby to deprive the enemy of the means of joining together the Army which was in the Country of Luxembourg to that which was on the Sambre behind la Capelle. The King's Army took up their Quarters, after passing over the river Aisne, three leagues beyond Rhétel, which was the very place where the Army from Flanders and that from Luxembourg were to join.

An. 1653. M. de Turenne, who had been a long time at Stenai, was very sensible that the enemy might have thoughts of joining in that place, and full well knew that if their junction could be hindered by the King's Army, it would take the enemy up two or three days at least to fix upon what to do; that is, whether the Army which was on the Sambre should go to Luxembourg, or whether that of Luxembourg should cross the Meuse, and join that of the Sambre; and that in either case, it would require four or five days at least to march one corps to the other: which would give the King's Army a safe opportunity of eight or nine days to undertake the siege of Rhetel, without having the enemy's Army upon their back. So we went upon the siege with half the King's Army: Marshal de la Ferté was there likewise with a part of his Army.

There were not above eight or nine hundred men in Rhetel: we took the out-works presently, nor did the whole siege last above three days. In all the latter campaigns of this war, there was no one thing of greater consequence than to have the King's Army assembled in the Country beyond Rhetel, and the hindering the Prince from beginning the campaign on the river Aisne: he had this year an Army greatly superior to the King's. The war of Bourdeaux was still carrying on; and had he march'd and got under Rhetel, and kept it, having on his left hand the Meuse, where he was possess'd of Moufon and Stenai, and on his right the frontier of the Low-Countries, from whence he could have provisions, it would have been utterly impossible to cover all the Countries which were exposed, namely, Verdun, S. Disier, and Vitri on one side, and on the other Guise, Laon, and Soissons, and in front Rheims and Chalons. The King's Army, this campaign, had not above six or seven thousand foot, with which the field was to be kept, and the places garrison'd at the same time. M. de Turenne, above a month before he left Paris, considered the Prince's entrance by Rhetel as the greatest mischief that could happen; for which reason, as he was assembling the King's Army about Chalons, as soon as ever he understood that the Prince was rendezvousing his Army, he sent to Marshal de la Ferté, who was in the neighbourhood of S. Menehould, to desire him to put himself in March, which he did; and himself by another rout went on to Chateau-Portien, and pitch'd his quarters at the castle

file of Chaumont, where there were two hundred of the enemy's men, who surrendered at discretion; from whence we went and besieg'd Rhetel next day. An. 1653.

The Prince, whose measures were quite broke, not being sufficiently aware of the importance of Rhetel, entered France by the frontier of Picardy with an Army of thirty thousand men, where he met with great Obstacles, and where most certainly there was not the same easy opportunity of doing any thing of moment, except towards Champagne, while we had Rhetel, and the other places of the Meuse, such as Mouson and Srenai. The month of June was very far advanced when we took Rhetel; which deprived him of the excuse that he was prevented in taking the field; but oft-times persons of the best understanding commit faults which 'tis easier to point out than prevent.

After the taking of Rhetel, the enemy's Army being got together at la Capelle, the King's Army turn'd that way, and went and pitch'd near Vervins. About this time the King, together with the Cardinal, came to the Army, which went and lay at Ribemont, when 'twas known that the enemy's Army was marching to Fonsomme. While the King staid in his Army at Ribemont, that of the enemy was still at Fonsomme, and the guards of the two Armies were not above a quarter of a league the one from the other. This was our posture for five or six days, and then the King went away to Paris.

The enemy who had staid at Fonsomme, having given the necessary orders concerning provisions for themselves and the corps which they left in the country, march'd and entered France with a good number of Pioneers; and leaving the river Somme on their right, and the river Oise on their left, pass'd on to within a league of Ribemont, and went and lay between S. Quentin and Ham. The King's Army march'd the same day, and went and lay at Acheri, which is a league from la Fere, leaving that day the river Oise between them and the enemy. The following day, very early, their Army march'd, and leaving Ham on the right hand, advanced towards Chauni. It was of a considerable strength, having sixteen thousand foot, eleven thousand horse, and between thirty and forty pieces of cannon, without reckoning a third body, which was in the parts adjoining to Cambray. This march threatened

An. 1653. abundance of places, for they could go either to Compiègne, or take the posts between Compiègne and Pontoise on the river Oise, as Creil and Pont St. Maxence, and from thence march on to the very gates of Paris, and there put all things in confusion; men's minds there being very fluctuating, and the King himself not safe, had the enemy's Army but approach'd it. They could likewise have gone to Beauvais, which had no garrison, and there being but few foot in the King's Army, it could not have spared a man to be put into S. Quentin, Ham, or Peronne, or any other places on the Somme, on any one of which the enemy could easily have fallen, had the King's Army been at a distance.

M. de Turenne was of an opinion contrary to that of the whole Army, and Marshal de la Ferté concurr'd with him therein; namely, not to continue following the river Oise, thereby to cover Compiègne, Creil, and Pont S. Maxence, because that step would have exposed to the enemy the towns on the Somme, which they would have certainly besieged; but to pass over the Oise to the same side which the enemy was on, and to encamp within two hours of them in some very safe place. It must be considered that there being but seven thousand foot in the King's Army, and no infantry at all in the places, there was no other way to save them, but by keeping always near the enemy, and giving them to understand that we should always arrive at any place they should sit down before, within twelve or fifteen hours as soon as they. Had we put our infantry into the places, the Army would not have dared to keep the field close to the enemy, and thus we should have given them a means to undertake any thing they would have thought proper. As the Prince commanded the enemy's Army, we might expect all the vigorous resolutions that naturally occur, when once an enemy separates it self, and leaves so many places exposed. It was therefore much the better way (though somewhat dangerous) to keep continually by the side of the enemy, than to take either of the two methods which were proposed; that is to say, either to march with the Army to Compiègne without passing the Oise, or else to throw infantry into the places, and remove farther off from the enemy with the cavalry. By the first, it is certain the enemy might have been enabled to lay siege to the most considerable place

place on the Somme, having a body near Cambrai, with An. 1653. Pioneers of the Country always at hand, and the King's Army could not have come up with them under four or five days. By the second, the enemy would have had it in their power to march to Paris, seeing nothing like an Army near them, or they might have laid siege to a place wherein they had nothing to fear but a garrison, somewhat reinforced indeed, but no Army to hurt them. I dwell somewhat long on this, because sure enough the resolution of crossing the river, of putting no body into the places, and of lodging near the enemy, did actually make the enemy's entrance into France of no effect; and oftentimes by being apprehensive of too many things, we take measures different from this, which succeed very ill. Not that this is quite secure, for an enemy may march to you, and fight you: but when one has a good Army, though inferior in strength, and one takes good care in pitching ones camp, keeping a watchful eye on the enemy's motions, 'tis the most secure way of any.

The enemy's Army march'd from Chauni to Roye, and the King's about Noyon did not entrench; but keeping a sharp eye on the enemy's motions, always took up their quarters in very advantageous places. They attack'd Roye, which had no Soldiers in it; the siege lasted two days, and we had no thoughts of relieving the place, it being but a small town, which we could not have kept. When they had taken Roye, they began to be very much at a loss what to do next: they did not dare to advance into a Country where they had no places, while an enemy lay within three hours march of them with an Army. Neither could they fall upon any place on the Somme, where they must have separated themselves on account of the Morasses, and where the King's Army might have arrived the same day. Corbie being a naked place, M. de Turenne sent thither five hundred horse under M. de Schomberg.

About this time we intercepted a letter, and sent it to Court to be decyphered, whereby it was discovered that the enemy, before they undertook any thing (their first measures having failed) were sending for a body from Cambrai with a large quantity of provisions; and upon our making diligent enquiry in and about Bapaumes what was doing at Cambrai, we found that the said body was upon

An. 1653 upon the point of setting out. The King's Army leaving their baggage to come after, passed over the Somme at Ham; and marching to Peronne, M. de Turenne advanced with five thousand horse as far as Bapaumes, to wait for this body, which having intelligence of our march, retired back to Cambrai. The enemy's Army, finding we were between them and their convoy, and having miss'd their opportunity of advancing into the Country, or of attacking a place for want of provisions, quitted Roze, and marched to repass the Somme at Cerisy, which is between Peronne and Corbie, having thrown a great number of fascines on the Morais. In less than four and twenty hours time, their whole Army with their baggage was got over to the side of their own Country, and understanding that the King's Army lay within a league of Peronne hard by Mount S. Quentin without being intrench'd, they set out in the night, and march'd directly with a resolution of fighting. We were some time in doubt whether they had quite left the bridges which they had made for crossing the Somme with: but we saw by their march that they had entirely abandon'd them.

The King's Army had its front at a rivulet; but the enemy march'd to the spring, which was not above half a league from the camp, and thus they came in flank of us. Marshal de la Ferté's Army was on that side where the enemy was coming, and it was impossible for him to put himself in a good posture, and they so near at hand; the situation of the place did not allow him to do it, and gave a great advantage to the enemy, who had an opportunity to extend themselves. M. de Turenne advanced, having the Chevalier de Crequi with him, and two or three of his people to observe the enemy. Seeing that they took their march, and that no time was to be lost, he represented to Marshal de la Ferté the ill posture he was in; and returning to his Army, which was on the right wing, and at a little greater distance from that of the enemy, he sent Varennes, who acted as Quarter-Master of the Army, to see how the Country lay beyond a certain small wood: he found it to be a pretty large plain, where part of an Army might be drawn up in battalia; and that the enemy had not yet possess'd themselves of it, but had begun to advance some squadrons thither, and that the wood leading to it was very thin of trees.

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M. de Turenne immediately sent word to Marshal la Ferté An. 1653. that he was marching to that plain, and desiring him, if he pleased, to go and take the left there; which he too thought very proper to be done: and thus M. de Turenne began his march to Mount S. Quentin, and with a large front, passing through the wood, came to a valley on one side; he put his troops in order of battle in this valley, where setting the infantry immediately at work upon making five or six redans at the head of the Army, in two hours time we were well intrench'd.

The enemy's Army seeing that of the King in this state, and having been obliged to halt a little for the coming up of their infantry, stopt short; and after some skirmishings, began to settle themselves on an eminence, within a quarter of a league of the King's Army. Next night we advanced the works. It was said, that the Prince would fain have fought that day, but the Spaniards would not let him. I fancy the difficulty arose from their long march, and that the King's Army having shifted their post, obliged them to go a great way about, which occasion'd loss of time, and gave the King's Army an opportunity to entrench themselves fully: which being so, there was now no more likelihood of either the Prince's or Spaniards desiring to fight. It is true that before this same changing of their post, the King's Army ran a great risk, the enemy having all the eminences over it; and 'tis more than probable we should have fought that day with ill success. We kept in presence one of another for two or three days, there passing a good many skirmishes; and when that term was expired, the enemy march'd directly to Fonsomme, and sent three thousand horse under M. de Duras to invest Guise.

The King's Army having seen in the morning that the enemy march'd off, cross the Somme at Peronne, and went seven leagues that day. M. de Turenne sent M. de Beaujeu with all speed with two thousand horse to get into Guise. The enemy had not so far to go by one half as the King's Army had to reach Guise; but their Army stopt within three leagues of it, upon the Lorrainers making a difficulty of going upon that siege: 'tis said at least that this was what suspended their march: certain it is, that if they had gone on, they had got thither a day before the King's Army, and no man knows whether M. de Beau-

jeu

An. 1653. ~~jeu~~ could have got in there. This design miscarrying, they went and lay at Caulaincourt, which is between Caſtelet and Ham, and the King's Army at Ham, the river Somme being between them: where the former having continued above a fortnight, and held a great many councils with the Archduke, who came to meet them, they ſet forwards in all haſte, and leaving Guiſe on their left hand, they went and ſat down before Rocroi, where the ſituation is ſo advantageous to thoſe that come there firſt, becauſe of the great woods around the place, that we declined marching thither with the Army to its relief, and rather choſe to lay ſiege to Mouſon, where we arrived with very great expedition. Tho' the trenches were opened at the ſame time before both places, Mouſon was taken four or five days before Rocroi. The enemy had in it ſixteen hundred men, and of the beſt regiments of the Army. We made no manner of circumvallation, and we opened the trenches the very evening we got thither. The ſiege laſted ſeventeen days; and when we were marching on to Rocroi, we had news brought that it was capitulating. The enemy, after taking it, retreated farther into their Country, and we for our parts, thinking they might lay ſiege to la Baſſée, or Bethune, they having nothing but that to do, we threw in ſo large a number of foot into both places, that they could lay ſiege to neither.

The affairs of Bourdeaux being ended that ſummer, there came from thence ſome troops to the King, with which, and his French and Swiſs guards, his Majeſty ordered the ſiege of S. Menehould to be undertaken by MM. d'Uxelles, Caſtelneau and Navailles. M. de Turenne march'd to cover Picardy and the places of Flanders, and the Marſhal de la Ferté went towards the Meuſe to oppoſe M. de Lorraine, who was coming with ſome troops to relieve S. Menehould, the ſiege whereof continued till the beginning of December. The troops there were diſheartened by the fallies and bad weather, and 'tis thought that the powder of the beſieged taking fire, contributed not a little to the ſurrendring of the place. Winter now came on, and the Armies retired on both ſides: the King's Army having taken, during the campaign, Rhétel, Mouſon, and S. Menehould, and the enemy only Rocroi; tho' there was not the leaſt proportion between them in point of forces, thoſe of the enemy being by far the more conſiderable.

END of the SECOND BOOK. MEMOIRS

M E M O I R S

O F T H E

Viscount de TURENNE.

BOOK the THIRD.

Of the Wars in FLANDERS.

THE winter was spent without producing any An. 1654. thing considerable at Court, and all authority rested entirely in the hands of Cardinal Mazarin.

In the spring, the King went to be crown'd at Rheims, where it was resolv'd to take the regiments of French and Swiss Guards, and four or five other regiments of infantry, with twelve or fifteen hundred horse, and to give the command of them to M. Fabert, to go and besiege Stenai. It was resolv'd also that the King should go to Sedan, in order to be near the siege; that the Army should keep on the frontier of Champagne, that they might repair likewise to Stenai, if that of the enemy pass'd into the Country of Luxembourg; and that, in case they attempted any thing on the frontier of Flanders, we might also march to that side. There was no likelihood the enemy would make so considerable a siege as that of Arras. We thought that if they did not march to Stenai, they could only lay siege to Bethune or la Bassée, and then we might besiege some place on the frontier, as la Capelle or Landrecies.

While the King's Army was at la Fere, we learnt by M. Mondejeu, Governor of Arras, that the place was invested, without his having the least previous notice of it. In
Flanders

An. 1654. Flanders such a thing may easily happen, because it being a close Country, the fortified places are so near to one another, that the enemy may threaten a great many at a time, and the Governors not know which is aimed at. Excepting a hundred horse which M. de Mondejeu had in the place, all his cavalry, consisting of five hundred horse, was in a flying camp commanded by M. le Barre, who was on the river Authie, near Dourlens, and had orders to cover Arras, Bethune, and la Bassée. He had put his infantry into the two latter places, as being the most remote, and the most difficult to relieve in case the enemy besieged them; and he believed, as well as the Governor of Arras, that he should still have time enough to enter into the place before it was invested, because it was a plain champain Country, and not far off. He could not succeed the two or three first days; but afterwards, having sent M. d'Equancourt with four hundred horse, and M. de S. Lieu with a like number by different ways, and at a day's distance from each other, they both attempted to throw themselves into the place with great boldness; but meeting with the enemy's cavalry, who waited for them on two lines, one half of their men were taken or forced to return, and the other half got into the place with them. M. de Turenne detach'd likewise from his Army the Chevalier de Crequi with five hundred horse, made up of his regiment, that of Bouillon, and other detachments, who after fetching a great compass, meeting with a barrier of the enemy's camp which was not closed, they entered in; and though he was charged by their cavalry, he threw himself into the place with two hundred and fifty horse; a great part of the rest were taken prisoners, and his last troop, commanded by a Colonel, was lost in the night, and could not follow him.

When we heard that this cavalry was got into Arras, we were some time in doubt whether the enemy would go on with the siege; but we had information given us that they were at work on their lines, and that this relief had only retarded for some days the opening the trenches. The King's Army advanced to Peronne; and we fearing we should not be able to draw from thence all the necessary provision, M. de Turenne was against approaching near the enemy's camp, till after such order was taken in the matter of provisions, that we should not be obliged to fight the

the enemy in their lines without reason, nor to retire for want of subsistence. As for the former, there was no prudence in fighting an Army greatly superior, which had not opened a trench, and consequently was not weakened by desertion, or want of provision, or by loss of men, which is always very great in a siege: and for the other, nothing was more manifest, than that to approach an enemy, and be afterwards forced to retire, would be attended with very ill consequences both to the Army and to the town besieged. Had it not been for these inconveniences, it had doubtless been prudent to have march'd to the enemy as soon as possibly we could, after they had sat down before the place, because we might have prevented their storing their camp with provision: but we thought this last inconvenience less than the others.

The Cardinal, who was with the King at Sedan during the siege of Stenai, had thoughts of coming to Peronne; but he sent thither M. le Tellier. M. de Turenne and the Marshal de la Ferté went to see that Minister the morning that they march'd to the enemy's camp, and were perfectly well satisfied that, he being on the frontier, all things would be well regulated for the subsistence of the Army, which went nine leagues off, lay within cannon-shot of the enemy's camp, and put themselves between them and Douai, from whence they drew all their provisions. The King's Army had not above fourteen or fifteen thousand men, and that of the enemy above twenty-five thousand. M. de Turenne, on account of the weakness of the Army, and want of artillery-equipage and provisions, was not for undertaking any thing but the relief of Arras, the siege whereof he always thought would be difficult; and that if the King's Army, sure of provision, approached to the Spaniards camp, it might perhaps afterwards find means to force their lines. He was not of the common opinion that the French should be immediately put upon action, being persuaded they have the same patience as other nations when they are well conducted.

In two days time we came in sight of the enemy's camp near an eminence called Mouchi le Preux. The Spaniards having some cavalry there, we were at first afraid lest they should range themselves behind in order of battle to hinder that of the King from crossing a brook; but as this brook was far from the Place, they did not do it, because

An. 1654. cause the siege must have been rais'd, which could not have been done so soon, but the King's Army would have had time to put themselves in a good posture, and given them reason to have been apprehensive of the issue of a battle. It has however been said that the Prince had a mind to do it; but that the Spaniards would not consent to it. As soon as their troops saw us make divers bridges on the brook, they retired into their camp after some skirmishings, and the King's Army advancing on a height, began to fortify themselves there; which was done in the close of that day and the night following.

The camp had its right wing on the Scarpe, where we likewise soon made bridges to have a communication with la Bassée, and to hinder provisions from Douai. The whole front took up the space between the Scarpe and a small brook which goes down to Arleux, and, by the means of the cavalry, we kept, as much as we possibly could, the road to Cambrai and Douai, which being all an open champain Country, we easily hindered any wag-gons or carts from coming, but could not prevent Troopers from carrying ammunition behind them on horseback. We likewise sent to Count de Broglio, Governor of la Bassée, to come and lie at Lens, with fifteen hundred or two thousand men of the garrison; and by this means we cut off all provisions on the side of Douai and Lille: the side towards S. Paul was still left very open, whereby the enemy might have a free communication with Aire and St. Omer. The very evening that we came with the Army to Mouchi le Preux, we wrote to the Governor of Hedin to put men into S. Paul; and if that had been done, the siege of Arras had infallibly been raised, and we not obliged to attack their lines; but either private interest, or the weakness of the garrison of Hedin, kept the Governor from doing it. We had however found a remedy to this misfortune, had it not been for the death of M. de Beaujeu, who having been hurried away with twelve hundred horse and some infantry of Count de Broglio, to guard the side of S. Paul, met with the enemy as they were going with a convoy to Aire, and seven or eight hundred horse falling upon him at break of day, as his people were refreshing themselves, he was put in disorder, and killed on the spot; but his men rallying, the enemy were beaten, and a great many of them killed or taken

taken prisoners. Ours not having leaders, returned to Bethune, without marching whither they were commanded to go. In this interval, the enemy hastened with some infantry into S. Paul, which put the place out of a possibility of being taken, unless the Army march'd thither; and we could not quit the side of Douai, because both places are opposite to each other.

As the forementioned cavalry was returned to Bethune, M. de Turenne sent M. de Lillebonne to command them. He led them to Pernes, to cut off the communication between the enemy's camp and Aire; but the side of S. Paul still continued free, from whence they received many conveniences. M. de Broglie attempted to take that place; but he was repulsed with loss. Things remained some time in this posture; the enemy meeting with great difficulties in the siege, because of the resistance made by the besieged, as also on account of the King's Army, which was still encamped hard by them. As we were daily made acquainted how the siege went on, we made it our sole business to intercept or obstruct the convoys, without trying to force the lines, till the besieged were fore pressed. We knew the Spanish Army was greatly diminished: but their circumvallation could hardly be in a better condition. Nothing therefore very considerable happened for the space of a month, except some powder taking fire, as the enemy was carrying it on horseback behind them, and some small convoys which were met with. Whatever came from Cambrai to their camp was conveyed by Troopers who went by night; and though our cavalry was on the avenues to way-lay them, we could never light on them, because all the adjacent parts are wide extended plains. Mean while, the besieged bravely defended their out-works, and twice or thrice drove back the enemy to one of their first pallisades a very great distance from the place, and so well kept their ground, that at seven weeks end from the opening the trenches, the enemy was got no farther than upon the counterescarp of a half-moon, which is before the ditch, and had taken but one horn-work, without which they could not have gone on to that half-moon. The besieged did all that men could do in the defence of a place: the Chevalier de Crequi, M. d'Equancourt, and M. de S. Lieu were wounded in the outworks, where they did excellent

An. 1654. cellent service; M. de Mondejeu likewise behaved as well as a Governor could do.

The siege of Stenai was still carrying on, and was spun out into some length through the stout defence made by the besieged. M. de Turenne and Marshal de la Ferté seeing that the enemy nevertheless push'd on that of Arras, though attended with much difficulty, came to a resolution to attack the lines, being excited thereto by the intelligence they had received from Mondejeu, who feigned himself to be somewhat more pressed than he really was. It is no new thing for Governors to act thus; because not being sure but that the enemy will attack them with yet more vigour, or that their own men may grow faint in the defence, they are always for putting things at the worst, and making believe they cannot hold out so long as in reality they can. We had ordered to be in readiness all the fascines and hurdles for attacking the lines next day, when news was brought in the evening, that Stenai was capitulating; and the Cardinal sent word that the King would expedite his march to Peronne, and send all the troops which had serv'd in the siege of Stenai to re-inforce the Army. M. de Turenne thought fit to wait for this re-inforcement; because we had certain knowledge that the town could still hold out, and we were so near the enemy that nothing could happen but we must have notice of it every day. The Cardinal too had a mind to try whether M. de Turenne would be offended at Marshal d'Hocquincourt's having the command of the troops which were coming from before Stenai to join him; but in so important a situation of affairs, M. de Turenne thought there could not be too many troops or too many Generals: Marshal de la Ferté too was of the same mind. These troops therefore hasten'd their march after the surrender of Stenai, crossed the Somme, and making long marches, came to Baupume.

Two days before their arrival, the Duke of York and M. de Joyeuse, who was Colonel General of the Light-horse, riding out with M. de Turenne towards the enemy's camp, pretty near the Prince's quarter, saw two troops at some distance from their main guard: M. de Castelnau was there too with some Volunteers; and being minded to push at those troops, we ordered out a squadron of
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our guard to support the Volunteers, who having begun an engagement, those two troops turn'd back; and coming to a hollow way, they put these Gentlemen into some confusion with their carbines, and began to pursue them. The squadron which supported them took a fright; so that they retreated two or three hundred paces, being hard put to't by the enemy. There were seven or eight Volunteers wounded or taken prisoners; M. de Joyeuse also was wounded in the arm with a carbine-shot: his wound was at first thought to be but slight, but being carried to Paris, he died of it in six weeks after. As soon as 'twas known that the troops from Ste-nai were within three leagues of the enemy's camp, M. de Turenne went and met Marshal d'Hocquincourt with two thousand horse: Intelligence being brought to them that the enemy expected a large convoy from S. Paul, they lay that night at Aubigni, which is three hours march from Arras, and the following day they went to S. Paul, and took it as soon as they reach'd it. Here we were given to understand that the enemy expected three thousand men to secure the convoy, and that the siege too went on but heavily, for want of warlike stores. This obliged us to do our utmost to intercept this convoy, because if that had been done, the enemy must have raised the siege.

After S. Paul was taken, M. de Turenne and Marshal d'Hocquincourt spent a whole day in battering the Abby of St. Eloy, where the enemy had five hundred men, who surrendered at discretion. It being not above a small league from the enemy's camp, and Marshal de la Ferté continuing at Mouchi le Preux with the Army, it has been said that the Prince would fain have fallen on the body which attack'd the Abby of Mount S. Eloi, and that the Spaniards did not think it proper; but obstacles oftentimes occur in a large circumvallation, and after a long siege, which hinder the execution of the best laid schemes.

Mount S. Eloi having surrendered, Marshal d'Hocquincourt began to entrench himself in Cesar's camp, and M. de Turenne went and re-join'd the Army at Mouchi le Preux, marching all along the enemy's lines for above two hours. None but a few skirmishers came out of the lines, which M. de Castelnau went and took a

An. 1654 close view of, and the cavalry march'd all that time within the reach of a three-pounder cannon-shot. We observ'd this whole side of the lines to be very naked : this was Dom Ferdinando Solis's quarters ; and 'tis certain this march gave us great lights, both how to make the attack, and as to the road we were to take in order to the making it. M. de Turenne being arrived in the camp, sent to Marshal de la Ferté to let him know that the enemy's cavalry which had designed to conduct the convoy, were taking their way to Dowai, and that in all likelihood they would endeavour to enter the lines in the night. He gave all the necessary orders for hindering it, having caused all the cavalry to mount ; but thro' the fault of an Officer who was posted on the route with a small body of cavalry, and who gave no advice of the thing, M. de Bouteville, who commanded that cavalry loaded with powder and granadoes, enter'd the lines ; which being known, it was resolv'd to make the attack next day. After having consider'd all things, it was thought proper to fall on with all the Army in front, and that too in the night : M. de Turenne being always of opinion not to make attempts on several sides at once, because each waiting to fall on, an opportunity often is slip't, the time pass'es away, and day-light comes ; besides, when people don't see one another, they easily grow suspicious that their friends are repulsed. In the day time an enemy gets all his troops together ; but in the night he dares not entirely disgorge his quarters : the greatest difficulty which attends an expedition by night, is the mens liableness to miss their way ; for which reason our camp should be very close to the enemy's lines to avoid falling into this inconveniency.

We march'd then in the beginning of the night : M. de Turenne led the van : and having cross'd the Scarpe under the quarter of Marshal de la Ferté, who had order'd a good number of bridges to be made. We took the same road we had done in returning from mount S. Eloi : we were well advis'd of the condition of the enemy's lines ; they had every where a forlorn ditch (*fossé perdu*) five or six foot deep, and eight or nine broad ; and between this ditch and that of the line, there was a space of four or five paces full of holes or wells, which were round, and three or four foot deep, and about a foot in diameter. Beyond these was a line as usual, with
a ditch

a ditch of seven or eight foot, and a parapet of the accustomed height: they had put between the holes a kind of small pallisades, only a foot and a half high, the more to hamper and embarrass the horse.

We resolved to give the onset with the infantry in two lines; and to each battalion of the first line was appointed four or five squadrons to carry the fascines and hurdles with which we were to cover the holes: the cavalry carried likewise tools proper for the business they went upon. Having march'd within a small half league of the line, there wanted scarce two hours of day-light. M. de Turenne's Army drew up in order. That of Marshal de la Ferté took the left hand; Marshal d'Hocquincourt came also from Mount St. Eloi to charge on the same front. We approach'd within two hundred paces of the line, without giving an alarm; and two hundred men who were at the head of each battalion of the first line, advanc'd to the first ditch: the fire they sustained was but slight; and yet if the battalions had not that same instant march'd up and seconded these detachments, they had been overpowered. We hardly met with any resistance; but all the troops had fancied this action to be a thing so difficult, that none but the Officers and some of the Soldiers stuck hard to the parapet, all the other Soldiers of the regiments remaining in the field, without daring to come near. Of Marshal de la Ferté's Army, there were but some of the regiments that went to the last ditch: but not one enter'd by his attack: when we had forced the line on their right hand, they came and enter'd that way. We were a good half hour in filling up the ditches, the cavalry which was behind the battalions alighting, and carrying the hurdles and fascines, during which space there was a great noise of kettle-drums and trumpets behind the line, but little or no firing.

The Count de Broglio, M. de Castelnau and M. du Pafage commanded the infantry of M. de Turenne's first line; M. de Roncherolles two battalions of the second, and the Duke of York, M. de Lillebonne, and M. d'Eclainvilliers were with the cavalry, who as soon as the infantry had made themselves masters of the line, began to enter by a barrier, leading their horses by the bridle; and shortly after, the regiments which were on the first line, that is, the Swiss guards, Picardy, Feuillade, Pleffis-Praslin,

An. 1654 and Turenne, having each made its way thro', the cavalry which was design'd to follow each regiment of foot, enter'd by the passage which those regiments had made for them.

It was very near day-light when the openings of the line were made, and orders were given that the cavalry, after they had entered, should form their squadrons near the line, by the favour of the foot which should continue in battalia; but the great joy the troops were in, at seeing themselves within the line, and at the enemy's taking a fright, as also the hope of plunder, made all the soldiers run confusedly into the camp, the infantry to pillage and the cavalry to follow some squadrons of the enemy, which were retreating on the side of the Lorrainers quarters.

Marshal d'Hocquincourt's Army having a little mis'd their way in the dark of the night, attack'd the lines soon after the first attack, and carried them with little or no difficulty. Marshal de la Ferté, as soon as he saw a passage open'd, enter'd with his cavalry, and advanced with some squadrons, slipping within the line on the left hand; there were likewise some Officers and Soldiers of our infantry, who followed him in very great disorder.

The Prince having pass'd through the Spaniards quarter, led some cavalry to the relief of the line: some of his infantry likewise follow'd him; but when he saw the line carried in so short a time, and his whole camp already in such great disorder, 'tis said that upon the Archduke's asking him what he would advise him to do, he answer'd, *TWAS HIS OPINION HE OUGHT TO RETIRE.* For his own part, he march'd directly on to where Marshal de la Ferté was, who was fain to order his squadrons to retreat. M. de Turenne had re-assembled some troops, foreseeing plainly enough, that if the enemy return'd, there would be a great confusion. All he could do was to cheer them up, when the cavalry which had advanced return'd back, after they had got two twenty-four pounders, over the line. It is certain, that if the Prince could have brought some regiments of infantry with his cavalry, he would have forced the King's whole Army to have thrown themselves into Arras, so great was their confusion when first they enter'd the lines; but as there was a very great consternation in his Army, all he could do was to
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push that cavalry of M. de la Ferté's, and take a good number of prisoners of the infantry which I said had follow'd him, and by this means give a good part of the Spanish infantry an opportunity to retire, some to Cambrai, others to Douai: as for the cavalry, they lost very few of them; but they left near sixty pieces of cannon either in their trenches or on their lines. I believe there might be two or three thousand Soldiers of their infantry kill'd or made prisoners, and all their baggage lost. Of the King's Army there were some Officers kill'd or wounded, and three or four hundred Soldiers: there were some common Soldiers taken prisoners, and some Officers of the Guards. When the Prince retired, the King's whole Army fell to plundering the enemy's camp; so that they were not pursued farther than their circumvallation.

The Court which was at Peronne came to Arras five or six days after the siege was rais'd; and as we could undertake no considerable siege, there being nothing in readiness for that, the King's Army being all retired into their respective places, the King went back again to Paris. The Marshal de la Ferté and the Marshal d'Hocquincourt follow'd him. M. de Turenne went over the Schelde between Cambrai and Bouchain; and having march'd as far as Condé, he heard that Quesnoi, the outworks whereof the enemy had razed, was very thinly garrison'd; he march'd three leagues back, and took it the second day; then he advanc'd to Binches, a sorry town which surrender'd: he staid there twelve or fifteen days, having left a garrison at Quesnoi, which he did not quit till November, having caused to be brought thither divers convoys, on account of its being a place far advanc'd in the Country.

The Prince having prevailed on the Spaniards to get their Army together twelve or fifteen days after their defeat at Arras; and being favour'd by the places and rivers, he still kept within two or three hours march of the King's Army; so that to preserve Quesnoi, fortify it and furnish it with ammunition and provisions was very difficult, and the Army suffer'd very much. It is certain that had it not been for the defeat at Arras, which for some time made the enemy less forward to undertake any thing (as an Army always is after a defeat.) Quesnoi could not have been kept; on the other hand had it not

An. 1654. been for the Prince, the Spaniards would not have got again into a body, and much disorder might have happen'd in their Country; but their Army being again assembled, we could not march to Brussels and Brabant. And thus ended the campaign, we preserv'd Quesnoi, and the Armies retired on both sides.

Though we were but lately got out of a civil war, the winters pass'd away very quietly, there being however a great many persons weary of, or dissatisfied with Cardinal Mazarin's ministry; but the evils and inconveniences which every one had felt in these internal disorders of the Kingdom, so opened the eyes of all men, that the discourses of turbulent people could not now any longer work upon them: As when there happens any great revolution, all seem to think themselves in as bad a condition as 'tis possible for them to be; so when a civil war is over, fresh troubles rarely begin again soon after, because of the mischiefs which are so fresh in memory.

An. 1655. In the winter subsequent to this campaign, there was a misunderstanding which lasted a long time between the Court and the Parliament, on occasion of the *Lys*, a coin, which the King was for making, but the Parliament was against it; and as all things seem'd tending to an open breach, the Cardinal, in presence of the King, desired M. de Turenne to go to the Premier President, on account of the Parliament's being to meet the next day. * M. de Turenne hit upon expedients to accommodate every thing, being very desirous that things might not proceed to extremities: besides that it would have obstructed the designs for the next campaign, it is certain that the Prince in Flanders, and Cardinal de Retz at Rome, had a great many friends and abettors at Paris. All these together would have render'd things difficult to be made up, had they come to an open rupture. The Court set out from Paris to go to Compiègne, and thence to la Fere. Paris was rather weary of the troubles than cured of its prejudices. The Cardinal naturally loved to keep all things in equilibrio, to make matters easy to those who had any cause of discontent, and to keep measures with such as he could not gain over to him.

* The Viscount always passes over, with rapidity or in silence, his own services to the State.

While the King was at la Fere, his Army got together again, as did also that of the enemy at the same time. M. de Turenne with some troops conducted two convoys to Quefnoi; he foresaw that if we did not besiege Landrecies, it would be impossible to preserve Quefnoi, and that that was a conquest the best proportion'd to the forces we had: the Cardinal was of the same mind; and so was Marshal de la Ferté, whose Army was got together about Laon. The Prince and the Archduke were above a fortnight out of Brussels, and their whole Army at the rendezvous; that of the Prince on the Sambre, five or six hours march from Landrecies, and that of the Archduke near Mons, not being above four or five leagues asunder, and both together very near of equal strength to that of the King; so that it was a very dangerous thing to begin a siege almost in their presence: but the situation of Landrecies promising a more easy success there than at any other place, because Quefnoi, which is more advanced within the Country, kept the enemy at a little distance, and hinder'd them from marching with that facility to oppose the siege, we resolved to undertake it. M. de Turenne having order'd the Army he commanded to rendezvous at Guise, and Marshal de la Ferté his at the same place, we were at three o'clock in the afternoon with the whole Army within cannon-shot of Landrecies.

M. de Turenne had inclin'd getting his Army together in a body before this rendezvous at Guise, because it is certain that his troops lying in separate quarters, obliged the enemy to have their eye on more than one side. Had the King's Army been all together, that of the enemy would have drawn up to it; and so being equal in strength, it had been a thing impossible to undertake any siege. The first tidings the enemy had of us, was, that the King's Army was before Landrecies, into which the enemy had lately thrown two regiments of foot; so that there were fifteen hundred foot and above a hundred horse in the place: nevertheless their first intention was to throw in some farther succours, and to gather their troops with all expedition into a body. The Prince and the Archduke had a meeting to confer about it, but the attempting of succours did not take effect, because of some difficulty in getting the Army together.

An. 1655. The King's Army being come before the place, work'd with such diligence at the circumvallation, that it was finish'd in three days. The Marshal de la Ferté being fallen sick near Guise, tarried there two days, and on the third came and rejoin'd his Army in the camp. In the five first days such diligence was used, that the circumvallation was in good condition, and there were provisions in the camp for a month. The Prince who had the chief share in all the resolutions of the Army in Flanders, had a notion that if they march'd quick, and got between Guise and Landrecies, it would be impossible for the King's Army to have any more convoys, and that in so short a time we could not be sufficiently furnish'd with provisions, artillery, and ammunition: but the diligence with which we had got our convoys, occasion'd his taking wrong measures. He arrived, but not till the seventh day after the King's Army had invested the place, in a camp named Vadencourt, and did indeed hinder our having any more convoys; but we had already sufficient of all things to go thro' with the siege. Some alarm was given the King and Queen, who were at la Fere, on account of this approach of the enemy; but the Cardinal having dissipated their apprehensions, they set out for Laon with less precipitation than they would have done in their first fright. He advis'd this journey, because it was said by a great many that the King's Person was not safe at la Fere.

The trenches were open'd at Landrecies on the eighth day, and there being two attacks, one by M. de Turenne, and the other by the Marshal de la Ferté, the third day we got up on the counterscarp of a horn-work, which was but very indifferently defended by the enemy: we made two lodgments there; we descended the ditch of the horn, and after we had set on the miners to it, and blown up the two faces, we carried the whole head of the work. The enemy had an entrenchment in the midst: we slipt along in the thickness of the parapet; and we carried on trenches in order to go to the half-moons, which were on the two sides of the horn-work. All these works were forwarded with so great dispatch and so little loss, that on the seventeenth day after opening the trenches, the mines play'd under the two bastions of the place; and after we had made small lodgments at the bottom of the breaches, the besieged surrender'd, and at the end of two days march'd

out upon good terms, to the number of about twelve hundred men, who had made none of the best defence. An. 1655.

All this time the enemy did nothing considerable: they often sent out parties against the foragers, but with no great success. M. de Bouteville was beat by the Marquis de Renel, and the Count de Grandpré*, who commanded the escort that guarded the foragers belonging to the King's Army. That of the enemy which was at Vaden-court having news that Landrecies was capitulating, retired without loss of time to Cambrai: all the night long after they had received this news, a great noise was heard in their camp, and 'tis certain, among the common Soldiers, there was no little consternation.

After the taking of Landrecies, the King came to Guise, and la Capelle was ordered to be invested: however, after the Cardinal was made sensible of the small importance of the place, and that when it was taken, we should find it difficult to enter into the Country, because the season was advanced, and the enemy's Army would ruin the places through which that of the King must pass, the Cardinal thought the best way would be for the King to march with his Army, and enter the enemy's Country, and no place was judged to be more commodious for provisions than along the river Sambre. The King advanced up to Thuyn: M. de Castelnau went and seiz'd a post near Dinan, which was thought to be tenable; but finding that it could not be fortified, we abandon'd it. From thence the King went to Bavay, where a Council of War was held, to see what was to be done. Some belonging to the Court would fain have had Avennes besieged; but there being nothing in readiness for that, M. de Turenne did not approve of it, nor Marshal de la Ferté neither: so that we cast about how to cross the Scheld, draw near the enemy, and see if they might not give us an occasion to do something, either by dispersing themselves into the towns, or opposing our passing the river.

The Spaniards had so flooded the Country from Valenciennes to Condé, and from Condé to S. Guislain, that there was no likelihood of passing that way, and their Army was behind to hinder it; so that we resolved to march with all speed between Bouchain and Valenciennes.

* Since Marshal de Joyeuse.

An. 1655 **Marshal* de la Ferté** had the van, and setting out by night from Bavay, he arrived by noon next day at a place call'd Neuville, where having laid two bridges, and meeting with no resistance, he began to pass his Army over, and some squadrons were actually got on t'other side, when M. de Turenne arrived about the close of the day, and in the night the Armies cross'd the water with their baggage. Part of the enemy's cavalry advanced within half a league of us; but seeing that the Army was passed, they retired towards Valenciennes, where the body of their Army arriv'd that day. They threw in the night some infantry into Bouchain, and began to intrench themselves; but they did it without being well resolved to keep that post, in case the King's Army should move towards them: so that next day when they saw us marching directly to their camp, they began to file off their van directly for Condé; and as, generally speaking, people have no mind to retreat, before they know for certain whether a whole Army is in march, or only a body of horse, which they often flatter themselves to be the case; so the Prince staid somewhat of the latest with his rear. We not seeing their motions, fancied they would continue in their intrenchment, and M. de Turenne waited for the cannon and infantry to attack them. Mean while he caused M. de Castelnau with his body to advance, and possess himself of a wood near their camp, and to take the enemy in flank, which seem'd somewhat uncovered, there being nothing but the head of the camp entrench'd, and this flank not being so. As M. de Castelnau advanced, he saw that the enemy's Army was retiring, and that there were only some squadrons in the camp, he sent advice of this to M. de Turenne, who sent him orders to follow on with his body. When the enemy quitted their camp to go to Condé thro' a very close Country †, the Prince having let all his troops file off, was left with (only) seven or eight squadrons in the rear. The enemy had not brought their baggage to the camp of Valenciennes, which very much facilitated their retreat. § M.

* Here the Viscount passes over in silence the several excellent pieces of advice which he gave in the Council of War, and which have been found in the Duke of York's memoirs.

† By a close Country, he means where there are a great many defilés, rivers, canals, woods, or eminences.

§ Here the Viscount conceals Castelnau's misconduct, and his own laudable actions.

de Castelnau advanced with some of his squadrons, one or two whereof having pass'd a defilé, the Prince himself return'd with a few of his men, and made such as had already pass'd the defilé to repass in confusion. There was some little skirmishing in this rear, and that was all; for the enemy having cross'd the Scheld near Condé, left two thousand men in the place, and retired two hours before day towards Tournai.

The van of the King's Army arrived very late in view of their camp, the Scheld being between these two Armies. That very night M. de Turenne wrote to the Cardinal who was with the King at Quesnoi, and gave him a particular account of what had happen'd. The letter falling into the Prince's hands, he took two things very ill: one, that it said he had no mind to quit the post of Valenciennes; and the other, that one of the squadrons of the enemy's rear had swum over the Scheld. What made M. de Turenne mention the first circumstance, was that a great many persons of condition having spoke with those in the Prince's rear, told M. de Turenne in the evening, that if the Prince's advice had prevailed, they had not quitted the post of Valenciennes; and as for what he writ concerning a squadron's swimming over the Scheld, M. de S. Lieu, a Colonel, had told him so when he accosted him. And in fact, when the enemy broke their bridge over the Scheld, there were some who did swim over. As for the rest of M. de Turenne's relation, he never once named himself in any respect, nor dwelt upon the precipitate retreat of the enemy, nor the wrong steps they took to come to a post in the very teeth of the King's Army, and then quit that post in its presence, being in such a confusion as to abandon all the rivers, and the most advantageous ground in the world; and this with an Army, which, had they not weaken'd it by conceiving a jealousy of their places without any reason, was no ways inferior to that of the King.

The Prince took great offence at this relation, and sent a Trumpet to M. de Turenne with a very sharp letter, wherein he told him, that if he had been in the van of his Army while he was in the rear of his, he would have seen things better, and not have related matters so remote from the truth. The Prince wrote also to a great many Officers of the King's Army, by way of manifesto, and acquainted Marshal de la Ferté that M. de Turenne did
not

An. 1655. not speak handsomely of him in his relation. M. de Turenne received the Prince's letter in presence of a great many Officers, and shew'd it them instantly, without saying any thing immediately to the Trumpet. Indeed the letter did not at all move him, because he knew of nothing he had done contrary to the esteem he had for the Prince of Condé, or to the respect due to a Prince of the Blood; but he saw plainly enough that things going cross with the Prince, he had put himself in a passion for a very small matter. But then as the Prince had a little transgressed the usual bounds, M. de Turenne told his Trumpet that he should be punish'd if he brought him any more such letters. He wrote nothing back to the Prince, who in the close of this campaign, and in that which follow'd, express'd much bitterness against him; and they never more wrote to one another, as they used to do the preceding years.

We pass'd the Scheld hard by Condé, and it being to no purpose to follow the enemy who got under Tournai, we attack'd Condé, and took it the third day after opening the trenches. Its fortifications were none of the best, and there was nothing but slight works, not much better than an intrenchment of a camp: but as there were two thousand men in the place, they made a great fire on us as we were at work, and killed not a few of our Soldiers, besides two Captains of the Guards, with other Officers. During this siege, M. de Buffi having been to escort the foragers with three regiments of horse, as he was coming back was charg'd by some cavalry of the enemy's Army that was come to Valenciennes, and was beat without much resistance.

We were so far advanced into the enemy's Country that they were under apprehensions for all their towns. If they furnish'd them with troops, they durst not approach in a body, and that happen'd which commonly does happen to men in their case, which was, they fear'd a great deal more from an enemy than it was in an enemy's power to execute; and though people have had great experience, yet they can't help being apprehensive of things which they well know they would not do themselves were they in the place of those they dread: but as great mischiefs may arise if an enemy does more than we think he will do, we chuse rather to provide a remedy against even what we think he cannot do. - The enemy sent a body to cover
Brussels.

Brussels. As the King's Army had a great deal of trouble An. 1655. to get provisions, without advancing farther than Condé, they went and besieged S. Guilain, which is but three leagues off, and whither provisions might come with ease.

The King who had staid at Quesnoi during this march of the Army, came to the siege of S. Guilain, which was taken in a few days. It was granted the same capitulation as Condé, that is, the garrison march'd out, and was conducted to the nearest (fortified) place. The King, after he had staid in the Army eight or ten days, returned to Guise, and his Army for above six weeks wrought at the fortification of those two places, and in fetching convoys to store them with all things necessary for their support and defence. There was a necessity to bring all provisions from Guise; for though Landrecies and Quesnoi facilitated the coming of convoys, they were conquests so new and so destitute of provisions, that there was a necessity to furnish them from France, and the Army likewise: so that here were four places to be victualled, not only for the present, but for the whole winter, besides bread to be furnish'd every day, which occasion'd much difficulty in going through the campaign.

The enemy believed a long time that we would advance to Brussels, which made them not think of cutting off our convoys; besides, they were some time in recovering themselves from the ill success of the campaign. At length however they did get together again, and came to the river Sambre. M. de Turenne having put upwards of four thousand foot into the conquer'd places, continued till the seventh or eighth of November in the field. M. de Castelnau remain'd at Condé with a body of infantry of about two thousand five hundred men. The Army retired to Ribemont, whither the bad weather which spoilt the roads hindered any convoys from coming. As M. de Turenne was retiring, there came a Secretary, one Ronseret by name, from the Cardinal to him, to tell him that M. d'Hocquincourt was gone to Peronne, and that advice was come that he was treating with the Spaniards for that place and Ham. Ronseret likewise let M. de Turenne know that it was wish'd he would go towards Peronne with the Army; but he brought him no express order so to do. M. de Turenne replied that 'twas his opinion, if he approach'd near Peronne with the Army, it would oblige

M. d'Hoc-

An. 1655. M. d'Hocquincourt to take some very extraordinary resolution; and that the thing being in a possibility to be made up, nothing ought be done that might hurry M. d'Hocquincourt into rash measures. The enemy's Army was not ruined, having always kept in their own Country; but that of the King was very much weaken'd by long and great fatigues, by want of provisions, and the great distance of the places the convoys were obliged to come from; so that it would be the greatest baulk that could be to the King's affairs for the Prince and the Spanish Army to have at their disposal Peronne and Ham, two places on the Somme, and very considerable inlets, to carry the War even as far as Paris, and into Normandy.

The Prince's presence during this conjuncture render'd it partly a civil war. M. de Turenne, who went and paid a visit to the Court at Compiègne, advis'd the Cardinal not to cause the Army to approach near Peronne, or give Marshal d'Hocquincourt any pretext to enter into an alliance with the enemy. The Cardinal very much stomach'd it that the King must come to a treaty with one of his own subjects, who insist'd upon two hundred thousand crowns, and the government of one of those places for his Son. But when we contemplated Peronne and Ham in the Prince's hands, the whole Army of Spain ready to support him, and the disposition of almost all the men of quality in France, who only wanted an insurrection, either to set themselves against the Court, or to sell themselves very dear, M. de Turenne thought it his duty to persuade the Cardinal to an accommodation. The Prince and part of the Spanish Army came to Cambrai, and for a fortnight M. d'Hocquincourt had Envoys continually coming to him from the King and the Spaniards to whom he gave separate audiences, not concealing from either party what the other offer'd him, as if it was free for him to make what choice he pleas'd. Madam de Chatillon, who had manag'd Marshal d'Hocquincourt for the Prince, being seized, the Marshal, who was in love with her, hasten'd to make his Peace with the King, for fear that Ducheſs should be ill treated. It is a long story, and so I decline entering into the particulars of it: it is sufficient to say the treaty was at last concluded, and it was stipulated that M. d'Hocquincourt should have two hundred thousand crowns given him, and Peronne and Ham put into the

King's

King's hands. The government of the first named place was granted to his Son, in whom the Cardinal reposed great confidence. An. 1655.

The Prince who had advanced within two or three hours march of Peronne, and who all the rest of the time continued with an Army about Cambrai, retired to the Sambre as soon as he heard of the treaty. We were in doubt if he would not fall on Condé or St. Guislain in his retreat; for which reason the King's Army had advanced as far as St. Quentin; but understanding that he was retiring farther into the Country, the King, after having been at Ham and Peronne with the Cardinal, return'd to Paris, and M. de Turenne follow'd them two days after, the winter quarters for the Army having been first regulated.

That winter was the first that ever the cavalry was put into the villages, and had their pay assign'd them on the land-tax after the rate of twenty sols a Trooper, and a certain number of places were allotted for the Officers, which saved the expence of remittances of money, and prevented likewise any deficiencies. The troops caused themselves to be paid on the spot, and the Troopers being dispersed up and down in the villages, serv'd them for a safeguard, and expended among them a good part of the money which they drew from them; which was the cause that a great many villages of the flat Country follow'd their husbandry with more security, and, contrary to the common opinion, part of the villages of Champagne recover'd themselves by this new way of distributing the troops.

This winter was spent in an entire dependance of the King and Queen on the Cardinal, who had always a great value for M. de Turenne, who knew as much as any body the most secret interests of the Court, and in any affair of difficulty he was sure to have the principal share of confidence. The Cardinal being no ways restrained either by the King or Queen, and having a perfect knowledge of all men's tempers at Court, behaved himself according to the disposition he knew every one to be of, having a most singular method of bringing people to his own point.

The convoys which had been put into Condé and St. Guislain, and the care M. de Castelnau took all the winter long to get a good many small ones into those places by the means of Quefnoi, put them into a condition of wanting nothing till May, at what time M. de Turenne leaving Paris,

An. 1656. Paris, went to the frontier, and so to Condé, conducting thither a large convoy. In ten or twelve days we put a great quantity of provisions into the advanced places, sufficient to supply both the Army and the garrisons. The enemy not being in the field, we met with no manner of difficulty in the bringing these convoys.

The King came to la Fere, and the Cardinal often discours'd with M. de Turenne of the operations of the ensuing campaign; but we deferred any resolution till we were on the frontier to see what we could undertake. Marshal de la Ferté sent his *corps* from Lorrain; but being indisposed, he could not come himself to the Army till some time after. The arrival of Dom John of Austria being a sort of a new establishment, had hindered the enemy from taking the field betimes. This put People upon thinking of undertakings a little romantick. M. de Turenne propos'd to the Cardinal to go to Tournai, and attack it if it was disgarnish'd, or if it was found too well provided, then to come back and invest Valenciennes. The Minister did not oppose this, tho' he had many reasons to fear a bad event; but he was willing to hazard something, because he was of opinion that in war it is necessary to be always attempting new conquests, and that whenever we begin to flag, we run a risk of losing all. There were abundance of troops and recruits which had not yet join'd the Army; but as the enemy were not got together in a body, there was no danger in advancing into their Country; so that M. de Turenne having collected what troops were on the frontier, march'd with great diligence to Condé, and from thence to within two leagues of Tournai with all the cavalry, ordering the infantry, cannon, and provisions to follow after, under the command of the Marquis d'Uxelles. When we were got on t'other side Mortagne, having sent M. de Castelnau, who pass'd by S. Guislain with part of the cavalry to invest Tournai, M. de Turenne had an account brought him that the enemy had some regiments incamp'd about Tournai; and as the design of attacking it was only in case there should happen to be no garrison in it (there being nothing so irrational as to go upon a siege which would last any time, so far within an enemy's Country, and consequently at such a distance from ammunition and provision) he return'd to Condé; and, leaving his bridge at Mortagne, which

which is situated at the place where the Scarpe and Scheld An. 1656.
join their streams, with a body of troops, to wait the coming of four thousand men from Arras, he march'd the next morning to Valenciennes, whither he order'd that body which was left at Mortagne, and the other troops which were expected, to come and join him.

There were not in Valenciennes above a thousand foot and two hundred horse; but it being a large city, the Burghers might do the service of military men: M. de Turenne sent the Marquis d'Uxelles, who commanded Marthal de la Ferre's body of troops, over into the Island of S. Amand, with orders to advance as far as the Scheld above the town on the road to Bouchain. He himself march'd thro' the plains which face Quesnoi and Cambrai, and invested the place on that side. There was then little or no difficulty in having a communication by the upper part of the river; and the same evening in which Mr. de Turenne arriv'd before the place, he pass'd over a bridge which had been laid in Marquis d'Uxelles's quarter, and left M. de Castelnau below the town: the enemy were forced to quit two redoubts they had below the town; so that the place was pretty closely shut up, the very first night we came to it. Next morning we began our circumvallation; on the third day there was ground enough thrown up every where to hinder a small succour from entering the town: tho' there was a talk of some stoppage of water which might be made at Bouchain, we never imagin'd it was near so great as we afterwards found it. The enemy offer'd to throw a small succour of seven or eight hundred men into the place the third night by the Lorrainers quarter; but not a man got in: some were taken, and the rest retired to Bouchain.

The fifth or sixth day the circumvallation was in very good order; first, with a single ditch, and after with a double ditch and palisades; but as there was but few infantry for so large a circuit, all parts of it could not be in an equally good condition: we busied ourselves only at the principal avenues, and deferr'd till afterwards such places as were not so easy to be attack'd. After two or three days we began to see the river swell between Bouchain and Valenciennes, and to run over its banks into the meadows; but having order'd a good quantity

An. 1656. of fascines to be brought, we kept the passage open. Had we seen at the beginning the water any thing near so high as it became afterwards, we had not entertain'd the least thought of making a communication, nor indeed of undertaking the siege. As the water increas'd by little and little, we provided against it by assiduity and continual care; and almost all the cavalry of the army carry'd fascines two or three times a day, besides whole regiments employ'd therein. At length, for the space of upwards of a thousand paces there was every where a depth of above ten foot of water, and in some places a great deal more. Throughout this whole space, we made a bridge of fascines, floating in some places, and in others fasten'd with stakes thrust into the earth, over which the infantry always pass'd, and the cavalry as soon as ever it was put in order: sometimes there came such a swell of water as took us up to the waist on the very bank, which we had cast up to keep it out; but by dint of labour, the army remedied the mischief the same day: this was above the town, and yet below we made bridges of communication, so that on the ninth day we were in a condition to open trenches. Our camp abounded with provisions and ammunition through the care we had taken to have them brought into the advanced places. The enemy could throw no succour into the place, tho' it was in the very midst of all their fortified towns. M. de Turenne having intelligence that they were assembled near Dowai and were marching towards our camp, we deferred, for three days, the opening the trenches, that we might have the more time to raise our bank for our defence against overflowsings as also to work on the circumvallation. The enemy likewise waited till we opened the trenches, and then drew towards us the next day: they at first lay within a league of us; and continuing their march, they posted themselves above the Lorrainers camp, within half-cannon shot of the lines. Their Army was not quite so strong as the King's: however they had at least twenty thousand men. The great extent of the circumvallation and the difficulty of assembling the quarters, would not allow us so much as once to think we could attack them. They entrench'd themselves that very day; and I have been told that Don John of Austria was for attacking our lines as soon as he came: the presence of the enemy help'd

help'd to make them much better, and there came to M. An. 1656. de Navailles a supply of four hundred foot; which obliged us to advance the line, in order to gain a small eminence which was between the enemy and the Lorrainers camp. This was our posture seven or eight days. The trenches being open'd with a large front exposed us to be much annoy'd by the cannon of the town; however, we advanced apace the first days, and lost very few men; but as we approach'd to the enemy's works, we began to lose abundance of pioneers. There were two attacks, and the enemy made no considerable sally. When we were got to the counterscarp of the outworks, they defended it very well, and we were repuls'd three or four times in endeavouring to make a lodgment there. The enemy without, being encamp'd not above half a cannon-shot from the King's Army, obliged M. de Turenne not to stay in the trenches when night came on, which otherwise he would have done; he always held it for certain that the enemy would fall upon his lines; so that though he left nothing undone to carry on the siege, yet he did not press it as the principal affair. We fore-judged very near the time when the enemy would assault our lines, and that they would regulate themselves therein according as the siege advanced.

Marshal de la Ferté came to the Army eight or ten days after the trenches were opened, and before he was quite recovered of his illness. He very much hasten'd the works at his quarter *, and at the bank of earth I mention'd above. Three weeks after the trenches had been opened at M. de Turenne's attack, there was a *boyau* [a branch of a trench] on the edge of the town-ditch, and another in the ditch of the half-moon; and at Marshal de la Ferté's attack, we had taken a *tenaille*. Those within the town had already done their utmost; and we saw plainly enough that for three or four days past they began to abate of their vigour. At last the enemy [in the field] one morning, took their arms, and we saw their baggage marching towards Bouchain. We made no doubt but they would fall on our lines in the night-time. Their

* We cannot too often repeat or too much admire the Viscount's silence with regard to all the faults committed by his rivals. The misconduct of Marshal de la Ferté occasion'd the relief of Valenciennes, as is apparent from the Memoirs left us by the Marquis de Puysegur.

An. 1656. camp was upon an eminence above the Lorrainers quarter. They had on their left hand the Scheld, on which they had laid five or six bridges, the river being very narrow; and at their right they had a small brook, which comes from about Quesnoi, and which separated the Lorrainers from M. de Turenne's other quarters: the enemy had also laid several bridges over this brook.

We were full of expectations all the first night, having been inform'd by a man who came and surrender'd himself to us, that their design was to march towards Marshal de la Ferté's quarter. All M. de Turenne could do, was, to keep some infantry in a readiness to march upon the Dyke, with order to pass it, if the quarter beyond was attack'd, or to march on this side to the place where they should see the attack made. In a circumvallation of very great extent, there was not above twelve thousand foot, and on both attacks there was a necessity for infantry; so that it was impossible to have any one place well provided: but we reckon'd upon a great body of cavalry behind the line, and on the infantry which would quickly march to reinforce us, and likewise on what often happens, namely, the assailants being puzzled and at a loss, upon their meeting with never so little resistance from those they attack.

The first night pass'd without alarm. All the following day we saw the enemy in battalia without baggage; and when night came on, we were in the same disposition we had been in all the foregoing day. M. de Turenne was in that quarter which fronted the enemy's; and Marshal de la Ferté having push'd their guard, and taken some prisoners, they told him that his quarter was to be attack'd; but the enemy being in presence, and nothing to hinder them from being in half an hour on the very edge of the intrenchment, he could make no change of the first disposition. We were likewise informed that there was a body of three or four thousand men under M. de Marfin at S. Amand, who were to make a separate attack. M. de Turenne constantly believed the enemy would try a grand attack on the Lorrainers front, whither they could come in order of battle directly from their own quarters; and that in the mean time M. de Marfin with that body from S. Amand, would march into the island below the town; which were distant two full

full leagues the one from the other, and consequently without all possible means of assisting each other. Don John of Austria and the Prince having resolv'd upon attacking Marshal de la Ferté's Army, began to pass the river as soon as it grew night, leaving as they were wont to do the guards at the head of their quarter. The Lorrainers quarter was so near the enemy, that we had shut up all the grand barriers, and there was in the whole front of the Lorrainers camp but two outlets, where no more than one horse could pass at a time; which was the reason why we kept only ten or a dozen horse out of the lines, a-nights. The enemy, without being discovered, cross'd the Scheld; and Marshal de la Ferté not having posted any body without the lines, in a belief that there was no need of it, the enemy pass'd over the water, drew up in battalia, the Spaniards on the right hand, and the Prince on the left.

The first alarm which we heard, was at their coming to the first ditch of the intrenchment; there they fell on in a wide front, and carried the line without much resistance of the infantry, who were very ill seconded by the cavalry. On the first musket-shot, two regiments of M. de Turenne pass'd the Dyke, and four more followed; but the regiment of Vervins, which came first, found all the enemy's troops got into the line, in the dark of the night; tho' Marshal de la Ferté repaired thither with some squadrons, he found the confusion there to be so great, that he could do nothing to any effect. The enemy's troops meeting with so little resistance, filled up both trenches, broke down the palisades, and the day coming on, they march'd to the town of Valenciennes, and sent their cavalry in pursuit of the troops that were running away. Great part of Marshal de la Ferté's Army were made prisoners, and the rest escaped to Condé, though the Marshal had done all that could be done. What occasion'd much loss, there was but one bridge, the passage over which was encumber'd by the baggage. The two regiments which Mr. de Turenne had made pass the Dyke, having been defeated by the enemy, which were already enter'd into the line, the others stopt on the Dyke whither M. de Turenne came soon after the beginning of the fight, which lasted not above a quarter of an hour, from the time that the enemy came to the

An. 1656 edge of the ditch, till the time that they were in battle-array within the intrenchments.

In this instant, day began to appear ; M. de Turenne not knowing certainly what had passed, his guards whom he had sent thither in all haste, being all taken or kill'd, nobody came time enough to defend the line. As we perceived by the shouts of joy that were made at Valenciennes, that the town was relieved, and by there being no firing in the line, that it was forced, M. de Turenne sent forthwith to the trenches, with orders to retire ; but they being above a league off, the orders arrived a little too late, and some of the enemy's troops had already got into the town ; so that he lost half the troops that were in the trenches. Day-light increasing, the enemy's whole Army was seen marching, in order of battle, directly to the town. M. de Turenne drew off the infantry which was on the Dyke, and order'd all the cannon which was on the lines to be drawn off, and that the guard-horses should be made use of to draw them from place to place, in case of an attack. He also order'd the lines to be levell'd ; and as he march'd with the Lorrainers to M. de Castelnau's quarter, made M. de Navailles dislodge ; and thus we all join'd again at the border of the intrenchments.

The enemy march'd a body of cavalry into the town, and the Prince himself hasten'd thither ; while M. de Turenne having caused the line to be broken in abundance of places, and having stood his ground resolutely for a while with some squadrons, at last quitted the intrenchments, leaving some tents and baggage behind him. While we were getting together again from so many different parts, it was impossible to avoid being a little in confusion at first ; however, within half a league's distance from the town, we got ourselves into good order ; which the enemy seeing, made a stop, nor did they afterwards push their pursuit of us with much briskness, meeting with something or other to pick up by the way in many places.

We march'd to Quefnoi with five or six pieces of cannon : the bridges below on the river, towards the isle, which I mention'd before, being broke down, Marshal de la Ferté's troops could not retire to M. de Turenne's quarter, where M. de Marlin, who had made an attack with those

those troops from S. Amand, was repuls'd. The disorder in the King's Army having begun on the other side, occasion'd likewise no small mischief, because it contributed to cut off their way to the bridge; the enemy after having taken Marshal de la Ferté, who had behaved himself very well, and almost all the general Officers, and a great many others of his Army, prisoners, they stopt at Valenciennes, not pursuing us far with their cavalry. All the King's Army concluded upon going on beyond Quesnoi to Landrecies, and thence to the frontiers of France, and the baggage was already beginning to file off on the other side of Quesnoi, when M. de Turenne sent some troops to stop it; and having chosen a camp near the town, he lay there that night. Very early next day, he drew up the Army in order of battle, that he might regulate the wings of the cavalry and the battalions of the infantry, and that his men seeing themselves again in a compacted body might recover their spirits; for though it was Marshal de la Ferté's Army only that had suffer'd any notable loss, yet there was no small consternation among the rest of the troops. Notwithstanding a report was spread that the enemy would go and besiege Condé, M. de Turenne believed rather that they would follow him, and the Army was not of opinion to wait for them. Next day after the raising of the siege the enemy received a re-inforcement of two thousand German foot, and having allowed themselves a whole day to get again into order and disburthen themselves of their prisoners, they march'd directly to the King's Army. It is certain that if M. de Turenne had had nothing to fear but the loss of Quesnoi, he had retreated to the frontiers; but he foreseeing the many fatal consequences of that general discontent, which such a retreat would have caused all over the Nation, and even at the court itself, as likewise of the Prince's appearing in France, chose rather to wait for the enemy, than make a motion that would have been attended with so many mischiefs. There was a necessity for the enemy to cross two small rivulets to come to the camp, where the King's Army lay; and as it is well known that two Armies never approach each other without a great many precautions, which take up time, M. de Turenne order'd his men, not to take their arms, but only

An. 1656. keep themselves ready, fearing lest any of the baggage being seen to move, might give a bad appearance; and besides he had a mind to let his Army see there was no occasion to be afraid, though the enemy were approaching. M. de Turenne discoursed with the General Officers about the matter, but held no Council of War, upon the question, Whether to continue in that post, or to retire. The enemy coming within cannon-shot of the King's Army, M. de Turenne advanced with some regiments of the main guard; and the enemy seeing all the tents up, and the main guard at the head of them, perceived plainly enough that the Army was not dislodg'd, and that they had deceived themselves; for with a full persuasion, that after the defeat at Valenciennes (knowing that what was left of Marshal de la Ferté's Army was at Condé) the King's Army would fly before them, they had detach'd three thousand horse to follow us. It is true that fifteen hundred men, who had been appointed to bring a Convoy to the siege, came and joined the King's Army the day it left Valenciennes.

The enemy's Army arriving somewhat late, thought of nothing that day but to rest themselves; and M. de Turenne being quite destitute of tools for making any grand works, and not thinking it proper to go upon small ones, which would only have argued fear, and afforded little or no security, did not set his men to work at all. The enemy continued two days in view, without attempting the least thing. All that space of time the news was that they would attack us, and also that they designed to march between Quesnoi and Landrecies, to cut off the provisions and forage of the King's Army, in which case M. de Turenne was resolv'd to oppose such their marching, and to fight them, though that seem'd a little rash considering the condition the King's Army was in; but after the resolution we had taken to stay at Quesnoi we were no longer to fear any thing.

Two or three thousand men, who had escaped from Marshal de la Ferté's Army to Condé, having got to S. Guislain, came to Landrecies, and from thence to Quesnoi, the second day that the Armies were in presence, so that the enemy not judging it proper to undertake any thing, march'd to Condé. M. de Turenne, seeing them decamp, sent a thousand horse-load of meal to S. Guislain

S. Guislain and Condé : in which last place, there had been large quantities of provisions when the siege of Valenciennes first began ; but M. de Turenne had very much drain'd it, to supply his camp. An. 1656.

M. du Passage, who commanded in Condé, having kept with him no more than five and twenty hundred men, the enemy found it very easy to besiege that place, which indeed served only to advance other conquests ; the siege of Valenciennes being rais'd, Condé was so wedged within their country, that it was a very easy matter for the enemy, without separating their quarters, to prevent its relief ; so they fix'd their quarters very orderly one next to another, being in no fear of our throwing in provisions, because of its situation. M. de Turenne put some into S. Guislain, seeing the impossibility of succouring Condé, and receiving advice from the Governor that there were not provisions for above ten or twelve days, he thought it not reasonable to undertake any thing, in the condition the Army was in. He told his mind to the Cardinal, who agreed with him in the same sentiment, after they had conferred together upon that subject at Guise. But the Governor of Condé having more provisions than were absolutely necessary, and the siege drawing into length, the Cardinal was of opinion that M. de Turenne should march to the Scheld, and he left it to his choice, either to alarm Catelet, or advance towards the Lys.

This march was made when Condé was going to capitulate, and with a design to save the troops that were there. M. de Turenne having cross'd the Scheld, march'd to Arras, and thence to the river Lys ; and he had attack'd S. Venant, had he not received advice of the surrender of Condé. The capitulation of the garrison was, that it should be re-conducted into France through the Country of Luxembourg. The enemy, after having spent three or four days in demolishing the fortifications, advanced pretty near to Cambrai to give us a jealousy they designed to enter France, or, in case the King's Army should go and cover the frontier, to attack Bethune or la Bassée. The Cardinal had used his utmost endeavours to remount the cavalry since the action at Valenciennes ; and this cavalry when remounted he caused to march into the frontier-places ; as for M. de Turenne he stirr'd not from
Lens,

An. 1656. Lens, which is four leagues from Arras and three from la Bassée.

The enemy having refresh'd themselves some days in the plains between Cambrai and Bapaume began to march, leaving Arras on their left, to come to Lens, where M. de Turenne had stay'd ten or twelve days on purpose to wait there for them. But as he saw, not only that they could come to him by some rising grounds, by favour of which they were masters of a pass where he could otherwise have fought them, but also that the King's Army would on their approach be obliged to decamp from Lens for want of forage, he chose rather to depart before they were in view; as soon therefore as he was informed that they were got within three leagues of him, he march'd to Bethune. He saw that this had an ill effect on the minds of the soldiery, who were somewhat surprized at his thus retreating before the enemy; but having weigh'd the necessity there was for decamping, the other consideration did not stop him. He had observ'd on the map a place nam'd Houdain, which was situated just as he desired, because he should there have Arras near him, and be able to give a helping hand to Bethune and la Bassée; but when he was come to it, he found a great difficulty in respect of water for the horses, and many inconveniences as to encamping; so he entrench'd himself a little in the night-time, and next day went in search of a fitter place, which was la Buissiere, at a league's distance from Houdain. Being inform'd by some prisoners, that the Spaniards were arriv'd at Lens with an intention to follow him, mightily exulting at his retreat, and thinking they should always drive him before them, M. de Turenne was of opinion that Houdain was the better place to wait for the enemy in; not that it was any of the best for an engagement, but his chief reason was his having Arras behind him, from whence he might get provisions; whereas should he tarry at la Buissiere, and the enemy be at Houdain, he should have his communication with Arras cut off; so, setting forward at midnight, to the end that by day-break he might be in order of battle, (believing the enemy would march thither early) he advanced with the Army to Houdain, and posting the right wing on a rising ground, the foot and left wing descended into the plain, taking such a distance

distance as is requisite for an Army that is preparing for an engagement. There was a rivulet behind; but M. de Turenne would not pass over it, for fear the enemy should place themselves before la Bassée, whose situation is such, that, by getting there but ten hours before an enemy, the relieving it is render'd very difficult, and M. de Turenne was willing to have it in his power to arrive there soon after the enemy; which the Defile of the rivulet would have hinder'd.

About eight or nine in the morning the enemy began to appear at the distance of about a league and a half from the King's Army, which when they saw in a fighting posture, they made a halt for more than three hours, and held a council, after which they directed their march towards us. We thought it would have come to a battle that day; but night approaching, they ranged themselves in battalia within a small quarter of a league of us, extending their wings of cavalry and their infantry in the very same order as that which confronted them. In the night-time, M. de Turenne had a mind to possess himself of a village and put his infantry into it, thereby to alter the form of the left wing, which he did not think well placed. After having lost three or four hours in this perplexity, he concluded at length that the best way would be to leave the Army as it was, and in two hours time he caused some small redans to be cast up at the head of the left wing. 'Tis said that the enemy had approach'd us, in a persuasion that we were retiring. When it was day-light, they came to take a view of us, and there were some skirmishings, and this was all that happened that day. The next morning, they march'd to Lens in great order: for as the way is through wide plains, there could be no confusion in marching. There was a good deal of skirmishing between us and them in their retreat, which began a little to make an alteration in the spirits of the two Armies. M. de Turenne in the camp at Lens had often exercised his infantry, which had somewhat restored their vigour. The enemy went and lay at Dowai, from whence, some days after, they detached a body of infantry to go and besiege S. Guislain while they should cover the siege with their Army. The situation of the Country made this easy for them to do, and render'd the relieving of the place impossible. As they

An. 1656. they likewise made their attack with few men, the rest of their Army was sufficient to hinder us from undertaking any thing in Flanders. M. de Turenne, as soon as he saw the enemy was moved off, sent S. Martin, Lieutenant of the Ordnance, to wait on the Cardinal who was at la Fere, in order to get the artillery ready, and the military implements fitted for use. This M. de Turenne did, thinking he might be able to lay siege to la Capelle, which was so remote from the place where he then was, that he believed the enemy would have no suspicion of his design. The Cardinal having left it to M. de Turenne to do as he thought fit, the latter departed from Bethune, pass'd through Arras, made a shew of going to the river Somme, to conceal his march from the garrison of Cambray; and slipping along the river, left his infantry behind him, and went and invested la Capelle.

The Prince had detach'd a body under the Count de la Suze, who was to have thrown himself into the place; but laying at the distance of two leagues from la Capelle, and hearing no news of the King's Army, he did not enter, neither did he attempt to do it, till after he had received advice that the town was invested. M. de Turenne had, in his way, been join'd by fifteen hundred foot, which came from Conde: with these and the cavalry he began to intrench himself. Some troops of M. de la Suze's Corps endeavour'd to get in, the first night, but to no purpose; but the second, the son of M. de Chamilli the Governor threw himself into the place with about fourscore horse, having forced his way through the squadrons which surrounded it. The infantry arriv'd the second day after the cavalry, and there not being above two hundred men in the place, we, in one night, carry'd the counterscarp, took three half-moons, and crossing the ditch set some soldiers on against the bastion, but this being overcast with good stone-work, they could not keep their ground there. All these out-works which we took were admirably well staked and palisaded. The enemy, mean while, getting themselves together at S. Guislain, resolv'd to make us raise the siege of la Capelle, and march'd thither in haste, nothing doubting but they might return again to S. Guislain, the situation of the Country giving them reason to depend on such measures.

M. de Turenne had an accoynt brought him that the enemy

enemy had rais'd the siege of S. Guislain, and that their whole Army was arriv'd at Avesnes, an hour after all the out-works of la Capelle were carried : this oblig'd him to press the siege. Though the place was very small, yet the circumvallation was above three leagues in compass ; but there being woods about the town, which hinder'd an enemy's Army from giving a jealousy in all parts, we wrought with the utmost diligence at the head by which the enemy could come, which had a wide front ; and in the night, as we fear'd not the place, we kept the Army very near it, that we might be able to repair speedily to that quarter, by which the enemy should make their approach. They advanced, without losing time, to within a league of the circumvallation ; but being greatly fatigued with a continual rain during their two day's hasty march, they did not think it adviseable to fight, and continued two days at that distance from the camp of the King's Army. The soldiers who had advanced the first night as far as the wall of the bastion, not having been able to keep there, we made holes in it with our cannon ; in these holes the Miners lodg'd themselves, and the place yielded the fourth day in presence of the enemy's Army.

After the surrender of la Capelle, the Prince sent some of his troops into Rocroi, and the Spaniards found themselves unable to return so soon to S. Guislain. They went and lay at Maubeuge ; and the King and the Cardinal arriv'd at Guise, they thought it adviseable to cause a large Convoy to be thrown into S. Guislain. There was a great likelihood that the enemy would return to their old camp, before this place, which was a very advantageous one for the hindring of our going to it with the Convoy, and indeed with the Army ; however, the Cardinal could not help thinking that the King ought to attempt it. He therefore set out from Guise with the Army, and lying at Quesnoi, next day M. de Turenne being advanced within a league of the place, sent thither M. de Castelnau with four or five hundred foot, provisions for eight months, and plenty of warlike stores. The enemy, tho' in no condition to hinder it, yet march'd to Mons, which is not above a league from S. Guislain, and shew'd themselves before the place two hours after the troops which had guarded the Convoy were retired.

There

An. 1656. There was a sorry castle which we took in this march. From thence the King went to Guise, and, the season being far advanced, he return'd to Paris soon after.

The enemy were no longer in a condition to besiege S. Guislain, and the King's Army staid in the Cambresis till the beginning of November; then it re-passed the Somme to go into quarters in France, and that of the enemy retired between Mons and Namur, where after it had staid a while in the villages, it was dispers'd up and down in the Countries where it used to be. The King's Army was dispos'd of in the villages, and we began this year for the first time to quarter the foot therein, assigning them places in like manner as the horse, both officers and soldiers.

An. 1657. During the winter the enemy, having tamper'd with some Irish officers who were in S. Guislain, and who had promis'd them to make the soldiers revolt when they should draw near the place, came before it with some troops drawn out of the garrisons, and attacking the out-works, carried them. Though their secret intelligence with those Irish officers had no effect, they continued the siege and took the place in six or seven days from opening the trenches. M. de Schomberg commanded there with a garrison of six hundred men, and by capitulation came away to Quesnoi. There fell out nothing considerable this winter at Court, where a plenitude of power was continued to Cardinal Mazarin.

A treaty being concluded with the Protector of England, he promis'd to furnish six thousand men, to be paid by the King, to undertake the siege of Dunkirk or Gravelines, and it was agreed that which soever of those two places was first taken should be put into the Protector's hands; and if it should prove to be Gravelines, then this was to be as an hostage to him till Dunkirk should be taken and put into his hands, in which case Gravelines should be restored to the King.

The Army took the field in the beginning of May, with intention to do all that could be done on the sea-coast. M. de Turenne was some time at Amiens before the Court, in order to assemble the Army. The dilatoriness of the officers in raising the recruits, and that of the English who landed not at Calais, till the month of May was far spent, gave the enemy time to get together in Flanders.

ders. The King having no one passage into it, our hopes of success on the sea-side was solely grounded on our being so early in our undertakings that the enemy's Army could not be got together. These measures were broke on the side of Flanders, which is so close and compact a Country, that no scheme is like to succeed there, when a passage is not secured, and there is an Army to oppose it. Marshal de la Ferté was with an Army about Luxembourg, in order to attack Arlon, if he found it ungarrison'd, or at least to put a stop there to the Prince's Army, which for some years past used to winter in that Country and the territories of Guelderland, Juliers and Brabant.

The Cardinal came to Amiens, where M. de Turenne agreed with him that the Army should march to the Lys; that the King should go to Montreuil, in order to put the enemy in pain for their places on the coast, and that we should return suddenly and fall on Cambrai which was entirely defenceless. To make this design the more feasible, and to keep the enemy from making preparations at Cambrai, it was requisite the English should land just when the King's Army appeared before that town and not before; because else the Army tarrying in the Boulenois would have made the enemy suspect that we were contriving to enter into Flanders, and immediately have put them upon throwing men into Cambrai, which was but at the distance of two days march from us. On the other side, it was not thought proper that Marshal de la Ferté should re-pass the Meuse and quit the Country of Luxembourg, lest the Prince with his Army, seeing that the Marshal had his face turn'd towards Flanders, should likewise march to Cambrai. These considerations made M. de Turenne, without the English and without Marshal de la Ferté's Army, resolve to sit down before Cambrai, chusing rather to hazard the letting some succour enter in, and in that case not to continue the siege, than to discover his design by going thither with more precaution, and by causing the English and M. de la Ferté to approach; which would have engaged the enemy to put the place into such a condition as would have prevented all thoughts of attacking it. Setting out from Bethune, he march'd with all his cavalry, and in a day and a night arrived before the place, after he had passed the Scheld above the town, and fetch'd a compass round the citadel. He met
M. de

An. 1657. M. de Castelnau whom he had sent, with good part of the cavalry, between Cambrai and Bouchain, and the infantry being arriv'd with a bridge of boats the evening of the same day that M. de Turenne got there with the cavalry, we made in an hour's time a bridge of communication; and having distributed the working-implements the same day, we began at seven in the evening to work on the lines. We had no intelligence of the enemy, and M. de Turenne well knew that with the utmost diligence horsemen could make, the cavalry of the Spaniards in Flanders could not be there before the next day, by which time he believed he might be inclosed either within lines; or secured by the baggage of the Army or the provision-waggons, in such a manner that no cavalry of the enemy could be able to pass. Whilst he was coming on the side of Flanders to invest Cambrai, he learnt nothing of the Prince, whom he believed to be about the Meuse. M. de Condé being importuned by the Spaniards to march into Flanders, which they chose rather to save and leave the places of Luxembourg to take their fate, arriv'd with all his cavalry at Valenciennes the same morning, that M. de Turenne did at Cambrai; and having notice thereof from divers Couriers whom the Governor had dispatch'd to Bouchain, when he began to see the King's Army appear, as likewise by the cannon of the citadel and town, he went away to Bouchain with his cavalry, which is not above two hours march from Valenciennes, and it is as much from thence to Cambrai. He arrived about ten in the morning at Bouchain, saw all that day the King's Army filing off towards Cambrai; and although abundance of people counselled him to wait for the troops of Spain in order to relieve the place, he well judg'd that the difficulty would increase, if he gave us time to work on the lines; that very night in which we had invested Cambrai, about eleven o'clock, he march'd over the plains, (it being all a flat Country about Cambrai) directly to the citadel, with near three thousand horse, but no infantry at all.

M. de Turenne having had information in the close of the day, that there were arriv'd nine squadrons of horse at Bouchain, fancy'd they were some Spanish troops that had a mind to enter the place, and thinking they would avoid coming where he was encamp'd, but would go round

round in order to get in without meeting any body, he An. 1657.
 went and posted himself in the place where it was supposed they would pass, with seven or eight regiments of cavalry, leaving all the troops extended along the plain. It is not certainly known whether the Prince was misled by the Guide, who, it is said, intended to carry him another way, to avoid the camp; but he came by the highway from Bouchain to the citadel. He had twenty five or twenty six squadrons, three squadrons in front, and the others behind in three columns. They found in their way but four or five squadrons of the cavalry of the King's Army, who having only made some discharges, and not opposing them in front, let them pass on with but little loss. A squadron of Clerembaut, where M. de Varenne was, charg'd that where the Prince was, follow'd it quite to the counterscarp of the citadel and took a good number of prisoners: some likewise miss'd their way in the dark of the night; but the Prince found himself an hour before day on the ditches of the citadel with all his troops about him, except five and twenty or thirty officers and three or four hundred troopers which he lost. M. de Turenne was a great way off, when there was brought to him a Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment of Enguien, who was taken as the Prince was entering the camp. Though M. de Turenne hasten'd to that side, he could not learn before it was day-light, whether or no any body of men was got into Cambray.

Day-light beginning to appear, M. de Turenne saw all the enemy's troops in order of battle upon the counterscarp of the citadel; upon which he immediately order'd M. de Castelnau, who was on the other side the Scheld, to re-pass on this side, and made no hesitation to raise the siege; not having undertaken it but upon an assurance he should find but few men in the place, and being fully persuaded that if he beat the Spanish succours, which could not be very considerable the first nor the second night, he might easily carry on the siege: but the Prince's arrival at Bouchain, the day he (himself) invested Cambray, and the resolution which the Prince took to enter the place in person (which was a very bold thing) utterly broke M. de Turenne's measures, and oblig'd him to assemble all the troops. Having taken up all the bridges on the Scheld, and having re-loaded the waggons with

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An. 1657. whatever might have been taken out of them in a blockade of one night, he began to march between Cambrai and le Catelet.

When M. de Castelnau had done passing the Scheld, and was re-loading his bridge, there appear'd some cavalry of the Spanish Army, which the Prince, when he arriv'd at Bouchain, had order'd to hasten away to him. There was no considerable skirmish in the rear; and the King's Army, after staying two days about Cambrai, drew near to S. Quentin, where the King who was in Picardy arriv'd some days after. This attempt on Cambrai having given the enemy time to get themselves together, any enterprize from the sea to the Scheld became in a manner impossible; so that we caus'd the English to advance to S. Quentin, who had landed to the number of near six thousand men, and the King went thither with the Cardinal: M. de Turenne repairing thither likewise, a resolution was taken to send to Marshal de la Ferté with a proposal to attack Arlon or Monmedi, thinking that an attack upon a small place in Luxembourg might make the enemy take some wrong step; which we chose rather to do than to sit down before a great town, after having given the Spaniards time to get together; for this would enable them either to enter France, or fall on some place which could not be well supplied, when the Army was employ'd about a great siege, and had many places to defend. This was what determin'd us to fall upon Monmedi, to which Marshal de la Ferté readily assented: and although there were great difficulties on account of the rock, yet we flatter'd ourselves that we should find but few men there, as indeed there were not above four hundred at the most.

M. de Turenne sent away four thousand foot to Marshal de la Ferté, and caus'd the body of English to draw near him, with intent to oppose the enemy's Army; and putting some infantry into Landrecies and Quefnoi, he kept himself at the head of the frontier to hinder the enemy's attempting to relieve Monmedi, or doing any thing else that was considerable. The siege therefore began, and M. de Turenne march'd thither once with his cavalry, upon advice that the enemy were between the Sambre and the Meuse in their way to the place. He returned thither a second time, the enemy's whole

whole Army having been as far as Charlemont which is An. 1657.
 on the Meuse, from whence they returned hastily thro' Flanders to Calais, to execute a design which they had on that place, but it miscarry'd : and the Cardinal, who was at la Fere with the King, sent away with the utmost expedition his Majesty's Musketeers to Ardres, who, together with the cavalry which M. de Castelnau sent thither likewise, prevented the enemy's stopping at Ardres, after missing their aim on Calais ; but having refresh'd themselves near a fortnight, they again approach'd the frontier and came to Ribemont.

The siege of Monmedi lasted much longer than it had been imagin'd it would, because of the rocks near the Counterescarp ; so that the enemy astonish'd at the length of the siege, resolv'd after all these attempts to relieve it, and after marching to Calais to make again as if they would break into France, having first sent M. de Marcin with a Corps to Luxembourg, to endeavour to relieve Monmedi : but they staid no longer than one day at Ribemont, and retired from thence into their own Country. M. de Turenne sent a new reinforcement of troops to Monmedi ; so that after above two months from the opening of the trenches, the place surrender'd, the enemy having undertaken nothing, and their Army being in a very ruinous condition, by reason of divers marches which had very ill succeeded. We had for some time entertained a very ill opinion of the siege of Monmedi ; which obliged the King to approach it, and afterwards the Queen, who had staid at la Fere, went thither to visit the King, who resided at Stenai, but now and then took a ride to the siege to see how it went on.

When the place surrender'd, the enemy's whole Army was between the Sambre and the Meuse, and the Cardinal propos'd to M. de Turenne the siege of Rocroi ; which the enemy judging feasible, they drew near it with their whole Army. M. de Turenne was between fourteen and fifteen leagues from the place where the Court was, and well knew that there had been no new plan form'd for any enterprizes ; the Court fancying every thing to be good, so it could but be brought about : but he, seeing that the enemy were advancing towards Rocroi, resolv'd to march very early, to be beforehand with them, and to get into Flanders sooner than they. He, at setting

An. 1657 ting out, advertised the Cardinal of his design; and all Marshal de la Ferté's troops, as well those of his own Corps, as those which had been sent him, continued near Monmedi, except the cavalry which M. de l'Islebonne and M. de Varennes commanded. Departing from Rumigni, he took his march towards Avesnes, and from thence cross'd the Sambre at Amiens, where he tarry'd no longer than was just requisite to take some refreshment. He pass'd near Quesnoi, and went and cross'd the Scheld at Neuville, a league below Bouchain, from whence he went and lay at Sailli on the Scarpe, and that very night sent from thence M. de Castelnau to invest S. Venant, having order'd him to pass over to the other side the Lys. M. de Turenne at the same time arriv'd on this side with all the cavalry and a detachment of Musketeers. From the Sambre we had march'd in three days as far as S. Venant, the first we reach'd Neuville hard by Bouchain, the second we got to Sailli, on the Scarpe, and the third to St. Venant.

M. de Turenne knew very well that he could not get above a day's march of the enemy, who by going thro' their own Country, would meet with nothing to retard their progress; for which reason he would not lay siege to Armentieres, because the enemy could have been there a day sooner than at St. Venant. This expeditiousness of the King's Army was not at all hinder'd by the baggage which had been almost all sent away except some waggons and cannon which march'd with the Army. M. de Ciron, who conducted the baggage, was order'd by M. de Turenne to take along with him the tools, which were to be at S. Quentin, and make the best of his way thro' Arras and Bethune directly to St. Venant.

When the Army arriv'd there, we found the place naked enough; not having in it above three hundred men. As we could bring but very little ammunition or provision with the Army, M. de Turenne sent away immediately to fetch what could be spared from la Bassée and Bethune. The Prince and Don John of Austria lost no time, and having march'd without baggage, their van arriv'd within four leagues of S. Venant, the day after that the King's Army was got before the place. We wanted all things necessary for a siege, so M. de Turenne took some cavalry and went to la Bassée; from whence, coming

ing back by Bethune, he brought some provisions to the An. 1657.
camp, as likewise a little ammunition.

The enemy's whole Army arriv'd before the place, the third day after that of the King. We received news that day, that the baggage of our Army, escorted by seven or eight regiments of horse and fifteen hundred foot, was set out from Arras and coming to the camp. M. de Turenne sent five hundred horse to meet it, and sent word to M. de Ciron who conducted it to go round by Lilers, where he encamp'd in the evening within an hour and half's march of S. Venant; and next day M. de Ciron, departing thence pretty late, came in the morning to M. de Turenne, with part of the troops of his van, having heard no news of the enemy, of whom a body of a thousand or twelve hundred horse reinforc'd from the garrisons of Aire and S. Omer, under the conduct of M. de Bouteville, had intelligence at Aire, that the beforemention'd baggage was encamp'd near Lilers. So setting out from la Motte au Bois, they went thro' Aire directly to Lilers; they found part of the baggage upon the march, part being got before to the camp or very near it. As here are nothing but narrow passes where the foremost can't assist the hindmost, three regiments of cavalry and the regiment of infantry of Alsace, which were in the rear, were charg'd by that cavalry of the enemy's, routed, and part of the baggage taken: we saved a good many horses, but several regiments suffer'd very considerable loss. 'Twas very late before the alarm was given in the camp, when many of the cavalry ran thither in disorder; they took some prisoners of the enemy who had staid too long, and who had not time to plunder the rest of the baggage.

All that day our troops were much dejected on account of this loss: there arrived however some tools with which we fell to work with all speed; and it being a close cover'd Country, the enemy could neither see the condition the King's Army was in, nor extend themselves to make any orderly attack upon it, though they were very near us, and we not intrench'd. We had no general rendezvous, but opposing few troops against them trusted to the difficulty of the access to us.

The trenches were not open'd, and the enemy believing 'twas their presence that hinder'd it, came and lodg'd within cannon-shot of a village which gave entrance to

An. 1657. our camp, and which was the easiest place to attack it by. They found, when they came there, that some carriages with bread from Bethune were arriv'd there too. Three squadrons which guarded them posted themselves in the rear, and having seen the Convoy safe in, were charg'd by a great number of the enemy's squadrons, which made the van of their Army, and were drove to the very barrier of the village, the entrance whereof was made impracticable to the enemy by some sutlers carts which march'd after the Convoy. This was at four o'clock in the afternoon, and the thing was so sudden, that there were only a few musketeers at the barrier, who fired some shot. All the infantry being at work, was at a very great distance from that place. M. de Turenne was in the camp. He ran to where the noise was, with not above twelve or fifteen persons with him, among whom was M. de Humieres, who advancing forward, arriv'd at the barrier, whither the enemy were already got. M. de Turenne arriv'd there at the same time; so that the enemy, who had no settl'd design upon our camp, retired to their own, which was not above a thousand paces off. Had they had dragoons or infantry in their van-guard, 'tis certain they might at that time have caus'd great confusion in our Army, which was very much scatter'd. M. de Turenne seeing that the enemy had no other design but to hinder us from opening the trenches, and by that means to save the place, through the apprehensions we were under from the neighbourhood of their Army, at a time when that of the King was neither above half-intrench'd, nor provided with necessaries for a siege, was very sensible that delay would but render things more difficult, and detract from the reasons of undertaking the siege instead of adding to them; so he open'd the trenches that very evening.

The place, though of some importance to the enemy, on account of the passage of the Lys, yet being none of those which could give cause to fear the dangerous consequences attending great sieges, the enemy came to no resolution that night; they continu'd all the [next] day in their camp. After some skirmishes, and after the Dukes of York and Gloucester had spoke with a good many French Officers of their acquaintance, the night following the Spaniards march'd away in all haste to Ardres, having

having the day before sent the troops which were at Aire, An. 1657.
to invest the place.

All the night that the enemy were moving off, we could not learn their design, nor indeed the night after. The only tidings we had, were, that they were marching to Aire : we fancied they were going round the camp to attack it on some other side ; so that the trenches were advanced but as usual. But so soon as M. de Turenne heard that they were arriv'd before Ardres, he made the Counter-scarp be taken by his own regiment of foot which was upon guard *. There was a large ditch full of water in the way to it ; so that some soldiers were drown'd, for we did not fill it up till we had made a lodgment : we might lose about a hundred soldiers, and had near five and twenty Officers kill'd or wounded. The besieged who laid the stress of their defence there, made a very obstinate resistance, and it was one of the sharpest and most difficult actions that has been seen in any siege. This press'd the enemy so hard, that the guard which followed having likewise carry'd a work, they desired to capitulate, seeing the whole cavalry of the Army bringing fascines to fill the ditch of the place. M. de Turenne having spoke to the hostages at the head of the works, press'd so warmly the surrender, that in an hour's time we were masters of one gate. He commanded, that instant, four or five thousand horse to march away to Ardres and pass close by the gates of Aire, to the end that the garrison of this latter place might fire their cannon : the enemy's Army which was before Ardres perceiv'd thereby that S. Venant was taken, and so gave over the siege. And this was what actually saved the place ; for the enemy knowing that nothing but the out-works were in any condition of defence, committed one great fault, which was, not to carry them the first night they came before it : but having attack'd them the second, and not finding any body to defend them, they went down the same night into the ditch by three several places, the descent not being difficult, and set on miners to a curtain and a bastion : it was this very night that they heard the cannon from Aire, and summon'd the place several times, and they had

* Here the Viscount passes over in silence the generous action he did in causing his plate to be cut in pieces and distributed among the soldiers.

An. 1657. news in the morning that the King's whole Army was marching to Ardres; thus they believed the van-guard to be the Army it self, took the alarm, and retir'd into Flanders about eleven o'clock the same morning: the yleft some miners busy at the bastion, and some few of their infantry which they could not withdraw from their posts in the day. 'Tis certain Ardres might have been taken, there not being two hundred men in the place, had it been besieged according to the rules.

M. de Turenne having march'd that day seven leagues with the Army, had an account brought him in the evening that the enemy was retir'd into Flanders. After three days refreshment, he return'd by St. Venant, cross'd the Lys, and took la Motte au Bois, a castle which very much annoy'd S. Venant, and order'd it to be razed: knowing that the enemy's Army was near the Colme, but uncertain whether they had pass'd it, and hoping to meet with part of it on this side, he left his baggage in the camp, with orders to march to Cassel, and stay there: and he with the Army went in one day from Merville to la Berge: the weather was so bad, that but part of the van could get thither, and that in no great order. We were inform'd by prisoners, that the enemy's whole Army was beyond the river, and we went and observ'd their posture next day: We saw them almost completely entrench'd; and the opportunity of undertaking any thing, being over, the Army went to Wate, where M. de Turenne hearing that the enemy were quitting the post of Bourbourg, and had kept the fort of Rupt, he hinder'd them by his diligence from cutting the banks, resolv'd to cross the Colme, and besiege Mardyke. He sent the Sieur Talon to London, to propose it to the Protector, having always had orders from the Court to draw down to the sea-side whenever it could be done, and well knowing that the intention was to execute the treaty made at the commencement of the campaign. As there is no acting but according as an enemy gives occasion, M. de Turenne thought he ought not to neglect this, tho' the season was very far spent, in order to make a beginning of conquests in Flanders.

The month of September was almost elaps'd, when M. Talon went over into England. We took however the Fort of Hennuin, which was an inlet, and we prepared

pared all the necessaries, both provisions and artillery, for An. 1657. going upon a siege. The Army continued nine or ten days at Wate, during which space there happened nothing of moment. Our tarrying thus long made the enemy imagine that we had no thoughts of proceeding farther; so that they had at first resolv'd to blow up the Fort of Mardyke, and had begun to dig mines under the bastions; but afterwards flattering themselves that the inconveniences of the season and the difficulty of the roads would hinder our besieging the place, they drew off their workmen, and put a garrison into it. M. de Turenne, who could besiege neither Gravelin nor Dunkirk in an advanced season, the former, because of the strength of the place, and the latter, because the enemy was incamp'd under its walls, resolv'd to go to Mardyke, without having any positive account of what were the Protector's thoughts: he knew that the English Fleet was in the road, and chose rather to begin a thing, tho' of very great difficulty, than to put an end to the campagne without doing something more. So, sending away his baggage to Calais, with five or six regiments of horse, he marched to Mardyke. The whole Army were, of necessity, to march upon a dyke, and advance into a Country where there was no retreating but by the same way they went. We order'd all the cavalry to carry palisades, and the infantry fascines, there being no woods about Mardyke, which is so near Dunkirk, where the enemy's Army was, that it was absolutely necessary to begin the fence of palisades the moment we got thither.

The enemy had in the place six or seven hundred men, being three Italian regiments, and some Spaniards and Walloons. We were two days e'er the Ships could enter the Basen, because of the wind, and all that time we saw boats passing from Dunkirk to Mardyke, which render'd the siege very difficult; besides, the want of forage shew'd that the Army could not continue there long. M. de Turenne was a whole day in doubt, whether he should begin the siege; but M. de Castelnau having determin'd him to it, we resolv'd to open the trenches and to bring up cannon to batter the wooden fort; seeing the enemy were going to abandon it, some cavalry hasten'd with all dispatch along the sea-shore, and got between the two forts. Having by this means cut off their

An. 1657. their communication by sea, we with more pleasure pursued the resolution we had taken to open the trenches; which was done that night, and the guards mounted them, and we drew very near the Counterscarp. Next day we made a general attack on it, and carried it on all sides; and making a lodgment we began without losing time, to pierce it, in order to descend into the ditch of the place. In the morning, as we were throwing fascines into it to fill it up, the enemy desired to capitulate; and not being admitted to surrender but as prisoners of war, after having two or three times in five or six hours broke the truce, they accepted the capitulation, and came out next morning, all prisoners of war, except the Governor and one Spanish Captain, who came as an hostage, whom M. de Turenne dismiss'd. We only let some Officers go to Dunkirk, to solicit the liberty of the rest, who were sent into France, and dispers'd up and down in the towns.

After the taking of Mardyke, the keeping it was much more difficult than the conquest of it had been: because M. de Turenne had chose rather to pass by many considerations, and undertake something, than conclude the campaign without doing any thing. As he had marched to the siege of Mardyke without having any positive answer from the Protector, whether he would do what was necessary for keeping it, the place being taken, there arose a world of difficulties in coming to a determination. The Embassador of England, who was at Court, arrived in this interval, with orders to M. de Turenne, to do all that was possible to besiege Dunkirk or Gravelin: tho' both the one and the other was impracticable, yet the Cardinal was very desirous to please the Protector, by proposing it. The enemy's Army, being encamp'd under Dunkirk, made us drop all thoughts of that siege. M. de Turenne once resolv'd to remain some days in the camp, to fortify Mardyke; but the want of forage, and the time it requir'd to put into a proper condition a place destitute of every thing, made him likewise think of razing it; but this course, tho' the safest, would have had such bad consequences, because of the alliance with the English, that he could not resolve on it. He found himself in the case of those who of two evils chuse the least. I forgot to mention that M. de Schomberg was left at Bourbourg with about two thousand men, to keep the passage,

passage, and preserve that place, which was wholly levelled with the ground ; but it was as difficult a thing to put it in a tenable condition as Mardyke. M. de Turenne was of opinion that if he drew near Gravelin, he might possibly find means to invest it, and so spend the whole winter there, and by that means preserve Mardyke and Bourbourg ; but this thought had no good foundation, nor was there in this whole matter any sure principles, on which we could form a resolution. It happened likewise to rain very hard the night and day that the Army decamp'd, so that it was impossible to stay near Gravelin ; the Army therefore went back beyond Bourbourg, where the roads were become so bad that we were forc'd to leave the cannon. The whole Army, especially the infantry, entirely dispers'd themselves to go and look out for places where there was wood to warm themselves, after having been three days on the dykes suffering inconveniencies impossible to be express'd. No body at that time was willing to stay at Bourbourg ; and had it not been for M. de Schomberg who continued there, it is certain the place must have been abandon'd. M. de Varenne had been wounded at Mardyke.

M. de Turenne seeing there was no striving against bad weather, left near two thousand men at Bourbourg, seven or eight hundred English at Mardyke, and march'd to Ruminghen, the nearest place where there was firm ground to incamp on, and resolv'd to make roads for carrying the provisions from thence to Bourbourg, hoping that the Army lying there might hinder the enemy from besieging Mardyke : however he himself doubted the success, and no body thought the thing feasible ; indeed, the enterprize was difficult : it was in October : Bourbourg had been razed, and wanted every thing ; the canals absolutely requir'd to be put into a condition for going from Calais to the river Aa, and both forts and bridges were indispensably necessary ; lastly, soldiers were to be sent for from the camp at Ruminghen three long leagues from Bourbourg, to carry on all these works, and no wood or covert in any one place. The long abode of the Army in this camp, which lasted near six weeks, facilitated the effecting all these works. Jaquier, Ammunitioner-General, undertook to make the canals navigable, and accomplish'd it, with the assistance of a good number

An. 1657. number of hands from Calais. M. de Castellinau and the Marquis d'Uxelles undertook each a fort on the river *Aa*, which they put into condition, with bridges on the river; and M. de Schomberg was as busy at his place.

The enemy still flattering themselves that the Army would retire, made no attack on Mardyke. The Ambassador of England was under great concern about the place, and at a loss whether or no he should demand to have it abandon'd; he had earnestly wish'd, that the King's Army would return to Mardyke and fortify it: but he saw very plainly the impossibility of that; however he had a great mind to be freed from the care of keeping it. M. de Turenne seeing the place neglected by the enemy, had propos'd to send Miners thither, to blow up the bastions; but the Ambassador of England having represented that such a step would convince the Protector that we had no mind to pursue the treaty, M. de Turenne resolv'd, rather to run the risque of the place's being taken by the enemy, than incur a certain misunderstanding with the English: so, he sent two or three hundred French to post themselves on the Counterscarp, which had continued near a month in such a condition, that the enemy might have carry'd it in six hours.

Some days after the French had enter'd the place, the enemy acted in such a manner, as could not be well accounted for, unless they had some private correspondence with those within. They did not level the lower fort, as they might have done; and continued all night very near the Counterscarp without once attacking it, and then drew off with the loss of some men. This fail'd not to animate the besieged a good deal; and, in England, they were encouraged again to endeavour the keeping of the place. M. de Turenne sent some infantry into it; and some palisades came from London, with which they fell to work on the lower fort.

Towards the end of November, the King's Army was oblig'd to retire from Ruminghen; and that of the enemy, which had been all along encamp'd behind Dunkirk, retired likewise into their own Country, not having been able to undertake any thing. The Prince falling sick, caus'd himself to be carry'd to Ghent, where he was in some danger; but recovering from his indisposition, they convey'd him to Brussels. As M. de Turenne

renne was drawing off his Army towards the Boulenois, An. 1657. he had notice given him from the Cardinal, who had very good intelligence in Flanders, that the enemy still designed to attack Mardyke, in the winter-time, when the King's Army could not relieve the place; wherefore he sent thither a reinforcement of French infantry; and the regiments being now almost without soldiers (there having been a desertion, on account of their having received no pay all the campaign; which had never happen'd before, since the war began) we were forced to detach some Officers of each *corps*, without soldiers, which likewise had never been done before; and afterwards the King sent thither all his musketeers, with the Cardinal's companies of gendarmes and light-horse, as also his guards. When M. de Turenne return'd with the Army to the frontier, Marshal d'Aumont, who was at his government in the Boulenois, had orders to go to Mardyke, where he continued till January was almost at an end.

The enemy observing all these precautions, attempted An. 1658. nothing, but satisfy'd themselves with wintering almost their whole Army in Flanders, as well not to lose time in attacking the before-named place, even though they should have an opportunity, as to be near at hand to oppose the attacking any towns in Flanders, in case the King, favour'd by the English, should attempt such a thing. His Army continued till the beginning of January on the frontiers, after which they were dispos'd of as usual into their quarters in divers Provinces of France. The Prince who had been in some danger at Brussels, began to recover his health; and the enemy's Generals met together there, having left their frontiers on the side of Flanders, much stronger garrison'd than usual.

In the beginning of March, the Governor of Hedia dying, that government was given to M. de Moret. The Major (Defargues) being then at Paris, came immediately to wait on him and receive his commands, and afterwards went his way without being suspected into the place. M. de Moret went thither some few days after, and was refused admittance. It was found out that that Major had long before gain'd an absolute ascendancy over the minds of part of the Officers; and seeing the Governor to be an unhealthy man, had conceiv'd thoughts of

An. 1658. of seizing the place and making himself master of it. The
 ——— Marshal d'Hocquincourt, who had been a long time a
 mal-content in Picardy, being a man who was very apt
 to take hasty resolutions, went away to Hedin, knowing
 the intentions of Defargues, Major of the place before-
 mention'd, staid some time therein but without having
 any power, and from thence went and waited on the
 Prince in Flanders. Those of Hedin having no security
 for any peace that could be made between them and the
 Cardinal, after what they had done, enter'd into treaty
 with the Prince and the Spaniards who sent them troops,
 which they did not receive into the town, but put them
 for a time into a camp very near; and, after abundance
 of goings and comings in negotiating at Brussels, they
 insensibly admitted them into their suburbs: they were in
 treaty during all that time with the Court; but it was
 plainly seen it was to gain time, and to slacken the desire
 we had to attack them forthwith.

The King's Army not being yet in a condition to take
 the field, the Cardinal saw that this negotiation could
 do no manner of hurt. The time came for the King's
 Troops to leave their quarters, and the King went to
 Amiens with the Queen. By a Clerk of M. le Tellier's,
 one Carlier by name, who had been often at Hedin, we
 receiv'd news, which gave less hopes than ever that the
 town would make its peace with the King. This novelty
 began to rouse many people in France, where naturally
 there are always mal-contents: besides, the long war
 and dearth in all the Provinces, through the continu-
 ance of the heavy imposts and taxations, gave the people
 some cause to wish for a change in the Ministry; and
 they wish'd it with so much ardency, that they consider'd
 not whether it would be for their good or their hurt.

There had been, before, some meetings of the *No-
 bleſſe* in several Provinces, with some Gentlemen at their
 head, and especially in Normandy. Though Madam de
 Longueville was so entirely taken up with devotion that
 she concern'd herself with no cabal whatsoever, yet had
 she so great an ascendant over the people there, that she
 made them lean to that side to which, she did not disown,
 her inclination sway'd her, namely, that of her brother.
 The seeds of the most important affairs are sometimes
 sown and ripen'd in a cell as well as a court, in a retir-
 ed state of life as in the great world.

Things

Things were in this desperate condition, when the An. 1658. Court came to Amiens, where the King remained some days, and part of the Army was assembled there. And now was made that enterprize upon Ostend, wherein Marshal d'Aumont, who had been during the winter some time in Mardyke, engaged himself, on the word of some people of the common sort, who were grossly deceived by those of Ostend, who having acted a farce in the town, made as if they seiz'd their governor, cried aloud, *Vive le Roy* in the streets, and threw out a deal of abusive language against the Spaniards: these credulous people went to Marshal d'Aumont, as he lay at anchor in the road with twelve or fifteen hundred men, and having assured him that he was master of the place, if he would come strait away, he without taking any hostage, landed on the bridge with part of his people: the Spaniards, who lay conceal'd in the cellars, rush'd out, and shutting up the haven, took five or six hundred men, together with Marshal d'Aumont; but the rest, who had not entered, retired in their ships.

The miscarriage of this attempt upon Ostend, and the affair of Hedin abovementioned, made the Prince conceive great hopes, and occasioned the Campaign to begin with very bad appearances on our side. The Court itself, which was at that time with the Army, spoke as ill or worse of the state of affairs than other people, at least most of the courtiers did so. Tho' the major part of the officers of the Army were not yet come, the King approached Hedin with ten or twelve thousand men. Those within having some Spanish troops incamped in the out-works, sallied forth to skirmish, and fired the cannon upon the King himself, who had advanced pretty near; insomuch, that after this so open a declaration, all thoughts of treating with Hedin were laid aside; and a resolution taken to deal with it as a place of the enemy's.

During the winter, the Cardinal had treated with the Ambassador of England, who had been extremely urgent for an expedition against Dunkirk, and articles were sign'd; whereby it was concluded, that Dunkirk should be put into the hands of the English; that they should furnish six thousand foot, and keep the sea with a naval force. The treaty was but for a year, during which they were to continue the same succour by land, assist also by sea in besieging

An. 1658. besieging Gravelin which was to remain to the King, and to lay no claim to any other place but Dunkirk only. The Cardinal was desirous to have us march into Flanders; and Marshal de Turenne, without knowing whether Dunkirk could be besieged, or whether we should stop at Bergues, was likewise desirous honestly to let the English see we did our best to execute the treaty. The King, who was incamped within a short league of Hedin, went and rejoind'd the Queen at Montreuil, in order to return together to Calais, with two or three thousand men commanded by M. de Castelnau; while Marshal de Turenne with seven or eight thousand men, took the route to S. Venant, there to cross the Lys, and afterwards march to Bergues and Dunkirk.

At his arrival near Bethune, he learned from the Marquis de Crequi, who was governor of it, that there were two or three regiments of the enemy in Cassel, five leagues from St. Venant on the way to Bergues; he gave him seven or eight hundred horse, and some detach'd musketeers, with which advancing, he took, in Cassel, two regiments of Irish foot, amounting to between two and three hundred men. M. de Turenne arriv'd there soon after with his van, and because of the badness of the roads, he staid there a day for his baggage; and had he followed the advice of those of the Country, he had taken none with him, nor cannon neither, by reason of the difficulty he must meet with on the roads, which were become worse than usual thro' the excessive bad weather and long continuance of the winter. In May, M. de Turenne seeing that dispatch was very necessary, and learning by the prisoners that the enemy's Army was not got together, he caus'd his baggage to follow all night long, and ordering the roads to be mended, advanced to the Colme, and leaving Bergues on the left hand, march'd thro' a Country full of water towards a small redoubt where the enemy had put thirty men and a Captain. We made a passage over the river, and having found some piles, over which we laid planks, we brought thither some horses, leading them by the bridle: which being observ'd by those within the redoubt, as likewise that we were advancing that way with fifty or sixty musketeers, they surrendred. This was the only passage we could make use of, because the Country was overflow'd
between

between Furnes and Bergues, from whence to Dunkirk An. 1658.
 we saw nothing but water, and M. de Turenne had much
 ado to get back to his quarters, which were a league off;
 having left M. de Bellefons, Lieutenant General, with
 some infantry, to take a view of the roads from thence
 to Dunkirk.

There was not a man all thereabouts that said there
 was any road; and M. de Turenne having sent that even-
 ing M. de Varenne along the Colme, he left Bergues on
 the right, to see if he could any how have a communi-
 cation that way with Mardyke, where M. de Castelnau
 was. Varenne brought word that there was no passing
 for the waters. The whole night was spent, and not the
 least appearance of a possibility of getting to Dunkirk.
 In the morning, M. de Bellefons sent word that the ene-
 my had quitted another redoubt near Bergues, and that
 there was a dyke by which he believ'd they might get to
 the forts between Bergues and Dunkirk. The enemy, af-
 ter the taking of Mardyke, had, on the dyke from Bergues
 to Dunkirk, wrought at two great forts which were
 at such a proper distance, that it is certain, had they been
 in a state of defence, neither Bergues nor Dunkirk could
 have been besieged, without first taking those forts, each
 of them being but a cannon-shot from the other, and at
 the same distance each from those two towns. We had no
 exact information of the condition they were in; so that
 they always appear'd the greatest obstacle to the siege of
 Dunkirk: but, as I have said, the resolution was taken
 to do every thing necessary to an ingenuous execution of
 our treaty with the English.

M. de Turenne went early in the morning with the
 whole Army to that redoubt which had been taken the
 evening before; and causing the bridge over the Colme
 to be put in order, we advanc'd to the above-mention'd
 forts. The prisoners taken at the redoubt had reported
 that one of them was in a condition of defence, and the
 other not. After we had filled up a great many ditches,
 the enemy seeing the Army advance between Bergues and
 Dunkirk, began to abandon the forts and the dyke. M.
 de Castelnau arriving with the three thousand men who
 had set out with the King, and three thousand English,
 which forces had the day before been within cannon-shot
 of the enemy, the latter sent out two battalions from

N

Dunkirk,

An. 1658 Dunkirk, and about six or seven hundred horse to defend the canal and the two forts.

The Army approach'd with much difficulty between Bergues and Dunkirk, and the enemy being taken in the rear, and their forts being in no state of defence, they retired to Bergues and Dunkirk, but the greatest part to the latter. M. de Turenne having march'd but with few men on the before-mention'd dyke, sent away immediately one of his people who could swim well, to give an account of his passage to M. de Castelnau, who repaired to him instantly; and as it was necessary to come to an immediate resolution either to besiege Bergues or Dunkirk, the first of which was very easy, and the other very difficult, M. de Turenne being of opinion that if we lost the present moment, we should never have another opportunity, resolved, notwithstanding all the difficulties, to go to Dunkirk. We could not do it that day, because of the waters and canals; but having wrought hard on the several bridges over the Colme, the canal from Honscote to Dunkirk, and that of Furnes to the same town, we were next day at two o' clock in the afternoon near the Downs [sand-hills about Dunkirk.]

All the enemy's troops which were in the neighbourhood threw themselves into the place, so that there was in it about two thousand two hundred foot, and seven or eight hundred horse. The Marquis de Lede had likewise enter'd the day before the Army got there. The Prince and Don John were still at Brussels, fully persuaded the enterprize was absolutely impracticable, since we had neither Bergues, Furnes, nor Gravelin, of which the first was not above the distance of an hour's march, the other three hours, and the last four, and the season not affording any grafs for the horses. We began that very evening to take our quarters; and during the first five or six days, if any one of the enemy's General Officers, with but a few troops, had posted himself at Furnes or Bergues, we could hardly have made the communications before a great many troops had enter'd the town; but the enemy believing at first that we would lay siege to Bergues, and afterwards hearing of the siege of Dunkirk, sent only two or three regiments under wretched Officers, who tho' they had orders to enter the town, staid at Bergues, and sent word that it was impossible to execute what they

they were commanded. The Spaniards now resolved to assemble their Army with all possible speed, and come and relieve the place. An. 1658.

The first days of the siege we suffer'd very great hardships from the situation of the camp, on account of the communications, the want of wood for the soldiers, and of forage for the horses. As we had nothing but the sea, it was impossible to get the necessary assistances from thence because of the difficulty of debarkations; and indeed the English, except some cannon and five thousand foot who behav'd very well, brought very few conveniences to the siege. The King who was at Calais, as soon as he knew we were before Dunkirk, was so urgent with the Cardinal that they came together to the old fort of Mardyke three days after we were got before Dunkirk, where the Army settled their quarters. M. de Turenne fixed his on the Downs near the strand, and kept with him a good part of the troops who extended themselves from the sea to the canal of Furnes, where he posted a regiment of foot. He afterwards put some Lorrain regiments, and a regiment of infantry into the great fort between Bergues and Dunkirk, with some few cavalry, and a corps of troops on the side of the sea, by which the enemy could come.

M. de Castelnau continu'd on the other side of the canal of Bergues with the troops he had brought with him and the English. There were extreme difficulties in making the bridges of communication: the enemy sometimes sallied out of the town with seven or eight squadrons; but as no trench was open'd, we were not near enough to them to be able to undertake any thing.

We were hard put to't these first days, but then there began to come to the camp some barks with provisions, and afterwards oats for the cavalry which were on the side of the Downs. There came likewise tools and some pallisades with which we went to work on the circumvallation, which was never good for any thing, especially towards the Downs. We also made a *staccado* of huge piles, fastened together with chains which the English Mariners came and fitted, but which could never resist the strong tides, when the wind blew hard. But every night the cavalry kept guard on the shore. We placed there large bomb-chests when the tide went out, and re-

An. 1658 mov'd them again with our horses when the sea return'd; so that there never was any space left void. The Army which was very weak at the beginning, increas'd by degrees, thro' the continual coming of troops out of France to join us. We thought proper to begin the siege, tho' with but a few troops, rather than by waiting for more, to give the enemy time to get together; which would infallibly have broke the design, it being easy for them to supply such a place as Dunkirk, and it was only by undertaking this siege that France preserv'd her alliance with the English; but the affair of Hedin and Ostend had thrown the enemy into a state of security. The King was some days at Mardyke, where the Cardinal gave orders for supplying all the military stores, and oats for the horse, and likewise caused to be brought by sea platforms and fascines. As there was a talk, even before the trenches were opened, of the enemy's assembling, the Cardinal very prudently advis'd the King to go back to Calais, there not being any other place where he could continue with safety, and the siege we were upon being by the situation of the Country of such a nature, that a retreat was next to impossible, if a misfortune should happen in any one quarter of the Army.

Three or four days after the King and Queen, and Monsieur were departed, we open'd trenches on the side of the Downs, which we made use of for a place of arms. The first night the enemy made a sally with all their cavalry. We had many alarms while we were clapping on our workmen, and the English, who were not much us'd to sieges, left their work, and ran immediately to their arms. The first nights of a siege not being very dangerous, we hardly lost a man. We saw in the morning all the enemy's cavalry abroad, and the front of the city on that side being very large, the enemy had twenty pieces of cannon pointing to the trenches; so that till eleven or twelve o' clock, the enemy's horse advancing by favour of the cannon, look'd like troops in a field of battle, rang'd one before the other; but as soon as ever they approach'd the trenches, the King's cavalry repuls'd them with such vigour, that in the several sallies which the enemy made, they had not the least advantage; and tho' our cavalry suffer'd much loss from the cannon, and from the very musketry too, as they drew near the counter-scarp,

scarp, yet we always drove them back to the very edge of it. An. 1658.

The Swifs reliev'd the Guards, and the fourth day when the regiment of Picardy was upon duty, and that of Pleffis at the head of the trench, there was such a high wind, we could not see for the sand that blew in our eyes. The enemy sallied out, levell'd the point of the trench, and killed or wounded a hundred of our men. The English made an approach on the left, and the fifth or sixth night we were on the edges of the first pallisades, which the English attack'd very vigorously; but though they went boldly up to the pallisades, they knew not how to lodge themselves there, and always return'd into the trenches with great loss: we likewise attempted the same three or four times on the French side, but without success. About the sixth or seventh day from the opening the trenches, M. de Turenne had advice that the enemy were assembling, and that the Prince and Don John were coming to Furnes with the Army.

We could do no good on the Downs side as to the circumvallation; and although we took in some of the foremost sand-hills, yet we still saw others which were very troublesome; and the uncertainty one is in whether an enemy will come on such a side, always makes things seem less dangerous than when we actually see him before us. The besieged had made divers sallies with their cavalry; but were always repulsed with so much vigour by the King's cavalry, that they were prevented from doing any thing of consequence; but we continually lost some good Officers, and chiefly by their cannon, which they continu'd masters of a long time. All the General Officers, that is to say, M. de Scomberg, M. de Crequi, M. de Varenne, M. d'Humieres, M. de Bellefons, M. de Gadagne, always signalized themselves wherever they appear'd, and the Marquis de Crequi acted his part excellently well at a sally or two of the horse. The Count de Guiche, Mestre de Camp in the Guards, was wounded in one of these actions, where he was only as a Volunteer: the Count de Soissons likewise had a horse killed, and narrowly escaped being taken prisoner close by the pallisades of the counterscarp.

By the eighth or ninth day from the opening the trenches, when we had taken some advanced pallisades on the glacis

An. 1658 of the counterſcarp, and had endeavour'd at ſome lodgments, but without being able to maintain them, we ſaw a body of cavalry advancing along the Downs: we knew not whether 'twas the whole Army or not. M. de Turenne march'd with ſome few of his people along by the ſea. About this time they pushed our Guard on the other ſide the Downs, which conſiſted but of one regiment of horſe, and Marſhal d'Hocquincourt being advanced with the ſcouts, received a muſket-ſhot from ſome of the Soldiers, who were moſt advanced, at a ſmall work, of which wound he died that night. We did not ſo much as know he was wounded, till ſome Trumpets came and inform'd us; ſo that the enemy's cavalry retired to the Abby of the Downs, which is pretty near Furnes, where their Army was, about two leagues from the camp.

The Swiſs mounted the trenches that day. We could not make ourſelves maſters of the counterſcarp. Next day we ſaw the enemy's whole Army marching over the Downs, and the advantage which thoſe ſandy hills gave them to approach the general quarter, ſhew'd itſelf ſtill more evidently when the enemy was near; ſo that M. de Turenne advanced only ſeven or eight hundred paces before his own quarter with the troops which were there, left all the reſt in the line of circumvallation, and took poſt on a high down, which he was apprehenſive the enemy would come and poſſeſs themſelves of; he preſently order'd ſtakes to be planted upon the ſtrand, over-againſt that place; the other ſtaccado becoming uſeleſs to him, by his having made his troops advance beyond it. We likewise made a fort of a ſmall intrenchment on the top of the Downs in the enemy's preſence; but it may be well ſuppos'd that none of theſe works could be very good, being made in ſo ſhort a time; or that piles fixed in haſte where the tide returned, could ſtand very long.

The enemy being advanced within half a league's diſtance of that place, where M. de Turenne had poſted himſelf with the Army, made a halt; and we ſaw plainly that they muſt neceſſarily lie there. Don John of Auſtria had the right, which look'd to the ſea, and the Prince of Condé had the left on the canal, which comes from Furnes to Dunkirk. In this part, the Downs for fifteen hundred paces are acceſſible, but the ground very uneven, the ſtrand on the right hand, and on the left a meadow

meadow of twelve or fifteen hundred paces, intersected with little ditches, reaching as far as the canal of Furnes. The Prince easily made a communication between these little ditches, and two or three hours before night he made a bridge on the canal with a great number of barks which came to him from Furnes; and this bridge was close to his left wing. M. de Turenne going along this canal, saw them work at the bridge, and in an hour's time finish it. He drew off all the advanced Guards which were on that side, and seeing what a mighty advantage it would be to the enemy to march on both sides the canal to Dunkirk, he was presently sensible there was nothing to be done but to fight them; so he sent orders to all the quarters, to rendezvous at his, two hours before day. He order'd the English who were between Dunkirk and Mardyke to send away their baggage to the fort, and commanded the troops which were on this side the canal that goes from Dunkirk to Bergues, to put their baggage under cover of a great fort which the enemy had begun in the winter, but which we possess'd.

There being six or seven canals between the quarters, it was much easier for the Dunkirkers to make a sally on them when they were weaken'd; and therefore it was very dangerous to leave a large circumvallation without troops, because those of the town might set fire to the camp, and break down the bridges of communication. Besides this, the trenches put M. de Turenne in great pain; for a sally from the place, together with the terror which might happen among the men, thinking themselves abandon'd, the Army marching to meet the enemy, would have oblig'd him to raise the siege. Again, as we were close by the cover'd way of the counterscarp, and some traverses of the glacis already taken, sallies were very much to be fear'd, because there's no getting forth of the trenches, when once those at the head of them are beaten; and a confusion easily arises there. The enemy having all the counterscarps as well as the fire of the place, whereas the trenches were very much straiten'd and so far advanced, that the cavalry could no longer act, we could not possibly remedy this, and pursue our design of fighting too, otherwise than by ordering, as we did, into the trenches a good guard, which was two French battalions, with orders to try to lodge themselves on the counterscarp in

An. 1658 like manner as the preceding days. The English likewise mounted on the left with a good guard, and there were eight squadrons of horse commanded thither for a re-inforcement.

The troops march'd all night according to order given, and the hindmost were a little before day at M. de Turenne's quarter. In this manner the night pass'd, the enemy having only sent to give an alarm or two. There was of the King's Army, without reckoning what remain'd in the camp, with the baggage, and in the trenches eight or nine thousand foot, and five or six thousand horse. There were ten French battalions and six English, and two French battalions intermix'd with the right wing of the cavalry, and some French and English Musketeers in the left wing, with ten pieces of cannon, five whereof went in the right wing between the Downs and the meadow, and the other five along the strand, which was very broad, the sea being low. There were fifty four squadrons of light horse, and four of Gendarmes.

The first line of the right wing and the first of the left wing were compos'd of fourteen squadrons each, the second lines of ten each, four squadrons of Gendarmes who supported the infantry, and six squadrons of reserve, which march'd at a good distance behind the whole Army. The first line of infantry consisted of ten battalions, and the second of six, who had no detached men before them but fifty musketeer-guards, to keep off the enemy's cavalry, which was in small bodies on the Downs, a little way from their Army.

M. de Castelnau commanded the left wing, and had M. de Varenne to lead the first line of the cavalry; and as the Lorrainers were part of them, M. de Ligneville commanded some squadrons near the infantry. The Marquis de Crequi commanded the squadrons on the right of the right wing, and M. d'Humieres was with those which were near the infantry. M. de Schomberg commanded the second line of the left wing, and M. d'Esquencourt the second line of the right wing. M. de Richelieu was in the reserve, and M. de Gadagne commanded the first line of the infantry, and M. de Bellefons the second. The English infantry of the first and second line was commanded by General Lockart, the Ambassador of England in France, and by Major General Morgan. An hour before

fore day, we march'd in this order from the place whither An. 1658.

M. de Turenne had advanced the preceding day in the Downs, and where the troops had join'd him in the night. The Guards of both Armies seeing one another, as soon as the King's Army began to ascend the first Down, the enemy had notice of its march; so that we saw some horses which were out a grazing hastily taken up, as likewise the squadrons and battalions which were in the camp without baggage, ranging into form. Their Army continued as the day before, that is, Don John of Austria on the right, with the Marquis de Caracena and the Duke of York, the Duke of Gloucester, and Don Estevan de Gamara; and on the left the Prince of Condé with his General Officers, M. de Coligni, M. de Bouteville, M. de Perfan, M. de Guittaut, and the Count de Suze: M. de Marfin, who was the only absent General Officer, was with a small body near Luxembourg. The horse of the left wing, which was very much extended towards the canal, being incapable of employment in that meadow, on account of the ditches, the Prince placed them in five or six lines between the Downs and those ditches, where neither the one nor the other could march above two or three squadrons abreast. He posted two battalions in a place somewhat covered, just before his cavalry; and afterwards going up the Downs, he placed others all along, till they join'd D. John of Austria's infantry, which was extended to the edge of the Downs looking upon the strand; and all his cavalry was behind his infantry, a Spanish battalion whereof he had advanced upon a very high Down, which was about a hundred paces before any of the others.

Such was the order we saw them draw up in. The King's Army marching towards them, and the height of the Downs hindering our seeing all their motions, M. de Turenne imagin'd there was a great number of cavalry behind their infantry, and was afterwards told, that the Prince, who had five or six lines one behind another, had a mind to take some one to place behind his infantry, as indeed his Guards were there, and some squadrons besides. The enemy's cannon was not yet arrived, but was to come that evening with their baggage; and there might be in their Army nine or ten thousand horse, and five or six thousand foot. The Prince went himself in haste, and acquainted D. John that the King's Army was marching, and

An. 1658. and he put all his troops in order with all possible diligence.

Things being in this disposition on both sides, the King's Army march'd leisurely on, and the enemy being pretty much puzzled to get themselves into order of battle, all the General Officers were busied therein, and we saw plainly that not one of them repaired to their advanced Guards, who retired to the main body of their Army, without skirmishing. We likewise were sensible that more diligence in marching would have been of great advantage, because expedition always deprives an enemy of an opportunity of getting into order: but when an Army is marching in battalia, it must go a certain regulated pace, and oftentimes the several corps must wait a little for each other, to be able to range into form. We had, as I said before, in the King's Army five pieces of cannon in each wing, which marched at the head of the foremost squadrons, and were at a reasonable distance from the enemy. We fired once or twice from each, and then put the horses to, and hasten'd them up again to the head of the squadrons. We made four or five discharges before we came up to the enemy.

The English who were in the left wing, coming the first to that Down which was foremost, ascended with two battalions to attack it, and for some time they cross'd pikes with the Spaniards; but the great resolution of the former, aided by a detachment of foot from the English main body which came upon the enemy in flank, put a Spanish regiment into disorder, and soon after to flight: it was that of Don Gasper Boniface.

The enemy's cavalry at first supported their infantry pretty well; but the regiments of horse of the left wing having speedily succour'd the English, and some of our squadrons likewise having advanced along the strand, went and placed themselves between the enemy's two lines; which put them into confusion, they being also vigorously charg'd in front just when the English were got up on the Down, and when the Spanish regiment and that which was to support it began to give ground. The Guards, the Swiss, the regiments of Picardy and Turenne began to attack the infantry which was before them; and the four squadrons of the van march'd up against those at the head of the

Prince's corps. His infantry made but a very indifferent An. 1658. discharge, and the King's infantry hardly fired at all, but broke them without putting themselves into any confusion. The cavalry likewise broke the first squadrons of the enemy, with but little resistance; but pushing on too far, they were drove back again by the Prince's cavalry, where he himself being present, things were a little dubious for some time. The enemy's whole cavalry advanced in good order, because of this small success; but there being but four of our squadrons repuls'd, the rest of our cavalry was in good order behind, and the Guards and the Swiss who had met with very little resistance, and who were also in very good order, (tho' the latter had been charg'd by the Prince's horse Guards, who could not penetrate the battalion, and were part of them kill'd) turn'd a little to the right, and receiv'd with a very smart fire the Prince's cavalry which was advancing. Montgomery's regiment of foot which was mingled with the horse in the right wing, made also a discharge, and those regiments which had been pushed, recover'd themselves again. Here the Prince had his horse wounded, and instantly took another: but his troops now beginning to be in confusion, he was hard put to it to make his escape. Messieurs Bouteville and Coligni were taken here: M. de Meille was taken and wounded, and died of his wounds a few days after.

This happening just after the enemy's right wing was put into confusion, their whole Army fell into disorder without rallying; and except some squadrons which dispers'd themselves, our whole Army pursued the enemy a quarter of an hour in very good order. Part of their infantry got away on the left hand through the Morais; all the rest were taken. There were between three and four thousand of the enemy made prisoners, and a thousand killed or wounded. Of the King's Army, there were some Officers and Troopers kill'd of the squadrons on the right and left of both wings, some Soldiers and Officers of English infantry, and a few of the other infantry.

Being engaged in the siege, we could not pursue the enemy very long: however the cavalry push'd on as far as Furnes, behind which place the enemy retired, and stop't there, well knowing that the King's Army would continue at the siege. There fled to Furnes a good number of prisoners, whom our Troopers and Officers let go for their ransom,

An. 1658. ransom, and we were afterwards informed that this was the case of almost all the enemy's Officers in this battle. Don John and the Marquis de Caracena, the Duke of York, and Duke of Gloucester his Brother were on the right wing, and behav'd themselves very well; but they were obliged to fly with the rest.

M. de Turenne returning to the camp, sent M. de Peruis to carry the news to the King, who was at Calais. His Majesty came again next day to Mardyke, and the siege went on, the besieged abating nothing of their vigorous resistance. Three days after the battle the Marquis de Crequi lodg'd himself with Turenne's regiment on the counterescarp, where we lost a great number of men, and after that, M. de Schomberg, M. de Varenne, M. d'Humières, M. de Bellefons, and M. de Gadagne advanced their approaches as far as possible: there being abundance of traverses, there was no one guard, where something very vigorous was not to be done, and that too without any cover. The English who were on the left, though they did their duty very well, could never lodge themselves on the counterescarp, till after it was abandon'd. M. de Castelnau, who had been very serviceable, and had acted very vigorously during the whole siege, was wounded going to fort Leon, and died of his wounds. After the battle, we no longer fearing to employ a good number of foot before the town, had begun an attack on that fort, which serv'd rather to give a diversion than any thing else: we likewise made the enemy abandon a wooden fort, wherein they had some cannon, as also the whole length of a dyke, which advanced into the sea, from which they very much annoy'd the trenches; but they soon quitted it: so that six or seven days after the battle, which was the eighteenth day from the opening the trenches, when we were lodg'd at the foot of their last work, they desired to capitulate. We were inform'd that the Marquis de Lede died the same day, having been wounded five or six days before.

The King, who had been five or six days at Mardyke, came the next day with the Cardinal to M. de Turenne's quarters, where hostages being given, the capitulation was sign'd, and the garrison march'd out a day after, and was conducted to St. Omer. There was left of them a thousand foot, the remains of seven or eight regiments, and six or seven hundred horse. The town was, according to treaty, put into
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the hands of the English; and two days after M. de Turenne march'd to Bergues. The enemy staid at Furnes, and had left eight or nine hundred men in Bergues. The King who had not stirr'd from Mardyke since the taking of Dunkirk, came to Bergues when the Army was got there; and the trenches being opened the next day, he took a ride out, and came to M. de Turenne's quarter, and he then look'd very much out of order; and indeed that very evening he was in a violent fever, and own'd he had had some symptoms of it for two days before, tho' he did not speak of it: here it was his severe fit of sickness began; and being carried to Calais, he was there so very ill as to be thought at the point of death.

The first night after the trenches were open'd at Bergues, we carried a redoubt which the enemy had near their counterscarp, and the whole guard of the trenches was lodg'd in a place to which there was no going in the day time. Next day, M. de Schomberg commanded the guard: we carried the counterscarp and all the outworks, and lodg'd our selves on the edge of the ditch, which we began to fill up, and we caus'd some cannon to be brought openly, and without the least cover close to the gates, whereupon those within the town desired to capitulate, but were told they must yield themselves prisoners of war. There were five old regiments of foot and one regiment of horse in the place, making in all eight or nine hundred men. As soon as they had desired to capitulate, and found that we would not allow them any other terms than that of being prisoners of war, they were in such a consternation that a great many threw themselves into the Moras to get away; but they were taken by the Soldiers, and the rest threw down their arms, and forsook all the posts along the walls; and had not M. de Turenne come up, the town would have been plunder'd. We secured all the prisoners, both Soldiers and Officers, and sent them into France by the way of Calais. Next day, M. de Turenne receiving intelligence that the enemy was quitting the neighbourhood of Furnes, sent thither M. de Varenne with two thousand men, and follow'd five or six hours after, with very few to attend him. Those of Furnes made some discharges, but seeing they were abandon'd by their Army, which was at Newport, and which had left but fourscore men with them, surrender'd to a Trumpet which M. de Varenne had

An. 1658. had sent to them after he had severely threaten'd the Burghers that they should be plunder'd, in case they stood upon their defence; and in that very instant M. de Turenne enter'd the town, and sent those fourscore men to Newport, where was Don John of Austria. M. de Turenne staid at Furnes that night, because they did not surrender till an hour before night, and he returned very early next day to the camp; and having kept the Marquis de Crequi with a corps at Roseburgh, which is on the road from Bergues to Ypres, he ordered him to take his way to Dixmuyde, thro' the inner part of the Country; while he himself marched along the Dyke directly to Fintelle and Kenoque, where the canal which goes to Ypres and Dixmuyde separates itself.

The enemy who after the taking of Bergues were retired between Newport, Dixmuyde and Ypres, would fain have kept those canals; but our march was so quick, that they durst not stop any where, not having had time to get themselves into order. They began to work on a redoubt at Kenoque, and there was some cavalry behind it. And it being a Country where there's no going but by dykes, he that's first fortified in a place there has a great advantage; but the short time they had to dispose their affairs, made them always take measures which we plainly saw necessity forced them to; and thus were they continually at a loss as soon as ever we advanced towards them, it being easy to perceive they never stopt but in hopes we would proceed no farther, and their baggage was always four or five leagues behind them. The King's Army having therefore made a long march from Bergues to Kenoque, where a third of our troops swam over to take some cattle beyond it; we advanc'd next day very early towards Dixmuyde, which is but a long league off, and which there was no going to but by the banks and dykes.

The town had been greatly neglected, being in the heart of the Country, and they had for eight or ten days before been mending the counterscarps of it. The Prince who staid there a good while at one of the gates to see the King's Army arrive, was sensible he was in no condition to defend it: he however left in it three or four hundred men, with orders, as appear'd afterwards, to surrender in case we pass'd over the river, and they should see us forming the siege. The enemy's Army was between this place
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and Newport; but having put men into Ypres, they had very much weaken'd themselves; and besides, they did not think it advisable, on account of the terror their troops were in, to make head in any place, how narrow soever it was. An. 1658.

The King's Army made a bridge near Dixmuyde; and having sent over some troops to summon the town, M. de Moret arriv'd at that very time sent from the Cardinal to M. de Turenne, to let him know the King was at the point of death, and that he should undertake nothing till he heard further concerning the issue of his Majesty's sickness: perhaps we should not have thought of passing the river, if the town had not surrender'd. The inhabitants sent to desire to capitulate, and M. de Turenne permitted the garrison to retire, either to their Army or to Newport; they chose the latter. The Cardinal sent to M. de Turenne for some companies of the Guards, and two or three of the Swiss, which he sent accordingly; and the Count de Soissons went with those companies of Swiss. We were in great pain for the King; and the whole Army were in the disposition that became them, being resolved to continue in their duty should a misfortune happen. This being an affair which regards the particular history of the Court, a great many persons who then belong'd to it can relate all the circumstances, which were very well known to M. de Turenne. The King throughout the whole time of his being in danger, express'd a great tenderness for the Cardinal, who for a day or two was under much uneasiness about the dispositions of Monsieur, to whom he talk'd very judiciously, and told him he knew there were some people who caball'd with him upon occasion of the King's illness, and that if his Majesty should do otherwise than well, he had no reason to be under any pain, or to doubt of his and the whole Kingdom's submission. The Cardinal who is much exclaim'd against, as those who are at the head of the administration commonly are, found a great many friends at that time. There were some women with whom the Queen was very much offended for some things they had said during the King's illness, and for their inquisitiveness about his health. For two whole days the King seem'd ready to expire; but a dose of emetic wine brought him to himself. In his delirious fits he often talk'd of the Army. At last, he began,

AN. 1658. main'd three weeks before the place, and the trenches had been open'd near a fortnight before the enemy made any change in their posture. They had always had a body under M. de Marfin, which kept an eye upon the Country of Luxembourg: This *corps* they caus'd to approach nearer to Flanders, and they rais'd three or four thousand foot towards Brabant. All these were ready to march about the time I have said. They had at the beginning of the campaign a body of cavalry to the amount of above twelve thousand horse: they reckon'd it fourteen thousand, which being put in order, and having a great many regiments which had not been in the battle of Dunkirk, their Army assembled about Bruges; and drawing near the Lys to remove farther off from Dixmuyde, where the King's Army was, they there join'd M. de Marfin, with a part of his new levies, pass'd thro' Ypres, where was the Prince de Ligne's *corps*, and advanc'd to Poperingue a complete Army, with all its Generals

M. de Turenne observing that the troops on the side of Newport and Ostend were drawing off to furnish their Army, chang'd his posture and caus'd the Marquis de Crequi to march with his *corps*, which was hard by Newport, to Fintelle, in order to keep himself a-head of the enemy's Army, which was at Poperingue, and was advancing to Roseburg. This *corps* had orders to send away their baggage to the camp, and was designed for Dixmuyde, keeping a hand always upon that place by means of some dragoons and cavalry which lay at Kenoque, for fear lest the enemy, who had all their baggage under Ypres, should steal a march, leaving Bergues on the right hand, and so go and relieve Gravelin, which was not above six or seven leagues distance from thence.

M. de Turenne kept two brigades of horse at Mardyke, who had orders to march to Gravelin as soon as they had intelligence of the enemy; and he with a few troops kept about Dunkirk, from whence he had sent out small separate bodies even beyond Furnes. Still a guard was left before Dixmuyde; and on the other side, those that lay at Mardyke saw the camp at Gravelin, tho' they are two leagues asunder; yet the situation of the Country is such as makes this practicable. The enemy not being able to cross it but by making bridges, we were free to
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second one another by means of a great Dyke : the bag-^{An. 1658.}gage as it was on one side was no hindrance at all ; and those small bodies within half a league or a league of one another, could presently go by the dyke to each other's assistance ; and whoever knows the Country is sensible that there was no getting between.

In this posture we lay till the siege of Gravelin was over. It lasted twenty five or twenty six days from the opening of the trenches. The Marquis d'Uxelles was killed at it ; he was a man of merit, and one of the first Lieutenant-Generals of France. There were likewise about eight or nine hundred men kill'd or wounded in the siege ; and it being one of the strongest places that can any where be seen, tho' there were but very few men in it, they made such a defence as gave us no little trouble.

The enemy who were at Roseburgh, hearing that Gravelin was capitulating, retired to Ypres, and from thence along the Lys. The Cardinal, who had staid during the whole siege at Calais, and who took great care to supply all things, tho' at first there did not seem to be any preparation at all, came to Dunkirk before he return'd to wait on the King. We must needs say there is no body so indefatigable, so fruitful in expedients, or has so clear a head to go through with such a variety of affairs. A great many in his place would have return'd with the King after the taking of Dunkirk ; whither he came, as I have said, and where M. de Turenne waited on him.

Marshal de la Ferté, after the taking of Gravelin, left his troops to two or three Lieutenant-Generals, and return'd into France, where he had some affairs of his own. We sent away two or three regiments of infantry towards Hedin, where was an Army of ten thousand horse and nine or ten thousand foot, as also a very fine train of artillery and provisions for the campaign. The Cardinal staid a whole day at Dunkirk, and the King who had stop'd at Compiègne for a few days, and was entirely recover'd, press'd him to make haste to Fontainebleau, whither he was going with the Queen and the whole Court. The Cardinal left it to M. de Turenne to do whatever he thought fit ; yet expressing a desire that things might be so managed as to leave a good many troops in the Country ; and only letting him know that

An. 1658. he had had certain advice that the enemy, after the taking of Dunkirk, fully expected to lose Armentieres.

M. de Turenne was always for leaving some troops about Hedin ; to the end that in case he could do nothing considerable in the Country, he might by strengthening that *corps*, form a blockade at Hedin all the winter ; and this was the reason for which those regiments were sent thither. Marshal Schulemberg was designed to have the direction of this enterprize. In these thoughts, the Cardinal set forward on his journey from Dunkirk to Paris, and M. de Turenne return'd to the Army which was within four leagues distance from Dunkirk. The Embassador of England staid in that place with a large garrison. Two thousand English soldiers, and not more, under M. Morgan, follow'd the Army, and M. de Turenne order'd Marshal de la Ferté's *corps* to follow him to Dixmuyde.

The embarrassments in the march out of Gravelin detain'd them a whole day ; but it being a close Country, where it is always troublesome to wait for any considerable number of troops at a rendezvous, he pass'd on with the Army, and went and lay beyond Dixmuyde ; where leaving orders for M. de Schomberg to get together seven or eight regiments with which he was to continue about Dixmuyde, Furnes and Bergues, he march'd with the Army to Thielt, which is in the midway between Bruges and Ghent, with intent to march to the Lys and Scheld ; leaving the enemy a great way behind him, whom he knew to have a design to cover Armentieres and Courtrai ; to the end that by making them apprehensive for those great places Ghent and Bruges, he might oblige them to separate themselves or take such a posture as might give him an opportunity to do something of consequence. The enemy after the surrender of Gravelin, had taken up their quarters beyond the Lys, and had left a great body in Ypres, at their head. M. de Turenne, with his van which was a large body of horse, arriv'd at Thielt betimes, commanded that the Army should lodge there, and with the van went on straight to Deynse, where he knew there was a bridge over the Lys : he intended without stopping, to go on to Oudenarde, being thoroughly apprised of the situation of the Country, (tho' he had never been there) by the information of
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the natives and by the maps: but in the beginning of the night the guide lost his way, so that he was forced to return to his quarters, very much concern'd that he had fail'd in his design upon Oudenarde. He however sent M. de Gassion with five or six regiments to Deynse upon the Lys, with orders to send out parties towards Oudenarde, being perswaded there was no marching further on, without waiting for the rear which he had left eight or nine leagues off.

We continued two days at Thielt; and when M. de Turenne knew that those troops of the rear were arriv'd within a league's distance, he set forward very early in the morning with the Army, leaving the baggage at Thielt; and that *corps* of Marshal de la Ferté which made the rear, coming up at break of day and joining the reserve of the Army which staid at Thielt, he commanded that whole body to incamp there, having thus only made them change their camp, that they might with more safety and greater facility come and join him upon the first orders: and marching himself at break of day with part of the Army, without baggage, he cross'd the river Lys at Deynse, where he learn'd that a *corps* of five or six of the enemy's regiments was arriv'd at Oudenarde. Having sent out a good many parties to alarm the enemy on all sides, and left likewise some regiments under M. de Gassion at Deynse, he march'd the same day to Gavre, which is a castle on the Scheld three leagues distance from Deynse, where he arriv'd very early. The enemy not having had time to get together in a body behind the Scheld, there appeared but fifty horse. There was to have been a good number of peasants; but quick marches give leisure for reasoning indeed, but none at all for remedying. Of four or five thousand peasants who were order'd to be at that passage, there were not above two or three hundred and they immediately scamper'd away, all but fifty who put themselves into the castle which was on t'other side the water.

When the dragoons of the King's Army arriv'd on the banks of the river, as also the cavalry of the van, presently two hundred horse or thereabouts swam over the river under the very castle, at which those within were so terrify'd, that they all immediately surrender'd them-

An. 1658. felves. M. de Turenne afterwards caused four regiments of the brigade of Podwitz with all the *corps* of the regiments to pass, and we coursed up to within four leagues of Brussels. Some of the enemy's regiments, who were going towards Ghent, left their baggage; and this occasion'd such a confusion, that the regiments under Oudenarde march'd likewise to Brussels. It was Don Antonio de la Cueva who commanded them, and had orders to lead them thither. We wrought at a bridge of boats over the Scheld, and M. de Turenne had not yet taken any resolution, when very early next day he learn'd by a man who was sent by the Governor of Oudenarde, to ask for safe-guards, that the cavalry was march'd out of that place. He presently took a thousand horse and two hundred dragoons and cross'd the Scheld, sent M. de Madaillan, his Aid de Camp, to let the Governor know that he was going to besiege him, and to advise him to remain neuter and give passage to the Army. With that body of cavalry he drew near the town, and made his dragoons seize upon some houses close by the gate. Once we thought the Governor would surrender; but seeing how few men we had, he began to fire. M. de Turenne, after staying three or four hours about the place, seeing there was so small a force within, resolv'd to sit down before it with the Army, and commanded a party of three hundred horse under Lieutenant-Colonel de Bouillon, to go on t'other side the water, to prevent any troops getting into the place from Courtrai. He went himself to the Army, having sent for seven or eight hundred musketeers, to strengthen M. d'Humieres, who had only those two hundred dragoons abovemention'd. M. de Turenne was no sooner gone a league from the place, when those within the town seeing but a very few men near their gates, made a sally upon the dragoons, killed some of them, and setting fire to the houses, drove those out who were lodg'd there. M. de Turenne, when he was on his way, thought that there was some danger in leaving that body so near the town, and that the enemy would have time to send a *corps* thither by the way of Tournay: he therefore sent back S. Martin, Quarter-master of the cavalry, to bid M. d'Humieres retire half-way from the town to the Army; which he did at the close of the day: and very early next morning, the Army
having

having all night long been at work to take the bridge to An. 1658. pieces, march'd along the river, going up strait to the town, and drawing up the bridge after them.

Lieutenant-Colonel de Bouillon, at break of day, beat two regiments that would have got into the town. The cavalry of one of the two was taken; but the dragoons got in, who were not in number above a hundred. The Army arriv'd betimes before the town on the side of Courtrai, and the *corps* which had been the day before on the other side, had orders to go thither again: and M. de Turenne having cross'd the water in a boat, the bridge not being made, went and visited the posts; and descending along the side of the river, he spy'd a place where a body of men might come without being in any danger from Courtrai: he sent for the King's dragoons thither. As he was visiting the places thereabouts with thirty or forty horse, being got a little way off from the spot where he had left the dragoons, three regiments of cavalry under M. de Chamilli, whom the Prince had detached to enter the town, arrived in open day at the very place where we had just been posting the dragoons. The latter who were commanded by M. de Peguillain, stood their ground resolutely in a lane; which made that cavalry stop short, and presently after they took a fright; so that not one of them got into the town, nay M. de Chamilli was himself taken, with half his men. It was the regiment of Condé and two other regiments, who designing to come by the other side of the water, the Governor of the place had sent them word that there was nobody on the side where they were, as indeed our troops came thither but a quarter of an hour before. We found by the prisoners that the enemy were very much dispersed; and thus we saw plain enough that without lines, or hardly any communication over the Scheld except by a little bridge which we made in the night, we could easily take the place.

M. de Turenne had sent orders the day before to the whole *corps*, which was left at Thiel with the baggage, to march directly to Oudenarde; so that they arriv'd there that very evening: and having open'd the trenches in the night-time in three different places, and in two hours time approach'd to a half-moon which we were going to take, those of the town desired to capitulate:

An. 1658. they were receiv'd upon the terms the burghers had demanded; but three regiments which had come from Courtrai and enter'd the day that we approach'd the town, on t'other side of the water, were not allowed any other composition but to be prisoners of war.

Oudenarde was a town where there was a great many people, but where every thing was wanting for its defence: and indeed it is so very much advanced within the heart of the Country, that it was not reckon'd as a town of war. As I said before, it being a conquest so far within the Country, the keeping it seem'd very difficult in winter, and M. de Turenne was in doubt some time whether he should advance towards Brussels with the Army, or return to the Lys, where he knew Menin to be a place that was capable of being made strong, and whose situation afforded a great facility for a communication between Dixmuyde and Oudenarde. Neither did he know but that if he march'd quickly to the Lys, he might meet with an opportunity to make an attempt upon Courtrai. What hinder'd his advancing towards Brussels, which he would not have despair'd of being able to take, was, that having only some field-pieces, and but two or three days provisions, he could not enter upon a siege: so that if he had met but with ever so little resistance, as he would have been oblig'd to exhaust whatever provisions were in Oudenarde, and as the town was not fortify'd, he must have retired and quitted the Country beyond Oudenarde, and Oudenarde itself too: whereas by putting himself behind Oudenarde he subsisted on what came to him by sea, and at the same time took measures that were more secure and more conducive for six weeks or two months, to the preservation of Oudenarde itself. He left only two regiments of cavalry and four hundred foot under M. de Rochepaire, and march'd the next day after the town surrender'd; as he went up the Scheld, leaving it on his left hand, he order'd boats to follow after, as if he meant to make a bridge for the besieging of Tournai, or to enter into Brabant. He had left M. de Gassion with twelve or fifteen hundred men to keep the bridge at Deynse upon the Lys; he sent orders for him to come to him at the camp within an hour and an half's march of Oudenarde, from whence he would soon have set out at midnight, hoping that by a speedy and

and an unseen march, he might find something of importance to do on the Lys. He had no tidings of M. de Gassion's arrival till four hours before day; and as he would not march without knowing where he was, lest he should leave him too far behind, he set forward only two hours before day, keeping for a pretty while the road to Tournai where the Prince was; Don John and part of the troops had march'd to Brussels; we were about noon near Menin. It was in the beginning of September; M. de Turenne having sent thirty of his horse guards to learn if the enemy were at Menin, they brought him two prisoners who told him that the Prince de Ligne was within a league and half of the place with two thousand foot and fifteen or sixteen hundred horse on the same side the river. M. de Turenne detach'd the regiments of horse which were in the van, to engage them. They were that of the Count de Roys and that of Melun; and as a great many Officers happen'd to be at that time at M. de Turenne's quarters, they join'd the detached regiments in the action. We follow'd them full gallop with the cavalry, who did not march that day in very good order. The Prince de Ligne had always been with that *corps* in Ypres, and as the enemy believ'd the King's Army intended to march to Brussels, that Prince was to have enter'd Tournai, when the Prince (of Condé) should set out to join Don John at Brussels. He had halted from day-break in the field to govern himself according as he should hear news by the way of Tournai, or by the parties he had sent out towards the King's Army, who return'd without any intelligence, except one piece of advice that arriv'd just as we began to make our push at them. If we had waited till some troops were got together before we had charged them, 'tis certain the enemy would have had time to retreat; but M. de Turenne having commanded the foremost to fall on without staying for dragoons or infantry, he left them no room to think of any thing else but making head just as they found themselves situated along the road; and all that part of the Country is naturally so made that there is no going above two or three a-breast. The first that made the onset were some Officers who had put themselves at the head of our detachment; some of these were killed. The enemy's regiments, Droot and Louvigny, having

Jan. 1658. got on horseback, at first repulsed the foremost troops of the guard. The Count de Roye was at the head of his regiment which behav'd very gallantly, and charg'd the regiment of Louvigny whose Mestre de Camp was very dangerously wounded and taken prisoner. The Count de Roye received two pistol-shot in his legs, but broke thro' the enemy's first squadrons: the regiments of the Queen, Rennel and Crequi followed, at the head of which M. d'Humieres and M. de Gadagne put themselves, as likewise de la Ferté's regiment of dragoons. The enemy seeing our troops second each other so closely began to fall into disorder. Their infantry which were in some inclos'd fields, made but a sorry fire, and began to throw down their arms. We follow'd them to a bridge on the Lys which is at a castle call'd Commynes which was held by the enemy. They had some baggage and provision-waggons which were come to them from Lille, and these help'd to put them still more into confusion. So we took almost all their infantry, whose number amounted to between twelve and thirteen hundred, their arms and their colours; and as for the cavalry, of a thousand or twelve hundred horse there escaped not above three or four hundred to Ypres with the Prince de Ligne, and about a hundred or a hundred and fifty retir'd to Lille; almost all the Officers of the foot were taken, and abundance of soldiers in the hedges without arms. As people, for the most part, take delight in talking, though to the prejudice of their own party, there were divers prisoners who said that the town of Ypres was naked and unprovided. M. de Turenne was at first for bringing up the cannon to take the castle of Commynes, but he afterwards alter'd his mind, upon M. d'Humiere's telling him something might be done at Ypres. We march'd thither directly, lest that very night some forces should get in either from Armentieres, or of the usual garrison, which was reinforced by the troops of S. Omer and Aire arriv'd two days before, or by those of the Prince at Tournai which is not above five leagues distance from it. Besides, a Secretary of the Prince de Ligne having been taken, we found about him divers letters from the Prince (of Condé) written from Tournai the preceding day, and the night before the fight, wherein he gave him notice of M. de Turenne's march up the Scheldt: but tho' it has been

been averr'd by many that he caution'd him to re-pass the Lys, and post himself somewhere. so as to be able to enter Ypres, that did not appear by those letters. And indeed in field-expeditions it is impossible exactly to prescribe to a separate body, how to govern itself in each action, because every different motion of the enemy, and the various accounts a man has of them, ought to make him alter his measures, and there's no giving a commander other than general rules, the rest depending on his own conduct and fortune. Thus the Prince of Condé, I am apt to think, had not prescrib'd any thing precisely to the Prince de Ligne, who had sent out divers parties to learn news of the King's Army; but the people of Menin shut the gates against one of those parties for fear it should plunder the town, and another not having got any intelligence return'd to the enemy's camp but a moment before our foremost troops began to charge them. It was purely owing to the great diligence with which we march'd against the enemy, that they could learn no news by their parties.

In order therefore to prevent any soldiers being thrown into Ypres, M. de Turenne sent instantly to the brigade of M. de Podwitz consisting of eight or ten squadrons, and which had not been that day in the van, to refresh their horses an hour or two, during which time he went to Menin to demand passage for the troops; and it being a place half razed the Burghers made no manner of difficulty to comply. There is a bridge on the Lys which, having a little repair'd it, M. de Podwitz pass'd over with twelve or fifteen hundred horse the same day as the fight happen'd, and was almost at the beginning of the night, or at least before the next day, before Ypres on the road coming from Armentieres. The moment he arriv'd there, he saw a regiment of two or three hundred dragoons coming from Armentieres to get into the place, but he was so quick as to prevent them, so that not above seven or eight men enter'd, the rest were either taken or retir'd to Armentieres. M. de Turenne had also sent M. de S. Lieu that evening with a brigade of horse to put themselves on the way from Ghent to Ypres, but they met nobody.

That night the Army incamp'd near Menin, which is four leagues distance from Ypres: M. de Turenne commanded

An. 1658. mandated that they should keep ready, but not march, till a body he had left to make head at Tournai and to cover the baggage of the Army, had join'd him, or at least till he heard it was on the march. In the morning we heard in the camp a great noise, as of a magazin blown up, and we learnt from some who were on a steeple, that it was at Ypres; this added to our desire of hastning thither with all possible speed. M. de Turenne left in Menin a thousand foot and five hundred horse, and sent orders to M. de Gassion (who with eight hundred foot and five hundred horse had set out from Deynse, and had rejoin'd the *corps* which was about Tournai) to go to Oudenarde, what troops had remain'd here, being too weak. He march'd himself straight to Ypres, commanding that all, except what was left at Menin, and what he had sent to Oudenarde, should march with the baggage. The Army could not arrive till very late before Ypres. Twelve or fifteen hundred men had also staid under the command of M. de Schomberg, to guard Bergues, Furnes and Dixmuyde, to whom orders were sent to come to Ypres, and draw near the Army putting those places in a state of safety. M. de Turenne was very weak at his arrival before Ypres; and he was willing to preserve Oudenarde, which was in no state of defence, and Menin, which was the only passage he had over the Lys. When the Cardinal left Dunkirk, he thought it adviseable, and M. de Turenne was of the same opinion, to leave some regiments of infantry with Marshal Schulemberg, to try if they could form a blockade at Hedin. We knew we might depend on having two or three thousand more foot from that side; and the enemy was in so bad a condition, what with the battle of the Downs, the Prince de Ligne's engagement, and so many regiments defeated, and parties beaten, that we might venture to attack a considerable place with a few men. There were no tools for making trenches; but M. de Turenne had order'd some regiments of horse to look out for some, as they march'd by the houses forsaken by the peasants.

The evening that the Army got before Ypres, we found no forage at all; yet in the morning M. de Turenne made the tour of the town, and all the troops arriv'd. We broke some avenues as well as we could; and tho' we were inform'd that there were six or seven hundred

hundred horse in the town with the Prince de Ligne, we flatter'd ourselves a little with respect to the number of foot, which we did not believe to be above three or four hundred, but which we found to be twelve hundred or a thousand; a great many of them were, indeed, but Militia; and so we resolv'd to sit down before the place. M. Talon, Intendant of the Army, was sent to Dunkirk and Gravelin to fetch tools and ammunition and cannon, a Field-Army not having a sufficient quantity of those things for a siege. M. de Turenne's intention was not to apply himself so to the siege of Ypres, as to confine the operation of the campaign to that alone, and abandon Menin and Oudenarde. He knew that the enemy's weakness, occasion'd by so many losses, had put them into a condition no longer to be fear'd, as an Army is that can form enterprizes, when that which it had to do with is engaged in a siege. The beginning of the siege of Ypres was a sort of a blockade, both because tools and ammunition were wanting, and because a resolution was taken to quit it with part of the Army, in case the enemy went upon any enterprize. In order to be the more secure of Menin, which was the only passage to Oudenarde, as soon as M. de Schomberg was arriv'd with twelve or fifteen hundred men, which he had about Dixmuyde, M. de Turenne sent him with two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, to re-inforce the garrison of Menin, which was a place that could not be maintain'd without a great many men. There had all along been a detachment of a thousand or twelve hundred horse which had been at St. Venant. They received orders from Marshal Schulemberg, Governor of Arras, whom M. de Turenne desir'd to advance upon the Lys while he made the siege of Ypres. The Marshal march'd with that cavalry and some regiments left about Hedin, and drawing out two thousand foot or thereabouts from the garrison of Arras, he came and incamp'd within two leagues of Ypres, and next day march'd to Menin. M. de Turenne left likewise under his orders the troops which were there, except two regiments of infantry commanded by M. de Schomberg, which he drew thence, because he had but very few foot for the siege.

Two days after, there came some tools from about Calais; and Marshal Schulemberg brought also two or three

An. 1658. three thousand. After we had made some ditches before the easiest and most open avenues, we began the siege, opening the trenches by favour of a rising ground, which is within five hundred paces of the place, and capable of sheltering a great many troops behind it. We open'd two trenches, of which the guards had the head of one, and Marshal de la Ferté's troops, which were commanded by two or three Lieutenant-Generals, had the head of the other. I forgot to mention that the cavalry of the town had, the evening before, made a sally, wherein M. de Charost and some Officers were very much wounded, but the sally had no effect, the besieged having been repulsed as far as the palisades of the counterscarp. Every body in the Army of any rank and condition ran to the charge, and all behaved themselves very well. The second day after the opening the trenches we approach'd very near the counterscarp; and the third, being of opinion that we ought to make all the dispatch we could, for fear the enemy should have time to look about them, and attempt something either for relief of the place, there being no circumvallation, or else by way of diversion, M. de Turenne resolv'd to carry the counterscarp, and reinforced the two attacks with five hundred English, of which there were about fifteen hundred in the camp. At the beginning of the night, having placed these behind the before-mention'd rising ground between the two attacks, they march'd at the same time with the French, and advanced up to the counterscarp in a front of three hundred paces extent, with a great quantity of grenades. The enemy made not much resistance, having put part of their forces into the half-moons, in one of which was the Prince de Ligne with a great many Officers. The French and English, not satisfy'd with being masters of the counterscarp, attack'd the half-moons, and took three of them. Some Officers of the enemy were taken prisoners, and the Prince de Ligne escaped with difficulty into the town, by means of a plank which was laid over the ditch, full of water. There was an English Captain who following them into the town, and believing them to be some of his countrymen or French, was taken, being got a good way within the place. At dawn of day, all the counterscarps fronting the attacks and three half-moons being taken, we made lodgments there, tho'

we had but indifferent communication with either the half-moons or counterscarps. M. de Schomberg, M. de Gadagne and M. d'Humieres served at the guards attack, who acted every night with great vigour; and M. de Bellefons, M. de Coudrai Montpensier and M. du Brezis serv'd at the attack of Piemont, who likewise acquitted themselves very well.

The fourth night was spent in making communications in order to go to the counterscarps and half-moons, and to descend into the ditch of the place. The fifth, the cavalry having carried a good number of fascines, and the ditch of the town beginning to be fill'd at the guards attack, those within desir'd to capitulate; and Colonel Droot was sent to M. de Turenne with some of the principal Burghers. He granted a very honourable capitulation to the Prince de Ligne, who march'd out the next day with two pieces of cannon, six or seven hundred horse, and eleven or twelve hundred foot, who were conducted to Courtrai. As the siege was carried on briskly, we lost a thousand men, kill'd or wounded, with not a few Officers. The siege lasted but five days; and during the seven or eight days that we had lain before the place without opening trenches, the enemy not thinking we would attack it, had taken no measures to relieve it, nor even to be in a capacity of putting themselves in any good posture in case it should be taken: so that the Prince de Ligne and Don John of Austria found themselves at Tournai, as much embarrass'd after the siege of Ypres as before, plainly seeing that the season would not so soon oblige the King's Army to go out of Flanders. M. de Turenne, not to lose time, sent on the very day of the capitulation two thousand men to attack the castle of Commines on the Lys; it is a very strong castle, and a considerable pass. The day after the garrison had quitted Ypres, he march'd with the whole Army, advancing towards the Lys to favour the siege. One Colonel Rutherford of the Scots guards, commanded the attack, and in three days time oblig'd those of the castle to surrender, and there march'd out fourscore men.

M. de Turenne leaving a garrison in it, pass'd the Lys next day with the Army, the cavalry whereof was greatly fatigued, having been distress'd for want of forrage before Ypres. He stopt between the Lys and the Scheld, in a place

An. 1658. place call'd Turcoin, where he continued five or six days, having found therein good store of corn : he gave in the mean while orders for the fortifying of Menin and Oudenarde. It was the end of September ; and tho' the season was very far advanced, it was necessary to put Oudenarde, where nothing had been so much as begun, into a defensible state, it being, as every body knows, within four leagues of Ghent, and seven of Brussels ; the houses of two or three suburbs reaching to the very edge of the ditch, and there being a mountain towards Brussels, which commands at half a musket-shot a whole side of the town, no body can abide without the walls nor on t'other side the ditch, which is full of water.

Marshal Schulemberg having staid at Menin five or six days after the taking of Ypres, went back again to Arras, on account of his being troubled with the gout, leaving all the troops which he had brought with him, even those of his garrison, at Menin. M. de Turenne after having staid some days at Turcoin, and left only a thousand or twelve hundred men in Ypres, without disarming any of the inhabitants, relying on the Army which still remain'd to make head against the enemy, march'd to a place on the Scheld named Epierre, between Oudenarde and Tournai ; and having order'd boats to be brought up from Oudenarde, he there made two bridges, resolving principally to apply himself to the fortifying of Oudenarde, and providing it with military stores, of which it stood in great need. To this end, he had them fetch'd out of France by Dunkirk to Ypres ; the Cardinal to whom he had sent an account of all things, being very glad of such good success, gave the necessary orders for the same.

The march of the King's Army to the Scheld threw the enemy back into their first confusion. The Prince continued at Tournai : Don John of Austria and the Marquis de Caracena went with some troops to Brussels and Tenremonde, which is a place on the Scheld between Antwerp and Ghent, for which the enemy were in extreme fear : they placed some troops on the river Tenre to cover Brussels (not knowing what they could do better) till the bad weather should oblige the King's Army to retire. The place where it was incamp'd was very full of forrage, on both sides the water ; and the ammunition-bread which came by Ypres, was brought up the Scheld

Scheld by Oudenarde. Then, and not till then, it was An. 1658. that we fell heartily to work at the fortifications of Oudenarde. M. de Rochepaire whom M. de Turenne had left to command therein, being a very understanding man, had got together a good many peasants; and the Chevalier de Clerville, who had great skill in fortification, being sent thither, they began considerable works, which in every one's opinion, could not be in a condition before the Army retired. But the works advanced beyond all expectation. There were every day employ'd above a thousand peasants, besides soldiers, and the Army was at four or five leagues distance, to cover the works: a sufficient distance not to ruin the neighbouring parts, and thereby put the garrison to inconveniencies in the winter. The Army staid near a month in this camp on the banks of the Scheld; and it being within three leagues of Tournai, where was the Prince, with few foot indeed, but with two or three thousand horse, and within four leagues of Courtrai, where was a large body of horse, no day passed without some little action both in foraging and between parties meeting one another, in all which the King's Army continually got the better.

In the beginning of November, Don John of Austria having had intelligence that the King's Army intended to decamp from Epierre, where it had continued a month, came to Courtrai with the Marquis de Caracena and some Cavalry which he had brought from Ghent, thinking to hasten the more by his approach the retreat of the Army. M. de Turenne had resolved to continue as long as he could in this camp, and afterwards to pass beyond the Scheld, towards Brussels, tho' the season was so far advanced, that it seemed to be a thing very difficult to do. What obliged him thus to lengthen out the campaign all he could, was, his having receiv'd letters from the Cardinal, acquainting him that the King and Queen were setting out from Paris on a journey to Lyons, having seen the affairs of Flanders on so good a footing, and the Cardinal having for some time past promised Madam de Savoy that the King should make this journey and see the Princess Margaret, between whom and his Majesty a match had been for some time before propos'd and great hopes given of its taking effect: M. de Turenne being thereupon desirous to continue the campaign

An. 1658. as long as he could, tho' in a very bad and very advanced season, he pass'd the Scheld, and tho' he had information brought him the evening before he did so, that Don John was arrived at Courtrai, this did not make him alter his resolution; on the contrary, it spur'd him on the more to it, thereby to make Don John go back to Brussels. At break of day, the Army began to pass over the bridge. He had, the evening before, order'd M. de Podwitz with two thousand horse and some dragoons to go and pass the river Teare, which is four leagues from the Scheld, and the like distance from Brussels. The enemy had two or three regiments on the other side, rather to give intelligence of the passing, than to dispute it. M. de Podwitz took a part of a regiment of foot that would have retired, and lodged himself in Gramont, which the Spaniards abandon'd. M. de Turenne after he had pass'd the Scheld, left the infantry and baggage of the Army near it, together with some cavalry to observe Tournai, where the Prince still was; and he went himself with part of the cavalry to Ninove, and sent M. de Lislebonne with two thousand horse and two hundred foot, to try if the town of Alost could be made to open its gates. Two hundred foot which the enemy had thrown into the place, having hindred the Burghers from surrendring, M. de Turenne sent to M. de Lislebonne to come and join him at Ninove, not being inclined in this season to undertake, with some hazard of not succeeding, things which he thought to be of no service, not having any intention to keep that place. The month of November being now far spent, we laid aside all thoughts of going upon any further enterprize; because it was necessary to confine ourselves to what we had taken, for fear of falling into an inconvenience which the winter would have produced; for the body of the Army going out of the Country, where it was impossible it could winter all together, if we had had a mind to keep certain posts which required no siege to re-take them, because they could no longer be succour'd by the Army, we should infallibly have lost them together with the men we had put in 'em, and our reputation too at the same time, for having taken our measures so ill. And therefore, tho' the enemy believ'd we meant to keep Ninove and Gramont, M. de Turenne never had any such thought: he was only for leaving

leaving some troops in 'em, whilst the Army was in places where it might support 'em, judging it likewise very necessary to ruin those places as much as he could, that the enemy might not keep troops there during the winter, or if they did so, it should be but a very small number and with great inconveniency to themselves. Besides, the beforementioned body of three or four thousand horse being out of the Army, it gave more facility to foraging, coop'd up Don John and the Marquis de Caracena, with a body of troops in Brussels, where they were not very safe, reduced their Army in their own Country to wish as much as that of the King for winter-quarters, and render'd them consequently incapable of enterprizing any thing on the conquer'd places when we were return'd into France. The troops which were in Tournai and Courtrai suffer'd such inconveniencies, that they had more need to leave Flanders and go to the Meuse, to refresh themselves, than the King's troops had to go into France.

We staid all November in these places, and in the mean while we kept working at Menin, but not with that application as at Oudenarde, in which place M. de Turenne left seven or eight hundred horse, and two or three thousand foot. In the beginning of December, the Army pass'd the Lys at Harlebeck, within a league of Courtrai above Ypres; Dunkirk, Gravelin, Bergues, Furnes and Dixmuyde were so remote from the enemy that we thought the ordinary garrisons would suffice to secure them. The King was now at Lyons; and M. de Turenne might retain in Flanders or send into France all the troops which he judg'd proper; because the King and Cardinal were pleas'd to give him a discretionary power to act as he thought fit. He left six or seven hundred horse and fifteen hundred foot in Menin, commanded by M. de Bellefons: he went to Ypres himself, with twelve companies of French guards, and six regiments of Cavalry. He left in all a hundred troops of cavalry in the conquer'd places, and full half the infantry, consisting of five thousand men. He led the Army as far as Etaire from whence it return'd into France under the conduct of M. de Lislebonne, M. de Wirtemberg and M. du Coudrai, who commanded the *corps* of Lorraine. He return'd to Ypres, and staid there

An. 1658 till the beginning of February: then he left M. de Humieres at Ypres, the government whereof the King had conferr'd on him at M. de Turenne's request; he left M. de Bellefons in Menin, with orders to have an eye upon Oudenarde; and M. de Schomberg was to take like care of Bergues, Furnes, and Dixmuyde. The communication continuïng free between all these places, the body of English consisting of about fifteen hundred men, was sent to Amiens, and the garrison of Dunkirk remain'd near three thousand foot strong, with three hundred horse. M. de Turenne seeing that things might easily subsist in this manner, the places having store of all things for the winter, and commerce being free throughout the whole Country, he at length went back to Paris, where he arriv'd two days after the King's return from Lions.

End of M. de TURENNE'S MEMOIRS,



RELATION

OF THE

CAMPAIGN of FRIBOURG,

By the MARQUIS de la MOUSSAYE.

THE battle of Rocroi and the taking of Thionville had re-establish'd the reputation of the arms of France in the Low-Countries: the Spanish infantry was ruin'd: a terror had seiz'd the rest of the enemy's troops; few of the towns in Flanders were in a condition to defend themselves long: in a word, a General might undertake any thing with success. The Duke of Orleans had this command. An. 1644.

In Germany it was quite otherwise; for after the Duke d'Enguien had carried succours thither, Marshal de Guebriant was kill'd before Rotwil, and the Army remain'd with no other Leaders than Rantzau and Rose. Rantzau had courage and good sense; he had likewise a certain natural eloquence, which greatly prevail'd in Councils of War, and irresistibly drew others over to his opinion; but his conduct was not always answerable to his discourse; for wine oftentimes made him commit great faults, and render'd him incapable of commanding. He had put the infantry into quarters at Tutinghen, without taking any precaution to secure 'em from being surpriz'd, and had quarrel'd with all the German Commanders: the Bavarians and Lorainers fell upon him before he was in the least apprized of their march; and John de Wert having forced him to yield himself with his troops, all the Officers were prisoners of war: the German cavalry that were dispers'd in divers places, retired to Brisac under the conduct of Rose, and took up their winter-quarters in Lorain and Alsace.

An. 1644. As soon as the news of this arriv'd at Court, the Viscount de Turenne had orders to go and gather up the broken remains of that Army, and take on him the command thereof. He spent the whole winter in re-establishing it; but notwithstanding all his industry, he was in no condition to oppose the Bavarians whose Army was much increas'd after Rantzau's defeat. Merci who commanded it seeing himself master of the field, went and invested Fribourg which was unable to hold out a long siege.

The Duke d'Enguien had information of this at Amblement hard by Mouson, and receiv'd orders from the Court to go and join the Army of Germany and endeavour to relieve this place. He march'd the twentieth of July towards Metz, where his troops pass'd the Moselle and left their heavy baggage. In thirteen days march he advanced threescore and eight leagues, and got to Brisac with six thousand foot and four thousand horse.

The Prince learnt by the way that Fribourg was surrender'd to the Bavarians, that the Viscount de Turenne was incamp'd very near them, and that Merci as yet made no shew of any design to change his quarters. On this advice, he advanced towards the Viscount de Turenne with Marshal de Gramont, and at the same time order'd Marfin to pass the Rhine at Brisac with the Army, the third of August.

The Duke d'Enguien staid in the Viscount's camp no longer than was necessary to observe how the Bavarians were posted, and to resolve in what manner to attack them. He return'd to his Army the same day it pass'd the Rhine, and the day following he march'd to execute an enterprize he had formed in concert with the Viscount de Turenne.

Fribourg is situated at the foot of the mountains of the Black Forest: these mountains extend themselves here in the shape of a crescent, and in the midst of this space you see near Fribourgh a small plain bounded on the right by very high mountains, and surrounded on the left with a marshy wood. This plain is water'd with a small brook which runs along the skirts of the wood, and afterwards falls on the left of Fribourg into the hollow of a valley which is narrow and intersected with boggs and woods. Those who come from Brisac cannot enter
this

this plain but by defilées at the foot of almost an inaccessible mountain which commands it on all sides, and the entering it by the other roads is yet a matter of much greater difficulty. An. 1644.

Merci had posted himself in this advantageous place; and being one of the greatest Captains of his time, he had forgot nothing to make the most of this situation. His Army consisted of eight thousand foot and seven thousand horse. He had stretch'd his camp along the brook; but besides this defence and the advantage which he drew from the wood and quagmires, he had fortify'd it towards the plain with a large intrenchment. There was no getting at him but by the road-way between Brisac and Fribourg, and consequently there was an inevitable necessity to pass by the foot of this mountain which skreen'd the best part of his troops: for which reason this General made it his whole business to put that part of his camp out of a possibility of being forced.

In the declivity towards the plain, he erected a fort which was palisaded, wherein he put six hundred men with artillery: by this means he secured that part of the mountain that was easiest of access. From thence he carry'd a line along the side of a wood of fir-trees, ascending up towards the top to a place where it was impossible to pass. This line was defended by redoubts every two hundred paces; and in order to create more trouble to such as should attempt to force it, he caus'd to be fell'd and laid along this work a great number of fir-trees, the boughs of which were half cut and twisted one within another, and had the same effect as those defences call'd *Chevaux de Frise* *.

Between this mountain which the French Army found on the right and another which was nearer Fribourg, there was a deep hollow by which the Bavarian Camp might have been enter'd; but in order to get to it there was a necessity to go a great way about, and pass through places that had never been tried before. This part was naturally fortify'd by a broad and deep water-course, and Merci had contented himself with felling of trees and laying them cross that *ravin*. In short, no camp was

* *Chevaux de Frise* are beams stuck with iron-pointed stakes every way, which present their points like a hedgehog.

An. 1644. ever better situated or more strongly entrench'd than this was.

However, the Duke d'Enguien resolv'd to drive Merci out of it, and dispos'd his attack in this manner. He was to march with all *his* Army against the line which ran along the wood of fir-trees on the mountain, leaving the fort on the left and solely applying himself to carry the redoubts which defended the line; to the end that, after he had gain'd the upper ground, which commanded all the rest, he might make himself master of the fort, and descend in battalia into the camp of the Bavarians.

The Viscount de Turenne was to attack the line of trees which defended the valley; and provided both attacks were made at the same time, there was reason to hope the forces of the enemy being separated, they would be at a loss to defend themselves, and if they should happen to be forced on the side of the water-course, the Duke d'Enguien coming from above, and the Viscount de Turenne entering the plain at the same time, Merci would not be able to withstand them.

As soon as the troops were arriv'd, the Duke d'Enguien gave orders to get ready during the night, to fight the next day. The Viscount de Turenne being to fetch a great compass, set forwards before break of day; but the difficulties which he met with in his march retarded the attacks which the two Armies were to make at the same time.

The Duke d'Enguien dispos'd his thus: his infantry was compos'd of six battalions of eight hundred men each: Espenan, Major General, was commanded with two battalions of the regiments of Persan and Enguien, to make the first onset: the Count de Tournon, Major-General, put himself at the head of the regiments of Conti and Mazarin to support Persan: the Duke d'Enguien reserv'd two regiments to be employ'd as occasion should require, and Marshal de Gramont, Marfin, l'Echelle and Mauvilli remain'd about his person. Major-General Palluau supported the whole attack with Enguien's regiment of horse, and the gendarmes were posted at the entrance of the plain in a very close place to hinder the Bavarians taking the infantry in flank.

In order to go to the enemy, it was necessary to ascend a very steep hill cross a vineyard, wherein, at certain distances,

distances, were walls four foot high, which supported the An. 1644. earth, and serv'd the Bavarians instead of so many intrenchments. The troops nevertheless that were commanded to begin the attack, mounted into this vineyard and push'd on to the intrenchment of the fir-tree wood, from behind which the Bavarians made an extraordinary fire. The French infantry could not force the before-mention'd fortification of trees plash'd together without losing a great many men, and even without being put into disorder.

The Duke d'Enguien drawing near to see what effect this attack had, took notice that the first line of his men began to stagger, and that they were partly within that intrenchment of firs before the enemy's camp, and partly without, neither flying nor advancing: they were even beginning to file off to the right along the camp of the Bavarians, in order to go and fall upon them from the top of the mountain; but the Prince having himself perceived before, that there was no forcing that place, judg'd that the success of his enterprize depended wholly on carrying the enemy's line in the middle.

He therefore resolv'd to begin a new attack with what was left of the first regiments, tho' he had no more than two near his person, and these were almost discouraged at what they had seen. At first it look'd like a sort of temerity to undertake with two thousand dishearten'd men to force three thousand who were well intrench'd and proud of the advantage they had just gain'd; but there was no other way to bring off those who had pass'd the first intrenchment of firs: and had the Duke d'Enguien abandon'd them, he must have retir'd with the mortification of having fail'd in his enterprize and sacrific'd to no purpose the best part of his infantry; beside that the whole Bavarian Army would have fallen on the Viscount de Turrenne, having only him to defend themselves against.

The Prince makes all these reflections in an instant, alights from his horse, puts himself at the head of the regiment of Conti and marches against the enemy: the Count de Tournon follow'd by Castelnau Mauvissiere does the same with the regiment of Mazarin: Marshal de Gramont, Marlin, l'Echelle, Mauvilli, la Moussaye, Jersé, the Chevaliers de Chabot and Gramont, Lignai, Meilles, la Baulme, Tourville, Barbantane, Desbrotteaux, Aspremont

An. 1644. mont, Viange and all the Officers and Volunteers in general dismount. This action gives the soldiers fresh courage; the Duke d'Enguien is the first that passes the fence of fir-trees; all the rest after his example, throw themselves in crowds over this intrenchment, and those that defended the line run all away into the wood by favour of the night which was now coming on apace.

After this first advantage, the Duke d'Enguien mounted into a redoubt which he found abandon'd; but the situation he saw himself in was almost as dangerous as the action he had just perform'd. One part of his infantry had been kill'd, the other had left their ranks to pursue the run-aways towards the wood; the enemy were still in possession of the fort where they had planted artillery; and Merci might have come and charg'd the Prince's troops in the disorder they were in; but perhaps the approach of the night hinder'd him from taking this advantage.

While there was yet a little day-light remaining, the Duke d'Enguien got his infantry together, fortify'd the redoubts he had just taken, and notwithstanding the difficulties of the way he made his cavalry ascend upon the eminence which he possess'd. After all his troops had join'd him, he order'd a great sounding of trumpets and kettle-drums to be made, to let the Viscount de Turenne know that his Army had completely gain'd the top of the mountain, and he disposed all things for renewing the fight next day.

The Viscount de Turenne on his side had attack'd with a great deal of vigour the fence of the fell'd trees which were in the valley, between the mountain which the Duke d'Enguien had carried and that which was near Fribourg: but Merci not imagining that we could force his camp by the mountain towards Brisac in the condition he had put it, had carry'd his principal force towards the valley; and this is what commonly happens in attacking of lines; that part which was thought to be strongest is first carried. The place was spacious enough behind his intrenchment to draw up his troops in order of battle, and though the Viscount de Turenne's Army should have push'd the infantry that defended the entrance, the whole Bavarian cavalry might have supported them without breaking their squadrons. The Viscount de Turenne met with so vigorous a resistance, that he was never

never able to force the Bavarians: sometimes he won a post, and then lost it again; and thus his attack was nothing but skirmishing, nor was he able to enter their intrenchments, tho' he shew'd on this occasion all that the courage and conduct of a great Captain can do to surmount the disadvantage of numbers and the ground.

The Duke d'Enguien heard from the top of the mountain the noise of this attack, and prepar'd himself for an engagement the next day. His design was to fall down from the heights upon the camp of the Bavarians, and to cause 'em to turn against him a part of their forces, thereby to facilitate to the Viscount de Turenne the entrance of the plain: Every body set himself about this enterprize as to a certain victory, it being next to impossible for Merci to sustain two attacks at the same time, one whereof would come from above and pour upon his Army in the rear, whilst the other attack'd it in front.

Merci, however, got clear of this danger by a more than ordinary diligence; he removed his troops to the mountain near Fribourg, and before day got his cannon out of that fort, which was below the Duke d'Enguien's Army, without the French Generals having any notice of it: so that they were surprized the next day to see the Bavarians intrenching themselves on the mountain adjoining to Fribourg, and to find their camp deserted and their fort forsaken.

The Duke d'Enguien seeing the Viscount de Turenne's troops spread up and down the plain, went immediately down to them; the Army followed him, and he had scarce taken a nearer view of the places before he was inform'd by the firing of cannon from the Bavarians new camp, that they had entire possession of the mountain close by Fribourg. Upon this noise, the Duke d'Enguien, vex'd that he had mis'd his aim, drew up his Army in battalia, notwithstanding it had rain'd hard all night long; but seeing how much his troops were fatigued with fighting and with bad weather, he put off till next day the driving the enemy from their new intrenchments: and so our Army had the remaining part of the day and all the night to take a little repose, and to prepare themselves for the most perillous action that has been seen in all the last wars. On the right hand of Fribourg, coming from Brisac, there is a mountain, where one third of the

An. 1644. the way up is not extremely difficult to ascend; but exceeding steep the other part of it. Towards the summit, there is a space of ground very even and capable of containing three or four thousand men in battalia. At the end of this little plain there are some ruins of a tower, at the foot whereof the highest mountain of the black Forest begins to rear itself insensibly: but as it removes very far off in proportion as it rises, it has at top but a very small command over this plain.

Merci had posted the largest body of his infantry about this tower; the rest was incamp'd behind a wood on the right approaching to Fribourg; his cavalry was placed from the wood to the walls of the town: in short, this General had as well husbanded the advantages of ground in this post as he had done in the former. He had likewise added to defend it all the inventions which the art of war and the conveniency of the woods could furnish him in so small a time. The lines which he had made during the siege, serv'd him in part to shut up this new camp, and he had only to fortify that side which faced the valley. Here he placed several rows of trees which he had caused to be fell'd, and their branches twined in one another: his best infantry was behind this intrenchment supported by his cavalry, the squadrons whereof took up all the rest of the ground between these rows of trees and the town.

As soon as it was day, the Duke d'Enguien approach'd the foot of the mountain where Merci was intrench'd, and took by the way some redoubts which the enemy's dragoons were still guarding in the valley. Turenne's Army had the van-guard that day, and was to make the greatest effort. Lieutenant-General d'Aumont commanded the infantry; l'Echelle, Marshal de Bataille, march'd at the head of all with a thousand musketeers detach'd from both Armies: he was commanded to attack the intrenchment which cover'd the largest body of the Bavarian infantry near those ruins of a tower. This was the most accessible place by which they could be come at: for which reason the Viscount de Turenne order'd all the cannon of the Weymarians to march that way.

The Duke d'Enguien's body of infantry, under the conduct of Espenan, was commanded to force the fence of the fell'd trees. Between these two attacks, there

was

was a false one to be made with a few men and only An. 1644.
to favour the two real attacks. Rose supported the infantry with the Weymarian cavalry, Marshal de Gramont had orders to keep in the plain in order of battle with the French cavalry to take his measures according to the event.

The camp of the Bavarians gave them great advantages, both for defence and offence : their infantry was cover'd on all sides ; one of their wings was supported by the artillery and musketry of the town ; the other wing was posted on a mountain the height whereof was alone sufficient for the security of troops which possess'd it : but they had so great an extent of intrenchments to defend, that their infantry, weaken'd by the fatigues of the siege and former encounters, was not sufficient to defend their camp. L'Echelle had already caused the artillery of his attack to play, and only waited for the rear and the signal to begin the fight. The Duke d'Enguien had order'd all the attacks to be made at the same time : l'Echelle was order'd not to march up to the enemy till he heard the noise of the musketry on the side of the fence of fell'd trees and of the false attack in the middle : but an unforeseen accident (as very often happens in the best-concerted enterprizes in war) frustrated all the Duke d'Enguien's orders, and saved the Bavarians from a general overthrow.

While the rear was waited for (which could not come up by reason of the badness of the ways) the Duke d'Enguien, follow'd by the Viscount de Turenne and Marshal de Gramont, was got upon the highest mountain to take a view of the ground behind the enemy's Army, and see their order of battle. In his absence, Espenan detached some men to make a false attack on a little redoubt, which was in his way to go to the Bavarians ; tho' at first he had sent but very few men, yet the fight on both sides insensibly became general ; for the enemy supported those who defended their redoubt ; and Espenan re-inforced those, who attackt it ; at length it grew to so warm a skirmish here, that at the noise l'Echelle thought it high time to begin the battle, and his error overturn'd all the designs of that day.

The Duke d'Enguien seeing from the height where he was the enemy's mountain all in smoke and fire, concluded

An. 1644. cluded that Espenan and l'Echelle had made a mistake, and that his orders had not been well executed. He runs into the thickest of the engagement, finds l'Echelle dead, and his troops not daring either to fight or retire. To repair this disorder, he commands the Count de Tournon to put himself at the head of these dismay'd troops, and assure them that he will come himself to support them with a powerful succour. The Prince's presence gave the soldiers fresh courage; the Bavarian infantry began to bend and give way. Two battalions of that body of foot that was to sustain those who defended the intrenchment had already caus'd their colours to turn about, and had all the appearances of men wholly intent upon making their escape; but those that lined the intrenchment made so furious a fire, that the French infantry lost heart: those that were farthest off began to retreat, the others took a fright, and many even of the Officers themselves ran away.

In vain did the Generals tell them of the disorder which was seen in the Bavarian camp, in vain did they press them, threaten them, drag them to the fight. When once a soldier is seiz'd with fear, he no longer either sees his General's example, or hears his orders. The Duke d'Enguien was forced to put an end to the attack and draw off his troops. This action was extremely hazardous to the Prince and all those who accompanied him; for he was always on horseback within thirty paces of the enemy's intrenchments: Accordingly, of twenty persons that were about him, there was not one but who brought away some tokens of the danger to which he had been expos'd.

The Duke d'Enguien had the pommel of his saddle shot away by a cannon-ball, and the scabbard of his sword broke by a musket-shot. Marshal de Gramont had his horse kill'd under him, and all the rest were wounded. Yet did not this event at all discourage the Prince: he only alter'd the design of his attack, and instead of making his grand push at the line, as he had resolv'd in the morning, he order'd the principal attack to be made at the intrenchment of the fell'd trees. D'Aumont was commanded to keep the Bavarians in play with the troops which had been just fighting, by making a diversion in the same place where the first attack had miscarry'd. The

Duke d'Enguien and the Viscount de Turenne with the whole body of infantry led by Mauvilli, Marshal de Bataille, supported by the gendarmes and Rose's cavalry, march'd directly to the fell'd trees. An. 1644.

Hardly had the foremost men of this new attack enter'd the wood, when the Bavarians made an extraordinary fire: yet the French march'd on in very good order, to try to force these intrenchments. After having several times driven the enemy before 'em, and been as often repulsed by them, at last, Gaspard de Merci, Major-General of their horse, was forced to make all his troopers alight, to support his infantry which began to shrink: then did the conflict grow fiercer than before; both sides fired with so much fury, that all things were confounded in noise and smoke, and they could no longer distinguish one another, but by the flashing of the artillery and musketry: the woods all around resounded with a dreadful roaring, which added still more to the horror of the fight. The soldiers were so fiercely bent, the one to force, the other to defend the intrenchment, that if night had not come on, there would have been the greatest slaughter that has been seen in our time.

The French gendarmery perform'd a very gallant action; la Boulay commanded them: he led his squadrons up to the very edge of that intrenchment of trees; and, notwithstanding the enemy's fire, they skirmish'd a good while, making use of their pistols only. Never was there an engagement, where, without coming to close fight, so many fell on both sides: here the French lost Mauvilli, and the Bavarians Gaspard de Merci, their General's brother.

The Duke d'Enguien having led back his Army into the camp, applied his thoughts wholly to cut off the provisions of the Bavarians, and thereby oblige them to retire from so advantageous a post. The troops had four days to refresh themselves; and the wounded, who were very numerous, were carried to Brisac, to the end that nothing might remain in the camp which could retard the design, the Duke d'Enguien had formed.

The mountains of the Black Forest take their beginning in Switzerland, and follow the course of the Rhine, till they join themselves to the hills which are on the banks of the Neckar: these mountains stretch a great

way

An. 1644 way in length, but their breadth is greater in some of the Countries through which they extend themselves than it is in others ; their greatest breadth is ten or twelve leagues from Fribourg to Filinghen. These towns have no communication but by a valley very narrow and incommodious for the march of an Army : yet this was the place by which Merci would in all probability make his retreat : he had not dared to attempt it in view of the French Army. Thus, the Duke d'Enguien believ'd that by stopping up this way from Fribourg to Filinghen, he should deprive him of provisions and forage, and force him either to come to a general battle, or retire in disorder.

The ninth of August, the Prince march'd his Army towards Langendentzling : the village which bears this name is situated on the most accessible of all these mountains. This place was very fit for distressing the Bavarians, or for fighting them in their retreat. The Duke d'Enguien might have provisions from Brisac, in case he engag'd himself farther within the mountains ; but the way by which he must enter that valley was extremely difficult, on account of the morasses which the woods are full of ; besides that the van of the Army being once got into these woods, and having passed the brook which runs along their skirts, the rear would be expos'd to the Bavarians, and the rest of the troops not able to assist them any manner of way.

The Duke d'Enguien us'd all the precautions which the disadvantage of the ground and the presence of so vigilant an enemy required. The troopers not being able to march but one by one, and very often on foot, leading their horses, the Prince plac'd a large body of infantry in the rear of the Army, to support the rear of the cavalry : he likewise post'd platoons of musketeers on the wings, to defend the passes by which the Bavarians might come and charge them.

No sooner did day-light appear, but the Viscount de Turenne caus'd his Army to march, he having the van that day. The Duke d'Enguien had the care of making the retreat, and kept himself in presence of Merci's Army till all his troops were pass'd ; and after having in this manner cross'd those morasses and woods, he re-join'd the van at Langendentzling, without the Bavarians making

ing the least attempt to dispute with him either the passage of the brook, or the entrance of the wood. An. 1644.

Merci having observed the march of the French, immediately guessed the reasons of it: as he was one of the ablest and most expert Generals in the world, he did not fail to judge that his safety lay in preventing the Duke d'Enguien, and not in opposing his passing a defile. He had but just time enough to retire before the foremost troops of the French van could be up with him; and this in all likelihood was what hindered him from attacking the rear. As soon as he saw it march, he made his Army decamp, keeping the top of the mountains, and ordering his baggage to be conducted thro' the valley of St. Pierre, which leads to Filinghen.

The Duke d'Enguien being appriz'd of Merci's march, did all he could to hasten his own; but he had almost insuperable mountains to climb over, in order to stop up the enemies way, and his troops were fatigued; so that he was constrain'd to detach Rose in all haste with eight hundred horse, only to amuse the Bavarians and gall them in their retreat, while the rest of the Army were passing the defiles.

Rose executed this order with vigour, and began to skirmish with the Bavarians at the Abby of S. Pierre. As soon as he was come up with the enemy, he sent to let the Duke d'Enguien know that he was at their heels. The French Army were filing off thro' a very narrow valley, at the end of which they were necessitated to ascend to the top of a mountain so steep and so woody, that there was no passing but singly one after another. The Duke d'Enguien however surmounted all these difficulties; and his van was no sooner on the top of this mountain, but it discover'd the Bavarians in battalia, and Rose almost touching their rear.

To go from this mountain, where the van of the Duke d'Enguien's Army had halted, to the place where the Bavarians had posted themselves, it was necessary to pass two defiles, between which there is a space capable of containing four squadrons together: to get to this opening, one must go down a very narrow hollow way, and one ascends from it by another more difficult way to the entrance of a plain, where Rose's cavalry was skirmishing with the rear of the Bavarians.

Q

Merci

An. 1644. And thus was Colonel Rose's retreat the last remarkable action of the battle of Fribourg, which may be termed rather a series of bloody fights, than a single battle. On the one side we see a valour which is not discouraged either by inclemency of weather, or disadvantage of ground, which hazards all to conquer, and which at last does conquer. On the other side we observe a prudence which is not disconcerted by any thing, which improves every advantage towards making a defence, and yet is all along accompanied with the utmost valour. It is no easy matter to determine which of the two deserves most praise, to attack an Army intrench'd in almost inaccessible places, and force it to quit them; or to preserve an undisturb'd judgment, a mind firm and intrepid in a long retreat, before a pressing and victorious enemy, and at length chuse such posts as are impossible to be forced. It is true nevertheless, that a General, who abandons his artillery and baggage, is commonly look'd upon as beaten; and the honour of his retreat is not complete, unless he saves every thing: it may likewise be said that Merci's prudence would not have been able to secure him from a general rout, had not Esplanan and l'Echelle been guilty of a mistake in timing the execution of the Duke d'Enguien's orders. In fine, it almost always happens that an Army which attacks intrenchments with vigour has great advantages over that which defends them.

After the Duke d'Enguien had sent away the Count de Tournon, he went back to Langendentzling, where his baggage and canon waited for him. Then he bent his thoughts wholly to the advantages which the retreat of Merci might afford him. The principal Officers were for retaking Fribourg: the sole intent of their coming had been to relieve this place, and consequently this ought to be the first fruit of their victory. The Bavarians had not been able to fill up their lines; they had already got a great way off; the garrison of this place was weak, ill provided, and dismay'd at the event of the battles they had seen from their ramparts.

The Duke d'Enguien was however for undertaking the siege of Philipsbourg, the other design not seeming to him grand enough in the close of a campaign, which ought to be crown'd with something glorious: besides, should they have confined themselves to the taking of Fribourg,

the French Army could have advanced no farther into the Country, nay they would have been constrain'd to re-
 pass the Rhine, and take up their winter-quarters in
 Alsace. An. 1644.

Not but that the siege of Philipsbourg was extremely difficult; the troops had a long march to make before they could get to it. The infantry was diminish'd, money scarce, provisions at a great distance: but the Duke d'Enguien despis'd all these difficulties, and the siege of Philipsbourg was resolv'd on. He sent Champlastreux, Intendant of the Army, to Brisac, to prepare ammunition, and to load ten battering-pieces on the boats with which he was to make a bridge over the Rhine.

Champlastreux, who was active and understood his business, had soon made these preparations. The Prince began to march his Army from Langendenzling the sixth of August, and took his rout along the Rhine, after having detached Tubal with part of the Weymarian cavalry, some musketeers and some dragoons. Rose follow'd Tubal, with the rest of the Weymarians. The Duke d'Enguien reserv'd to himself the conduct of the infantry of both Armies and of the whole French cavalry. In this order he march'd to a castle, situated within five or six leagues of Strasbourg, fortify'd with towers of the old fashion, and defended with a very good ditch full of water, which he took by the way, thereby to make sure of a communication with Strasbourg: from thence he went to Kuppenheim, which Rose had taken in his passage with several other places. Tubal had also made himself master of Etlinghen, Forsten, Bretten, Durlach, Baden, Pruessel and Wisloch, small towns surrounded with ditches, and having most of them castles. The Viscount de Turenne went and invested Philipsbourg with three thousand horse and seven hundred foot; and the Duke d'Enguien arriv'd the twenty fifth of August before that place, after a ten-days march from Langendenzling.

Philipsbourg is situated near the Rhine, on the confines of the Duchy of Wirtemberg and the lower Palatinate, three leagues from Spire. From Brisac to Hermestein there is no strong place but Philipsbourg; formerly it was call'd Udenheim; it was the seat of the Bishops of Spire. The troops of Germany insensibly en-

An. 1644 gaged these to fortify it. When they had put it into a condition of defence, it did not long continue in their hands: the Imperialists first, and then the Swedes made themselves masters of it: the French possess it some time, and now it was again become the Emperor's.

This place has a square fort which commands the Rhine, and which has a communication with the town by a causeway six paces broad, and eight hundred paces long, rising five foot above a morass. Over against Philipsbourg the river forms a large elbow, and makes a great many bogs half way round the place: its fortification is nothing but earth, but its ramparts are very thick: it has broad and deep ditches; the approach to it cannot be made but by one point. The body of the place is composed of seven bastions almost regular: the *berm* is so broad as to serve for a *fausse-bray*, and is defended by a very thick quick-set hedge: the ditch is full of water, is two hundred foot broad, and four fathom deep, with a counterscarp well pallisaded. On the side towards that elbow made by the Rhine, there's nothing but a morass cover'd with wood in some places; on the other side the ground is somewhat higher, partly heath, partly plough'd land, and partly cover'd with wood.

When the Duke d'Enguien invested it, Bamberg was Governor of it: his garrison consisted of two hundred horse, and five hundred foot: he had a hundred pieces of canon, and ammunition to sustain a long siege.

After the Duke d'Enguien had view'd the most advantageous places for securing his circumvallation, he employ'd the rest of the day in taking his posts, and resolv'd to attack the fort on the Rhine that night. The French Army took up their quarters from Knaudeneim to the brook, which divides the plain in the mid-way to Rheinhausen; and the German Army was posted from this brook to Rheinhausen.

As soon as it was night, the troops disposed themselves for the attack of the fort. The Duke d'Enguien went to it thro' the woods; and the Viscount de Turenne approach'd by some small banks which go across the morass. The Duke d'Enguien was not able to get thither before day-break, because the way he had taken was longer and more difficult. Bamberg not having infantry enough, had withdrawn into Philipsbourg all that were in the

the fort: the Viscount de Turenne found it abandon'd, An. 1644. seiz'd it, and furnish'd it with every thing necessary to defend it against attacks from the town.

The Duke d'Enguien now employ'd his thoughts entirely about his circumvallation: he caus'd forts and redoubts to be rais'd wherever the ground would admit of such works, and order'd abundance of trees to be fell'd in the marshes, thereby to block up all the ways. The Viscount de Turenne met with fewer obstacles in fortifying his quarter; for he made use of a large water-course or hollow-way, which ran almost from one end of his camp to the other, and this was a good defence by the addition of a parapet to it; so that all the works of circumvallation were finish'd in four days, and the camp closed in on all sides from Knaudeneim almost to Rheinhaufen.

Mean while arriv'd the bridge of boats loaded with cannon, ammunition, and provision: in twenty-four hours it was placed over-against Germesheim and Knaudeneim. Germesheim is a small town of the Lower Palatinate, seated on the bank of the Rhine, fortified with bastions of earth, with a dry ditch on the side towards Spires, and a wet one on that towards Philipsbourg and the morass. It was necessary to take this town, in order to be master of the upper part of the Rhine; and as there was no making a circumvallation beyond the river, so neither could there be any securing the river but by taking the places which commanded it.

The moment that the bridge was finish'd, the Duke d'Enguien sent d'Aumont over it with six hundred foot and three hundred horse to attack Germesheim: d'Aumont made himself master of it in two days after opening the trenches, and then march'd to Spires. This city, though standing on the Rhine, is considerable for nothing but being the seat of the Imperial Chamber; for it is defended by nothing but a wall, with antique towers, and a sorry ditch.

While d'Aumont was securing all the necessary posts on the bank of the Rhine, the Duke d'Enguien began the attacks at Philipsbourg. It has been already observ'd that the approach to it cannot be made but by one place, where there is a sandy ground, which continues almost of the same breadth as far as the counterscarp of two bastions of the town.

An. 1644. The Duke d'Enguien order'd two attacks by this way: Marshal de Gramont conducted the left; the Viscount de Turenne took care of the right. In their approaches to the two bastions they were going to attack, they both made use of about fifteen hundred paces of the channel of a small brook which runs by this plain, having diverted the course of the water. The trench was open'd the first of September; and that same night the besiegers made a place of arms common to both attacks, from which place of arms each carried on its approach to the opposite bastion.

Espenan with the regiment of Persian mounted guard the first night in Gramont's trench, and after having carried on the line near two hundred paces, he began a great redoubt, where he fixed a *corps de garde* of a hundred Gendarmes at the head of the workmen; and these troopers had orders to retire in the day time behind some old ruins near the opening of the trench. The night pass'd quietly enough; and the besieged not yet knowing where the besiegers were at work, gave them no interruption; but when day-light began to appear, and they saw the earth which had been cast up, they resolv'd to make a sally, and try whether they could not ruin the work that had been carried forward in the night: they detached two hundred foot and a hundred horse, who advanced against the line; and tho' it was still full of workmen, Espenan prepared to give them a warm reception, and commanded the Gendarmes to oppose the cavalry of the besieged. The Gendarmes march'd against the enemy in such disorder, that they were utterly routed at the very first encounter, and la Boulaye kill'd on the spot. Espenan however put the line into so good a condition, that the besieged did not dare to attack it, nor push any farther this first advantage which they had obtain'd; so that the Gendarmes had time to rally, and return to the charge: they then acquitted themselves so well, that in spite of the fire from the bastions, all who remained of this sally were driven to the counterscarp.

Thus the besiegers went on with their work without interruption; but they had suffered so great a loss of infantry, that the foot of the Duke d'Enguien's Army amounted but to three thousand men, and that of the other not to above two thousand. With this small number

ber the Prince had incredible difficulties to guard so large a circumvallation, and at the same time furnish soldiers for the guard of the trenches and all the other works. His infantry consisted of four battalions: that which was in the trenches went as soon as it was relieved, and served for the extraordinary guard of the camp; two others work'd at the approaches, and the fourth gathered fascines to fill up the ditch. Palluau, with Enguien's regiment, relieved Espenan and Persan the second night: he greatly advanced the line, and finish'd a redoubt. Tournon and Marfin the two following nights push'd on the works very far, and rais'd a battery of six canon.

The Viscount de Turenne had us'd no less dispatch on his side. The fifth night, the two attacks made their lodgment on the counterscarp. Bamberg had given no other opposition to all these works but by the fire of his canon and musketry. The Duke d'Enguien had received no account of the Bavarian Army: all he knew was, that John de Wert was upon the march with a thousand horse and as many musketeers, in order to throw succours into Philipsbourg; and this advice obliged him to double the guard of the lines, and even every night to keep the Biovac [or extraordinary night watch of the whole Army] for fear of a surprize.

As soon as the two attacks had made their lodgments on the counterscarp, the workmen began to pierce it, and to make batteries to ruin the defences of the place. The descent of the ditch was not very difficult, but it cost a great deal of pains to secure it; for the water being almost on a level with the counterscarp, the besiegers could not go to it under ground, and it would have required too much time to make a gallery covered with madriers [thick planks of oak us'd to support the earth in mining] so the Duke d'Enguien contented himself with drawing a right line which terminated in the ditch, and which was cover'd with fascines laid upon blinds and chandeliers.

Espenan and Palluau, during the two nights they were upon guard, advanced the works so far, that the ditch could now be fill'd up. The Count de Tournon had already caused great quantities of fascines to be thrown into it, when, as he was passing thro' that *enfiladed* line which led to the work, he was kill'd by a musket-shot.

La

An. 1644.

La Pomme, an Engineer very expert in making mines and passing ditches, had undertaken to make bridges of fascines; but he met with abundance of difficulty in doing it, from the canon of the place, which those of the besiegers could by no means get the better of; because the besieged had so great a number of them, that one of their pieces was no sooner dismounted, but they brought on another to supply the place of it; and beside those which they had on their flanks, with which they batter'd the bridge sideways, they had a range of them on the face of the bastions, which enfilad'd it, and which ruined all the work. 'Tis true their flanks were so little, that they could plant but three pieces there: it is the common defect of the best places to have their flanks either too close or too open; but the first of these defects is the worst, because of two opposite batteries, that which has the greater number of canon always prevails. Thus the besiegers having erected two batteries of four pieces each, silenced those of the flanks; but the besieged planted so many canon on the face of the bastions, the rampart whereof is very low, that they ruin'd the batteries of the besiegers: wherefore the Duke d'Enguien was forced to raise epaulments to cover his batteries, and to skreen himself from the faces of the bastions: by this means his canon got the mastery, and the besiegers wrought with more safety at their bridge.

Then Bamberg found it was no longer in his power to hinder the ditch from being fill'd up; and as his garrison was weak, he did not think it advisable to stay till the miners were set to work; but hoping to make a more advantageous capitulation, he immediately beat the chamade, hostages were given, and the garrison march'd out the twelfth of September to the number of five hundred men, with two pieces of canon. The Duke d'Enguien order'd Persan's regiment into the place, and he made Espenan Governor of it.

This conquest, tho' an easier one than the Prince had expected to find it, gave a great reputation to the arms of France. Several towns sent deputations. Spire did not wait to be summon'd by d'Aumont; the Magistrates brought the keys to the Duke d'Enguien, and were honourably received by him. He confirm'd their privileges, and then dismiss'd them, that they might cause the Imperialists

realists to evacuate the place, and might prepare to receive a French garrison which d'Aumont had orders to put into it. But the Duke d'Enguien could not himself reap the fruits of the taking of Philipsbourg, nor remove from it before he had again put it into a condition of defence: the enemy were approaching; his troops were weakened and fatigued; the canon had done a deal of mischief, which it was necessary to repair. The Duke therefore being in no condition to make head against Merci, who had refresh'd and augmented his Army since his retreat from Fribourg, satisfied himself with establishing his quarters so well in the places along the Rhine, that he could not have his conquest snatch'd from him, nor be forced to a general battle. He had the river on one side, the town on the other, the fort of the Rhine before him, morasses and woods behind. His Army being incamp'd in so advantageous a post, he detached the Viscount de Turenne to go and attack Worms. This city is not inferior either in dignity or number of inhabitants to any in Germany; it is situated on the Rhine, and fortified as much as its bigness and situation would allow of. Duke Charles of Lorraine had a garrison in it; and after the loss of his dominions, he had hardly any other retreat.

The Viscount de Turenne sent down the river the infantry, canon, and all things necessary for his design: he then march'd thro' the Palatinate with two thousand horse, and defeated six hundred men whom General Beck had ordered to Frankendal. The inhabitants of Worms opened their gates to the Viscount, and made the Lorrainers march out. From thence the Viscount de Turenne pursued his march to Mentz, and detached Rosen to go and attack Oppenheim. This is a small town situated in a plain, ill fortified, but defended by a very good castle: Rosen met with no resistance here. The Viscount de Turenne presented himself before Mentz; and having taken up his quarters in the suburbs, sent a trumpet to those who commanded in the town, to offer them honourable conditions.

Mentz is the seat of an Archbishop Elector; and one of the chief cities of Germany; besides its being large, very populous, and well built for a Country where the inhabitants never had a taste for good architecture, its situation

An. 1644. situation renders it considerable, being placed right against the mouth of the Mein, which runs at the foot of one part of its walls: to the landward they are defended by a citadel of four bastions; but, as is often the case of great cities, its fortifications were neglected, and its defence consisted more in the number of its inhabitants than in the strength of its ramparts. At the bottom of the town on the banks of the Rhine, is a very magnificent castle where the Electors reside. While this town was in the hands of the King of Sweden, he had built at the place where the two rivers join, a fort of six bastions, which bore the name of Gustavebourg; but at last the Imperialists having re-taken Mentz, the fort was abandon'd by the Swedes, and the Electors let it go to ruin.

When the Viscount de Turenne entered the suburbs, there was still in the town an Imperial garrison of eight hundred men; however, the Elector believing he could not stay in it without danger, withdrew to Hermestein; so that the Chapter who had the administration of affairs in the Archbishop's absence, called together all the companies of the city; and after much consultation, they resolved to send a deputation to the Duke d'Enguien, and to give the keys to none but himself, thereby to render, in some sort, their capitulation more honourable, by the quality of the person that should receive them.

The Viscount de Turenne sent this answer to the Duke d'Enguien, who was still with his Army within sight of Philipsbourg. He presently set out with a guard of four hundred horse, and in a day and a half reach'd the neighbourhood of Mentz. While the articles of the treaty were settling, Merci, with the Bavarian Army, had posted himself on the heights between Hailbron and Neckarsulm, and had the Neckar before him.

Hailbron is not above fourteen leagues from Philipsbourg. Merci thought to be able, from the post he was in, to put a stop to the Duke d'Enguien's farther progress: he detached Wolf, a famous Colonel of the Bavarians, with two hundred horse, and five hundred dragoons to throw himself into Mentz; but Wolf could not get thither above a quarter of an hour before the Duke d'Enguien. The trumpet whom the Duke sent to the townspeople to give them notice of his coming, found Wolf

in the midst of an harangue, endeavouring to persuade An. 1644. them to defend themselves, and offering them the succour he had left on the other side the Rhine, together with that of the whole Bavarian Army, which would follow it in a very little time.

But the inhabitants of Mentz, knowing that the Duke d'Enguien was in person in their suburbs, kept their word with the Viscount de Turenne; and having made Wolf leave the town, sent their Deputies to the Duke to finish the treaty of capitulation. The Chapter obliged themselves to evacuate Binghen, a small town with a good castle on the Rhine, and receive French troops there. The Duke d'Enguien gave the Government of Mentz to the Count de Courval, and left in it a strong garrison with all things necessary for repairing the old fortifications, and making new ones.

The Viscount de Turenne on his march took Creutznac, and d'Aumont went and invested Landau with twelve hundred foot and fifteen hundred horse. This town is situated in a plain four leagues from Philipsbourg, and is pretty populous: its rampart is only flanked with towers after the ancient manner, and surrounded by a ditch defended by some half moons and a covered way. There were in it four hundred men of the troops of Lorraine, and it was the only place the Imperialists had now in the Palatinate on this side the Rhine, except Frankendal, where the Spaniards had a strong garrison.

While d'Aumont was taking up his quarters, and beginning his approaches before Landau, the Duke d'Enguien went and rejoined his Army at Philipsbourg, in order to be nearer the siege which d'Aumont had undertaken: he had notice on his arrival that the trenches were already opened, but that d'Aumont had been dangerously wounded as he was visiting the works*. The Viscount de Turenne went to continue the siege, and carried on the trenches with so much diligence, that in three days a battery and a lodgment were made on the counterscarp. The fifth day the Duke d'Enguien having come to view the works, the Lorrainers treated with the Viscount de Turenne, and marched out of the town.

* He died at Spire a few days after.

An. 1644. After Landau was taken, Neustadt, Mannheim and Magdeburg made but small resistance; and thus the Duke d'Enguien was in one single campaign three times victorious over the Bavarian Army, and made himself master of the Palatinate, the course of the Rhine from Philipsbourg to Hermesthein, and all the Country between that river and the Moselle.

The End of the Relation of the Marquis de la MOUSSAYE.



AUTHORITIES

AUTHORITIES
FOR THE
HISTORY
OF THE
Viscount de TURENNE.

The SECOND PART.

CONTAINING

Several LETTERS, MEMORIALS, POLITICAL
INSTRUCTIONS, BREVETS, and other
original Pieces.

ADVERTISEMENT.

NOTHING gives us a truer picture of a man, than the letters he writes to his relations and friends, when he has no thought of their being made publick; he there speaks without caution or disguise, and discovers his real character, the cast of his mind and the bent of his heart. It was thought proper therefore to insert in this Collection of Authorities, several letters from the Viscount to his Sister, and to his Lady. In these we may see his soul quite uncloath'd, his simplicity, sensibility, modesty and religion. The instructions he drew up by the King's command, for the Ambassadors of France in the different Courts of Europe, are proofs of his extensive genius, and that in him the Politician was no less eminent than the Soldier.

LETTERS, MEMORIALS, Political Instructions, &c.

*Letter from Frederick Maurice Duke of Bouillon to
the Queen.*

Madam,

BEING so unhappy as to have the most respectful de-N. I. B. I.
ference I could pay your Majesty censur'd as disobedience and contempt, my reasons, as shifts and evasions, and my most innocent actions, as crimes and cabals against the King and the State, I was incapable of consolation till I had retired to a place where by my conduct I might remove the impressions your Majesty may have received to my disadvantage, and from whence you may know that the assurances I give you of my fidelity, my zeal for your service, and my entire obedience to your commands, proceed not from constraint or self-interest, but from a pure principle of duty, and a steady resignation to your will. I most humbly beg your Majesty would believe, that when I devoted my self to your interests, I did it without reserve, and with a settled resolution of ever continuing in the same dependence, and of submitting to you my life and my whole fortune. I presume once again to assure your Majesty of this, to the end that you may honour me with your commands, and may know by the future, as you might have done by the past, that I had never any other end in view but the King's service and your Majesty's, to which I shall remain inviolably attach'd. And I persuade my self, that my perfect fidelity to your Majesty's interests will oblige you to acknowledge me to be

Your Majesty's most humble and

most obedient subject and servant,

Nyon, the 5th of
April, 1644.

THE DUKE OF BOUILLON.

R

To

To his Royal Highness the Duke of Orleans.

Monseigneur,

BEING my self oppress'd with misfortunes, at a time, I take the liberty to say it to your Royal Highness, when I might have hop'd for every thing; and that notwithstanding the uprightness of my conduct, I was continually expos'd to the false reports of my enemies, I thought my self oblig'd, in order to deprive them of all pretence for misinterpreting my innocent actions, to retire to a place where they could no longer have any colour for their ill offices, and where the sincerity of my intentions may be known by my proceedings. I likewise confess to you, Monseigneur, that I could not prevail upon my self to stay at a Court where I had continual proofs of suspicions being entertained of me, that were injurious to my honour and to my sentiments. And what was an additional mortification, I seem'd to be fallen from that share in your Royal Highness's favour, which you had done me the honour to promise me. I cannot conceive what has brought this misfortune upon me, being far from believing, tho' some would persuade me to it, that your Royal Highness accuses me of having been the first author of the treaty with Spain, seeing, to clear my self, I need only, with submission and respect, put you in mind of what's past, and appeal to your Royal Highness, whether I knew of any design when you sent into the country for me, whether you communicated any to me when I saw you at Paris, whether your friends had not resolved upon theirs before my arrival, and whether afterwards, when you laid before me the extreme danger the State would be in if the King should die, I enter'd into any other engagements but those of serving your Royal Highness, of continuing firm in the Queen's interests, and of preserving to her the Princes her children, who were in danger of being taken from her. It is sufficient for my justification, to make it appear that I am guilty of no other crime but that of having been devoted to your Royal Highness. This consideration alone, Monseigneur, keeps me from consenting to an exchange, which being dishonourable, might leave a blemish upon your Royal Highness, seeing I was never accused of any other crime but that in which you was involved,

volved. Whatever fondness I may have for my estate and dignities, I had no regard to them when your Royal Highness's service, and the interest of the State were in question; and I with joy divested my self of them to save my honour, and to gain an opportunity of making known my innocence and the purity of my intentions. As it shall be my constant care to preserve these in all my future conduct, I presume most humbly to intreat, that your Royal Highness will not refuse some marks of your favour to him who has always endeavour'd to merit it by his most humble services, and who has the satisfaction to have shown to all the world that he has been, without reserve,

Your most humble, most obedient, and

Nyon, the 5th of
April, 1644.

most faithful servant,

THE DUKE OF BOVILLON.

Letters from the Viscount to his Sister.

Dear Sister,

SEVERAL persons have sent me word, that it is reported at Paris, I am upon no good footing with the Duke d'Enguien, and not well pleased to be joined in command with him. I entreat you, when you hear this talked of, to testify that I am not so impertinent, and that it is an honour I have always extremely desired. I assure you that there is a very great union in the Army; the Duke d'Enguien and I are in as good terms as possible: I am likewise very well with the Marshal de Guiche; we have no differences, and are always very good friends. I have also great reason to be satisfied with the behaviour of the German Army towards me: I have not found in it the least opposition to my orders, but on the contrary a very ready obedience. When this affair is over, I shall write to you more at length; adieu, my dear Sister. I am

Your most humble and

most affectionate servant and Brother,

From the Camp before Philipsbourg,
the 3d of Sept. 1644.

TURENNE.

R 2

Another

Another to the same.

Dear Sister,

I Am still very much in pain for you on account of your illness; and when you are well, I shall have another cause of uneasiness, and that is a fear lest you be angry with me for not writing to you oftener. I confess that at first I could not prevail with my self to write any thing to you of my misfortune at Mariendal, knowing how much it would affect you. I was as much ashamed for you as for my self. And though it be an odd sort of a reason, yet I swear I could not resolve to write to you my self. If after a misfortune which befel me through my compassion for the troops which were very much fatigued, and my complaisance for the Officers, I may be allowed to comfort my self with any thing, it is with this, that the enemy have made no advantage of their victory. M. Konigsmark's troops, those of Hesse, and mine, all these join'd with the Duke d'Enguien's, will put affairs in a better posture than could have been expected. I have not two thousand men less than I had before the battle. I took three or four days ago a small town where there were a hundred of the enemy, who have list'd in our troops. I am under great obligations to the Landgraves of Hesse for sending her troops so far with me at a time when the enemy might have entered her Country: I assure you she is a very worthy Lady. I conjure you to love me always, that being the thing in the world that will give me the greatest pleasure. I am,

Dear Sister,

Your most humble, and

At the Camp, the
4th of July, 1645.

most affectionate servant and Brother,

TURENNE.

Another.

Dear Sister,

BEFORE mentioning any news, I shall tell you that your reprimanding me has not changed my sentiments with regard to you; and I swear, that if I sometimes neglect

left to write to you, it is because I am perfectly well assured, that you will nevertheless love me unalterably.

There was fought two days ago near Nordlingen the greatest battle that has been since the war began. The French cavalry had the right, and I and my cavalry the left. The right was entirely defeated, as was likewise the French infantry: we had, God be thanked, better fortune in the left; we there made our selves masters of the field of battle, took almost all the enemies canon, and Gleen, who commanded the right wing of the Bavarians: the Duke, by the greatest good fortune in the world, after having had two horses killed under him, and being slightly wounded in the arm, came to the wing where I was, a little before the troops with whom he had resolved to continue, were broke. He testified his satisfaction with regard to my conduct upon this occasion. You know by the news the number of those who were killed or made prisoners. We have had accounts of Marshal de Gramont, whom the enemy have carried into Bavaria, that is to say, to the Danube, whither their Army retired, after quitting the field of battle. Their loss was greater than ours, tho' the French Army was entirely repulsed: I make no doubt but it will be said at Paris, that the victory was entirely owing to the German cavalry. The Duke made me more compliments upon this occasion before the whole Army than I can tell you, neither can I express how great courage and conduct he himself shewed in the action. I had four battalions of infantry, two of which under M. de Chabot were to support the Duke's Army, and the two others were posted near his infantry; but the French cavalry in their flight carried all those away; so that only the German cavalry and the Hessians stood their ground. The Duke thinks he cannot enough commend the Germans, and indeed he is indebted to them for his life and his liberty. It is not to be expressed in what a kind manner he does me the honour to converse with me. I entreat you would signify to the Princess and the Duchess of Longueville how much I reckon my self obliged to him for it. I am very sorry to hear that you are so often troubled with an ague. I earnestly pray God may preserve you, for I have not a greater pleasure in the world than to know that you are well. Adieu, dear Sister.

From the camp before Nordlingen,
the 8th of Aug. 1645.

R 3

Another

Another.

I Have only time to write this short word. I have received your letter, wherein you desire to know how you are to get out of Paris, and what I would advise in the matter. I think if you can find there any place of safety, you ought not to stir; you should rather go and live with some of our friends. When the way from Paris to the King's Army is open, I shall acquaint you whither you may come. I love you with all my heart.

Sully, the 30th of March, 1652.

Something has happened at Gergeau, but not very considerable.

Letter from the Elector of Mentz to the Viscount de Turenne.

S I R,

N. III.
B. II.

I Had this morning certain accounts from Munster, that by the grace of God the so long desired peace was signed, subscribed, and solemnly published at Munster and Osnabourg the 24th of this month. I would not fail to acquaint your Highness of it by this present, and to beg that when the King's Army goes out of Germany, you would be pleased to spare my territories in your march. I have so many proofs of your Highness's good-will and affection, that I venture to promise my self this satisfaction. I shall shortly send a deputy to treat with you of some affairs, and to thank you for the favours you have hitherto done me. I hope you'll do me the honour to believe that I am entirely

Your Highness's most humble, and

Aischaffembourg, the 29th
of Octob. 1648.

most affectionate servant,

JOHN PHILIP, Elector of Mentz.

Letter

Letter from the Duke of Wirtemberg to the Viscount.

Cousin,

BEING assur'd this morning by an exprefs from my N. IV.
deputy at Munfter, that the peace was fubfcribed B. III.
the 24th current, I would not neglect to communicate
the news to your Highnefs, fince I am perfuaded it will be
very agreeable to you, and the rather that by this means I
fhall foon reap the benefit of the kind intentions of the
Crowns of France and Sweden for my reftoration. I
know that your Highnefs will rejoice with me on this oc-
cafion, and that the war being finifh'd, you will act in
the prefent conjuncture for the prefervation of my eftates,
with the fame affection you have always exprefs'd for a
Prince, who is,

Cousin, Your moft humble, and

Stutgard, the 31st
of Octob. 1648.

moft affectionate fervant and coufin,

EBERHARD, Duke of Wirtemberg.

Letters from the Queen Mother to the Viscount.

LETTER I.

Cousin,

THOUGH it be reported at Paris, that your Brother
has taken part with the Parliament, which is now
in open rebellion; yet I cannot believe it, when I confi-
der that he knows what refolutions I have taken with re-
gard to your eftablifhment, and what I was willing to do
for his intereft in particular, and for that of the whole fa-
mily. But be it as it will, I am fo well affured not only of
your not joining with him, but even of your detefting his
conduct, if it has been truly reprefented, that I have no
other end in writing thefe lines, but to testify the entire
confidence I have in you, and to affure you of the conti-
nuance of my favour: for what I have further to fay, I
refer you to my Coufin the Cardinal Mazarin, whom I,
better than any body, know to be your beft friend. In the
mean time, I remain

Your kind Coufin, ANNE.

S. Germain en Laye,
Jan. the 11th, 1649.

R 4

LETTER

LETTER II.

Cousin,

I Send the Sieur Hervart to treat of those affairs which regard the service of the King my Son, and by this desire you would have entire confidence and trust in what he says to you on my part ; if it be necessary for satisfying the Officers of the Army you command, that he oblige himself in my name to pay what you agree upon with them, you need make no difficulty of warranting what he promises, for I assure you, and give you my word, that I will punctually perform it. In the mean time, I remain

S. Germain en Laye,
Jan. the 12th, 1649.

Your kind Cousin,

ANNE.

LETTER III.

Cousin,

THE fault into which your Brother the Duke of Bouillon is again fallen, at a time when he knew I had done or resolved to do every thing that could be for his advantage, and that of his family, affects me chiefly, on account of the uneasiness which I know it will give you ; for as to your part, I am so fully convinced of your affection, and of your attachment to the interests of the King my Son and to mine, that I am persuaded your zeal will rather encrease in this conjuncture, and that no consideration of proximity of blood will occasion the least alteration in it. Assure your self likewise that I will redouble the testimonies of my confidence and good will, and that I shall always have so high a consideration for you, that, for your sake alone, I shall make no difficulty, how great soever your Brother's crime is, to do every thing you can desire for the honours of your House. Referring my self to what I have order'd my Cousin Cardinal Mazarin to write, I remain, with great affection,

S. Germain en Laye,
Jan. the 28th, 1649.

Your kind Cousin,

ANNE.

LETTER

LETTER IV.

Cousin,

THOUGH I have already acquainted you of the good intentions I have towards you, and on your account towards your whole family; yet I was willing to take the opportunity of the Sieur de Ruvigni's journey, to explain them more particularly. I assure you then, with regard to the honours of your House, that the first time I see you, I will, without delay, put you in possession of those privileges which were refer'd to be treated of till after the majority of the King my Son. As to the Sovereignty of Sedan, and what relates to your Brother the Duke of Bouillon, though his fault be as great as can be conceived, especially considering he was not ignorant of the favourable intentions I had towards all his concerns, I will not only, for your sake, forget and forgive it, upon his returning to his duty, but also, for the same reason, put him immediately in possession of the said privileges, the consideration of which was remitted till the King's majority. And touching the exchange of Sedan, he shall be treated as favourably, and have the same conditions as were agreed upon at the last conference about that affair. You ought to look upon all these advances as marks of the sincere affection I have for you; and you may be assured that at all other times when I shall have an opportunity of obliging you, you shall meet with no less substantial proofs of it. In the mean time, I remain

Your kind Cousin,

S. Germain en Laye,
Jan. the 29th, 1649.

ANNE.

*Brevets from the King in favour of the House of
Bouillon.*

B R E V E T I.

THIS day, the twentieth of March, one thousand N. V. six hundred and forty seven, the King being at Paris, B. III. and desiring to testify his good will to the Duke of Bouillon and M. de Turenne his Brother, his Majesty, by the advice of the Queen Regent his Mother, in interpretation
of

of the Declaration address'd to his Parliament of Paris, has declared that his will and intention is, that the said Sieurs de Bouillon and de Turenne and their descendants shall hold the rank and precedence belonging to their family, on account of the Duchy of Bouillon and the Sovereign Principalities of Sedan and Raucourt; and shall be treated in all respects as other Princes descended of Sovereign Houses. In witness whereof, his Majesty has ordered me to expedite this present Brevet, which it is his pleasure to sign with his own hand, and to have counter-sign'd by me his Counsellor-Secretary of State, and of his dispatches and finances.

Signed LOUIS, and underneath DE LOMENIE.

B R E V E T II.

THIS day, the second of April, one thousand six hundred and forty nine, the King being at S. Germain en Laye, and remembring that by his Brevet of the twentieth of March, one thousand six hundred and forty seven, his Majesty had declared that his intention was that the Duke of Bouillon and M. de Turenne his Brother and their descendants should enjoy the rank and precedence belonging to their family on account of the Duchy of Bouillon, and the Sovereign Principalities of Sedan and Raucourt, and be treated as other Princes descended from Sovereign Houses; and being willing, in consequence of his declaration given in the month of March last, in order to put an end to the commotions of the Kingdom, and restore every one to his honours and privileges, to make known his will with regard to the said Sieurs de Bouillon and de Turenne: that none may pretend ignorance, his Majesty, by the advice of the Queen Regent his Mother, has confirm'd, and, in as far as is necessary, does confirm his said Brevet of the twentieth of March, one thousand six hundred and forty seven, and by so doing has declared and does declare that he wills and intends that the said Sieurs de Bouillon and de Turenne and their descendants do hold the rank and precedence which belong to their family on account of the Duchy of Bouillon, and the Sovereign Principalities of Sedan and Raucourt, and be treated in all respects as are the other Princes in
this

this Kingdom descended of Sovereign Houses: In witness whereof, his Majesty has signed this present Brevet with his own hand, and order'd it to be countersigned by us his Counsellors-Secretaries of State, and of his dispatches and finances.

Signed LOUIS.

And underneath PHELIPEAUX, DE GUENEGAUD,
LE TELLIER, and DE LOMENIE.

B R E V E T I I I .

THIS day, the twenty-sixth of October, one thousand six hundred and forty nine, the King being at Paris, and well inform'd that the Dukes of Bouillon and Sovereign Princes of Sedan have been comprehended and named among the Princes and Estates that were friends and allies of, and protected by this Crown, in several treaties of peace, and other publick acts between the Kings, his Majesty's predecessors, and the Emperors, Kings of Spain, and other Princes; that by particular treaties of protection granted by the Kings, predecessors of his Majesty, and even by that of the late King, of glorious memory, whom God absolve, dated the sixth of August, one thousand six hundred and forty one, and especially by the particular treaty made the same day, they are stiled and acknowledged Sovereigns of the Duchy of Bouillon, and the Principalities of Sedan and Raucourt; that by the exchange of the said Principalities with some of the King's demesnes, proposed and resolved upon in the late King's life-time as very advantageous to the State, the conditions of which were agreed upon in the King's name with the Duke of Bouillon, and the articles signed by his Majesty the twentieth of March, one thousand six hundred and forty seven, and confirmed by articles afterwards drawn up at a conference held at S. Germain en Laye, the thirtieth of March, in the present year 1649; and in execution of the said articles, by an express Brevet from his Majesty, dated the second of April in this present year, signed with his own hand, and countersigned by four Secretaries of State, the said Duke and M. de Turenne his Brother are maintained in the rank and preheminance of Princes; and that moreover they are stiled and treated as persons of that quality, and as Princes born, in all Courts,
and

and even by the Pope, the Emperor, his Catholick Majesty, and other Kings and Princes, which they make appear by several authentick records: And His Majesty considering that for the causes abovementioned, the said Sieurs de Bouillon and Turenne could not have been comprehended in the Brevet granted the tenth of this present month, at the instance of several Gentlemen at Paris; and that nothing could have been done to derogate from what has been so solemnly granted and promised by the said treaties, his Majesty, by the advice of the Queen Regent his Mother, in confirmation, in as far as is necessary, of the Brevet granted them the said second of April last, has declared and does declare, that his will and pleasure is, that the said Duke of Bouillon, and the said Sieur de Turenne his Brother, and their descendants, do enjoy the rank, prerogatives, and preheminences belonging to their house on account of the Duchy of Bouillon and the Sovereignities of Sedan and Raucourt, and be treated in all respects as are the Princes descended of Sovereign families settled in this Kingdom, any thing in the said Brevet of the tenth of this present month to the contrary notwithstanding. His Majesty, in testimony of his will, having commanded me to make out for them this present Brevet, which he has signed with his own hand, and caused to be countersigned by me his Counsellor-Secretary of State, and of his dispatches and finances.

Signed LOUIS, and underneath DE LOMENIE.

B R E V E T I V .

L OUIS, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre, to all present and to come, health. Be it known, that though our most dear and well-beloved Cousin Frederic Maurice de la Tour d'Auvergne, Duke of Bouillon, Sovereign Prince of Sedan and Raucourt, has this day, by a contract passed before two notaries at the Chatelet of Paris, given up and transferr'd to us in an exchange the property of the said Sovereignities of Sedan and Raucourt, and others in their neighbourhood belonging to him, on account of his said Duchy of Bouillon: We have not nevertheless intended, nor do intend that this cession and transfer should hereafter hurt, or in any manner whatsoever prejudice him or his as to what regards

regards the rank and precedence which belong to him, not only on account of his said Duchy of Bouillon, but likewise on account of the said Sovereignities of Sedan and Raucourt. On the contrary, we have judged it reasonable that he should be continued and maintained in them in all respects as if he were still in possession of the said Sovereignities which he has given up to us, *as a condition which makes a part of the said contract of exchange, and which we have thereby granted to him.* For these causes and other weighty considerations thereto moving us, by the advice of the Queen Regent, our most honoured Lady and Mother, of our most dear and well-beloved Uncle the Duke of Orleans, of our most dear and well-beloved Cousin the Prince of Condé, and other principal Lords of our Council, and of our own knowledge, full power, and Royal Authority, we have declared, and by these presents signed with our hand, do declare, that our will and intention is, that notwithstanding the cession and transfer made to us of the said Sovereignities, our said Cousin the Duke of Bouillon, and his heirs in a direct line, both male and female, do enjoy the same honours, place, dignities, prerogatives and precedencies belonging to the said Duchy of Bouillon, and the said Sovereignities of Sedan and Raucourt, which he and the Dukes of Bouillon, Lords of the said Sovereignities, have enjoyed, or ought to enjoy, either within or without the Kingdom, in which we will that they be continued and maintained; that none pretend that by this said cession they have lost any thing of the *rank they have always had, or ought to have had*, or make any disputes with them for that reason; and that all the pretensions which our said Cousin may have on that account remain in their full force without being diminished in any thing, as if he was in possession of the said territories and sovereignties by him given up. We declare furthermore, that for the considerations above specified, our intention also is, that our most dear and well beloved Cousin Henry de la Tour, Viscount de Turenne, Marshal of France, Brother to our said Cousin the Duke of Bouillon, and his children male and female, enjoy the same honours, rank, and precedency which he does and ought to enjoy as Son and Brother of a Duke of Bouillon, and Sovereign Prince of Sedan and Raucourt; and in case our said Cousin the Duke of Bouillon shall

happen to die without children, our will and pleasure is, that our said cousin his Brother, his children male and female enjoy the same honours, rank, precedence, dignities and prerogatives within and without the Kingdom, which our said Cousin the Duke of Bouillon now enjoys, and shall hereafter enjoy, either on account of the Duchy of Bouillon, or in consequence of these presents; and (if he or his children shall happen to be declared successor or successors to our said Cousin the Duke of Bouillon his Brother) as if the said Principalities of Sedan and Raucourt were still in their family, and he had succeeded through default of heirs of our said Cousin the Duke of Bouillon. We likewise give in charge to our beloved and trusty Counsellors the Members of our Court the Parliament of Paris, that they cause these presents to be registered and our said Cousins to enjoy the contents thereof fully and peaceably, without giving them or suffering to be given them any trouble or hinderance whatsoever: We also command our Procurator General to do all things necessary for that effect; for such is our pleasure. And that this may be firm and binding for ever, we have caused our seal to be put to these presents. Given at Paris, in the month of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred and fifty one, and of our reign the eighth.

Signed LOUIS, and on the fold BY THE KING, the Queen Regent his Mother being present. DE LOMENIE. Revised SEGUIER. And sealed with the great seal of green wax, fasten'd with green and red silken strings.

B R E V E T V.

THIS day, the twentieth of March, one thousand six hundred and fifty one, the King being at Paris, and desiring to testify his good will to the Duke of Bouillon and M. de Turenne his Brother, his Majesty, by the advice of the Queen Regent his Mother, in conformity to what is stipulated in the contract of the exchange of Sedan passed the said day, and to confirm, in as far as is necessary, the Brevets heretofore expedited, beside what is contained in his declaration addressed to his Court the Parliament of Paris, and in interpretation of it, has declared that his will and intention is, that the said Sieurs de Bouillon

illon and de Turenne and their descendants do enjoy the rank and precedence belonging to their family on account of the Duchy of Bouillon and the Principalities of Sedan and Raucourt, and be treated in all respects as other Princes descended of Sovereign Houses: his said Majesty, in testimony of his will, having commanded me to expedite this present Brevet, which he has signed with his own hand, and caused to be countersigned by me his Counsellor-Secretary of State, and of his dispatches and finances.

Signed LOUIS, and underneath, DE LOMENIE.

B R E V E T VI.

THIS day, the fifteenth of February, one thousand six hundred and fifty two, the King being at Saumur, and desiring to testify his good will to the Duke of Bouillon and M. de Turenne his Brother, and considering that they have been promised by the contract of the exchange of the Principality of Sedan, dated the twentieth of March last past, *that they shall be treated as Princes; and that, without that condition, they would not have consented to the said exchange;* and knowing likewise that *they have been and are treated in all places and on all occasions by the Kings, Princes, and States of Christendom, as Princes born;* his Majesty, in confirmation, as far as is necessary, of the treaties, brevets, and letters heretofore granted them on that head, and for the reasons and causes therein contained, has declared and does declare that his intention and will is, the said Sieurs de Bouillon and de Turenne and their descendants be treated in all respects as are other Princes in this Kingdom descended of Sovereign Houses, and without any distinction or exception with regard to them, in consequence of any regulation made or to be made by his Majesty, or the Kings his successors, or even in consequence of proposals which may be made, or resolutions which may be taken in prejudice thereof by the States General of the Kingdom, or otherwise in any manner whatsoever. In witness whereof, his Majesty has signed this present Brevet with his own hand, and ordered it to be countersigned by me his Counsellor-Secretary of State, and of his dispatches and finances.

Signed LOUIS, and underneath, LE TELLIER.

Extract from the Registers of the Council of State.

N. VI.

THE King having seen the petition presented to his Majesty by Frederic-Maurice de la Tour d'Auvergne, Duke of Bouillon, heretofore Sovereign Prince of Sedan and Raucourt, containing that the exchange of the said Sovereignities having been judged useful for the good of the State, he had consented to it, upon the assurances that his Majesty had given, that notwithstanding the giving up the said Sovereignities of Sedan and Raucourt, he, his Brother the Sieur de Turenne and their children and descendants should retain the rank and dignity of Princes, and all other honours, preheminences and prerogatives, which he, and the deceased Duke of Bouillon their Father and their predecessors Dukes of Bouillon, and Princes of Sedan and Raucourt, have or ought to have enjoyed; and that in the same way and manner as is practised with regard to other Princes in his Kingdom who are descended of Sovereign Houses, *which condition was a part of the said contract of exchange, since without it he would not have divested himself of the said Sovereignities*; and though his Majesty by divers publick and private acts, particularly by his Letters Patent, dated April 1651, has fully performed his promise, and sufficiently explain'd his intentions, and that the said Duke of Bouillon has by the contract of exchange reserved to himself his right to the Duchy of Bouillon; nevertheless the Duchefs of Vantadour in quality of Mother and Tutrix to the children of the late Duke of Vantadour, and the Dukes of Uzés, Sully, Brissac, Halvin, Lesdiguiers, and Saint Simon have the ----- and 26th of March last petitioned his Majesty's Court the Parliament of Paris to have the said Duke of Bouillon forbid to take upon him the said quality of Prince, or under pretence of that to assume to himself any other rights, preheminences and prerogatives than those of Duke and Peer; upon which petition the said Court has ordered that the opponent parties lay their cause before his Majesty. And inasmuch as the said opposition, tho' frivolous and not allowable, may hereafter serve for a pretence to give disturbance to him and his, if the matter remain undecided; the said Duke of Bouillon has petitioned that his Majesty,

Majesty, doing justice therein, would be pleased to declare the opposition of the said Dukes and Duches invalid and groundless, to cause him to be preserved and maintain'd in the said rank and dignity of Prince, and to prohibit his having any trouble upon that account on pain of disobedience: His Majesty having also considered the treaty made by the said Duke of Bouillon with his Majesty the 20th of March 1647, relating to the acquisition of the Sovereignties of Sedan and Raucourt, and that part of the Duchy of Bouillon, which the said Duke of Bouillon was in possession of; the contract of exchange of the 20th of March 1651, made in execution of the said treaty between the Sieurs le Fevre d'Ormesson, de Lomenie, the Count de Brienne, d'Aligre, Barillon, and d'Estampes, his Majesty's Commissioners and special Procurators on the one part, and the said Duke of Bouillon on the other: His Majesty's letters patent dated in April the said year 1651, containing the ratification of the said contract of exchange, and addressed to the Parliament of Paris: The acts of opposition enter'd in the rolls of his said Parliament of Paris the 25th of January 1652, by Lady Mary de la Guiche, relict of Charles de Levy, Duke of Vantadour, in the name of, and as tutrix to the minor children of the said deceased Duke and her, concerning the quality of Prince, assumed according to the said contract by the said Duke of Bouillon: The copy of a petition presented in his said Parliament the ----- by Emanuel de Crussol Duke of Uzès, Maximilian-Francois de Bethune Duke of Sully, Louis de Cossé Duke of Brissac, and Charles de Schomberg Duke of Halvin, Peers of France, desiring to be admitted as opponents to the registration of the said contract and letters, and that order be given that the said Duke of Bouillon have rank and place on account of the Duchies which have been given him in exchange by the said contract, only from the day in which he should take the oath for the said Duchies and Peerdoms, and that he be not allowed to take upon him the quality of Prince, or under pretence thereof to assume any greater rights, preheminences or prerogatives than those belonging to a Duke and Peer of France: An Arret of his said Parliament of Paris, dated the 20th of February 1652, by which it was ordered that the said letters and contract of exchange should be registered in the rolls of the said court,

in order to be executed according to the tenor and conditions of the said Arret; and among others, that the Peerdoms of Albret and Chateau-Thierry should not take effect, or have rank, but from the date of the said Arret, the said Duke of Bouillon obtaining letters from his Majesty for the erection of the same; and upon the protestation of the said Dame de la Guiche in the aforesaid names, and of the Dukes of Uzés, Sully, Brissac, and Halvin, that they should proceed in the same as they thought proper: Another Arret of his Parliament of Paris of the 26th of March in the said year, by which upon a new petition of the said Dame de la Guiche in the names as aforesaid, and of the Dukes of Uzés, Sully, Brissac, and Halvin, and of François de Bonthe Duke of Lefdiguières, and of Claude Duke of Simon, that a prohibition might be issued out to the Duke of Bouillon to assume the said quality of Prince, or under colour thereof to arrogate any rights, prerogatives, or preheminence whatsoever, greater than that of Duke and Peer, a registration was granted to the said petitioners of their protest, and it was ordered that they should apply to his Majesty thereupon. [*Having seen also*] the letters patents of the said month of April at the time of the ratification of the said contract of exchange, by which, according to the said treaty of the 20th of March 1647, his Majesty ordain'd, that notwithstanding the resignation to him made of the said Sovereignities of Sedan and Raucourt, and of a part of the Duchy of Bouillon, the said Sieur Duke of Bouillon and his posterity should retain the rank and dignity of Princes, and the other honours, preheminences, rights, and prerogatives, whereof he and the late Duke of Bouillon his Father, and their Predecessors, Sovereign Princes of the said territories and Sovereignities of Sedan, Raucourt, and Bouillon, did enjoy, or ought to have enjoyed heretofore; and his Majesty being fully inform'd of the said ranks, dignities, and preheminences, which the Princes of the said territories and Sovereignities, and even the said Sieur Duke of Bouillon have had and held in all the Kingdoms and States of Europe: His Majesty being in counsel, notwithstanding the protestation of the said Dame de la Guiche in the names as aforesaid, and of the Dukes of Uzés, Sully, Brissac, Halvin, Lefdiguières, and Saint Simon, has ordain'd and ordains the said letters of the month of April

1651, and all other acts of his Majesty in favour of the said Sieur Duke of Bouillon shall be executed pursuant to their form and tenour; and that in conformity thereto, the said Sieur Duke of Bouillon, and the Sieur de Turenne his Brother, being *Princes born, and recognized as such, their children and descendants shall have and retain the rank and dignity of Princes, with all the honours, prerogatives, rights, and prebeminences thereon depending, and which are enjoyed or may be enjoyed by other Princes settled in this kingdom.* Done in the King's Council of State, his Majesty being present, held at Corbeil the 25th day of May 1652.

Signed LE TELLIER.

Follows the tenour of the Commission annexed to the said Arret.

LOUIS, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre, to our Prime Usher or Serjeant. Willing that the Arret this day given in our Council of State, we being present, an extract whereof is hereto annex'd under the counter-seal of our Chancery, be executed according to its form and tenour, we direct and command you by these presents signed with our hand, that you notify the said Arret to all whom it shall concern, and do every thing requisite and necessary for the execution thereof; for which doing, we give you power, commission, and special charge by these said presents, without asking any permission, *Placet, Visa ni pareatis*; for such is our pleasure. Given at Corbeil, the 25th day of May, the year of the Redemption one thousand six hundred and fifty two, and the tenth of our Reign.

Signed LOUIS, and underneath By the King, LE TELLIER, with cross bars and flourish, and sealed on a single label with the great seal of yellow wax.

Letters from the Prince of Condé to the Viscount de Turenne.

LETTER I.

N. VII. **T**HE obligations I have to you are so great, that I want words to express my sense of them. I shall be mortally impatient till you give me an opportunity to be even with you. I swear to you I have nothing in the world more at heart, and will do every thing to serve you. As to affairs, I refer you to what I write to my sister, and shall add nothing here but that you may dispose absolutely of me, and that you are the man in the world whom I love and honour the most.

LOUIS DE BOURBON.

Pray assure Messieurs de Beauveau, de Duras, and de Grandpré of my services, as also Messieurs de St. Romain, Sarrafin, and all the Officers who are with you.

The 20th of Feb. 1651.

LETTER II.

S I R,

I Received the honour of yours, and have seen that which you wrote to my sister. I doubt not but she sends you a full account of all things. I beg to hear from you as often as possible, that I may know what passes on your side, whether in relation to the truce, or the suspension of arms. Affairs here are not yet in such a situation as could be wish'd, but we are doing our best in order to it: you shall know the particulars by the first opportunity. M. de Bouillon's contract will be sign'd in a few days to his satisfaction. There was one article which I got settled the day before yesterday that had put a stop to that affair, and it was a very important one. It was that the Duke your brother should swear upon the faith of a Prince; so that now all is concluded. As to your particular interests, my sister has spoke to me of them at large. I shall take the care of them that I ought. I swear to you they will ever be dearer to me than my own, and that

that there is nothing I will not do to convince you of this. We send you some money, and desire you will freely tell us what farther sums you shall want, we will supply you immediately. Be assured, I conjure you, of my entire friendship, and grant me the continuance of yours, since I am more than any man in the world

Paris, 18 March
1651.

Your most affectionate servant,

LOUIS DE BOURBON.

LETTER III.

THE perplexed condition of affairs, of which you have already had an account by the Duke your brother, hinders me from being able to answer you positively concerning the peace; and we must wait the return of the person sent to Brussels to know whether the Archduke has power: but methinks you have already sufficient reason to take your measures with the Spaniards in order to your leaving them. The Duke your brother has undertaken to acquaint you with our sentiments on that head. We had a long conference with my sister upon it. In the mean time, I intreat you to let me know pretty near about what time I should have my people ready to enter Stenai, and what will be done with regard to the town, and the things necessary to be put into it, whether provisions or ammunition. I have given the government of it to M. de Marfin, and I believe you will not disapprove my choice. You are sensible that it is necessary I should know these things in good time, that I may not be surpriz'd. I shall give orders as soon as possible for making you satisfaction for your troops, but I have not hitherto been able to do it, because Monsieur and I do not yet see the Queen. Your other concerns are of more account with me, and dearer to me than my own; and I send you no compliment when I assure you that I will make this appear in the manner you shall desire. I am

Paris, 18 April
1651.

Your most affectionate servant,

LOUIS DE BOURBON.

Letters from the Viscount to the Viscountess de Turenne.

LETTER I.

N. VIII. **I** Send the Sieur de Mardaillon to let you know that the
B. IV. city of Ypres has capitulated. It is certain that I discern the singular blessing of God on every thing I undertake, and I am sometimes the better man for it: however I am often very naughty; I tell you sincerely how it is with me.

We had a communion here last Sunday, M. Brevin made an excellent sermon; one ought to grow better for such discourses; that's the great point: but it is very hard to become good; and when I examine my self thoroughly, I find methinks but little amendment. In discoursing on these words, *Go out of Babylon*, he let me understand, that he should not have made such post haste as our Reformers. He has a great deal of knowledge, and no bitterness of spirit: he agreed with me, that the people of the two religions are not on either side fairly and honestly instructed in the tenets of the other, and that each party represents the religion of the other in such a manner only as may beget an aversion to it; just as in a town where there are two cabals, you never meet with sincerity or candour on either side. I know what my sister and you think on this head with regard to me. You imagine that a person who would not come so much into my way of thinking would keep me more steady, but you are mistaken. He preach'd upon the words of our Saviour at the institution of the last supper, and said not one word of controversy; one sees plainly that he has been very conversant with the antients, and follows their stile.

Ypres, 10 December 1658.

LETTER II.

THE Duke of York is here in disguise; there has been a great deal of stir in England; the people in Cheshire took up arms for King Charles, but have been intirely defeated by the troops of the Parliament commanded

manded by Lambert. I should have done the Royal House of Stuart a considerable piece of service, if the affair had not been so soon quash'd; I had even advanc'd some money for that; you'll see an account of the sums. Tho' I should not be reimburs'd by the Court, it must not be spoke of, but that defeat overturns at present all my projects. Call to mind a little my lessons; avoid dejection of mind; it is the most dangerous of all diseases. We must endeavour after a real inward change, and to find disinterested pleasures in the world; otherwise we ought to quit it. I am more hard upon those I love than upon others; but tho' I take upon me to reprimand, I am not the less sensible of my own faults.

Calais; 10 Dec. 1659.

LETTER III.

I Sincerely own to you, with respect to the book published by the Gentlemen of the Port Royal, I can subscribe to the article I wrote to you about. Let us but lay aside prejudice, and we shall often find in those long declamations that are made against the Catholicks, a spirit of strife and wrangling, and that some people are so intent upon reforming, that they quite forget charity. A man must have an extreme good opinion of himself to believe that education, and the conversing continually with persons of one side of the question only, don't byas him that way; and you know how he deserves to be stiled who won't listen to sound reason, compare things impartially, and make his enquiries in a spirit of humility and devotion.

To shew you how well you have been informed: A foreigner of our religion assures me, that in many parts of Greece there are convents of the same orders as in France. He named to me all the towns where they are; reflect a little whether it be reasonable to disbelieve a man of good sense, of our own religion, and who comes from the very country, when without the least prepossession, he simply answers to the questions that are put to him.

I have just received the letter from my Sister, and yours. I see very well that Madam de Elbœuf is much provoked. You two who exclaim so much how hard it is to win upon a young woman, do you take the proper methods?

methods? Let me tell you that roughness and severity beget aversion in young people. The skill is to follow steadily what will bring you to your aim, and the more little things you pass over in the way, the more skillful you are. The judgment may apply this maxim to every thing, and we ought to believe that we don't grow much wiser as we grow older, but much greater reasoners. Before I turn over, I shall own that what I have just said seems expressed with a little too much driness; I ask your pardon.

I had sent a Gentleman, who speaks English very well, to Monck, to learn his intentions upon his arrival at London. He has nothing in view but his own interest, to make himself rich, and to oppose the establishment of any power or authority that can interfere with that design. This Gentleman examined the state of religion in England, and went to several sermons, in one of which the Minister having chosen for his subject the passage of the children of Israel through the desert, said, that as God would have them wander there forty years, though he could have led them through it in a shorter time; just so he was leading the people of England, by a variety of afflictions and round-about ways; and the preacher promised them that General Monck, after all their present divisions, should bring them into a land flowing with milk and honey. One sees by this, and by the multitude of sects in England, that through a too presumptuous spirit of independency, though there may be good sense and perhaps devotion among them, they have so much disfigur'd religion, that each private man is for setting up a new sect of his particular fashion, and that whoever reads the word of God, and will explain it after his own fancy, goes greater lengths in folly than is easily imagined. You know in your own conscience, that those who educate our youth give their minds a turn to dispute somewhat more than to true devotion. Of this latter I confess I acquit my self but indifferently; however I can see well enough the motives upon which others act.

Amiens, 12 Feb. 1660.

LETTER IV.

I Have had a book here put into my hands written by one Martin, a Minister who has changed his religion; I have read a little of it, and it seems to contain good sense. I frankly own to you that many of the Ministers with whom I have convers'd, seem full of prejudices; and they have nothing of that candour, that honest plainness which persuades; the reason is, they are us'd to have to do with persons who content themselves with words, and they don't know, that to satisfy the mind of another, it is much better to own themselves in the wrong, when they are so, than to evade the force of an argument.

We have here the sweetest harmony that is possible between a new-married pair. The King is all day long employed in telling the numberless instances of his Wife's complaisance, and she has not the least thought, not even relating to the King her Father, which she does not instantly come and impart to the King her Husband. I am persuaded the Husband and Wife love one another extremely.

I was some time before I could understand what you meant by a stroke you aim at me; I don't deserve it, and in such a friendship as ours, little twittings are always out of season. In the eyes of God every thing is criminal; but with regard to men, I have nothing to reproach myself. I know very well, that loving me as you do, you will be extremely concern'd to find me have so quick a feeling of your reproaches. But as, thank God, I have no need of remonstrances, I had rather disburthen a little my mind with you, than have too much reserve, especially on a subject that touches you so nearly as religion. I impart my thoughts to you ingenuously, and they displease you; to confess the truth, I don't look upon the trouble you are in with the same eye as if I had found you candid enough to acknowledge certain truths, which seem to me clear as the day. Let every one act according to his conscience, and then my sister and you and I shall be as good friends as ever.

I read this morning a book, which I found yesterday at M. Duplessis, Secretary of State: 'tis a collection in French, made at the Port Royal, of what the Fathers of the

the

the first centuries have said concerning the Eucharist*. The passages are there entire, with the context before and after them, and nothing of the author's own. If the quotations are not fairly made, 'tis easy to shew it; but I assure you, that these passages do not square with what we say. I believe it is what I write to you from time to time on this head, which draws upon me those reproaches you make me; but nothing can lessen my affection for you. Notwithstanding any thing I have said, I shall not slight your remonstrances; and I beg you to believe that I am not insensible how much you love me; it affects me very much. Believe likewise, that what is meer nature, and regards the common springs of action, I understand it well enough. As for what is above us, I submit, as it is fit I should, though not yet to the degree I ought. I was going once to tear this letter, but the conclusion will assure you anew of my entire affection.

St. Jean de Luz,
11 June 1660.

* La perpetuite de lay foy.

TURENNE.

*Letter from the Landgrave of Hesse to the Viscount
de Turenne.*

S I R,

N. IX.
An. 1654.

THE only design of this is to testify to your Highness that I no sooner heard the news of the famous raising of the siege of Arras, the happy success of which was chiefly owing to your courage and conduct, but I felt a sincere joy, which was so much the more compleat, as, you have long known it, I take an interest in whatever concerns you, and particularly in the glory which you acquire by your great actions. I pray God that their consequences may be equally happy, and that they may continue to be as advantageous to the interests of your King, as glorious for your self, and all those who have the honour to belong to you. Among which number, I reckon my self in quality of,

Sir,

Your Highness's most humble, and

most affectionate Cousin and servant,

Cassell, Sept. 24.
1654.

THE LANDGRAVE OF HESSE.

Letter

Letter from Duke Francis of Lorraine to the Viscount de Turenne.

S I R,

I Believe that after the promise I have made your High- N. X.
 ness to take part in all your interests, it is superfluous An. 1659.
 to assure you of my joy for the good success of your glo-
 rious enterprizes, seeing without that assurance you ought
 to be persuaded of it, and that unless I renounce my self,
 I cannot help being as sensible of your good fortune, as I
 should of my own. I know with what advantage you
 would have made my son partaker with you, and with
 what generosity you have treated him: but I beg you
 would believe that I have all the sentiments of gratitude
 I ought to have, and that your Highness cannot oblige
 any person who will be more devoted to you than we;
 for my part, I shall reckon it an honour to shew my self
 always to be,

S I R, *Your most humble servant,*
 DUKE FRANCIS OF LORRAIN.

Letter from the Duke of Wirtemberg to the Viscount de Turenne.

S I R,

SEEING your Highness expresses a satisfaction in the An. 1659.
 honour you do me to continue me the testimonies of
 your friendship, I have great reason to be highly pleased
 with my good fortune, and to acknowledge the favour on
 all occasions; nor shall I fail, wherever I have an oppor-
 tunity, to give your Highness proofs of my real sense of it.
 Reports both of peace, and of the continuance of the war,
 have, I believe, spread every where, and the issue is with
 impatience expected, which I wish may be for the good of
 Christendom. Whatever the event be, I pray your High-
 ness would always remember what I value above all things,
 the promise you made to continue to love me; and be
 fully assured that I am as much, or rather more with the
 heart than the mouth,

S I R, *Your Highness's most humble, and*
most affectionate Cousin and servant,
 Studgart, April 22. 1659. THE DUKE OF WIRTEMBERG.
Letter

Letter from the Elector of Mentz to the Viscount de Turenne.

S I R,

I Was exceedingly pleased to see by your Highness's letter the marks of your remembrance, and of the affection you have favour'd me with in imparting to me the happy accomplishment of what was concerted last year. The peace which his Majesty has given to his Kingdom has not only rejoiced the people of France, but also occasion'd our peace in Germany, which was lately concluded at Oliva near Dantzick; so that we are all indebted to the care of his most Christian Majesty and the Cardinal, and to your Highness's wise conduct of your victorious Army, which has procured us so great a good: his Majesty has publicly declared this by honouring your merit with the office of Marshal General, which I exceedingly rejoice at, wishing your Highness may long enjoy it, with the same glory which you have hitherto acquir'd by your generous actions. If the war breaks out again in Germany, I know that your Highness will command the King's Army, nor can he make a more worthy choice: but as at present we hope for a general peace soon, some other opportunity will offer of seeing your Highness in your journey to the frontiers, which you mention in your letter. I long extremely for that honour, and am, and always will be,

S I R,

Your Highness's most humble and

most affectionate servant,

Mentz, May 15. 1660.

JEAN PHILIPPUS, Archiepiscopus, &c.

Patent, by which the King constitutes M. de Turenne Marshal General of his Majesty's camps and armies.

An. 1660. **L**OUIS, by the grace of God, King of France and
N. XI. Navarre, to all who shall see these present letters, health. We finding our selves obliged for the preservation of our State, as also for its glory and our reputation, to keep on foot, as well in time of peace as of war, a great
number

number of troops, both infantry and cavalry, to be always in readiness and in a condition to act for retaining our people in the obedience and respect they owe to us, for preserving to them the repose and tranquillity we have procur'd them by a general peace, and for assisting our allies as occasion requires. And as in order to make these troops as useful, and to employ them to as great advantage as can be done in all occasions which may offer within or without our Kingdom, it is necessary and convenient to fill up the office of Marshal General of our camps and armies, as one of the most important in war, altho' it has been vacant several years, we have resolv'd to supply it with a person capable to discharge it with courage and resolution, and maintain the same with all the lustre and dignity becoming it. And after having maturely deliberated upon the choice, we have judg'd that we could not make a better, nor one that will be more generally approved and applauded, than of our most dear and well beloved Cousin the Viscount de Turenne, Marshal of France, Governor, and our Lieutenant-General in our Province of Limosin, because of the esteem and universal reputation which his commendable personal qualities, and the great and signal services he has done to us and the State, have acquir'd him, he having given publick testimonies of his great capacity, extraordinary vigilance, courage, valour and prudence, also of his consummate experience in war by his great exploits, his memorable conquests, and the famous victories he has gain'd over our enemies wherever he has commanded our armies, whether in Germany or in Flanders, in which Countries he has of a long time exercis'd the office of our Lieutenant General, commanding in chief our armies which have acted there; having likewise entire confidence in his fidelity and singular affection to our service, we declare, that for these causes, and others thereto moving us, we have made, created, ordain'd and appointed, as by these presents sign'd with our own hand, we make, create, ordain, and appoint our said Cousin the Viscount de Turenne, Marshal General of our said camps and armies, with power to assign quarters, posts, and lodgements to our troops, both of horse and foot, and to dispose our artillery, provisions, and ammunition, in places which he shall see most proper and commodious for the situation of our camps and armies, and according as

he shall judge most convenient for our service ; and the said rank and office we have given and granted, and by these presents give and grant to him to have, hold, and hereafter to exercise; to enjoy and possess the honours, authorities, prerogatives, preheminences, powers, functions, and rights thereto belonging, altogether and in the same form and manner as those who have been provided with the same, have in time past enjoy'd them; and also the salaries, estates, and appointments which shall be order'd by us, and that as long as we please. Likewise we by these presents give in charge to all our Chiefs, Captains, and Leaders of our people of war, both foot and horse, and to our Justiciaries, Officers and subjects to whom it shall appertain, that they acknowledge, obey, and hearken to our said Cousin the Viscount de Turenne, of whom we have taken and received the oath in such cases used and required, and whom we have instated and put in possession of the said office, as they would to our proper person in all things touching and concerning the said office, and suffer him to execute, enjoy, and exercise it fully and peaceably, without trouble or hindrance. Moreover we charge our beloved and trusty Counsellors, and Treasurers of our Exchequer, and all other our Treasurers, Receivers and Officers accomptable, to whom it shall pertain, to pay, give and hereafter deliver to our said Cousin the Viscount de Turenne, each in his year the salary, estates, and appointments which shall be order'd him by us; they bringing with them these presents, or a copy of them duly collated for once only, with sufficient acquittances of our said Cousin's; we will that whatever shall be paid or deliver'd to him on the above account, be passed and allowed in making up their accounts, and deduced and abated from their receipts by our beloved and trusty Officers belonging to our accounts, to whom we give in charge so to do without delay: for such is our pleasure. In testimony whereof we have caused our seal to be affix'd to these presents. Given at Montpelier, the 5th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1660, and of our Reign the 17th.

Signed LOUIS, and on the fold, By the King,
LE TELLIER, and sealed upon a double label with
the great seal of yellow wax.

Letter

Letter from the Viscount de Turenne to the Count d'Estrades, Ambassador in England.

THE King has seen the letter which the Chancellor of England wrote to you, and has commanded me to let you know that he receives with great satisfaction the assurances the Chancellor therein gives you of the intentions the King his Master has always had to continue in close union with his Majesty, you may assure the Chancellor that the King has the same sentiments, and that his Britannick Majesty may be persuaded that the treaty which is made with the Dutch, is a proof of the King's friendship, far from being an evidence of the contrary.

To go back a little with respect to this affair : So soon as the Ambassadors of the United Provinces were arrived here, and had shewn that they had full power to make an alliance for the general guaranty of all that the King and their Masters possessed, his Majesty thought it for the good of his State to assist his allies to recover their antient privileges by which they had supported themselves, and were put in the condition they are now in, and made no difficulty to let them know that he would protect them in general in all the rights, both by sea and land, of which they are at present possess'd. The Ambassadors from the United Provinces holding themselves assured of this article, began to demand the taking off of certain imposts upon freight, and several other things in dispute; which occasion'd many conferences with the King's Ministers, and drew out the affair to a great length. In the mean while, the King knowing that his Britannick Majesty would be better satisfied if the word *fishery* were not put in the treaty of guaranty, us'd all his endeavours to have that word left out, giving up several things in the articles relating to freight, and not insisting upon many demands he had made with regard to the trade of the Indies, nor upon several other things which he might have required to have included in the treaty: but having it from very good hands that the Dutch Ambassador, would not proceed till that word was inserted, his Majesty thought it not only for his interest, but also for that of the King of England, not to let the Ambassadors return without finishing the treaty, being well assured that if they lost hopes of entering

N. XII.

B. V.

An. 1662.

tering into a strict union with France, they would seek any other alliance rather than that of England; and I doubt not but where you are, they are sufficiently informed of the strong remonstrances the Ambassador of Spain and the Emperor's Deputy are to make in Holland.

You may lay before the Chancellor that it cannot be thought strange that the King, making a treaty with a State, should be guarantee for all the rights which that State has peaceably possessed, and that there is nothing in all this that can give umbrage to the King of England, who will know by the consequences, and the manner in which the King will act with the States, that he does not pretend to support them in any thing that may be prejudicial to his Britannick Majesty, but only to oblige them to concur in what is for the common interest of the Kings of England and France, which the breaking off of the treaty would have been hurtful to. And certainly the recalling their Ambassadors evidently shews that the Dutch would have come into the measures of Spain, and an alliance with her, which they have hitherto been so averse from. Besides, as the King of England had assured the States by Mr. Downing, that he would give them no disturbance with regard to any of the rights they were in possession of, and gave them to understand that those included the right of fishing; the King by his treaty might be guarantee for it. The two Kings continuing in union as they are at present, may take counsel together to direct, as much as they can, the resolutions of the States to the good of the two Kingdoms. This is what you may positively assure the Chancellor of on his Majesty's part.

Instructions from the Viscount de Turenne to Hassfet his Secretary when he sent him into Portugal.

N. XIII. **W**HEN Hassfet arrives in Portugal, he shall tell M. de Schömberg, that I have sent him expressly to see him, and learn of him the true state of affairs in that Country; in what manner Portugal will maintain the war for the ensuing years; what succour she expects from England, what strength the Country has to continue the war, and what are the views of the Ministers in being willing to enter into an accommodation with Spain, which must

must in the end, whatever fair appearance it may have in the beginning, tend to reunite Portugal to Spain, and so put her again in the situation from whence she has withdrawn herself.

I shall not here express my thoughts at length on the subject of a marriage which is the principal reason of Hassët's journey; but M. de Schomberg may give credit to what he says to him. I shall name no body in this writing; he knows the person, and that her fortune is more than fifteen millions, and he can lay open all the consequences of the alliance. If they have this view in Portugal, the affair must be kept very secret; no body must know of it but the Lady concerned, M. Schomberg, and I. The thing must be concluded upon very soon, because it is a great chance if matters which ought to be kept secret, succeed if they be protracted. It is easy to see the advantage it will be to the King of Portugal to match himself in France, which cannot be easily done but by marrying one who is mistress of her self and her fortune as this Lady is, because they will not here openly infringe the articles of the peace.

No body, no not the Lady herself*, knows any thing of the marriage I propose. I shall not spend time in making a long discourse to persuade to it, I assure my self the Count de Leuve, who is a very able man, and the Count de Sande will much approve of the proposal, and will not lose time to acquaint me by Hassët what they think of it in Portugal; for I shall not bring the person of King Alphonso in question impertinently.

* Meaning Mademoiselle Princess of Montpensier, Daughter to Gaston.

Instructions by the Viscount de Turenne to the Marquis de Ruvigni.

M. de Ruvigni being to go into England in order to N. XIV. know the state of the Court at London, and the B. V. dispositions of those that compose it, it is necessary for him to be inform'd of what has pass'd till this time. When M. d'Estrades was in England, he had no correspondence in that country, nor any affair to treat of, but with Chancellor Hyde†, who then managed every thing under the

† The Earl of Clarendon,

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A

King,

King, and who began and finish'd the affair of the sale of Dunkirk, and the marriage with the Infanta of Portugal. Since that time every thing is changed: Mr. Bennet and my Lord Bristol have form'd a cabal against the Earl of Clarendon and all his measures. It is certain there has been several advices from Flanders that for some time past the King of England has seem'd not to be very averse from entering into some treaty with the King of Spain, and especially since Mr. Bennet's credit has increased with the King, and that the Chancellor is not the only one hearkened to, as formerly. The Queen of England, whose marriage was made by the Chancellor, seems not to be very agreeable to the King; perhaps it is that which makes the King so averse from assisting the Portuguese, and inclined to the Spaniards. But as reasonings at a distance are not sure, as it is very possible that the different parties may oppose each other's sentiments, without any view but to destroy one another, and without having a form'd design to break with France, or join Spain, and as negligence and little application to affairs abroad often occasions inaction, the King desires M. de Ruvigni would endeavour to penetrate into the sentiments of the King of England, in order to know whether it be through want of means that he no longer assists Portugal; whether he fears the aggrandizing of France by the humbling of Spain; or lastly, whether he thinks Portugal in so bad a condition, that it would be to no purpose to succour it. As to the first, which is the want of means, it must be made appear to the King of England that if he continues his alliance with Portugal, the Spaniards dare never send a fleet before Lisbon, and that means will be found to send land-forces to defend the towns. As to the second, I cannot conceive how it happens that the King of England, having a Portuguese Wife, does not see that the alliance with Portugal will be of great use to him for making himself powerful in the Indies; and that on the contrary the greatness of Spain may be very prejudicial to him. As to the bad condition of Portugal, it is easy to see that her union with France will soon re-establish her affairs, and immediately change the face of things. M. de Ruvigni's chief care ought to be to search into the King of Great Britain's secret inclinations, in order to discover whether he has not changed his maxims, whether he is not jealous of the

the King of France's greatness, and whether in that view he will not abandon Portugal, to which the dislike he has to his Wife may contribute.

Memorial by the Viscount de Turenne, presented to the King, on the subject of the alliance to be made with the English or the Dutch.

THE King desires to have laid before him the reasons ^{N. XV.} on both sides, for declaring in favour of the Dutch ^{B. V.} or against them.

I am of opinion, that tho' the King had no treaty with the two parties, he ought for his own interest to use his endeavours to have the peace concluded; to express himself willing to be for those who will consent to it upon the most reasonable terms; to carry on his negotiations with vigour at the Court of England, as he does by his Ambassadors; to solicit the King of Sweden to join with his Majesty in a mediation for the peace, and to side with the Dutch, if the English should make an ill use of their victory, or persist in refusing to put an end to the war. But there are many reasons why the King should act only as mediator, and not declare for either side. The principal are these:

The King, by breaking with the King of England, would make him his enemy, even after the peace with the Dutch, who desiring nothing but the encrease of their trade, would never continue firm to any but those who would most assist them in it. On the other hand, an open rupture with the Dutch would raise powerful enemies against the King, who would oppose all his pretensions upon Flanders, and never give him any assistance. The English might join the Spaniards, and by some secret accommodation draw over to them the Portuguese, who hate the Dutch, because they have, not long ago, taken all the places on the coast near Goa, which town they frequently block up. The Dutch by being so earnest to have the King declare in their favour, evidently shew their desire to have France and England at war, speedily by that means to obtain a peace for themselves, and afterwards make their advantage of the rupture between the two Crowns. If the King should declare war, he would be obliged to

equip a fleet; then the Dutch, not liking that there should arise a third power at sea to be a rival in commerce, might combine with the English in order to crush it, so that the King would have an assured enemy in the King of England, and jealous friends in the Dutch, both with regard to Flanders and the distant trade.

Some may think that the King ought to be apprehensive lest the English and Dutch unite, when, the latter see that his Majesty does not declare himself; but it is my opinion that while M. de Witt has the management of affairs, the union between England and Holland will not be so close as to give the King any ground of suspicion. They may perhaps come to a good understanding with regard to commerce; but that they will do whether the King declare for them, or they obtain a peace by his mediation.

I think it becoming the King's dignity and grandeur to make known the method he intends to take, tho' against his interest; and that should be, to propose to the King of England such conditions of peace as he thinks just, and to declare to the States, that if his Britannick Majesty agrees to them, it is his opinion they should accept of them, at the same time putting them in mind that it was they who began the war by their hostilities in the Indies and Africa, and assuring them that if the King of England does not accept of the terms, he will then declare for them. The conditions the King shall think fit to propose, ought not however to be at first imparted to the States, lest they protest against them, and look upon his mediation as a feint to draw them in to consent to terms too advantageous for the English.

It is proper it should be seen that the King is determin'd to make peace among his allies, or cause the treaties to be executed when there is occasion to support them by vigorous declarations.

Memorial by the Viscount de Turenne, presented to the King, with regard to the resolutions his Majesty ought to take in case of the King of Spain's demise.

THE King of Spain being very ill, and the Infant in N. XVI. no good state of health, the King desires my thoughts B. V. in these three cases, the demise of the King of Spain alone, An. 1665. his Son alone, or of both.

As to the first, of which there is the most likelihood at present, we must consider what affairs are to be transacted with the neighbouring Princes, and afterwards what disposition the King ought to make with regard to arms or negotiations, in order to get possession of the Provinces of the Low Countries, to which he has pretensions. The war between England and Holland, and the treaty which the King has made with the latter, seem not to have left him at liberty to make a plan according to his own choice, and have laid him under a kind of necessity to pursue the interests to which the treaty obliges him. We must not then reason upon what is to be done in case the war continues, since the King is resolved to assist the Dutch; but we must speak of the other Princes, who may interest themselves in the war of Flanders, or in the negotiation by which the King pretends to obtain what falls to him upon the King of Spain's death. His Majesty is well persuaded that to procure the continuance of the war in Portugal, or the conclusion of a peace, for which he shall be guarantee, is the best means, after the demise of the Catholick King, to make the affairs of Flanders be neglected. The King therefore must send a fleet to the coast of Portugal, which shall cast anchor at Lisbon, or in some other port of that Kingdom, on pretence of avoiding the going near the channel because of the English; but the King's fleet must be stronger than that of Spain before Lisbon; he will by this means oblige the Spaniards to retire into their harbours, and may then take such measures as are proper to hinder Portugal from entering into too close an union with England, and coming to an accommodation with Spain. It will be necessary then that the King, by his fleet, or by sending some person of credit,

credit, keep the Portuguese from giving ear to any thing the English may insinuate in favour of Spain. Nothing can be of greater service or prejudice to the King's pretensions upon Flanders, than thus to influence the counsels of Portugal or neglect them.

The affairs of Germany seem to be so much embroiled by the levies made by the Bishop of Munster, by the Swedes entering Germany, and the war between the Elector of Mentz and Elector Palatine, that it is hard to say whom the King can have for a friend. M. de Furstemberg spoke to me on this head, but it was in the belief that the ecclesiastical Electors and the Princes near the Rhine would not be engaged in a war; but if it once begins among them, no measures can be taken but according to the state affairs shall be in at the King of Spain's death. It is therefore too early to say any thing in relation to Germany, Sweden and Denmark, or even Lorrain, where there are some measures to be taken. I return to the disposition the King ought to make with regard to his troops and to ammunition.

I do not know what infantry the King can bring together, without reckoning his guards, and leave a reasonable number of troops in the garrisons, which will not require a great many men. It will be necessary to make an exact calculation of this; to provide powder and ball; to acquaint the Merchants that there will be soon use for them; to give orders speedily to the founders to make canon, if there be not enough; and to erect two magazines for ammunition, the one at Amiens and the other at Rheims. It is easier to provide ammunition as occasion requires, than to transport it from one place to another, especially in the Country between the Sambre and the Meuse, which is very inconvenient for carriage, and where the convoys would be in great danger in time of war.

As to the cavalry, the King knows what number he has: he has always used, in the beginning of a war, to make levies in Germany, and perhaps his Majesty's allies may furnish him with some: but it is certain that though the King has kept up a much greater number of horse since the peace of the Pyrenees than in former times of peace, yet it will be necessary to have more than the King has at present in order to enter Flanders.

If Germany were in tranquillity, I am persuaded that the Ecclesiastical Electors and the neighbouring Princes might, for fear of drawing the war upon themselves, bring the House of Austria to give up some towns in Flanders; but the war being in Germany, there is nothing to be depended upon relating to that matter. It is thought Don Juan would have a strong party against the Infant of Spain; it would be possible perhaps to keep one near him who might influence him.

If the King of Spain and his Son should die, this would occasion so great a change in the Monarchy, that the subject would be too vast to be discussed here: but I think that to have more troops than the King has at present, and to make a magazine in Picardy, and another in Champagne, of provisions, arms, and ammunition, is more necessary in this case than in the former; the opportunity being much fairer for his Majesty to do something great for himself in several places, as on the side of Franche-Comté and Burgundy. I believe likewise that the Kingdom of Naples would be very much shaken; and his Majesty knows that I have always thought that Cardinal de Retz could act there with great address for many reasons. As to Milan, I conceive it would be more difficult to succeed there, because it might be easily succour'd by the Emperor: but perhaps the Duke of Savoy and the other Princes of Italy might hope with the King's assistance to find something to their liking there; and thus the King might make a diversion without employing many troops.

In case of the death of the Infant alone, the King of Spain surviving, there would be such a near prospect of his death, that none of those preparations or negotiations could be useless.

In all these cases, the encreasing the number of the King's galleys and ships of war, is as necessary as augmenting the land forces, not only in regard to what the King of Spain possesses in the Indies, in Italy, and in Sicily, but with regard to Spain itself, which might easily be enter'd by the way of Portugal.

*Instructions drawn up by the Viscount de Turenne
for M. de S. Romain.*

N. XVII. **T**HE King, notwithstanding the inclination he had to
B. V. send an envoy into Portugal, thought it more pro-
An. 1665. per to wait for M. de Sande, whose return has been a long
time expected: but having had notice of the King of
Spain's death, he has judg'd it necessary to make choice
of a person pitch'd upon is M. de S. Romain, and as he is not
instructed in what has pass'd in Portugal with regard to
France, he ought to be inform'd of it, that knowing the
secret of affairs, he may be the better able to manage
them, so as to answer what the King expects from his ne-
gotiations.

The King, immediately after Cardinal Mazarin's death,
gave to the King of England for the assistance of the Por-
tuguese 200,000 crowns, towards the expence of sending
3000 foot and 2000 horse, who were commanded by Mor-
gan under my Lord Inchiquin; and though they were pro-
mised on the marriage of the King of England with the
Princess of Portugal, yet they would not have been sent
without that sum. Since that time, the King has given
divers sums for fitting out ships of war and levying French
regiments of foot and horse: he likewise gave 50,000
livres last year for 1000 English recruits, who were raised
at London, and the vessels that transported them were
hired at the King's expence. His Majesty also furnish'd
money for maintaining the French corps, and a German
regiment; which money, amounting to 200,000 crowns
yearly, was charged by M. de Sande to the article of ex-
traordinaries, and is not enter'd in the account of the
payment of the troops. There was no treaty for this,
because of the obligations of the peace; nor did the King's
name appear in it.

After the peace of the Pyrenees, M. de Schomberg
went into Portugal, with two or three hundred men,
with which he began to form the French corps. The
King afterwards thought it proper that M. de Turenne
should send to Lisbon his Secretary Haffet, to propose the
marriage of Mademoiselle with the King of Portugal; and
though

though his Majesty had not got Mademoiselle's consent to the match, yet he imagined that either she would agree to it, or that at least the proposal of it would break off the other marriages that might be offered to the King of Portugal, and make him turn his thoughts to a match on the side of France. The marriage with Mademoiselle having been a long time negotiated without success, the Marquis de Sande afterwards treated for one with Mademoiselle de Nemours; and as it was thought in a fair way of succeeding, the King was pleased to have him come into France incognito, where he staid seven or eight months with the Viscount de Turenne, or at a house in the country: but difficulties having arisen in that affair on account of the engagements between that Princess and Prince Charles of Lorraine; and a Council of Ecclesiasticks not having been able to give a clear decision as to the nullity of that marriage, M. de Turenne, by order, proposed Mademoiselle d'Elbeuf. After Portugal had refused this last Princess, the match with Mademoiselle de Nemours was again treated of; but when all the difficulties were removed, the Duke of Savoy married her. Then her sister Mademoiselle d'Aumale was proposed to the Portuguese with 400,000 crowns in portion, and they accepted of her. M. de Sande was to have return'd to finish the marriage, and conduct the Princess into Portugal this summer; but it was retarded by the King of Spain's death, which happened at that time. This is what has pass'd between France and Portugal till now.

As to the Court of Lisbon, the state of it is not known; there happens so many little changes in it, that a man is deceived who thinks he can make a fixed judgment of it.

It is certain that the King is very much govern'd by the Count de Castel-Melhor, who is a young man, but seemingly of a very worthy conduct, and who manages the Grandees of the Kingdom well enough: he is thought to be upon very good terms with the Marquis de Marialve, and the Marquis de Sande, who has been here, is likewise upon a good footing with him. The Marquis de Sande is more known than the others, he is a very able man, patient when it is necessary, though naturally passionate enough, loves his Country exceedingly, knows foreign affairs the best of any body, shows a great inclination for

for France, and hates the Dutch extremely: if he be still at Lisbon, when M. de S. Romain arrives, I believe he will have great part in the negotiation.

I think when M. de S. Romain comes to Lisbon, he should alight at M. Gravier's, who will introduce him to M. de Castel-Melhor, to whom he shall say, that the King having heard of the King of Spain's death, and not doubting but there have been several proposals made to the Court of Portugal on the part of the young King of Spain, has sent him to assure the King his Master of his Most Christian Majesty's affection, that he will continue to assist and succour him on all occasions, and will always take part in whatever can contribute to the establishment and security of Portugal. After the first compliment, M. de S. Romain must acquaint M. de Castel-Melhor with what the King desires with regard to the measures he would have the Portuguese follow, and what he has to ask of them.

I think that if M. de S. Romain does not learn that the Spaniards have made any proposal for a negotiation with Portugal, and if the Count de Castel-Melhor says nothing to him of it, he ought to speak of the continuation of the war, assure the Portuguese that the King will give them the same sum he used to do, and mention as something considerable the 400,000 crowns they are to have by the marriage. He will be able to see if they answer like people that are willing to draw more money from the King in order to continue the war, or as weary of it, and thinking of peace, and so not pressing the King too much to advance the money for fear of engaging themselves. It is very probable that the eagerness they will shew to have their King's marriage concluded, or the delays they will make with regard to it, will discover whether they are entering into a negotiation with the Spaniards, who will begin by endeavouring to break off the match with France.

If they act as making no difficulty about the marriage, and as having a mind to continue the war with Spain, M. de S. Romain must press them to send for their Queen, stay to watch all their motions, acquaint the King with their projects with regard to the campaign, and look narrowly into things, that they may not enter into any negotiation, and be not apprised of it. He must on all occasions lay before them that it is only the weakness of the
Spaniards

Spaniards that will oblige them to enter into terms with Portugal, and that the greatest security of the Kingdom is to continue inseparably united to France whether in peace or war.

If the Portuguese have some inclination towards peace, it is fit that the King should signify to them that he then hopes to be of great service to them, that they may not conceal their negotiations from his Majesty. As it is not known in what manner Spain will make her overtures to them, M. de S. Romain must endeavour to have those communicated to him, by letting them know that the King will enter into all their interests, and consult their advantage: and, as probably, if the Spaniards offer them peace, they will be willing to break off all correspondence with France, and put a stop to the marriage, M. de S. Romain must shew them that they have great reason to suspect the fidelity of the Spaniards when they attempt to divide them from the King, and that if the Court of Spain intends to deal candidly, and leave the Portuguese in peaceable possession of their Kingdom, it ought to allow them to perfect the alliances they are projecting with France, and even make the King the guarantee of the peace. If the Spaniards are for entering into negotiations on other terms, they must be opposed as much as possible with all the reasons which are easy to be found in so clear a case.

As to England, there is great reason to believe that the Ambassador from thence who is now at Madrid, and has been a long time at Lisbon with great reputation, maintains his credit, and keeps up a correspondence there. And if the Spaniards enter into a negotiation with Portugal, it will be by his means. M. de S. Romain must then let them know that the English act not at present in favour of Portugal, but out of opposition to France, who is upon the point of declaring for the Dutch against them; but as soon as that war shall be ended, the King will return to his ancient alliance with the English, and thus Portugal will remain without any assurances on the side of France and England, and will have no friends but the Spaniards, in whom they well know they can never confide. He must likewise shew them clearly that they can have no security either in peace or war, but in never separating from France, which will always have a great interest in their preservation, and can never change its
maxims

maxims upon that head: that by the treaty of the Pyrennees, the King was not to have assisted them; that they have nevertheless seen how he has acted; that there never will be a time when they can so little expect assistance as at present, and that they may be assured notwithstanding, that it shall be continued, and also encreased for the future either by the succours the King will send them, or the diversions his interests may perhaps oblige him to make. M. de S. Romain has here a fine subject to enlarge upon, in shewing them that the King must of necessity wish for and contribute to their aggrandizing themselves, seeing he must always desire to see the power of Spain diminish'd, which is suspected by France, and the fatal effects of which are seen upon the least disorder in our Kingdom.

Memorial by the Viscount de Turenne concerning the passage of the Rhine.

N.XVIII. **T**HE Emperor not being able to send an Army into
 B. V. Alsace, Lorraine, Luxembourg, and the Low Countries
 An. 1666 without it pass the Rhine, it is necessary to know the
 course of that river from its source till it loses itself in the
 Sea of Holland; and also what are the Princes and States
 bordering upon it, in order to judge of the necessity of
 their alliance, according to their situation and strength.

The Rhine, taking its source in the mountains of Switzerland, enters a plain at the Forest Towns, three of which, Seckingen, Waldhust, and Rhinfeld are in the King's possession, having been given up to him by the peace. The Emperor's Army, in order to come there, must cross the Circle of Suabia and the mountains of the Black Forest, which is a very difficult march. The King's greatest security would be to propose to all the Princes of that Circle and the Duke of Bavaria to unite to hinder the Emperor's passage through the Circle, while the King's Army should cross the Rhine in order to attack the territories of the House of Inspruch: not but that the Emperor would find the access to the Forest Towns very difficult, tho' the Princes of the Circle of Suabia should not unite, because he must go over almost impassible mountains before he can get into the Country of Montebeliard, and the County of Burgundy; and if the Emperor after passing

passing the Rhine at the Forest Towns, should have a mind to enter Alsace, tho' the Country be fine there, yet there is no great town for him. Nevertheless, if the Princes of the Circle of Suabia do not unite, the King must keep a small body of troops in Alsace, (besides the garrisons in the Country) in case his Majesty has a war with the Emperor.

The Rhine runs along from Bâle by Rhinfeld, Brisac, and Strasbourg to Philipsbourg. The mountains of the Black Forest stretch themselves through this space, that is, thirty leagues along the banks of the Rhine, from which they are in some places about four or five leagues distant. The House of Austria has some places between the mountains and the Rhine, as Fribourg and Lauffembourg; the rest belong to several Princes and private men: the Princes of Baden and Dourlach have many lands and small towns there. Beyond those mountains is the Country of Wirtemberg, which, with a few towns of the Imperialists, and some Estates belonging to the *Noblesse*, takes up all the space between Bale and Philipsbourg, there being about ten or twelve leagues from the Rhine to the territories of the Duke of Wirtemberg, who, if in union with the Circle of Suabia, might cover the approach to the Rhine. Moreover the Rhine makes so many Isles, and the coming to it is so difficult, that it is not probable the Emperor's Army should think of passing it between Bâle and Philipsbourg. The Country about three or four leagues below Philipsbourg begins to be more open, and the Rhine runs through it to Mannheim, which is a great town belonging to the Elector Palatin, and situated at that part of the Rhine where the Neckar enters it, and where it is very easy to make a bridge. In that place there are great plains on both sides of the Rhine, and the Emperor's Army in order to come there, need not go through the Duke of Wirtemberg's territories; but leaving Bavaria a good way to the left, and crossing the river, might enter Lorrain or the Country of Luxembourg without resistance, unless the King was assured of the Elector Palatine, and had a considerable Army on this side the Rhine: for on the other side from Bohemia to the Lower Palatinate, the Imperialists pass through the territories of no Prince of note who dares oppose their march, that Country having small Imperial towns, the lands of the

the Counts of the Empire and the Estates of the Teutonic Order scatter'd up and down it.

The Elector Palatine has likewise on this side of the Rhine, and about a league and a half from it, a town called Frankendal, which would be of great service to the Imperialists in their passage: there is also Oppenheim, a small town on the Rhine, where bridges have been often made in the former wars. Between Manheim and Mentz, which are twelve or thirteen leagues distant, is the great Imperial town of Worms, and between Philipsbourg and Manheim is Spires on this side the Rhine. All these places are in the plain, and in a very good Country, which the Imperialists might easily pass through, if there were none to oppose them; from thence they might march to the Country of Triers, and enter Luxembourg without resistance, if the Elector of Mentz and the Elector Palatine consented to allow them to march through their territories.

Below Mentz there is a small town belonging to the Elector of Mentz, called Bingen, which is on this side the Rhine, and where there is another passage: from thence to Hermentheim, which is a strong place situated where the Moselle discharges it self into the Rhine, there are several castles on this side the river, which belong to different Princes, and where the Rhine is impassable; as Baccarack belonging to the Elector Palatine, S. Genest to the Landgrave Ernest, who was at Paris, and Obervesel to M. de Schomberg: but in order to come to these places, the Imperial Army must necessarily pass through Franconia. If the Elector of Mentz could bring that Circle, in which he has the Bishoprick of Wurtzbourg, which makes a great part of it, to unite like Suabia to hinder any Army from marching through it, under pretence of guarding against the French and Swedes as well as the Imperialists, that would cover the Rhine to the Moselle, that is to say to Hermentheim. This town belongs to the Elector of Triers, whose City and Bishoprick are so exposed to the King's forces, that I doubt not but he would follow the same measures with the other Ecclesiastick Electors. His inclinations are for the Emperor, but the interest of his Bishoprick, and the examples of the Electors of Cologne and Mentz, would probably oblige him to join them.

The Rhine runs along to Cologne, which is ten or twelve leagues from Hermentheim. The Country of Berg over-against it on the other side the Rhine belongs to the Duke of Neubourg. Beyond it are the territories of the Prince of Darmstadt, and Hesse is not far off. If the Elector of Cologne and the Duke of Neubourg were united, the troops of Hesse-Cassel, Darmstadt and Brunswick might join to hinder the Emperor's passage. And if the Elector of Brandenburg were firmly in the King's interest, he might have a great body of troops there who from Mentz to the Wesel might oppose all that would endeavour to pass the Rhine. The Country of Marck on the other side the Rhine belonging to the Elector of Brandenburg, and joining to the Country of Berg, which is the Duke of Neubourg's, and to the Duchy of Westphalia, which the Elector of Cologne possesses, it is of the greatest consequence to gain those three Princes with the Duke of Brunswick and the Landgrave of Hesse, who cover all the Bishoprick of Munster, which being at war with the Dutch our allies, the Emperor would endeavour to join with it, but the King must begin by forcing that Bishop to a peace, and by that means all the banks of the Rhine would be guarded.

Memorial by the Viscount de Turenne concerning the Swedes.

HAVING nothing at present to fear on the side of N. XIX. England, and there being no probability that Hol. B. V. land will meddle in what concerns Flanders, without be- An. 1666. ing supported by the Empire, it is necessary speedily to find out means whereby to hinder the Emperor from sending any considerable Army into Flanders. After the precautions which have been already taken, it is certain that none of the Princes of Germany will openly interest themselves for the affairs of Flanders when it is attack'd, and that there is nothing to be fear'd from them, but only lest the Emperor make use of their neutrality to procure a passage for his Army, and gain some of them to facilitate the march of his troops, and the means of strengthening them in it. All that the King can hope for from those Princes who are the most zealous for him is, that they

they endeavour to obtain of the Emperor that his Army do not pass through their territories, and that they let his Imperial Majesty know, that since the affairs of Flanders are only concern'd, they do not think themselves obliged to join him, seeing he acts for the succour of that Country, as Prince of the House of Austria, and not as Emperor. In that diversity of inclinations, sentiments, and interests which prevails amongst the Princes of Germany, the Imperialists will still march on, pass the Rhine, and arrive in Flanders; so that there are none but the Swedes able to form a body in Germany sufficient to oppose the Emperor's forces, to hinder their passage, or to strengthen the King's Army in case he should want troops, after the Germans are marched into Flanders, or to give such a jealousy to the Emperor, as that staying in the Bishoprick of Bremen, he shall not dare to send a considerable body into Flanders, but will choose rather to attack the Swedes in Germany, which would still make the same diversions, and hinder the Emperor's troops from entering Flanders. The great and only inconvenience which the Swedish Army would occasion, is, that it would oblige many of the Princes to join with the Emperor, which is by all means to be avoided: So that I think the King should by a treaty engage the Swedes to keep 12000 men in the Bishoprick of Bremen to act against the Imperialists when his Majesty shall desire it, but not to enter upon action till the Emperor sends an Army into Flanders; for it is of great consequence to the King not to seem inclined to disturb the tranquillity of the Empire by means of the Swedes; but provided the Emperor begins first to march into the field, and send troops into Flanders, the King's allies in Germany being supported by the Swedes, may make a difficulty of granting them a passage. It is necessary then that the King facilitate the conclusion of a treaty with the Swedes, whereby he may secure to himself twelve or fifteen thousand men, who shall continue in the Bishoprick of Bremen, and act on the side of Flanders, according to the motions of the Imperial Army, and the King's desires.

Opinion of the Marshals of France concerning M. de Turenne's right to command them in the field.

SOME of the Marshals of France having consulted us N. XX. in order to know our sentiments with regard to the B. V. obedience we ought to pay to the absolute command we have received from the King to take the word from the Viscount de Turenne, Marshal of France, we say and declare, that after the most humble remonstrances which have been made to his Majesty, he persisting in his will, the Marshals ought to submit to that order, there being no reason that can or ought to hinder us from obeying his Majesty's absolute commands. This is our opinion, and as we say and declare, so we most willingly sign it.

The original signed GRAMMONT, PLESSIS PRASLIN, VILLEROY, and D'ALBRET.

Extract of Letters written by Madam de Sevigné on the death of the Viscount de Turenne.

LETTER CC.

I Write to you, my dear Count*, to inform you of N. XXI. one of the most afflicting losses that could have hap-B. VI. pen'd in France; it is the death of M. de Turenne: and I assure my self that you will be as much afflicted and as inconsolable as we are here. This news arriv'd at Versailles on Monday. The King testified an affliction equal to the occasion, the loss of the greatest Captain and the most worthy man in the world. All the Court was in tears, and M. de Condom had like to have fallen into a swoon. His Majesty was going to take his diversion at Fontainebleau; the design was immediately laid aside. Never was man so sincerely regretted; all Paris was in trouble and emotion, and all the people flock'd together, every one lamenting the Hero. I send you an exact relation of what he did during the last days of his life. It was after a three months conduct altogether wonderful, and which the Gentlemen of the profession are never

* M. de Grignan.

weary of admiring, that the day came which put a period to this glory and his life. He had the pleasure to see the enemy decamp, and on the 27th, which was Saturday, he was to go to the top of a little eminence in order to observe their march; he had a design to attack their rear-guard, and at noon wrote to the King that with that intention he had sent to Brisac to have *the forty hours prayers* said: he told the King of the death of young d'Hocquincourt, and that he would send a courier to inform his Majesty of the issue of his enterprize; he sealed his letter, and sent it off at two a clock: he went to the eminence, accompanied by eight or ten persons, and an unlucky ball from a canon fired at a venture took him in the middle of his body, and you may imagine what cries and tears there were in the Army. The courier set out that instant; he arriv'd on Monday, as I have told you; so that one hour the King had a letter from M. de Turenne, and the next an account of his death. There is since arriv'd a Gentleman who belong'd to M. de Turenne; he says that the Armies are pretty near one another, that M. de Lorges commands in the room of his Uncle, and that nothing can be compared to the great affliction the whole Army is in.

Paris, Wednesday July 31. 1675.

LETTER CCI.

I Am always thinking, my child, how grievously you must be struck and affected with the death of M. de Turenne: Cardinal de Bouillon is inconsolable. He learnt the news by a Gentleman of M. de Louvigni's, who had a mind to pay him the first compliment of condolence; he stopt his coach as he was returning from Pontoise to Versailles: the Cardinal did not comprehend what he meant, and the Gentleman perceiving his Eminence yet knew nothing of the matter, went off abruptly. The Cardinal sent after him, and had an account of that deplorable death; he swooned away, and was carried to Pontoise, where he has been two days without eating, and continually weeping and lamenting. Madame de Guenegaud and Cavoie, who are no less afflicted than he, have been to see him. I have just now wrote to him,

him, and, I think, properly enough: I have told him of your affliction before hand, both on account of his share in the loss, and the esteem you had for the hero. Do not forget to write to him; I think you write very well on all subjects; as for this, you have no more to do but set your pen a going. They seem very much affected at Paris, and in many families with this important death. We wait with great uneasiness a courier from Germany; Montecuculli, who was marching off, will probably return, and endeavour to make advantage of this conjuncture. They say that the cries of the soldiers were heard at the distance of two leagues: no consideration could restrain them. They cried out *to be led to battle, that they would revenge the death of their Father, their General, their Protector, their Defender*; that with him they were used to fear nothing, and that they would have a severe revenge for his death; that the Officers should leave it to them, that they were furious, and only desired to be led to battle. This news was brought by a Gentleman who belonged to M. de Turenne, and who came to speak with the King; he was continually in tears while he was relating his Master's death, and what I have told you, to all his friends, M. de Turenne received the shot through his body; you'll easily believe he fell and died; nevertheless the remainder of his spirits carried him the length of a step or two: he locked his hands in convulsions, and then a cloke was thrown over his body. Le Bois-Guyot (that is the Gentleman's name I spoke of) did not leave him till his people had carried him without noise to the next house. M. de Lorges was half a league off; judge of his despair; he has lost all, and has the charge of the Army and all its motions till the arrival of the Prince, who has a two and twenty days journey to make. M. de Turenne said to the Cardinal de Retz, when he took his leave of him, as d'Hacqueville told it two days ago; Sir, I am no great talker, but I beg you would believe me in earnest when I tell you, that were it not for these affairs here, which perhaps may require my assistance, I would retire as you do; and I give you my word, that if I return, I will not die in a trench, but in imitation of your example, put some space between my life and my death.

Paris, Friday August 2.

U 3

LETTER

LETTER CCIII.

To the same.

WELL then, you see our dear friends have at length happily repass'd the Rhine, at great leisure and after having beat the enemy : it is very glorious for M. de Lorges. We have all earnestly wish'd that the King would send him the staff after so gallant and so advantageous an action, of which he had all the honour : he had a horse kill'd under him by a canon-ball, which passing between his legs, he may be said to have been mounted upon it : Providence had given it its commission as well as others. We have lost Vaubrun in this action ; the enemy's loss is very great ; by their own account they have four thousand men killed, and we have lost but seven or eight hundred. The Duke de Sault and the Chevalier de Grignan distinguished themselves ; but above all the English did things beyond belief. In short we have had great good fortune. They say that Montecuculli *, after he had testified to M. de Lorges the grief he had for the loss of so great a Captain, sent him word that he would let him repass the Rhine, and that he would not expose his own reputation to the rage of a furious Army, and the valour of the French youth, whom nothing could resist in their first impetuosity. There was not indeed a general engagement, but the troops we attacked were defeated.

Let us speak a little of M. de Turenne, it is a long time since we have said any thing of him. Do not you wonder that we should think our selves happy to have repass'd the Rhine, and that what would have highly displeased us, had he been in the world, appears success now he is out of it ? See of what consequence the loss of one man is. Give me leave to tell you a thing which I think very fine ; methinks I read the Roman history. Saint Hilaire, Lieutenant-General of the artillery, stop'd M. de Turenne, who was galloping on, to shew him a battery : it was as if he had said, Stay a little, Sir, for it is here that you must be killed. The canon-ball came and carried off the arm of Saint-Hilaire, who was point-

* The Count de Montecueulli, Generalissimo of the Emperor's forces.

ing to the battery, and killed M. de Turenne. Saint-Hilaire's son threw himself upon his father, and fell a crying and weeping: Hold your peace, my child, said he to him, see there, pointing to M. de Turenne stone dead, see what ought to be regretted for ever, and what is irreparable; and without minding himself, began to weep and lament for the great loss. M. de la Rochefoucault cannot forbear weeping while he is admiring the nobleness of this sentiment.

Paris, Friday 9 Aug. 1675.

LETTER CCIV.

To the same.

I Have been just now seeing the Cardinal de Bouillon; he is so changed that he is hardly to be known: he spoke much to me about you; he does not doubt of your sentiments. He told me a thousand things of M. de Turenne which make ones heart bleed: his soul in all probability was in a condition to appear before God, for his life was perfectly innocent. He asked his nephew at Whitsuntide if he might not communicate without confessing himself; he answered he could not, and that probably he had offended God since Easter. M. de Turenne then told him his state; he was a thousand leagues from any mortal sin: however he went to be confessed according to custom, saying, Must I confess to this Recolet as I would to M. de Saint Gervais? is it all the same? Such a soul truly is fit for heaven; it came too directly from God not to return to him, it being so little hurt by the corruption of this world. He tenderly loved M. d'Elbeuf's son, who is a prodigy of valour at fourteen years of age: he sent him last year to pay his compliments to the Duke of Lorrain, who said to him, My young cousin, you are too happy in seeing and hearing M. de Turenne every day; you have no other relation nor father but him; kiss the ground whereon he treads, he killed at his feet. The poor boy is like to die with grief, he mourns with the reason of a man and the tears of a child; it is feared that he will hardly get over it. Cavoie is afflicted, but keeps within bounds.

The Duke of Villeroy has writ letters here in the transport of his grief, which are in such strong terms, that I must conceal them: he reckons it the highest pitch of good fortune to have been beloved by this hero, and declares that after that he shall despise all other esteem whatever. M. de Marillac has distinguish'd himself in speaking of M. de Lorges as worthy of a better recompence than M. de Vauvrun's place: Nothing could have been of greater use, or more encouraging, than to have honour'd him with the staff after so great success.

Paris, Monday 12 Aug. 1675.

LETTER CCVI.

To the same.

I Have a mind to put what you write concerning M. de Turenne in a funeral oration: your stile has an extraordinary energy and beauty; you are in that swell of eloquence which is caused by a tide of sorrow. Do not think, my child, that we had forgot M. de Turenne here when your letter came: time, that stream which carries every thing along with it, cannot so soon efface the memory of so great a man; it is consecrated to immortality. I was the other day at M. de la Rochefaucault's; M. le Premier was there, Madame de Lavardin, M. de Marillac, Madame de la Fayette, and I. The conversation lasted two hours on the divine qualities of that true Hero; every eye was bathed in tears, and it is not to be imagined how deeply the grief for his loss was graven on our hearts; you go beyond us in nothing but in having the comfort to sigh aloud and write his panegyrick. One thing we have observed, that it is not since his death only that people have admired the greatness of his heart, the extent of his knowledge, and his elevated soul: every body was full of admiration of those while he was alive, and you may judge what addition his death has made to it. In short, don't fancy that his death will pass over here like other men's; you may talk as much as you please, but ought not to imagine your grief a whit greater than that of others. As to his soul, (and this is another wonderful thing that proceeds from the great esteem people had for him) it
never

never enter'd into the head of a *Devôt* that it was not in a good state: no one believes that sin and evil could have any place in his heart: his conversion was so sincere, it seem'd to us like a baptism: every body speaks of the innocence of his manners, the purity of his intentions, his humility far removed from all kind of affectation, his true honour without pride, without ostentation, his love of virtue for itself, without respect to the approbation of men, and his generous and Christian charity. The English have told M. de Lorges, that they will continue to serve this campaign in order to revenge the Viscount's death; but will then retire, not being able to obey any other after M. de Turenne. There were some young soldiers who were uneasy at their being in morasses, where they were up to the knees in water; the veterans said to them, "Why do you complain? you do not know M. de Turenne: when we suffer, he is more concern'd than we are ourselves; at this moment he is thinking how to deliver us; he is awake when we are asleep; he is our father; it is easy to see that you are but young." and thus they encouraged them. All I tell you is true; I don't employ my self in relating idle stories, with which people think to please those that are at a distance; but that is only to abuse them; and I am more cautious of what I write to you, than of what I would say if you were here. I return to his soul: it is a thing very remarkable that no *Devôt* has entertained a doubt, but God has received it very mercifully, and as one of the best he ever made. Reflect seriously upon this universal persuasion of his salvation, and you'll find it a kind of miracle, which has happen'd only to him; in short, no body has dared to doubt of his eternal repose. You see in the news the effects of his loss. Another word of M. de Turenne: He had made acquaintance with a shepherd, who knew the Country and the roads very well; he used to walk alone with this man, and posted his troops according to the information he gave him; he loved the shepherd, and found him a man of excellent sense, and said, that Colonel Bec was such a one as he, and he believed the shepherd would make his fortune as he had done. When he had made his troops pass over at leisure, he was satisfied, and said to M. de Royes: *In truth, I think this is not ill done, and I believe that*

M. de Montecuculli will think so too. It was indeed a master-stroke of art.

Paris, Friday 16 August 1675.

LETTER CCVIII.

To the same.

THE Hero's body is not yet carried to Turenne, as I was told; they are transporting it to S. Dennis, to the foot of the burying place of the family of Bourbon: they intend to remove the bodies from the hole they are in to a chapel that is to be built for them; and M. de Turenne is the first that is to be deposited there. For my part, I had made such a stir about that place, that as I know not who else can have given that advice, I believe it was I. There are already four Captains at their Master's feet, and if there were none, I think M. de Turenne should be the first. Wherever the illustrious bier passes, there are nothing but cries and tears, crowds and processions, which oblige M. de Turenne's people to travel only by night: it will be a mournful spectacle to Paris if they pass through it. . . .

Paris, Monday 19 Aug. 1675.

LETTER CCIX.

To the same.

THE first President of the Court of Aids has an estate in the Country; his tenant came to him the other day, desiring him to lower the rent considerably, or break the lease that was made two years ago. The President asked him for what reason, telling him that the thing was not usual. The tenant answered, That while M. de Turenne was alive, they could with safety reap their harvests, and reckon upon the lands of that Country; but since his death every body quitted, believing that the enemy would enter it. These are simple and natural things, which make as noble a panegyrick upon him, as the Flechiers and Mascarons.

Livry, Wednesday 21 August 1675.

LETTER

LETTER CCX.

To the same.

DO not think, my child, that M. de Turenne's death is as soon forgot here as other news; they talk of him and lament him every day.

Tout en fait souvenir, & rien ne lui ressemble.

Every thing brings him to mind, and yet nothing is like him.

This verse may be applied to him. Happy those, as you say, who have the least adverted to this loss: that which has happened since has renewed the hero's praises.

Paris, Monday 26 Aug. 1675.

LETTER CCXI.

To the same.

I Am once again going to write to you of M. de Turenne. Madame d'Elbeuf, who stays some days with the Cardinal de Bouillon, desired me yesterday to dine with them two in order to talk of their affliction. Madame de la Fayette came there: we kept very exactly to our resolution; our eyes were never dry. M. d'Elbeuf had the Hero's picture exceedingly well drawn, and all his train came at eleven a'clock: they were all in tears, and already in mourning. There came three Gentlemen who had like to have died upon seeing the picture; their cries pierced our hearts, they could not utter a word. His valets de chambre, footmen, pages, trumpeters, all burst into tears, and made the rest weep too. The first that could speak a word, answer'd our sad questions: we made him relate the manner of M. de Turenne's death. Having a mind to be confessed, he, before he shut himself up, gave the order for the evening; he was to communicate the next day, which was Sunday. He designed to give battle, and mounted his horse on Saturday at two a'clock after dinner. There were many people with him, he left them all thirty paces from the eminence whither he was going: he said to young d'Elbeuf, *Stay there, nephew, you are always hanging upon me; you will make me be known.* He found

found M. d'Hamilton near the place he was going to, who said to him, *Come this way, Sir, they'll fire where you are going: Sir, answered he, I come, I have no mind to be killed to day; that would be fine indeed.* He turned his horse, and saw S. Hilaire, who said to him, holding his hat in his hand, *Sir, look to that battery, which I have caused to be raised there:* he return'd two paces, and without stopping, received the shot which carried off S. Hilaire's arm and hand that held his hat, and pierced the Hero's body after having shatter'd his arm to pieces. That Gentleman still look'd at him, but did not see him fall; his horse carried him to the place where he had left young d'Elbeuf; he was not yet fallen, but his head lean'd upon the saddle-bow. The horse stop'd there, and M. de Turenne fell into the arms of his attendants; he twice opened wide his eyes and mouth, and then remained quiet for ever. He was dead, and had a part of his heart carried away. There was nothing but cries and tears; M. d'Hamilton put a stop to them, and had d'Elbeuf taken away, who had thrown himself upon the body, which he would not quit, and had swooned away with crying. They threw a cloak over M. de Turenne, carried him to a hedge; and guarded him without noise. A coach was brought, and he was carried to his tent. M. de Lorges and many others had like to have died with grief there; but it was necessary to do violence to themselves, and think of the great affairs they had upon their hands. They order'd a military service for him in the camp, where tears and cries made a real mourning. All the Officers had crape-scarfs; all the drums were cover'd, and beat but one stroke; the pikes mean while trailing, and the muskets revers'd: but it is impossible to represent the cries of a whole Army without being greatly moved. M. de Royes, wounded as he was, caused himself to be carried thither, for the Mass was not said till they had repass'd the Rhine. I doubt not but the Chevalier* was deeply affected. When the dead body left the Army, there was yet another scene of mourning: there were lamentations wherever it pass'd, but at Langres they out-did themselves; two hundred persons in mourning, followed by the body of the people, and the Clergy

* De Grignan.

in their habits, went to meet it; they had a solemn service in the town; and in a word, all assented themselves to defray the expences, which amounted to 5000 livres; because the inhabitants attended the body to the first town, and would pay the expences of all the train. What say you of those natural marks of an affection, founded upon extraordinary merit? The body arrives at S. Denis to night or to morrow; all M. de Turenne's people are gone to meet it two leagues from hence. It will be deposited in a Chapel, where there will be a service till that of Notre Dame begins, which will be a solemn one. What say you of the diversion we had? we din'd in the manner you may imagine, and till four a clock did nothing but sigh. M. de Barillon supp'd here yesternight; he spoke of nothing but M. de Turenne; he is truly afflicted. He talk'd to us of the solidity of his virtues, of his strict adherence to truth, how much he loved virtue for it self, how greatly he thought himself rewarded by it alone, and then concluded with saying, that a man could not love him, nor be touched with his merit, without being the better man for it. His conversation communicated a horror at base actions and double dealing, and raised his friends above all other men. Among this number he named the Chevalier, who was very much beloved and esteem'd by this great man, whom he adored. Many ages will not produce his like, though I don't think people are quite blind in this, at least those whom I converse with. I fancy this is to boast of being in good company. The following account I had yesterday. You very well know Pertuis*, and his esteem for and attachment to M. de Turenne. As soon as he heard of his death, he wrote a letter to the King, wherein he said, Sire, I have lost M. de Turenne; I feel that I am not able to support my self under this misfortune; so not being longer in a condition to serve your Majesty, I beg leave to lay down the Government of Courtrai. Cardinal de Bouillon hinder'd the letters being delivered; but fearing lest Pertuis should come himself, he told the King the excess of his grief. The King took part in his affliction, and said to the Cardinal, that he valued Pertuis the more; that he should not think of giving up his place, and that he was too worthy

* He had been Captain of the Guards to M. de Turenne.

a man not to do his duty always in whatever condition he was. See how it is with those who regret this Hero. His patrimony was 40,000 livres a year, and M. de Boucherat has found that after payment of his debts and legacies, there remains only 10,000 livres a year; so that there are 200,000 livres for all his heirs, provided law does not meddle in the affair. See how rich he was grown in fifty years service.

Paris, Wednesday 23 Aug. 1675.

*A Letter from Lewis XIV. to the Abbot and Monks
of S. Denis,*

Dear and well-beloved,

N. XXII. **T**HE great and signal services which have been done
B. VI. to this State by our deceased Cousin the Viscount de Turenne, and the conspicuous testimonies he gave of his zeal and affection for our service, and of his capacity in the command of our Armies, which we entrusted him with, in a sure hope of happy and great success, which his consummate prudence and extraordinary valour have procured to our arms, having made us with great grief sensible of the loss of so great a man, and of a subject so necessary and so distinguish'd by his virtue and merit, we were willing to give a publick testimony, worthy of our esteem and his great actions, by ordering that there be paid to his memory all the honours which may witness to posterity the extreme satisfaction we have, and the remembrance we would preserve of all that he has done for the glory of our arms and the support of our State: and as we can give no proofs more publick and more certain than by taking care of his burial, we will to provide for it in such a manner, that the place where it shall be, may be an evidence of the greatness of his services and of our acknowledgments. For this reason, having resolved to cause a chapel to be built in the church of S. Denis for the burying place of the Kings and Princes of the Branch Royal of Bourbon, we will, that when it shall be finish'd, the body of our said Cousin be transported thither, to be there put in an honourable place, according to the order we shall give; and in the mean time we have permitted our Cousins

finis the Cardinal and the Duke of Bouillon his nephews, to deposite his body in the chapel of S. Eustace, and there to erect a monument to the memory of their Uncle, according to the design they have. Therefore we were willing to apprise you of it, and at the same time to tell you, that we will that you therein execute our will, in causing the said body to be put in the vault of the said chapel, and allowing the workmen to work at the said monument till it be entirely finished. See that you do not fail, for such is our pleasure. Given at S. Germain en Laye, the 22d day of November 1675.

Signed LOUIS, and underneath COLBERT; and on the fold, To our dear and well-beloved the Abbot, Prior, and Monks of the Abbey Royal of S. Denis in France.

IT was thought that the publick would not perhaps be displeased to see the following Eulogiums on the Viscount de Turenne by three celebrated persons; the first famous in the republick of the Belles Lettres, the second in the Magistracy, and the third in the Church.

EULOGIUM

ON

M. DE TURENNE,

By S. EVREMONT.

IT would be injurious to M. de Turenne's birth, should I go about to instruct the publick with regard to a family so illustrious and so considerable in Europe as his. I shall not lose time in describing all the lineaments of his face: the characters of great men have nothing in common with the pictures of beautiful women; but I may say in general that he had in him something august and agreeable, something in his countenance that discovered an inexpressible greatness of soul and mind. One might judge from his appearance, that by a particular disposition, nature had formed him for doing all that he did. Being born of a Father so considerable in the Protestant party as M. de Bouillon was, he followed his way of thinking about Religion, but without any indiscreet zeal for his own, or aversion to that of others; being cautioned against that subtle delusion which, under the mask of charity for others, conceals an excess of complaisance for our own opinion. As there is nothing mean in military employments, he passed thro' the lowest and the middlemost, and was still thought worthy of higher than he possessed. Tho' always distinguished on account of his birth, yet was it his services alone which gradually raised him to the command of armies; and it is no exaggeration to say, that for his arriving at the posts he obtain'd, never man owed so much to his merit and so little to fortune.

I shall not enlarge upon his actions, but confine myself to some particulars little known, which may contri-

bute to form a character of him. The Prince gave him the honour of all that was done in Germany while M. de Turenne served with him there; and so great was the esteem the Prince had for him, that conversing with some of the Generals of his time, "If I were to change my self, said he, I would be changed into M. de Turenne, and he is the only man that could make me desire such a change." It is incredible with what attention the Prince observed him, seeking to reap advantage not only from his actions, but also from his conversation.

I remember he asked him one day, what method he would choose to follow in carrying on the war in Flanders: "Make few sieges, answered M. de Turenne, give battle frequently, and after you have render'd your Army superior to that of your enemies, both as to the number and goodness of your troops, (which you have almost done already by the battle of Rocroi) and made your self master of the open Country, the villages will be of as much service to you as fortified towns; but people think it more honourable to take a strong town with difficulty, than conquer a Province with ease. If the King of Spain had laid out in strengthening and improving his Armies what it has cost him for making of sieges and fortifying towns, he would this day be the most considerable of all the Kings in Europe."

M. de Turenne's first maxim in war was that which is ascribed to Cæsar, that nothing ought to be reckon'd done, while any thing remains undone. Scarce had Philipsbourg capitulated, when he led a part of his troops to fall upon a small body which Savelli Colorado commanded; he attacked and defeated it, march'd to Spire, Worms, Mentz; every one of which surrendered, and all this was done in six or seven days. He prized actions more for their consequences than for themselves. He had a greater esteem for a General who preserved a Country after having lost a battle, than for him who had gain'd the victory, and did not know how to make advantage of it.

Let us come to our civil wars; it was there that M. de Turenne was best known, because more exposed to the observation of the Courtiers. It is known that he saved the Court at Gergeau, and prevented its falling into the Princes hands at Gien. He preserved the State when it

was

was thought lost : he encreased its glory and greatness when even its safety was almost despair'd of. He found the Court so abandon'd that no town would receive it : the Parliaments had declared against it, and the people prepossessed with false notions of publick good, blindly adhered to their declarations. The Duke of Orleans was at the head of the Parliaments, the Prince at that of the troops, Fuenfaldaigne was advanced to Chauni with 20,000 men, and the Duke of Lorraine was not far off. Such was the state of that unfortunate Court, when M. de Turenne, after some sieges and battles, the relation of which I leave to Historians, brought it back to Paris, where the Queen was no sooner come, but her re-establishment in the capital made her authority acknowledged over all the Kingdom. The King's safety being well establish'd at home, M. de Turenne made his power felt abroad, and reduced Spain to ask a peace which was her preservation, she not being able to continue a war that ruin'd her.

Let us return from M. de Turenne's exploits to a more particular observation of his conduct, his accomplishments and genius. In good success he push'd the advantages as far as they could be carried; in bad, he found all the remedies that could be found. In all things he prefer'd what was solid to what was glaring, being less solicitous about the glory he might gain by his actions, than the advantage the State might receive from them. The publick good was what he above all things regarded. He has been known to bear with the ill offices of the envious, the injuries of his enemies, and the disgust of those whom he serv'd, in order to do real service.

Being modest even in those things which were most to his glory, he render'd the Ministers vain and arrogant towards him, by the advantages they drew from what he had done; severe to himself, he reckon'd all his misfortunes as faults; indulgent to those who had committed mistakes, he made their faults pass for misfortunes.

He seemed to ascribe to fortune too little a share in events; and when one day, in order to convince him by his own example of her power, he was told that perhaps he had never perform'd better than at Mariendal and Rhetel, and yet he had lost both those battles because he had ill fortune, he answered, " I am satisfied with
" my own conduct in the action; but if I would do ju-
" stice

“ since a little strictly upon my self, I would say that the
 “ affair of Mariendal happen’d because I yielded unrea-
 “ sonably to the importunity of the Germans, who de-
 “ manded quarters; and that of Rhetel, because I trusted
 “ too much to the Governor’s letter, wherein, the very
 “ day he surrendered, he promised to hold out four days
 “ longer; and he added, when a man boasts of never ha-
 “ ving committed errors in war, he convinces me that he
 “ has not been long a General.”

He never forgot Rosen’s importunity in asking quarters, and his own too great easiness in granting them. This reflection and some others of the same nature, made him change his conduct with regard to the Officers: he continued to use them well as formerly, but he would never more suffer himself to be made uneasy by them in the service.

The first incumbrance he rid himself of was the disputes of the infantry: that old custom, founded upon an appearance of honour, was a sort of right which all the several *corps* would maintain: the opposition was great; but the General carried his point, and Puifegur, the most intelligent of the Officers, and the most noted for starting difficulties, Puifegur, the enemy of all the Generals he did not govern, was obliged to sell his regiment and retire with his troublesome capacity to his own house.

The usual roll of the Officers in detachments, and their rank in the order of battle were no longer observed. This was seen at the battle of Dunkirk, where M. de Turenne chose the Marquis de Crequi to command the wing opposite to the Prince, without regard to the seniority of the Lieutenant Generals.

After having changed those old customs, he changed, if I may say so, the genius of nations; he taught strangers to observe a civility which was not natural to them, and the French to lay aside that levity and impatience which their nation always had: he brought them to endure fatigue without murmuring, and the Courtiers who served in the Army to forget the Court, as if there had been no other employment but war. Such was M. de Turenne’s conduct towards the Officers; let us see his behaviour towards the Cardinal.

At the time when Mazarin was the most unfortunate, when his friends sought pretences to desert him, and his enemies opportunities to ruin him, M. de Turenne shewed him

the same deference, the same respect that had been paid him in his highest fortune. When his Eminence had re-established his power, M. de Turenne kept more state with him than he had done in his adversity. He was the first who ventured to make his court to the King, all other persons even of the greatest distinction making their application to the Cardinal only.

He never asked favours, and the advantages he obtain'd appear'd to be merely the effects of the service he did the State, not of his attachment to the Minister. Never were the virtues of a private man so well united with the qualities of a hero as in the person of M. de Turenne: he was easy in the commerce of life, delicate in conversation, and faithful in friendship. He has been accused of not being active enough at Court in behalf of his friends; but he was not more for himself: while a secret pride hindered him from asking what he was not sure to obtain, he did all the favours which he thought were in his power to do. A man's friends commonly think he has more interest than he has, and that he owes them more than he really does.

M. de Turenne was not incapable of love; his virtue was not of that severe and rugged kind which no sentiments of tenderness can soften: he even loved more than he thought he did, concealing as much as possible from himself a passion which others might easily discover.

If singularities are a kind of failings in society, M. de Turenne had two which few people can be accused of: a too great disinterestedness, while a spirit of interest reigned universally, and a probity too pure in a general corruption.

His change of Religion touched the Protestants very sensibly; those who knew him ascribed it neither to ambition nor interest. He ever loved to talk of religion, particularly with M. d'Aubigni, and used to say, that the doctrine of the Reformed was the soundest, yet they ought not to make a separation, but insensibly insfil their principles into the Catholicks. When a man confesses that he is in the wrong to separate from a Church, answer'd M. d'Aubigni, he is in a fair way of returning to it; and if I survive Madame de Turenne, I shall see you in ours. M. de Turenne smiled, but that smile did not sufficiently discover whether he meant to laugh at M. de Aubigni's prediction, or to approve of it. Both in the one and the
other

other Religion, he still aimed at what was right and good. While a Huguenot, he had no schemes contrary to the interests of the Catholics; when converted, he had no zeal prejudicial to the safety of the Huguenots.

Those who were with him in his last campaigns say that he shewed more spirit and vigour in them than in the preceding ones, that he was more bold in enterprizing and in exposing his person, than formerly. A canon-ball put an end to so glorious a life; a death to be desired (since death is unavoidable) by so great a man. His loss was lamented by all Frenchmen, regretted by all people unbiassed by interest; his person praised by his enemies; his virtue admired by all the world. The King, whom he had so well served, would have him buried at S. Denis, among the Kings his predecessors, thinking himself as much obliged to him who had preserved his Kingdom, as to those who had left it to him.

An Eulogium on M. de Turenne, by the President Delamoignon, in his speech at the opening of the Parliament in the year 1675.

THE great man, whose loss still fresh, all France laments, how many Captains did he form? It is not with a design to renew so just a grief, nor to set forth here the exceeding great regard we have for his memory, that we recal to day the sorrowful remembrance of this loss; our private grief gives place here to duties of greater importance. While all the world speaks of his glory, and the publick voice makes his *Eulogium*, this place, where it is so well known how to give merit its due, shall it remain in silence?

It ought not to be thought strange if we depart from the ordinary rules of this discourse, to enlarge upon the praises of a man who cannot be too much extolled. So many heroick qualities shine in his person, and his life is so perfect a model, that among the great number of virtuous actions with which it is filled, every one may find some to imitate.

But the virtues he more especially possessed in the highest degree were disinterestedness, probity, zeal for the publick good and for the glory of his Country. His heart insen-

fibble to gain and recompence, delighted in nothing but making others happy : far from heaping up treasures in the command of armies, he often borrowed considerable sums to distribute among the soldiers; whilst forgetting his private interest, he gave up those rights which the custom of war has made legal.

Nevertheless his moderation alone was sufficient to supply his beneficence, and afford him the means of being liberal without doing any thing unjust or unworthy. History, which suffers nothing of illustrious persons to be lost, will say the same thing of him that Plutarch reports of Scipio. That conqueror of Carthage and Numantia, who had enrich'd Rome with the spoils of Africk, neither encreased nor diminished his patrimony, and left only in his house at his death three and thirty marks of silver, and two of gold. The great man of whom we are speaking left precisely the same sum in ready money.

Can there be a clearer evidence of his disinterestedness? A quality rare in our days, and which is not, as in Scipio's time, the virtue of the age. Ours will not fail to admire it, and be liberal in its praises, but it will produce but few imitators; and it is so much the more inimitable, that in him it proceeded from a nobleness of heart, not from a principle of pride and a false magnanimity.

Every thing in his manners and sentiments was sincere: an aversion to flattery, a contempt even for just praises, a thing more difficult to great men than the contempt of riches, were likewise distinguishing parts of his character. He deserved all honours, but never sought any; was always humble after the most glorious success, and as it were uneasy at the resounding of his name, that famous name, the terror of the Empire and Spain, the delight of the soldiers, and the admiration of all Europe.

At his return from his last campaigns, which filled up the measure of his glory, and in which he drove the confederate Princes from the Moselle to the extremity of the North, and made formidable nations repass the Rhine, who in imagination had shared among them the best Provinces of France, he himself lessen'd the greatness of his exploits; being in all things an enemy to outward pomp, and in appearance like one of the lowest rank, he never distinguished himself from other courtiers but by an extraordinary modesty.

This

This virtue, so natural to him, did not leave him even at the head of an Army; he was never haughty but with the enemy: in the midst of danger he shewed an intrepidity without ostentation; and when the occasion required, never General more exposed his person, never Captain shewed himself more a soldier.

In the greatest heat of an action, he judged of the event of the battle in an instant, by the different movements of the combatants; and as he saw all with great calmness and with a glance of his eye, he took advantage of every motion, and of the smallest faults that were committed.

Nevertheless his resolutions did not proceed from a rash impetuosity, or a too cautious wisdom: he neither said nor did anything that was useless, but forgot nothing that was necessary, and his profound judgment appeared yet more in his actions than in his conversation: his orders were clear, always executed with courage, and more through love than fear, because he was exact without being rigorous. He knew that the love of an Army to their General maintains obedience, and that discipline keeps up their confidence and courage.

The soldiers likewise were so well assured of conquering under him, that they considered neither the number of their enemies, nor the strength of places, nor the dangers to which they were exposed, being persuaded that their General would provide for all like a father of a family; that he would give himself no repose till he had secured theirs, and that if he reserved to himself any advantage above them, it was to take the principal share in trouble and danger.

By such charms as these, he knew how to make himself at once beloved and obeyed; by this prudent economy, with a handful of men, he has checked and overthrown many united powers, subsisted a long time in a ruined Country, maintained his forces and strengthened them: he hazarded nothing blindly in good fortune, nor despaired of any thing in bad, and found out remedies in conjunctures where his defeat was thought unavoidable.

Against crafty enemies he managed with so much prudence, that he could never be surprised; if it was necessary to prevent them, he marched with a prodigious rapidity;

dity; when he had a mind to slip away from them, he escaped their vigilance, and, so to speak, left them in the snares he had laid for them; he made all possible advantage of the situation of places, and left nothing for chance to do but what wisdom could not effect.

And indeed in order to know the number of his victories, we need only reckon up all the campaigns he made: the most fortunate, and the best known actions are not always the most to be admired, for he was no less victorious when his enemies durst not appear before him, than when he defeated them in pitched battles, but with this difference, that the first manner of conquering is less dangerous and more useful to the State.

However great his desire of glory was, he regulated all its motions by a strict regard to his duty, and the principles of a solid piety. Instead of wishing for a war that he might make a greater figure, he desired nothing so much as publick tranquillity and the happiness of the people: having a mind far above the common way of thinking, he was less solicitous to make his name famous, than to do real service to a Prince who is worthy to be served by such heroes, and who as much surpasses all the Kings of the universe, as the great man of whom we are speaking excelled their captains.

It is surprising that his health should always answer the greatness of his courage; for what youth could appear more vigorous than his last years? and what man in the flower of his age less spared his person, or more chearfully bore the fatigues of a long campaign? One would have thought him insensible of all the toils of war and the inclemencies of the weather, if the continual care he had to spare others had not shewn that he felt them himself.

Did he not give wonderful proofs of this constancy to that famous Leader * of the Imperial Army, who used against him all the subtlety and stratagems of art? After having pushed him by little and little from one defile to another, being at length satisfied with having as it were shut him up in his post, and with the surprising march he had made, and being upon the point of gaining a victory for which he had so remotely paved the way, he, who never flatter'd himself in any thing, was going, as he said, to drive

the Emperor's troops far from our frontiers, and perhaps to force the enemy to ask a peace on conditions glorious for France, when a fatal blow at once cut off all his designs, and the course of so excellent a life.

Human schemes, deceitful hopes, is it thus that you vanish, and that the most illustrious men as well as the meanest are subject to the stroke of death? But this great man by ceasing to live did not cease to conquer: his spirit and his orders, still present to the whole Army, occasioned the gaining of the battle which preceded his funeral; and all the soldiers, animated by a just grief for his loss, did things incredible to revenge it

If what you have heard give you a veneration for this great man, and some love for extraordinary virtues, remember that the same ages which have produced great Captains, have generally produced great Orators; and at a time when we find Scipios and Alexanders, let it be seen that we do not want our Demosthenes's and our Cicero's.

*A Funeral Oration on the Viscount de Turenne by the
Abbot Fleckier, Bishop of Nîmes.*

Fleuerunt eum omnis populus Israel planctu magno, & lugebant dies multos, & dixerunt: quomodo cecidit potens, qui saluum faciebat populum Israel?

I Maccab. c. ix. 26, 27.

All Israel made great lamentation for him, and mourned many days, saying: How is the valiant man fallen that delivered the people of Israel?

I Cannot, Gentlemen, give you a higher idea of the melancholy subject with which I am going to entertain you, than by repeating the noble and expressive words which the Holy Scripture makes use of to praise the life and deplore the death of the wise and valiant Macchabeus. This man, who carried the glory of his nation to the extremities of the earth, who covered his camp with a shield, and forced that of his enemies with the sword; who grieved many Kings that were combined against him, who made Jacob glad by his acts and virtues, and whose memorial is blessed for ever. This man, who defended

the cities of Juda, who humbled the pride of the children of Ammon and Esau, who returned loaded with the spoils of Samaria, after having burnt the Gods of the heathen nations on their own altars: This man, whom God had set round Israel as a wall of brass, against which all the forces of Asia had so often been broken; and who after having defeated numerous Armies, and baffled the haughtiest and ablest Generals of the Kings of Syria, came every year, like the meanest Israelite, to repair with his triumphant hands the ruins of the sanctuary, and would have no other recompence for the service he had done his Country, than the honour of having served it.

This valiant man, this man of an invincible courage, pushing his enemies whom he had put to a shameful flight, received a fatal blow, and was in a manner buried in his triumph. At the first report of this sad accident, all the cities of Judah were moved; floods of tears ran down from the eyes of their inhabitants; they were for some time stunn'd, mute, and immoveable. An effort of grief at length breaking their long and mournful silence, with a voice interrupted with sighs, which sorrow, pity, and fear formed in their breasts, they cried out, *How is this valiant man fallen who delivered the people of Israel?* At these cries Jerusalem redoubled her tears, the arches of the temple shook, Jordan was troubled, and all its banks re-echo'd the sound of these doleful words, *How is this valiant man fallen who delivered the people of Israel?*

Christians, you whom a sad ceremony brings together into this place, do you not recal to remembrance what you saw, what you felt five months ago? Do you not perceive your own affliction in that which I have described? and do not you in your minds substitute him whom I have been speaking to you of in the place of the Hero the Scripture mentions? The virtue and the misfortune of both are alike, and there is nothing now wanting to the first but an Eulogium worthy of him. O that the Divine Spirit, the spirit of energy and truth, had enriched my discourse with those lively and natural images which at once represent virtue and persuade to it, with how many noble ideas should I fill your mind, and what strong impressions would the recital of so many edifying and glorious actions make upon your hearts?

What

What subject was ever better adapted to receive all the ornaments of a grave and solid eloquence, than the life and death of the most high and most mighty Prince Henry de la Tour D'Auvergne, Viscount de Turenne, Marshal General of the Kings Camps and Armies, and Colonel General of the Light Horse? Where do the glorious effects of military virtue shine with more lustre, the conduct of armies, the besieging and taking of towns, the passing of rivers, bold attacks, honourable retreats, well order'd encampments, battles resolutely fought, victories gained, enemies vanquished by force, scattered by address, and wearied out and consumed by a wise and noble patience? Where can so many and so great examples be found but in the actions of a man who was wise, modest, liberal, disinterested, devoted to the service of his King and his Country, great in adversity by his courage, in prosperity by his modesty, in difficulties by his prudence, in dangers by his valour, and in religion by his piety?

What subject can inspire more just and more affecting sentiments, than a sudden and surprizing death, which has suspended the course of our victories, and cut off our pleasing hopes of peace? Ye powers who are enemies of France, you still live, and the spirit of Christian charity forbids me to form a wish for your death. May you only be made to acknowledge the justice of our arms, to receive the peace which notwithstanding your losses you have so often refused, and to extinguish with the abundance of your tears the fire of a war which you have unhappily kindled. God forbid that I carry my wishes farther! The judgments of God are unsearchable. But you *live*, while I in this pulpit lament the *death* of a wise and virtuous General, whose intentions were pure, and whose virtue seem'd to deserve a longer life.

Let us restrain our complaints, Gentlemen; it is time to begin his Eulogium, and to let you see how this mighty man triumph'd over the enemies of the State by his valour, over the passions of his soul by his wisdom, and the errors and vanities of the age by his piety. If I interrupt this order of my discourse, forgive a little confusion in speaking on a subject which has occasioned so much. I shall perhaps sometimes confound the General with the wise man and the Christian. I shall praise sometimes the victories, sometimes the virtues which have obtained them.

If

If I cannot relate so many exploits, I shall discover them in their principles: I shall adore the God of armies, invoke the God of peace, bless the God of mercies, and shall engage your attention, not by the force of eloquence, but by truth and the greatness of the virtues which I have undertaken to speak of.

Expect not, Gentlemen, that I will follow the custom of Orators, and praise M. de Turenne as ordinary men are praised. If his life were less illustrious, I would enlarge upon the greatness and nobleness of his family; and if his own portraiture were less amiable, I would here produce those of his ancestors: but the lustre of his actions effaces that of his birth, and the faintest part of his glory is that of being descended from the ancient and illustrious house of la Tour d'Auvergne, which has mixed its blood with that of Kings and Emperors, and has given masters to Aquitain, Princesses to all the Courts of Europe, and even Queens to France.

But what am I saying? I must not here speak of this as an advantage, I must rather lament it as a misfortune: how glorious soever was the source from whence he sprung, the heresy of the late times had tainted it: he received with this noble blood the principles of error and falsehood, and one of the examples set him by his family was to be ignorant of truth and to resist it. Let us not then make a matter of panegyrick what was to him an occasion of penance; but let us behold the ways to honour and glory which the providence of God opened to him in the world, before his mercy drew him from the paths of perdition and the errors of his forefathers.

He began to carry arms before he was fourteen years of age; sieges and battles served for exercises to his early youth, and his first diversions were victories. Under the Prince of Orange his Uncle by the Mother, he learn'd the art of war in quality of a private soldier, and never through pride or laziness shun'd any employment because it was attended with toil, and required obedience. In this lowest order of the militia he declined no fatigue, feared no danger, did out of honour what others did out of necessity, and never distinguished himself from them but by a greater share of labour, and a nobler application to whatever was his duty.

Thus

Thus began a life, the course of which was to be so glorious; like those rivers which encrease in proportion as they are distant from their springs, and which at length carry convenience and plenty wherever they flow. From that time, he lived for the glory and the safety of the State; he did all the services that could be expected from a firm and active soul when it is joined to a strong robust body: he had in his youth all the prudence of an advanced age, and in an advanced age all the vigour of youth. His days were full according to the terms of Scripture; and as he did not lose his younger years in effeminacy and pleasures, so he was not forced to spend his latter years in sloth and weakness.

What people that was an enemy to France has not felt the effects of his valour? and what place on our frontiers has not been the theatre of his glory? He passed the Alps, and in the famous actions of Casel, Turin, la Route de Quiers, signalized himself by his courage and prudence; and Italy looked upon him as one of the principal instruments of that great and prodigious success, which will one day scarce be believed in history. He pass'd from the Alps to the Pyrenees to assist at the conquest of two important * towns, which secures one of our best Provinces from all the efforts of Spain. He went to the other side of the Rhine to gather up the remains of a conquer'd Army; he took towns, and contributed to the gain of battles. He thus raised himself by degrees, and by his merit alone to the supreme command; and throughout the whole course of his life shewed what can be done for the defence of a Kingdom by a General of an Army who makes himself worthy to command by obeying, and who joins application and experience to valour and genius.

It was then that his mind acted in all its extent; whether it was necessary to prepare, or to decide, to go in pursuit of victory, or to wait for it with patience; to prevent the designs of the enemy by boldness, or dissipate the fears and jealousies of the allies by prudence; to be moderate when successful, or undaunted when unfortunate in war, his soul was always even. He only changed virtues when fortune changed her countenance, being successful without pride, unsuccessful with dignity,

* Perpignan and Colliure.

and almost as much to be admired when with judgment and courage he saved the remains of the conquered troops at Mariendal, as when he beat the Imperialists and Bavarians, and with a victorious Army forced all Germany to beg a peace of France.

It was said that a happy treaty was going to put an end to the wars in Europe, when God, whose judgments, according to the Prophet, are a great deep, had a mind to afflict and punish France by her self, and to abandon her to all the disorders that civil and domestick dissensions produce in a State. Recal to your remembrance, Gentlemen, those times of trouble and confusion, when the dark spirit of discord confounded right with passion, duty with interest, the good cause with the bad, when almost all the brightest stars suffered some eclipse, and the most faithful subjects were drawn away in spite of themselves by the torrents of parties, as those pilots who being surprized by a storm in the open sea, are forced to quit the tract they intended to keep, and to give up themselves to be guided by the winds and the storm. Such is the justice of God, and such is the natural infirmity of men; but the wise easily return to themselves, and there is in politicks as in religion, a kind of repentance more glorious than innocence itself, which more than compensates for a little frailty by extraordinary virtues, and a continual fervour.

But where have I stopt, Gentlemen; your imaginations without doubt already represent to you M. de Turenne at the head of the King's Army. You see him fighting and scattering the Rebels, reclaiming those whom a lie had seduced, confirming those whom fear had shaken, and crying, like another Moses at all the gates of Israel, *Who is on the Lord's side? let him come unto me* *. How great were then his firmness and his wisdom? one while, on the banks of the Loire, followed by a small number of Officers and domesticks, he ran to the defence of a bridge †, and maintain'd it against an Army; and whether it was the boldness of the enterprise, the presence alone of this great man, or the visible protection of heaven that struck the enemy motionless, he stopped those by his resolution whom he could not stop by force, and by that

* Exod. xxxii. 26,

† The Bridge of Gergeau.

prudent and successful rashness raised up again a State that was inclining to ruin. * Another while, making use of all the advantages of time and place, he with a few troops stop't a victorious Army, and deserved even the praises of an enemy who in the times of idolatry would have pass'd for the God of battles. † At another time, towards the banks of the Seine, he by a treaty oblig'd a foreign Prince, into whose most secret designs he had penetrated, to leave France, and give up the hopes he had conceived of making advantage of our troubles.

I might here reckon up the towns taken, and the battles gain'd over the rebels; but let us rather deprive our Hero of a part of his glory, than longer behold the dismal image of our past miseries. Let us speak of his other exploits, which have been as advantageous to France as to himself, and at which our enemies have had no cause to rejoice.

I shall content my self with telling you, that he appeas'd the storm in which the Kingdom was toss'd. If licentiousness was restrained, publick and private feuds suppress'd, if the laws recover'd their ancient force, if order and tranquillity were re-established in the towns and Provinces, and if the members were happily reunited to their head, it is to him, O France, that you owe all this. But hold, I mistake, it was to God, who brings forth from the treasures of his Providence those great souls whom he has chosen as the visible instruments of his power, to produce publick tranquillity and a calm from the bosom of storms, to raise up Kingdoms from their ruins, and, when his justice is satisfied, to reconcile subjects to their Sovereigns.

His courage, which acted with regret in the misfortunes of his Country, seem'd to grow warm in the foreign wars, and his valour was redoubled. I would not be understood, Gentlemen, of vain, indiscreet, headstrong boldness which runs into danger for danger's sake, which exposes it self to no purpose, and has no other end but reputation and the vain applause of men. I mean a prudent well-regulated courage, which grows more animated at the sight of an enemy, which even in danger provides for every thing, and takes all advantages, but still governs

* The affair of Bleneau.

† At Villeneuve Saint George.

it self by its strength, and undertakes what is difficult, but never what is impossible, nor leaves any thing to chance that virtue can bring to pass: a courage, in short, capable to dare every thing, when counsel is usefess; and in order to fulfil its duty, equally prepared to die in a victory or survive a misfortune.

I confess, Gentlemen, that I here sink under the weight of my subject. The great number of the actions I ought to speak of embarrasses me: I cannot describe them all, and I would not omit any. Why have I not the secret to engrave in your minds an invifible and compendious map of Flanders and Germany? I would without confusion mark in your thoughts all that this great Captain did, and would tell you in abridgment according to the places: * here he forced the trenches, and succour'd a town that was besieged; there he surpris'd the enemy, or beat them in open field. † Those towns where you see the French standards erected, have been either defended by his vigilance, or conquer'd by his resolution and courage. ‡ That place, covered by a wood and a river, is the post where he encouraged his frightened troops after an honourable retreat. || Here he marched out of his lines in order to fight, and at one blow took a town and gained a battle. § There distributing what he had left of his own money, he finished a siege, ** and went and forced the enemy to raise another.

I would then reckon up a great many successes, and put you in mind of the bad nights the King of Spain confessed he had passed, and of that *† peace which he fought by so many treaties and alliances, without which, Flanders, that bloody theatre, whereon so many tragical scenes have been represented, that sad and fatal Country, too narrow to contain the armies that devour it, would have encreased the number of our Provinces; and instead of being the unhappy cause of our wars, would have been the peaceable fruit of our victories.

I could shew you, Gentlemen, as many trophies on the banks of the Rhine as on those of the Scheld and the *§ Sambre: I could describe to you battles gained, rivers and

* The relief of Arras. † Condé, Landrecies, Ypres, Oudenarde, &c.

‡ The retreat of Valenciennes. || The battle of Dunes, and taking of Dunkirk. § S. Venant taken. ** Ardres relieved.

*† The peace of the Pyrenees. *§ At Enshheim, Sintzheim, Mulhausen, &c.

defiles pass'd in the sight of the enemy, plains dy'd with their blood, and almost inaccessible mountains crossed in order to drive them far from our frontiers. But the eloquence of the pulpit is not proper for the recital of combats and battles: the tongue of a Priest set apart for the praises of Jesus Christ the Saviour of men, ought not to be employ'd in speaking of an art that tends to their destruction, and I did not come to represent to you scenes of murder and slaughter before these altars, where the blood of bulls is no longer offered in sacrifice to the Lord of hosts, but an unbloody victim to the God of mercy and peace.

Is there not then a Christian bravery and generosity? The Scriptures which command to sanctify wars, do they not teach you that piety is not incompatible with arms? Shall I condemn a profession which religion does not condemn, when its violence is moderated? No, Gentlemen, I know that Princes bear not the sword in vain, that force may act when it is joined with equity, that the Lord of Hosts presides over that awful justice which Sovereigns do themselves, that the right of arms is necessary for the preservation of society, and that wars are allowed for establishing peace, protecting innocence, curbing unbridled malice, and restraining the desires of men within the bounds of Justice.

I know also that wars among Christians ought to be regulated by moderation and charity, that the Generals who manage them are the ministers of the Providence of God, who is always wise, and of the power of Kings, who ought never to be unjust; and that they ought to have their hearts tender and charitable, even when their hands are bloody, and inwardly to adore the Creator when they find themselves reduced to the unhappy necessity of destroying his creatures.

I here, Gentlemen, call to witness the publick faith, and in speaking of M. de Turenne's mildness and moderation, I can have for evidences of what I say all those who have followed him in the Army. Did he ever take pleasure in exerting his power to hurt even those who were looked upon as enemies? Where did he ever leave terrible marks of his anger or private resentment? Which of his victories did he prize for the numbers of the miserable he had ruined, or of the dead he had left upon

upon the field of battle? Whose life did he expose for his own interest or reputation? What soldier has he not tenderly treated as the King's subject and a part of the Commonwealth? What drop of blood has he shed which has not been of service to the common cause?

In the famous battle of the *Downs* he pulled their weapons from the foreign soldiers, whom a natural fierceness exasperated against the vanquish'd. He lamented the unavoidable evils which war brings along with it, and which the times oblige to dissemble, to permit and to do. He knew that there was a higher and more sacred law than that which fortune and pride imposes upon the weak and the unhappy; and that those who live under the law of Jesus Christ ought to be as sparing as possible of blood, which he has consecrated by his own, and of lives which he has redeemed by his death.

He laboured to bring the enemy to submit, not to destroy them: he would have been glad that it had been in his power to attack them without hurting them, to defend himself without offending them, and to bring to equity and reason those whom he was obliged by his duty to use with severity. In short, he had made a kind of system of military morality that was peculiar to himself. He had no other passions but an affection for the King's glory, a desire of peace, and a zeal for the publick good, and no other enemies but pride, injustice, and usurpation: he had accustomed himself to fight without anger, to conquer without ambition, to triumph without vanity, and to follow no other rule in his actions but that of virtue and wisdom. This is what I am to shew you in the second part.

Valour is only a blind impetuous force which confounds and precipitates it self if it be not enlightned and guided by probity and prudence; and the character of a General is not complete, if it does not include wisdom and goodness. What discipline can that man establish in a camp who knows not how to regulate his own temper and conduct? And how can he calm or stir up according to his designs the different passions of an Army, who is not master of his own? Thus the Spirit of God teaches us in the Scriptures that a wise man is better than the mighty, that wisdom is preferable to the arms of men of war, and that he who is patient and ruleth his spirit is
more

more to be esteem'd than he who takes towns and gains battles.

Here, no doubt, Gentlemen, you form in your minds nobler ideas than I can give you. In speaking of M. de Turenne, I acknowledge I cannot raise you above yourselves; and the only advantage which I have is, that I shall say nothing which you will not believe, and that without being a flatterer I may say great things. Did ever man shew more prudence and foresight, manage a war with more method and judgment, use more precaution or find more expedients? Who was ever more active or more upon his guard, better disposed things to their end, or let his designs ripen with so much patience? He took measures that were almost infallible, and penetrating not only into what the enemy had done, but also into what they intended to do, he might be unfortunate, but could never be surpris'd. He distinguished the proper times to attack and to defend: he never hazarded any thing but when he had a great deal to gain, and almost nothing to lose: even when he seem'd to yield, he made himself feared. Such, in short, were his abilities, that when he was victorious, it was owing entirely to his prudence, and when he was vanquish'd, it could only be imputed to fortune.

Reflect, Gentlemen, upon the beginning and the course of the war, which tho' at first but a spark, yet now enflames all Europe. All declared against France; foreign nations were stirr'd up, her allies drawn off, her friends intimidated, the vanquish'd encouraged, and those that envied her arm'd against her. By imaginary fears and jealousies artfully instilled, interests were confounded, faith violat'd, and treaties despis'd. In order to resist so many Armies join'd together against us, I confess there was need of such valiant troops and such experienced Generals as ours: nothing was so formidable as to see all Germany, that great and vast body, compos'd of so many different nations, displaying all its standards, and marching to our frontiers, in order to overwhelm us with force, after having terrified us with multitudes.

It was necessary to oppose to so many enemies a man of a firm and approved courage, of an extensive capacity and consummate experience, who could support the reputation and manage the strength of the Kingdom, who
Y would

would omit nothing that was useful or necessary, and do nothing that was superfluous; who knew occasionally to make advantage of his successes, or recover his losses; who would be sometimes the shield and sometimes the sword of his Country, and who was capable to put in execution the orders he received, or take counsel of himself in emergencies.

You know whom I am speaking of, Gentlemen; you know the particulars of what he did without my informing you. With troops that were considerable only for their courage, and the confidence they had in their General, he stopt and wasted to nothing two great Armies, and forced those to conclude a peace by treaties who thought to have put an end to the war by our entire and speedy defeat. Sometimes he prevented the different bodies of the enemy's forces from joining, and cut off the course of those torrents that would have overflowed France. Sometimes he defeated or scattered them by repeated engagements. Sometimes he pushed them to the other side of their rivers; and always check'd them by bold attempts when there was occasion to recover reputation, and by moderation when it was only necessary to preserve it.

The towns which our enemies had already shared amongst them, are yet within the bounds of our empire; the Provinces which they had already ravaged in expectation and idea, still gather in their harvests; the Places, fortified by art and nature, and which they intended to demolish, are still remaining, and have been only terrified by the vain projects of a conqueror in imagination, who considered the number of our soldiers, but not the prudence of their General.

That prudence was the cause of such glorious success. It kept up between the soldiers and their leader that union which makes an Army invincible; it inspired the troops with that strength, courage and confidence which made them endure and undertake every thing to execute his designs. In short, it made the most stupid sensible of Glory. For, Gentlemen, what is an Army? It is a body animated by an infinite number of different passions, which a man of abilities puts in action for the defence of a Country; it is a troop of armed men, who blindly follow the orders of their leader without know-
ing

ing his designs; it is for the most part a multitude of vile and mercenary souls, who without thinking of their own reputation, labour for that of Kings and Conquerors; it is a confused assembly of libertines, who must be taught to obey, cowards that must be led to battle, rash headstrong men that must be restrained, and impatient spirits that must be accustomed to constancy. How great prudence is necessary to manage so many different wills and inclinations, and make them conspire to the publick good? How difficult is it for a General to make himself feared, without running the hazard of being hated, and frequently of being deserted? and how difficult to make himself beloved, without losing a little of his authority, and relaxing necessary discipline?

Who ever observed those mediums more exactly than the Prince whom we lament? He attached to himself by the bonds of respect and friendship those who are commonly retained by nothing but the fear of punishment; and by his moderation procured to himself an easy and voluntary obedience. When he spoke, every one listen'd as to an Oracle; when he commanded, every one joyfully obeyed his orders; and when he marched, every one imagined he was running to glory. One would have thought that he was going to fight confederate Kings, like another Abraham, with only his own family; that those who followed him were his soldiers and his domesticks, and that he was at the same time General and father of a family. Nothing therefore could stand their attacks, there were no obstacles which they could not surmount, no difficulties which they could not conquer, no dangers that could affright them, no fatigue which they could not undergo, no enterprize that could terrify them, nor any conquest that appeared difficult. How could they refuse any thing to a General who dispensed with his own conveniences that they might live in plenty, who gave up his own repose that he might procure theirs, who eased them of their toils, but never exempted himself from any; and who was prodigal of his own blood, but sparing of theirs?

By what invisible chain did he thus lead captive the wills of men? By that goodness whereby he encouraged some, excused others, and afforded to all the means to advance themselves, to overcome their ill fortune, or to repair their

their faults; by that disinterestedness which carried him to prefer what was more useful to the State to what was more glorious for himself; by that justice which in the distribution of employments never suffer'd him to follow his own inclination to the prejudice of merit; by that nobleness of heart and sentiments which raised him above his own grandeur, and by many other qualities which procured him the esteem and respect of all the world. How willingly would I enter into the motives and circumstances of his actions! With what pleasure would I lay open to you a conduct so regular and uniform; a merit so shining, and free from ostentation; great virtues, proceeding from yet greater principles; an universal uprightness, which led him to apply himself to whatever was his duty, and to reduce it to its just and natural end; a habit of being virtuous, not for the honour with which virtue is attended, but for the reasonableness of it! But it does not belong to me to sound all the depths of that great heart, it was reserved for a tongue more eloquent than mine to express all its motions and interior inclinations.

To reward so many virtues with some extraordinary honour, it was necessary they should be known to a great King, who believed himself ignorant of some things, and was capable of owning it. Far from hence those flattering maxims that Kings only are born with those great talents which others must acquire; that their privileged souls come out of the hands of God that created them, altogether wise and intelligent; that they have no need either of practice or study; that they are virtuous without trouble, and prudent without experience. We live under a King who great and knowing as he is, was willing to be instructed in order to command, who in his way to glory knew how to choose a faithful guide, and who thought it wisdom to make use of that of others. How great an honour, for a subject to accompany his King, to be his Counsellor, and, if I may presume to say it, his example in an important conquest? An honour so much the greater, as favour could have no share in it, as it was founded purely upon merit universally known, and as it was followed by the taking of the most considerable towns in Flanders.

After that glorious mark of esteem and confidence, what projects of advancement and raising his fortune would not an ambitious and covetous man have entertained? How would he have amassed riches and honours, and how dearly would he have sold so much labour and so many services? But this wise and disinterested man, content with the testimonies of his conscience, and rich in his moderation, found the reward of having done well in the pleasure of doing it. Though he might have obtained every thing, he neither demanded nor pretended to any thing; after Solomon's example, he desired only a frugal and honourable condition in a medium between poverty and riches; and whatever offers were made him, he measured his desires by his wants, and confined himself to the narrow limits of meer necessities. He was capable of no other ambition but that of deserving the esteem and good will of his master; that ambition was satisfied, and our age has seen a subject love his King for his great qualities, not for his dignity nor his own fortune; and a King love his subject more for the merit which he knew to be in him, than the services he received from him.

That honour, Gentlemen, did not diminish his modesty. At this word a certain remorse stops me. I'm afraid to publish here the praises which he has so often rejected, and to offend after his death a virtue which he so much loved when he was alive; but let us do justice, and praise him without fear, at a time when we cannot be suspected of flattery, nor he susceptible of vanity. Who ever did so great things? who ever spoke of them with more reserve? If he gained any advantage, you would think by his relation, it was not owing to his abilities, but the enemy's mistake. If he gave an account of a battle, he forgot nothing but that it was he that gain'd it. If he related any of those actions that made him so famous, one would have thought that he had only been a spectator, and would have doubted whether he or fame was deceived. When he returned from those glorious campaigns that will make his name immortal, he shun'd the acclamations of the people, blush'd at his victories, came to hear himself applauded as one comes to make an apology, and was almost afraid to approach the King, because he was obliged out of respect to suffer patiently the

praises with which his Majesty never failed to honour him.

It was then that in the sweet repose of a private condition, this Prince divesting himself of all the glory which he had acquir'd during the war, and confining himself to the conversation of a few chosen friends, exercised himself, without noise, in civil virtues: and being sincere in word, plain and simple in action, faithful in friendship, exact in duty, regular in desires, and great even in the smallest things, he concealed himself, but his reputation discovered him; he went without a train, and without equipage, but every body in their thoughts set him upon a triumphal chariot. People when they saw him, counted the number of enemies he had conquer'd, not of the servants that followed him; all alone as he was, they imagined round about him his virtues and his victories attending him: there is a certain nobleness in that simplicity, and the less proud he was, the more he commanded respect.

There would have been something wanting to his glory, if having every where so many that admired him, he had not likewise had some that envied him. Such is the injustice of men; the purest and most deserved glory offends them: all who raise themselves above them become odious and insupportable, and the most justly acquired and most moderate fortune cannot secure a man from that base and malignant passion. It is the fate of great men to be attacked by it; and it was the privilege of M. de Turenne to have been able to conquer it. Envy was stifled either by his contempt of it, or the perpetual increase of his honour and glory: it was merit that gave birth to it, and merit that killed it. Those who were least favourable to him have acknowledged how necessary he was to the State; those who at first could not bear with his elevation, thought themselves at length obliged to assent to it; and not daring to be grieved at the prosperity of a man who would never have given them the miserable comfort of rejoicing over any faults of his, they joined their voice to that of the publick, and believed that to be *his* enemy was to be the enemy of all France.

But what would all these heroick qualities have signified, if God had not manifested upon him the power of his grace, and if he whom his Providence had made use
of

of for so noble purposes, had been the eternal object of his justice? It was God alone that could dispel the darkness he was involved in, and he kept in his power the happy moment which he had appointed for enlightning him with his truth.

That happy moment came, that point in which all his real glory center'd. He had a glimpse of those snares and precipices which his prejudice had till then entirely concealed from him: he began to walk with precaution, and fear in those wrong paths in which he was straying. Certain rays of grace and light made him perceive that in vain should he fill up the finest places of history if his name was not written in the book of life; that in vain should he gain the whole world if he lost his own soul; that there was but one faith and one Jesus Christ, and one simple indivisible verity, which never discovers it self but to those who seek after it with an humble heart and a disinterested will. He was not yet enlightened; but he began to be docile. How often did he consult his knowing and faithful friends? How often sighing after that lively and efficacious light which alone triumphs over the errors of the mind of man, did he say to Jesus Christ, as the blind man in the Gospel, *Lord make me to see?* How often did he attempt with a weak hand to pull off from his eyes the fatal vail that hinder'd him from seeing truth? How often had he recourse to those antient and pure fountains which Jesus Christ left to his Church, drawing thence with delight and joy the waters of sound doctrine?

Habit, pretexts, engagements, the shame of changing, the pleasure of being look'd upon as the Chief and Protector of Israel, those vain and specious reasons of flesh and blood, could not restrain him. God broke all his fetters, and bringing him into the liberty of his children, deliver'd him from the power of darkness, and translated him into the Kingdom of his dear Son, to whom he belonged by eternal election. Here a new order of things presents it self to me: I see greater actions, nobler motives, and a more visible protection of God. I shall hereafter speak of a wisdom that was accompanied by true piety and a courage that was strengthened by the Divine Spirit. Renew therefore your attention in this last part of my discourse, and supply in your thoughts what may be wanting in my words and expressions. Y 4 If

If M. de Turenne had known only how to fight and conquer; if he had not risen higher than human virtues; if his valour and prudence had not been animated by a spirit of faith and charity, I would have placed him among the Scipio's and Fabius's; I would have left to vanity the care of honouring vanity, and I would not have come to a sacred place to have made an Eulogium upon a profane man. If he had ended his days in blindness and error, I should have in vain praised the virtues which God would not have crowned, I should have shed useless tears over his grave; and if I had spoken of his glory, it would have been only in order to have lamented his unhappiness. But, thanks to Jesus Christ, I speak of a Christian, who was illuminated by the light of faith, who was actuated by the principles of pure Religion, and who consecrated by a sincere piety all that can flatter the ambition or pride of men. Thus the praises which I give him return to God, who is the fountain of them; and as it was truth which sanctified him, so it is likewise truth which praises him.

How sincere was his conversion, Gentlemen, and how different from that of those, who forsaking hereby from interested views, change their opinions without changing their manners, who enter into the bosom of the Church only to wound her the deeper by a scandalous life, and from being declared enemies, become rebellious children! Though his mind had escaped the depravation commonly occasioned by passions, yet he was still the more careful to regulate it; he thought that the innocence of his life ought to be conformable to the purity of his faith; he knew truth, he loved it, and followed it. With what humble respect did he assist at sacred mysteries? With what docility did he hearken to the wholesome instructions of the Preachers of the Gospel? With what submission did he adore the works of God which the mind of man cannot comprehend? He was a true worshipper in spirit and in truth; he sought the Lord, according to the wise man's counsel, in simplicity of heart; was an irreconcilable enemy to impiety; far removed from superstition, and incapable of hypocrisy.

Scarce had he embraced the sound doctrine, but he became the defender of it; as soon as he had put on the armour of light, he combated the works of darkness: he beheld with horror the abyss from whence he had escaped

ed, and stretched out his hand to those whom he had left in it. One would have thought he had been commissioned to bring into the bosom of the Church all those whom schism had separated from her: he invited them by his counsels, attracted them by his benefits, pressed them with his reasons, convinced them by his experience, pointed out to them the rocks upon which human reason has so often been shipwrecked, and shew'd behind him, to use Saint Augustin's words, the bridge of the mercy of God over which he himself had passed. Sometimes he kindled the zeal of the Doctors, and exhorted them to oppose the force of truth to presumptuous falshood. Sometimes he discovered to them those soft and insinuating ways which gain the heart in order to gain the mind. Sometimes he raised, according to his abilities, the necessary funds for assisting those who had forsaken all to follow Jesus Christ who called them. You Bishops who were the confidants of his zeal, you know that busied as he was in his last warlike exploits, yet he concerted projects with you for the advancement of religion, and forgot nothing that could contribute either to the instruction of those whom long prepossession had blinded, or the gaining of those whom avarice and interest kept still in their errors; being a worthy son of that Church, whose charity, like God's, extends to all, and which procures to her children, besides an eternal inheritance, even relief in their temporal necessities.

Such, Gentlemen, was the disposition of his soul, when the providence of God permitted the King who was justly offended, to carry the war into the heart of an unjust and ungrateful Republick, and to make those feel the force of his arms who despised his favours, and would oppose themselves to his glory. It was then that our Hero again took up arms, and that in attending on his master and at the head of his Army, he exposed his life in a war not only fortunate but holy, where victory could hardly keep up with the rapidity of the conqueror, and where God triumph'd with the Prince. How great was his joy when after having forced towns, he saw his illustrious nephew, more eminent by his virtues than by his purple, opening and reconciling churches? Under the orders of a Prince equally pious and powerful, the one made his arms prosper, the other extended religion; the one beat down ramparts, the other restor'd altars; the one ravaged the lands

of

of the Philistines, the other carried the ark round the tents of Israel : then joining their vows together, as their hearts were already united, the nephew shared in the services the uncle did the State, and the uncle in those which the nephew did the Church.

Let us follow this Prince in his last campaigns, and consider so many difficult enterprises, and so many glorious successes, as proofs of his courage, and rewards of his piety. To begin battles by prayer, to restrain impiety and blasphemy, to protect holy persons and things from the insolence and avarice of the soldiers, to invoke the Lord of Hosts in all dangers, is the duty and the ordinary care of all Generals. But he went further ; even when he commanded the troops, he looked upon himself as a soldier of Jesus Christ ; he sanctified the wars by the purity of his intentions, the desire of a happy peace, and the laws of a Christian Discipline ; he considered his soldiers as his brethren, and thought himself obliged to exercise charity in a cruel profession, where even humanity is often forgot. Being animated by such great motives, he surpassed himself, and made it appear that courage becomes more firm when it is supported by principles of religion, that there is a pious magnanimity which procures good success in spite of dangers and obstacles, and that a warrior is invincible when he fights in faith, and when he lends pure hands to the God of battles who guides them.

As he had all his glory from God, so he refer'd it all to him, and entertained no other Confidence but what was founded upon the name of the Lord. Why may not I represent here one of those important occasions, wherein with a few troops he attacked all the forces of Germany ? After a continued march of three days, and passing three rivers, came up with the enemy and gave them battle : numbers on one side, and valour on the other for a long time suspended the fortune of the day ; at length courage got the better of multitude, the enemy fell into disorder and began to give way. Instantly the cry was, *Victory*, when the General checking that emotion which is usual in the heat of battle, and speaking in a severe tone, " Stop, said he, our lot is not in our own hands, " and we shall ourselves be conquered if the Lord does " not favour us." At these words, he lifted up his eyes to heaven, from whence his succour came, and continuing

tinuing to give his orders, waited with submission between hope and fear till heaven should execute its own decrees.

How difficult is it, Gentlemen, to be at the same time victorious and humble? Success in war leaves a certain affecting pleasure in the mind which intirely fills and possesses it. Conquerors ascribe to themselves a superiority of power and strength, they crown themselves with their own hands, they erect trophies in secret to themselves, they look upon the laurels which they have gathered with trouble, and often water'd with their blood, as properly their own; and even when they give solemn thanks to God, and hang up in his sacred temples the torn and bloody standards which they have taken from the enemy, how great danger is there lest vanity stifle a part of their thanksgiving, lest they mix with the vows they pay to the Lord the applauses which they think due to themselves, and reserve some grains of that incense which is going to be burnt upon the altars?

It was upon those occasions, that M. de Turenne offered up all the glory to him to whom it properly belonged: if he march'd, he acknowledged that it was God who conducted and guided him; if he defended towns, he knew that in vain did he defend them, if God did not guard them: if he intrenched himself, he believed that it was God who made a rampart round him to protect him from all insults; if he fought, he knew from whence he drew all his strength; and if he triumph'd, he thought he saw an invisible hand in the heavens crowning him. Thus referring to their origin all the favours he received, he thereby obtained new ones; and no longer reckon'd up the number of the enemies that surrounded him, but without being astonished at their multitude or strength, he said with the Prophet, *These men trust in the number of their men of war and of their chariots, as for us we rely upon the protection of the Almighty.* In this faithful and just confidence, he redoubled his ardour, formed great designs, did great things, and began a campaign which in all probability would have proved fatal to the Empire.

He passed the Rhine, and deceived the vigilance of a General of great abilities and foresight; he observed the motions of the enemy, raised the courage of the allies, kept steady the suspected and wavering faith of our neighbours,

bours, took from some the will, from others the power to hurt, and making advantage of all those important conjunctures, which pave the way to great and glorious events, he left nothing to fortune that counsel and human prudence could effect. The enemy confounded and disconcerted, began already to tremble in their camp; that eagle, whose bold flight had a little before terrified our provinces, began already to take wing in order to save itself in the mountains; those brazen thunders, which hell invented for the destruction of men, thundered from all sides to favour and hasten the retreat, and France in suspense waited the success of an enterprize, which, according to all the rules of war, was infallible.

Alas! we knew all that we could hope for, but never thought on what we had to fear. Divine providence had concealed from us a misfortune greater than the loss of a battle; it was the loss of a life which each of us would have redeemed with our own, and all that we could gain, was not worth what we were going to lose. O God, terrible but just in thy counsels concerning the children of men, thou disposest of conquerors and their victories! To accomplish thy will, and to make thy judgments feared, thy power overturns those whom it had exalted; thou sacrifice great victims to thy sovereign greatness, and strikest, when thou pleasest, those illustrious heads which thou hast so often crowned.

Expect not Gentlemen, that I will here open a tragical scene, that I will represent this great man stretched on his own trophies, that I will discover his pale and bloody body, round which the thunder that struck it still smokes; that I will make his blood cry like that of Abel, and expose before your eyes the sorrowful images of religion and his country in tears. In ordinary losses, people thus excite the compassion of their auditors, and by studied expressions of sorrow, draw some vain and forced tears from their eyes; but a death which is unfeignedly lamented is described without art; every one feels in himself the source of his grief, and opens up his own wounds, and there is no need of stirring up the imagination in order to affect the heart.

I had almost broke off my discourse here. Gentlemen, I feel my mind disturbed. Turenne dies; all is in confusion, fortune wavers, victory is weary, the peace is retarded, the
good

good intentions of the Allies slacken, the courage of the soldiers is sunk by grief and raised again by revenge; the whole camp is astonished; the wounded think of the loss they have sustained, not of the wounds they have received; dying fathers send their sons to lament the death of their General; the Army in mourning is employed in his funeral obsequies; and fame, which takes pleasure in spreading through the world extraordinary accidents, flies to fill all Europe with a glorious history of this Prince's life, and a sad regret for his death.

What sighs, what lamentations, what praises resound in the towns and in the provinces? One seeing his crop growing, blesses the memory of him to whom he owed the hope of gathering it; another, being yet in quiet possession of the inheritance he received from his ancestors, wishes eternal peace to him who saved it from the ravage and cruelty of war. Here they offer the adorable sacrifice of Jesus Christ for the soul of him who consecrated his life and his blood to the publick good; there they prepare for him funeral solemnities in the place where they hoped to celebrate his triumph. Every one chooses, in so excellent a life, that part which to him seems the brightest; every one undertakes his eulogium; and every one interrupting himself with sighs and tears, admires the past, regrets the present, and trembles for the future. Thus all the Kingdom laments the death of its defender; and the loss of one man becomes a publick calamity.

Why, O my God, if I who am but dust and ashes may presume to pour out my soul in thy presence, and speak to thee; why do we lose him in the most urgent necessity, in the midst of his great exploits, at the highest point of his valour, and in the maturity of his wisdom? Is it because that after so many actions worthy of immortality he had no longer any thing mortal to do? Was the time come when he was to reap the fruit of so many Christian virtues, and to receive from thee the crown of righteousness which thou keepest for those who have finished a glorious course? Perhaps we have put too much confidence in him, and thou forbidest us, in thy scriptures, to make to ourselves an arm of flesh, or to put our trust in the children of men. Perhaps it is a punishment for our pride, ambition and injustice. As there arises from the bottoms of the vallies the thick vapours of which the
thunder

thunder that falls upon the tops of the mountains is formed, so iniquities proceed out of the hearts of men, the punishment whereof thou inflictest upon the head of those who govern or defend them. I do not attempt, O Lord, to fathom the abysses of thy judgments, or to discover the secret and invisible springs which put thy mercy or justice in motion: I will and I ought to adore them. But thou art just; thou afflictest us; and in an age so corrupted as ours, we ought not to seek for the causes of our miseries, but in the irregularity of our lives.

Let us then, Gentlemen, draw motives to repentance from our grief, and let us not seek for true and solid comfort but in the piety of this great man. Countrymen, strangers, enemies, nations, Kings and Emperors lament and honour him; but what can they contribute to his real happiness? Even his own King; and how great a King! honours him by his grief and his tears; a great and precious mark of affection and esteem for a subject, but useless to a Christian. He will live, I confess, in the minds and memories of men, but the scripture teaches me, that man's thoughts, nay man himself is but vanity. A magnificent tomb will contain his sad remains, but he shall come out of that proud monument, not to be praised for his heroic exploits, but to be judged according to his good or evil works: his ashes will be mixed with those of Kings who have governed this Kingdom which he has so generously defended; but after all, what remains to those Kings more than to him, of the applauses of the world, their crowd of Courtiers, the lustre and pomp of their fortunes, but an eternal silence, a frightful solitude, and a terrible expectation of the judgments of God, under those precious marbles that cover them? Let the world then honour human greatness as it pleases, God is the sole reward of Christian virtues.

O Death! too sudden, but yet, by the mercy of the Lord, of a long time foreseen; of how many instructing words, of how many holy examples hast thou deprived us? we had seen, (and how edifying a sight would it have been!) a Christian dying humbly in the midst of victories and triumphs. With what earnestness would he have employed his last moments in inwardly mourning for his past errors, in abasing himself before the Majesty of God, and in imploring the assistance of his arm, not against visible enemies,

enemies, but against those of his salvation? His lively faith and fervent charity, would, no doubt, have affected us, and we should have had a pattern of confidence without presumption, fear without weakness, repentance without artifice, constancy without affectation, and a death precious in the sight of God and man.

Are not these conjectures just, Gentlemen? Why do I call them conjectures? they were formed designs; he had resolved to live as holily as I presume he died. Being ready to cast all his crowns at the foot of the throne of Jesus Christ, like those conquerors in the Apocalypse, and to gather together all his glory, in order to divest himself of it by a voluntary retirement, he was already no longer of this world tho' providence kept him in it. Amidst the tumult of arms, he entertained the sweet and secret hopes of solitude; with one hand he discomfited the Amalekites, and had already lifted up the other to draw down upon himself the blessings of heaven. This Joshua in battle, performed the office of Moses on the Mount; and under the arms of a warrior, had the heart and will of a penitent.

O Lord, who enlightenest the darkest recesses of our hearts, and seest in our most secret intentions the things that are not, as those that are, receive into the bosom of thy glory this soul which would shortly have been entirely taken up with the thoughts of thy eternity; receive those desires which thou thy self didst inspire him with; he wanted time, not courage to fulfil them. If thou callest for works together with his desires, behold the charities which he gave or appointed for the relief and salvation of his brethren; behold the erring souls which he brought back to thee by his assistance, his counsel and his example; behold the blood of thy people which he has so often spared; behold the blood which he so generously shed for us; and to say yet more than all, behold the blood which Jesus Christ poured out for him.

Ye ministers of the Lord finish the holy sacrifice: ye Christians redouble your vows and prayers, that God may admit him, for a recompence of his works, to the mansions of eternal rest, and may give in heaven a never ending peace to him who thrice procured us peace upon earth, transient indeed, but always pleasing and always desirable.

*Part of a funeral oration on the Prince of Condé,
spoken by Abbot Bossuet Bishop of Meaux.*

IT has been in our age an extraordinary sight, to behold at the same time and in the same campaigns, *two Men* whom the common voice of all Europe equalled to the greatest Generals of antiquity, sometimes at the head of separate bodies; sometimes united more by a concurrence of sentiments than the orders which the inferior received from the superior; sometimes opposed front to front, and mutually redoubling the activity and vigilance of each other, as if it had been the will of God, whose wisdom, according to scripture, often sports in the universe, to let us see them in all points of view and to show us at the same time all that men can do. What encampments! what fine marches! what bold attempts! what precautions! what dangers! what stratagems! Were there ever seen in two men the same virtues with so different, not to say contrary characters? the one seemed to act from profound reflection, and the other by sudden illuminations; the latter by consequence more active but without precipitation; the former with a cooler air yet without slowness, being more bold in action than in speech, and resolved and determined within, even when outwardly he seemed embarrassed. The one as soon as he appeared in the army, gave a high idea of his valour, and raised expectations of something extraordinary, but always advanced in order, and came as it were by degrees to perform those wonders which finished the course of his life: the other, like a man inspired from his first battle, equalled the most accomplished masters. The one by brisk and continual efforts, forced the admiration of mankind and silenced envy; the other cast immediately so bright a light that it durst not attack him. The one, in short, by the profoundness of his genius and the incredible supplies of his courage, raised himself above the greatest dangers, and knew even how to make advantage of all the faithlessness of fortune; the other by the superiority of his high birth, the great thoughts which heaven inspired him with, and a kind of wonderful instinct, of which men know not the secret, seemed born to enslave fortune and force the fates. And that we

might always see great but different characters in these two men, the one being carried off by a sudden stroke, died for his country like a Judas Macchabeus ; the other mourn'd for him as his father, and the Court and all the people lamented him ; his piety is praised as much as his courage, and his memory shall never decay through time. The other like David, raised by arms to the height of glory, like him also died in his bed, publishing the praises of God and instructing his family, and left all hearts full of the lustre of his life and the easiness of his death. How great a sight to behold and consider these two men, to learn from each of them all the esteem which the other deserved !

The end of the SECOND PART.



P R E F A C E,

BY THE

Cardinal de B O U I L L O N *.

THE King of England, JAMES II. having done me the honour to impart to me in discourse, in the year 1695, divers particulars, and some considerable actions of the life of the late M. de Turenne my uncle, which were unknown to me, as not being mentioned in those Memoirs I had by me of his own hand-writing, I made bold to represent to that Prince, that I was very sorry I was debarred by the profound respect I had for his Majesty, from most humbly begging, that he would be pleased, for the sake of that kindness he had for the late M. de Turenne, to commit to writing, at such hours as would be least incommodious to him, those particulars and those actions of his life to which I was an utter stranger; and I farther said, that I would not scruple to take the liberty of asking this favour of any body but his Majesty, whom I ought to respect even more than the memory of the late M. de Turenne, which, till that moment, was the thing in the world I held most dear. Upon this, his Majesty, out of his unparallel'd goodness and generosity, told me he would with pleasure do what I wished, as soon as possibly he could, and even acquainted me, that as he had already written in English, by way of Annals, the Memoirs of his own life, he would from them extract and translate into French, whatever related to the campaigns he had made in the army of France commanded by M. de Turenne, and those he afterwards made in the Low Countries in the Army of Spain till the peace of the Pyrennées was proclaimed,

* This Preface is in French, and prefixed to the Duke of York's Memoirs, and written with the Cardinal de Bouillon's own hand.

and King CHARLES II. his brother, restored and placed on the throne of Great Britain. It was an agreeable surprise to me, the 27th of January the next year 1696, when going to St. Germain en Laye, to pay my respects to that great and religious King; he took me into his closet, where he told me he would now perform the promise he had made me the preceding year, and at the same time he put into my hand the sheets hereto annexed, into which, he assured me, he had transferred every thing that he had found in his Memoirs concerning the late M. de Turenne, from the year 1652 inclusive, to the year 1660; adding, that he gave it me with gladness, not only on account of M. de Turenne, whose memory, he said, would be all his life long most dear and precious to him, as taking him to be the most consummate General and the greatest man he ever knew, and the best friend he ever had; but also, in regard of the personal friendship he had for myself in particular. He however recommended to me, never to permit these Memoirs to be perused by any person whatever till after his decease. Having return'd his Majesty my most humble thanks for this favour, I promised him I would obey his commands; which promise I faithfully kept as long as he lived. This gift, from the hands of so great a King, appeared to me so valuable, and so greatly tending to the honour of the late M. de Turenne, and of our whole family, that from that very moment I resolv'd, as I told his Majesty, when I received from him this rich present, I would entail it for ever on the eldest branch of our family, as I accordingly do by these presents, being at Rome the 16th of February, in the Year 1715, and having there by the providence of God, found again this inestimable book which I had mislaid, and despaired of ever seeing more.

Signed, THE CARDINAL DE BOUILLON,
Dean of the Sacred College.

MEMOIRS

O F

The DUKE of YORK.

BOOK FIRST

Of the Civil Wars in FRANCE.

THE Duke of York was in France with the Queen An. 1652. his mother, in 1652, when Cardinal Mazarin's return having render'd the Court irreconcilable to that Minister's enemies this Prince, judging the war would soon be rekindled with great violence, and being extremely desirous to capacitate himself to do the King his brother all useful service, whenever an opportunity should offer, he resolv'd, if he could obtain his and the Queen's leave, to make a campaign as a volunteer in the Army of the King of France. The Chevalier Berkeley was the only person that made no opposition to this design when it was first propos'd; but the Duke strenuously insisting upon the thing, it was consented to, and leave was granted. But still there remained a difficulty, not so easy to be overcome as the first; nothing was so scarce as money. The Court of France was then at Angers, and in very necessitous circumstances; so that, had not a certain Gascoin Gentleman, named Gautier, who had served in England, lent him three hundred pistoles, it would have been utterly impossible for him to have gone into the field.

With this small sum, they fell to work upon his equipage: the King his brother gave him a set of six horses, which the Lord Crofts had brought from Poland: they were indeed too small for a coach, but they served to mount

An. 1652. two or three footmen and as many grooms : two mules were hired to carry to the Army a field-bed and the small baggage. The Duke was to be accompanied only by the Chevalier Berkeley and Colonel Werden, and he had not one led horse for change in case of necessity. These few preparatives were easily made with that secrecy which was necessary to prevent his being stopt, as 'tis probable he would have been, had his design of going to the King's Army been discovered; besides, that he could not handsomely have taken leave of the Duke of Orleans his uncle, to go and serve in the contrary party to his. To avoid this inconvenience, he went with the King his brother to S. Germain en Laye, under a pretence of hunting; and after he had staid there two or three days, he took his leave and departed the 21st of April, to go and join the Army.

He passed through the *Fauxbourg S. Antoine*, and could not get further than Charenton the first night. The next day he reach'd Corbeil. Arriving at the suburb, he there found some companies of the regiment of guards, against whom the towns people had shut the gates. The Duke of York, tho' he much doubted whether he should be admitted, yet put it to the hazard, and presented himself at the gates: a world of objections were made to him; however, at last, he by fair words prevailed to be admitted on foot, and on condition he left his horses in the suburb. Afterwards, having represented to the magistrates the dangers to which they exposed themselves, by persisting to refuse entrance to the King's troops, they at last suffered themselves to be persuaded, though 'tis certain had they continued in their obstinacy, the Court, which was then got to Melun. would have had a great deal of trouble to have possessed themselves of the place, both on account of its strong situation and its nearness to Paris; and if the King by this unforeseen accident had not become master of it, his affairs would have suffered greatly; whereas this post proved afterwards of very great advantage to him upon many occasions.

As soon as ever the Court was informed that the King's troops were entered into Corbeil, it left Melun and went thither, where the Duke of York waited its coming, and by its arrival he got a small supply of money, which he stood in great need of, not having above twenty pistoles left when he came into that town. His equipage was augmented

mented with one horse and two mules. He set out the same evening for Chatres, with several volunteers of the Court who accompanied him, and there he found the Army, which was arrived but a few hours before him. Before we begin a relation of this campaign, and those which followed, it is necessary to go back a little, in order to lay open the state of affairs in France.

In the beginning of this year the Court was reduced to the utmost extremity: the number of such as continued faithful subjects to the King was small; even those whose interest it was to be the most zealous for the service and safety of the State, were the principal instruments in the troubles which tore it to pieces, under the specious pretence, which has been constantly used in all rebellions, of removing evil counsellors from the King's person. To make this complaint the more plausible, declamatory invectives were levelled at the Minister, and great cry made, that it was a shame for France to suffer herself to be governed by a foreigner, whilst there were so many Princes of the blood fitter and more capable than the Cardinal to sustain the Administration. These Princes were at the head of the malecontents, followed by most of the great Lords and men of rank and fortune in the Kingdom: the most considerable cities and the greater number of the Parliaments had declared for them; and though the Duke of Longueville had not openly taken any side, it was well known he inclined, and all Normandy with him, to that of the Princes, and that he only affected to be neuter till such time as he could without danger join the strongest. Whatever proposals could be made him on the part of the King, he still found pretences to elude them, and to excuse himself from receiving him into Rouen, at a time when the greatest towns refused to open their gates to him, and even the least, such as Corbeil, followed the same example; so universally was the poison spread all over the Kingdom.

The Spaniards, ever intent on making their advantages of the disorders of France, left no means unattempted to foment them, in hopes to regain in a short time the places she had taken from them, and which had cost her so many years, so much labour, such effusion of blood and expence of treasure: nay, it is highly probable, that they had vaster designs, and flattered themselves with the hopes of entirely crushing this Monarchy, or at least weakening
of

An. 1652. it to such a degree, that it should not for a long time be able to attack them : but they took wrong measures, and their precautions and policy being over-strained, made all their schemes miscarry. Besides money, and magnificent promises, which they scattered among the leaders of the malecontents, they sent from Flanders, to strengthen the Army of the Princes, some troops under the command of the Duke de Nemours, who had gone purposely to Brussels to ask succours. They entered France early in the spring, to the number of about 7000 men, horse and foot, and passed the Seine at Mantes, where the Duke of Sulli was Governor, and who might, if he had pleased, have refused them passage, and have very much retarded their junction with the Army of the Princes, which was assembled in the neighbourhood of Montargis. From the time of that junction, and the taking of Angers by the King's troops, nothing of note happened till the affair of Blesneau, except that M. de Turenne, whom these Memoirs more especially relate to, prevented the design which the enemy had to make themselves masters of Gergeau : they had already seiz'd one end of the bridge, and would not have been long before they had possessed themselves of the place, whose whole defence was a single gate and a very few soldiers, if M. de Turenne had not casually arrived there with troops enough to prevent the execution of that scheme, which, if it had succeeded, would have been of great advantage to them. They were obliged to retire with some loss, of which the most considerable was that of M. Sirot, Lieutenant General, one of their best officers.

The Court went to Gien, where the Army cross'd the Loire, and took up their quarters round Blesneau. That of the Princes advanced to Lorris. Whilst this was doing, the Prince of Condé departed secretly from Guienne, where his affairs were in a very bad condition, in order to go to Paris, where his presence was more necessary. He was not attended in this dangerous journey with above four or five persons. He was scarce arrived there, but he was obliged to set out again and put himself at the head of the Army of the Princes ; and being informed in what condition the King's troops were, he resolved to attack them in their quarters, which they had been obliged to extend pretty wide for the conveniency of forage. M. de
Turenne

Turenne had his at Briare, and those of Marshal d'Hoc-^{An. 1652.} quincourt were at Blesneau. The latter, upon advice that the Army of the Princes was moving towards him, ordered his troops in case of alarm, to march to the rendezvous he had appointed them between M. de Turenne's quarters and his own. He at the same time sent advanced guards towards the enemy, and posted dragoons in a pass, through which, in all appearance, they were to come. M. de Turenne having been likewise inform'd of their design, went himself to M. d'Hoquincourt, who was the most exposed, to advertise him of it.

The dragoons, on whom M. d'Hoquincourt had relied, and whom he supposed capable of stopping the enemy in the pass, behaved themselves ill; for they were no sooner attacked but either through cowardice or treachery, they forsook their post. The Prince pursuing his advantage, fell upon M. d'Hocquincourt's quarter, which after a short resistance was forced, not without some loss on both sides. The beaten troops got away by favour of the night, lost all their baggage, and their terror was so great, they forgot the rendezvous which had been appointed them. The enemy who were hinder'd by the night from pursuing them, did not doubt but as soon as it grew light, they should beat M. de Turenne, whom they knew to be near them, if he did not retire in time. The whole Kingdom would have been in extreme danger, if this little Army had been put to the rout. The King, together with all his Court, could hardly have escaped falling into the hands of the Princes; and every thing was to be feared, at a time when the ambition of some great men knew no bounds.

As soon as M. de Turenne had intelligence of the enemy's approaching, he marched out of his quarters to the rendezvous, at the same time sending out small parties, who quickly came and informed him that M. d'Hocquincourt's quarters had been forced. The night was so dark, he could not well know the post he had taken. It was dangerous to advance, the enemy being so near, and to retreat was no less dangerous, not knowing the country well enough. He was afraid of intimidating his troops, and putting them in confusion: he resolved therefore to stay where he was, hoping thereby to give his dispersed troops time to rejoin him. At dawn of day, when he discovered

An. 1652. discovered the enemy, he observed with much joy, that he could possess himself of a very advantageous post, where they could not come at him without passing through a very narrow *defilée*.

Behind this *defilée* he drew up his little Army in *battalia*, having a wood on the one side, and a great pond of water on the other. Some officers proposed to him the posting along the wood some small parties of infantry, the better to defend the passes. He did not follow their advice; because, as he afterwards told the Duke of York, the enemies infantry being more numerous than his by one half, they would have found it no hard matter to drive them out of the wood, which must have obliged him to have gone to their assistance, and would have so far engaged him, that he could not have avoided the intire defeat of his troops. He thought it best to leave the wood bare, and removed himself above a musket shot off, between the wood and the *defilée*. In this situation he waited for the enemy, who seeing him take such right measures, did not dare to attack him. They continued on both sides in order of battle, contenting themselves with watching and canonading each other, till M. de Turenne counterfeiting a retreat, the enemy thought they had an opportunity to charge him, and marched in *battalia* to the *defilée*. Fifteen or twenty squadrons had already passed it, when M. de Turenne turned upon them, and obliged them to retire with so much the more disorder and precipitancy, as they had no other course to take to avoid being entirely cut to pieces; and as the main body of their Army was advanced near the *defilée*, the King's Army resuming their former post, with their canon did terrible execution on the enemy, who in their hurry trod down each other in heaps. This canonading held all the rest of the day.

At last, M. d'Hocquincourt's troops arrived in the evening, and joined M. de Turenne, who was still in presence of the enemy, and now the match was not altogether so unequal. It is not known who retreated first; be that as it will, M. de Turenne in this important action, by his conduct and resolution, saved the State, which if this Army had been defeated, would have had no resource at all, or at least would have suffered such a confusion as it would not easily have recovered.

After

After this action, the Prince of Condé left the Army An. 1652. to go to Paris, where he was received with great applause, his party exaggerating his advantages far beyond the truth. His absence was a great prejudice to the interests of the cabal. There was no body left to command the army in chief; M. de Tavannes commanded only the troops of the Prince, M. de Valon those of the Duke of Orleans, and M. de Clinchamps the Spaniards: though they had all three of them both courage and capacity, not one of them had a head for leading an Army; and that happened which always does happen, when there is no chief Commander over all the troops in general; though they had one and the same interest in common, they were divided in their designs, and jealousy spoilt all. M. de Turenne was too wise not to improve this misunderstanding: though the Armies were at no great distance from each other, he found means to amuse the enemy, and to order his motions so dexterously, that by making long marches in concert with the Court, he artfully slipped in between them and Paris; and though he had a large compass to fetch, his diligence was such, that he got to Chatres the one and twentieth of April, when the enemy were but at Etampes. The Court then might have gone to Paris, as had been resolved on; the most considerable of the King's party in that city, nay, even Cardinal de Retz was for it: but whether the Court wanted courage, or the artifices of Mazarin's enemies, who had a mind to frighten him, prevailed, it staid at Melun, and came to Corbeil much about the same time as M. de Turenne arrived at Chatres with the Army, where the Duke of York joined him.

Some days passed, and nothing considerable happened: the parties which were sent towards Etampes often brought away horses which were out a foraging, and some prisoners, who reported that the enemy's whole Army was quartered in the town and suburbs. Mademoiselle sent a trumpet to M. de Turenne, to desire a passport to go to Paris: she was coming from Orleans, where her presence and interest had prevailed, and caused that city to declare for the Princes, and she could not return to Paris without passing through both Armies. M. de Turenne was scrupulous of granting her a passport without leave of the Court, whither he dispatched an express; but before his return, having considered that he might make some advantage of

Aug. 1652. of this request of the Princess, and knowing the day she was to reach Etampes, he sent her a passport. It was told M. de Turenne by the parties he had sent out, that the enemy had not been foraging for two or three days past, from whence he guess'd she was to see the Army drawn up that day, which was the third of May; that the next day she would set out for Paris; that the enemy not going to forage till the fourth, they would be obliged to make a great one, after having put it off so long; that as most of the General Officers would not fail to attend Mademoiselle part of the way, the foraging would be performed without much precaution. All these circumstances having been well considered, he resolv'd with M. d'Hocquincourt to march all night with the Army: he left in Chatres no more than a hundred horse and one regiment of foot to guard the town and baggage. In an hour's time the whole Army was in motion: they began their march at eight a-clock in the evening with great silence and much order: the design was to post themselves between the enemy's army and the city of Orleans, and so intercept the foragers, who it was suppos'd would be found in the field on that side.

They pass'd all the defiles before sun-rising; M. d'Hocquincourt led the van, it being his turn. It was necessary to go somewhat about, to get between Etampes and Orleans; which being done, the Army began to form into order of battle, when advice was brought by some who had been sent out to get intelligence, that the enemy, instead of being a foraging, had their Army in battalia a league off, in a plain above Etampes. A resolution was presently taken to march towards them and give them battle; but as soon as they perceiv'd from a rising ground, the King's Army, whose march till then they knew nothing of, they began to retire into the town: the cavalry was order'd to trot briskly after them, in hopes to charge their rear before it could be under cover; and the infantry and artillery were order'd to follow with all possible diligence.

The enemy instead of going out to forage that day, as it was judg'd they would, drew out their Army to let Mademoiselle, who was to depart in the morning, see it in order of battle. When their Generals espied the King's Army, they ask'd her advice. She answer'd, they must follow the orders of the Duke of Orleans and the Prince of Condé, and immediately put herself on
her

her journey. They made such haste to get their Army into the town, that before M. de Turenne and M. d'Hocquincourt had gained the rising ground above the town, the enemy were in safety. This precipitate retreat occasioned a new resolution, which was to attack the suburbs: orders were sent to the infantry to dispose themselves for it as they marched, and to make proper detachments.

Etampes lies in a bottom: a small river flows along the side of its walls, and afterwards loses itself in the Seine at Corbeil; that side of the town and suburb which is on the right as you go from Chartres, is commanded by a small eminence, the whole plain whereof may be discovered from the top of one of the highest round towers that is any where to be met with; the walls are flanked with small towers, which are not canon-proof; they are only surrounded by a dry ditch towards Chartres; the suburb towards Orleans is encompassed with the river and a brook which join each other at the gate of Orleans, the only gate by which the town can have communication with this suburb. Here the enemy had nine regiments of infantry, among others those of Condé, Conti, and Burgundy; the auxiliary troops of the Low Countries; to wit, Berlo, Pleur, Vauge, la Motte, Pelnitz, &c. and about five hundred horse. They were entrenched behind the brook which covered all that side, except a small space near the gate, where they had thrown up a good line.

The King's infantry attacked the enemy as soon as they arrived; they scarce staid for the coming of the canon, which made two or three discharges against the intrenchments, not so much for the sake of doing any great execution, as to give notice it was arrived. M. d'Hocquincourt's infantry which had the right, made their attack on the brook side: they marched up to the brink, receiving the enemies fire; but some officers having sounded it with their pikes, and found it deeper than it was thought to be, they retired in good order, and marched a little higher towards a mill.

M. de Turenne ordered M. de Gadagne, Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment of marines, to make his attack on the left near the town, which place having but one line to defend it, was carried without much resistance. This was the only place that was ill defended, though it was of the greatest consequence; for that being taken, there was no longer

An. 1652. longer any communication between the town and suburb. Immediately upon this, the street was barricaded over against the gate. M. de Turenne made his whole infantry enter here, and they made way for the cavalry, at the head whereof entred Marshal d'Hocquincourt, but he was come in such a hurry, that he forgot to give his orders to the rest of his wing what they should do, so that the whole body of them would have entered the suburb, had not M. de Turenne gone and stopt them all, except two or three of the foremost squadrons which were already got in. He ordered them to go and remain on the eminence where his cavalry was posted; he having in the suburb more horse than he wanted to support the foot; and had any more of them come in, the enemy who were in the town might have taken advantage of it, by going out at the other gate, and so have slain on the cavalry which was without; for without reckoning what troops the enemy had in the suburbs, they had in the town as many horse and foot as there were in the King's Army.

Mean while the regiment of Picardy, with the rest of M. d'Hocquincourt's infantry, passed the brook at the mill, attack'd the enemy vigorously, who as vigorously defended themselves; and after they were forced, made a resolute retreat from wall to wall, and from post to post. On the other side, M. de Turenne's infantry having finished their traverse against the town, turned to the right, and attacked in flank the regiment of Burgundy, which defended the line; but though the attack was one of the most violent that could be, and the canon did terrible execution on the enemy, yet they obstinately disputed every wall which inclosed the gardens, the back-sides whereof terminated at the line: they had here made openings for six men to pass abreast, as they marched along this line. It was in this place they made so vigorous a resistance, that they drove the assailants from the walls which they had gained, beat them back so far, and put them into so great disorder, that had it not been for Turenne's regiment which stopt their impetuosity, and gave the others time to rally, the whole advantage which had been before obtained would have been in danger of being lost; but the enemy's brunt being born, they were again push'd from one wall to another, to the very last of all, where taking new spirit, they a second time repulsed the assailants

assailants into an adjacent close, and made a great slaughter of them. An. 1652.

The enemy had been pursued the last time with too much heat and so little order, that the King's horse and foot were huddled together. The enemy did not push their advantage further, but contented themselves with keeping their last wall, whilst the assailants rallied again under the shelter of that which was nearest it; so that there was left an inclosure between both: and for a time they contented themselves with firing briskly at each other. The Duke of York, who was present at this warm attack, saw an officer of the enemy named Dumont, a Major of Condé's regiment, attempt an action capable of stopping the course of this victory, if it had been seconded: he came out of his rank with his pike in his hand, and advancing twenty paces, which was the breadth of the before mentioned close, exposed himself to all the fire of the assailants; but no body following him, he was fain to retire. He repeated this dangerous experiment three times, without receiving the least hurt; it fired the King's troops with emulation. It was a dangerous thing to go directly to the breach or opening, which was defended by so many brave fellows. An officer, whose name I have forgot, went out at the aperture of the wall which the assailants possess, and in sight of the enemy advanced quite up to that which they defended: he was followed by as many of his own men as could secure themselves from being fired upon. The close, as I observed before, was narrow, and there was now but one wall between the two parties; here was fought a very singular sort of combat; the wall being built with large stones, both sides roll'd them down on each other; and it began to be considerably diminished, when the King's troops having found a small eminence from whence they could take the enemy side-ways, they fired on them so opportunely, that seeing themselves attacked in flank and front, and the place not tenable, they quitted their last wall, and retreated into a church just by, whither the regiment of Picardy had likewise push'd those they had attacked; they could not defend themselves there, and asked quarter, which was granted them. Their cavalry crossed the brook, and got off, after they had lost the Baron de Briole who commanded them, and the Count de Furstenberg, who were both killed.

An. 1652.

During this engagement in the suburb, the enemy who were in the town made some sallies to force the barricade, and pushed the King's troops so briskly, that if M. de Turenne had not himself advanced, and supported them with a squadron of his cavalry, within pistol shot of the town, the barricade would have been in danger of being forced. All depended on this post, the loss whereof would have been attended with the entire overthrow of the troops which were actually engaged in the suburb; but the relief which M. de Turenne brought so timely, the ammunition which he caused to be distributed, and M. de Gadagne's intrepidity, rendered ineffectual all the efforts of the enemy, who made two sallies more, but were repulsed with loss.

Of the nine regiments of infantry which the enemy had in this suburb, scarce a man escaped; there were nine hundred killed, and seventeen hundred taken prisoners. The chief of the latter were, Briol, Marshal de Camp; Morital, who commanded the regiment of Condé; Dumont, Major of the same regiment, whom the Duke of York took notice was the person that had distinguished himself with so much bravery at the attack of the last wall; the Baron de Berlo, Marshal de Bataille; Vange; Pleux; la Motte. The King's army lost at least five hundred men, but nobody of any distinction among them: The young Count de Quince was shot through the body, and Count Carlo de Broglio in the arm, of which they both recovered.

This action was as bold as it was fortunate; the Generals would not have attempted it had they known the weakness of their infantry, which did not amount to two thousand men, whereas it was to have been at least five thousand; the march being made on a sudden, and in the dark, all the soldiers who were detached could not join the army before the attack was over. The enemy had three thousand foot in the town, and the like number in the suburbs, without the horse; but the disorder which was observed to be among them on the arrival of the King's troops at the eminence, the confusion with which they retired, and the little harmony there commonly is where the command is divided, was what probably determined the Generals to attack them.

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If the enemy had been attentive to the faults committed by the King's army, they might have taken hold of a fair opportunity they had to have routed it in its retreat. M. d'Hocquincourt, without minding whether or no M. de Turenne followed him with the rear-guard, which he was a long while getting together, because of the great number of soldiers who busied themselves in plundering the suburb, marched on with the van, without once halting, directly to Etrech; the enemy, by going out at the Paris gate, might have got between them and beat them both; but they contented themselves with attacking the rear-guard as it was retiring on the side of the barricade, and pressed it so hard, that M. de Turenne was obliged to repair thither in person with the cavalry to bring it off. As soon as he arrived on the eminence, the Chevalier Berkeley told him the van was gone; to which he answered, shrugging up his shoulders, that it was too late to remedy it. The danger was so much the greater in that they were incumbered with the prisoners they carried away with them. They marched on with all possible expedition, and their fears were not over till they got to Etrech. Next day the whole army returned to Châtres.

This good success retrieved the King's affairs considerably, and raised the Cardinal's courage not a little. He sent orders to M. de Turenne to block up the enemy in Etampes, where they began to want forage. Before every thing could be disposed in readiness, the forage about Châtres being entirely consumed, it was necessary for the army to march to Palaiseau, where it remained till the twenty sixth, when it came and encamped hard by Etrech, and next day advanced within a league of Etampes. They began to throw up a line of contravallation within musket-shot of the place, on the brow of a hill. As soon as the enemy perceived it they made frequent sallies to interrupt the work, in one of which they cut off about a hundred workmen before the guard could get on horseback; but they were vigorously repulsed by the Marquis de Richelieu, who commanded it. The next day the lines were almost completed; they could not be very good because of the nature of the ground, which was very stony, and for want of tools and wood, there being none all thereabouts.

An. 1652, Some infantry were lodged in the ruins of the suburb, which the enemy had burnt when they found they were going to be attacked again. The army was encamped within less than canon-shot of the place, but received no damage therefrom, because it is in a bottom; but the enemy could discover from the top of a very high tower, already mentioned, all that passed in the camp, which was a very great advantage to them. M. de Turenne laid a bridge over the river to hinder their going out to forage; and preparations were making to lay several more, which would have cooped them up, and in a short time have starved them, but the Duke of Lorraine came and broke all these measures. That Prince had given the Cardinal such positive assurances of continuing attached to his interest, that he sent orders to the Marshal de la Ferté, Governor of Lorraine, to permit the Duke to draw his troops together, which were scattered up and down; but they were no sooner got together in a body, but he marched directly into France, and declared for the Princes, with whom he had secretly been in treaty at the same time as he was carrying on a negotiation with the Cardinal.

This unlucky incident obliged M. de Turenne to alter his design, and attack Etampes by main force and make a push, foreseeing that if he did not take it quickly, the Duke of Lorraine would come to its relief. With this intent all possible diligence was used in erecting batteries, some on the lines, and others in the bottom, against the Orleans-gate and at the same time against the wall between that gate and the great tower, with a view to batter an advanced work which the enemy had made there a little nearer to the gate than to the tower. In the night M. de Gadagne, with a thousand detached men, gave the attack there, and after some resistance became master of it without considerable loss, though it was but pistol-shot from the walls of the place. M. de Turenne had caused some horse to go out of the camp and post themselves between the town and the lines on the eminence, to prevent M. de Gadagne's being surprized behind; these horse were recalled at the dawning of the day; but so soon as the sun was risen, the enemy came out along by the ditch to attack the work behind, while from the place it was attacked in front,

front. Though M. de Gadagne did all that could be expected from a good officer, he was driven out of it, and made his retreat not without a great deal of difficulty along the ditch to the barricade which he had made before the Orleans-gate. He was thought at first to be lost by his not returning with his men; neither did he get off but by great good fortune, being got in amidst the enemy's horse with two or three serjeants, and as many musketeers, who never forsook him, but helped him with great bravery to disengage himself. He was not at all wounded, though he received above twenty strokes of swords and pikes on his buff-coat, the goodness whereof preserved him. M. de Turenne was gone to the camp when this affair happened, having been all night in the lines. As soon as he heard the alarm, he caused all his foot of his quarter to march, and his own regiment getting thither first, he ordered it to re-take the work. This regiment marched immediately, in sight of both armies, and without the least diversion being made, or a single shot fired from a canon to favour the attack, it advanced, being preceded by some soldiers detached from those who had been driven from the work; but a Captain of Picardy who led these latter being killed, they betook themselves to flight, and hurried along with them part of the musketeers of the left of the regiment, which however was not at all discouraged at the accident. The Captains took into their own hands the colours, and went at the head of their soldiers, without firing a piece, till they got to the foot of the work, which was filled with the enemy. Then the assailants poured in upon them a volley of all their fire-arms, and advancing to within a pike's length, they charged the enemy with so much resolution and bravery that they carried the work, and lodged themselves on it. They lost but one Captain of their regiment, one or two subaltern officers, and a few soldiers, though they had long sustained the fire of the enemy, whom nothing hindered from firing true, since during the whole action neither the canon nor small arms fired so much as a single shot from the King's army. All who saw this action owned they had never seen a bolder or a warmer. M. de Turenne himself, and most of the experienced officers, were of opinion it would have been impossible to carry their bravery

An. 1652. such lengths, if the colours had not been continually before the soldiers eyes; and this was what partly determined the regiments afterwards to procure new colours, the old corps, as well as the rest, having till then, through a mistaken glory, affected to have their colours so tattered and ragged, that oftentimes there was nothing left but the staff. The regiment of Turenne was the only one that then had them the most entire, without excepting the French guards, for there were no Swiss in this army.

One would have thought after this action the remainder of the day would have been spent in repose; but the enemy reflecting on the facility with which they had regained the work in the morning, and weighing the importance of it, resolved to attack it a second time, and fall upon the lines at the same instant. In the afternoon, about three o'clock, they sallied out with twenty squadrons and five battalions. M. de Turenne, who was luckily in the lines, commanded the troops to march to their posts, and sent orders to all the infantry which were in the camp to come and join him. Mean while, to gain time, he ordered to march out of the lines three squadrons commanded by the Count de Rennel, and go and charge the first body of the enemy which was approaching, which he did with great intrepidity and firmness, till being no longer able to sustain so unequal a fight, he was pushed into the very lines, the ditch whereof was so poor a one, that some of the troopers who could not enter at the avenue leaped over, and there were but very few horses that fell down in attempting it. The Count de Schomberg, who was then but a volunteer, was wounded in the right arm as he was standing upon his defence in the avenue, which had no barrier to it, because there was not found wood enough in the country to make one. M. de Turenne at the time he ordered the Count de Rennel to march out, advanced himself with two squadrons towards the avenue, imagining that the enemy would make their principal push there. Affairs were in a melancholy situation; no troops came to assist; the enemy was approaching with three battalions and several squadrons, some of which were within pistol shot, waiting for the infantry, who were not above half a musket shot off. There were not in the lines to defend them more than two squadrons of horse, some centinels at certain distances,

distances, who instead of galling the enemy, discovered An. 1652.
 a great deal of weakness; there were no canoneers at the batteries, and no hope of any considerable reinforcement of infantry which could arrive in this pressing necessity, most of them having been sent to the Orleans suburb on account of the action in the morning. In short, it was thought we were so near being attacked, that the Duke of York, who rode on a pad-nag, began to think he should not have time to change him, though they brought him a war-horse, or to put on his armour, with which he caused himself to be accoutred as he sat on horseback. There arrived, that instant, two hundred musketeers of the regiment of guards; which was all that could be got together in the camp. M. de Turenne recommended to them, instead of staying to fire all at once, to take good aim, which order they observed so well, that never was so much execution done by so small a number of soldiers: At the first discharge they fetched down so many officers and troopers, and made such lanes in the three first squadrons that they thought fit to remove further off. They afterwards fired on the infantry which was still advancing, but by good fortune they found in their way a small *rideau* which covered them their whole height, and they were so well pleased with their screen, that no exhortation, nor blows, nor threats, could make them stir a step farther; they contented themselves with firing briskly on the lines, till the cavalry from the other quarters coming to the relief of the lines, the enemy thought it best to retire.

They had no better success in attacking the work; for having further to go before they could get to it, those who had the guard of it had time to make ready to receive them. M. de Traci, who commanded the German cavalry which was in the service of the King of France, having been advertised in his quarter of what had passed, thought it proper to march between the lines and the town; he met those of the enemy that were going to attack the work; though he had but four squadrons, and was very much inferior in number, he charged them so roughly, that having stopped their progress, he gave time to the other troops, commanded by the Marquis de Richelieu, to come and second him. With this reinforcement the enemy were charged a second time, and

An. 1652 forced to retire in great disorder; but as they were near the town, it would have been dangerous to push them too far. Most of the King's troops arriving in the lines, and the enemy retiring, several officers were urgent with M. de Turenne to pursue them, to whom he answered, that as they were too near their walls, he could not do them any great mischief, and should expose himself to the hazard of losing too many men, and to the danger of being forced to retreat in disorder.

The enemy were so mal-treated in this enterprize, wherein they lost abundance of men and above three-score officers, that from that time they were cured of their longing to give us any more visits. They were hard pressed at the Orleans-gate and the advanced work which had been taken from them, and the Miners were by this time at the wall, when news came that the Duke of Lorraine was marching with the utmost expedition to Paris, and that a bridge of boats was preparing for him a little above Charenton. This advice obliged M. de Turenne to raise the siege, that he might not be shut in between two armies of the enemy: First were drawn off the canon of the batteries which were nearest the town; but we were so ill furnished with draught-horses, that though the Court sent all the coach-horses they had, not excepting those of the King and Queen, we could not send away above one half of the artillery the day before we decamped, and were fain to wait the return of the horses to draw off the other.

We began the seventh of June, the army being in bat-talia, to withdraw the troops which were in the advanced work. M. de Navailles who commanded there, made his retreat in good order, though the enemy pressed him pretty vigorously. Then the army began to march, after having set fire to the huts. Whilst the first line made a halt, the second advanced about five hundred paces, after which it faced about towards the town; then the first moved on, and marched leisurely till it had gained the intervals of the second line, and continuing till it was got five hundred paces beyond, then made a halt and faced about towards the enemy, in like manner as the second had done, which repeated the same movement as before. In this manner did the army retire for the space of a league, and indeed it was a very fine sight. The

enemy

enemy pursued the first line in its first movement, skirmishing in great bodies; but afterwards they attempted nothing that could give uneasiness. The army being arrived at Etrecchi staid there two or three days; then it went and encamped at Itterville near Corbeil, and from thence proceeded to Balancourt, where M. de Turenne having learned that the Duke of Lorraine was arrived at Villeneuve S. George, he hastened on with the army in order to fall on him before he could be joined by the enemy that had been left in Etampes. The fourteenth the army crossed the Seine at Corbeil, and used such diligence that it came upon the enemy when they least expected it. It was about two o' clock in the afternoon when they were in presence of each other; but they could not engage because of a brook which was between them, and which falls from la Brie into the Seine; we kept along the side of it till we found a passage. The army marched all night, and leaving the forests on the left, the van arrived by day-break at Gros-bois. Beaujeu, who was employed by the Cardinal to the Duke of Lorraine, came thither with Dagecourt, Captain of that Prince's guards, to wait on M. de Turenne, and to make proposals to him on the part of the Duke, whereof the principal and most urgent was, that M. de Turenne would advance no farther; but he would not suffer himself to be over-reached by his artifices: He continued his march; and being informed that the King of England was arrived that same night in the Duke's army, to do his endeavours in a negotiation which was in hand between him and the Cardinal, he desired the Duke of York to go to him there; which he the more willingly complied with, because the King his brother had signified to him that he should be glad to speak with him, and that he had M. de Lorraine's word for his safe return.

That which occasioned the King of England's going to the Duke of Lorraine's army, was the request the latter had made to his Majesty to be mediator between him and the Court of France, guarantee of the treaty which was on the point of being concluded, and in order thereto to do him the honour to come to his army and after the affair was finished to carry him to the Court, which was at Melun. The King of England

An. 1652. England having at Paris received M. de Lorrain's letter, wherein he made him these proposals, went immediately and imparted them to the Queen his mother, who was at Chaillot. As she knew the Duke seldom acted a sincere part, she was not for the King's being engaged for him; but the earnest desire he had to contribute to an affair which might be so advantageous to the Court, determined him above any other consideration whatever. He set out that very instant, taking in his coach the Lords Rochester, Jermin, and Crofts. Arriving at Charenton he heard that the two armies were in sight of each other, and it is supposed that he there met with an express from the Duke to desire he would hasten his coming. When he was got to Villeneuve S. George, he found that Prince bustling about and very uneasy, on account of M. de Turenne's unwelcome neighbourhood. Then it was that M. de Beaujeu and the Captain of the guards were sent to him as above-mentioned with proposals. Mean while, the success of the treaty being uncertain, the Duke of Lorrain prepared for battle. He posted himself to the best advantage that the ground would admit of. He caused in the night time five redoubts to be run up with inexpressible diligence to cover the front of his army, which consisted of about five thousand horse and three thousand foot, with a small train of artillery; the greatest part of the foot he put into the five redoubts, and the rest he kept in reserve behind the middlemost redoubt in form of a large battalion; most of his canon was planted on an eminence above the town, hard by a gallows; his horse was on two lines behind the redoubts; he had a great wood on his right, the town on his left, on which side he could not be attacked, because of a very steep eminence there. In this situation, wherein he shewed great experience and judgment, he waited for an engagement or a conclusion of the treaty.

The Duke of York arriving at Villeneuve S. George, went and waited on the King his brother, who told him what it was that brought him thither, and desired him to leave nothing unattempted to bring the treaty to a happy issue, so that he might with honour get out of so ticklish an affair, being very much perplexed about the course he should take in case the two armies came to action; it did

did not become him on the eve of a battle to retire without An. 1652. sharing the honour of it; the Duke of Lorrain had invited him to come and help him to conclude his treaty with France, he lay under particular obligations to him, and was in his quarters, where he had lodged one night: on the other hand, he was under the King of France's protection, and in his dominions; he received a pension from him, which was the sole visible support he had in this conjuncture to subsist on; but the principal consideration was, that if he fought for the Duke of Lorrain, it would look as if he countenanced rebellion against a lawful King, and for this very reason it was not without the utmost unwillingness that he tarried there, knowing the ill impressions it might make in the minds of people; and yet he did not see how he could withdraw with honour. In this perplexity he asked the Duke of York what proposals he brought; the Duke told him in few words, that Turenne required that the Duke of Lorrain should immediately desist from going on with the bridge which he was making over the Seine; that he should engage to quit the territories of France in a fortnight, and at the same time give his word never to afford any assistance to the Princes; that in respect of the first article, M. de Varenne, who was come on purpose with him, had orders to see the execution of it himself, and that without the performance of this preliminary M. de Turenne would give no ear to any thing. The King who knew the engagements the Duke of Lorrain had with the Princes answered, that he very much feared he would never sign such hard conditions: the Duke of York replied, that he was sure M. de Turenne would not bate a tittle of them. At the same time M. de Lorrain came into the room; the Duke of York immediately presented him the plan of the treaty; he received it with a sneer which was customary with him, but it seemed somewhat forced at that time. He presently consented to the first article, and instantly sent away an officer with M. de Varenne to put a stop to the work at the bridge; but for the rest he protested that nothing should oblige him to submit to terms so dishonourable. The Duke asked him if he would have him carry that answer; he replied, he could give no other; and imagining that this young Prince (the Duke of York) had more mind for an action than an accommodation,

An. 1652. accommodation, he begg'd the King of England to send along with him the Lord Jermin, to try to obtain of M. de Turenne conditions more tolerable.

M. de Turenne this while lost no time, but advanced with that expedition that the Duke of York and Lord Jermin found his army within a league of the Lorrainers, marching on in battle array. The Duke of York reported to him M. de Lorrain's answer, and the Lord Jermin did his utmost to prevail on him to recede from what seemed to be too harsh in his proposals; but he would depart from no one thing he had demanded; so Jermin went back to acquaint the Duke with the result of his endeavours. Jermin was very earnest with the Duke of York to return along with him, in hopes to gain time, and that M. de Turenne would not fall on till he was come back with a final answer; but he flatly refused it, assuring him that that General was too prudent to lose time, since he knew that the army from Etampes followed him so close; that it was every moment apprehended that it would appear on t'other side the river; that therefore he made no doubt but the armies would be engaged before he could return: he added smiling, that his presence would not quicken the Duke of Lorrain to finish the affair the sooner, but that M. de Turenne's approach would be a far better means to determine him to conclude it. The Lord Jermin departed; and the army proceeding on its march was got within canon-shot of the enemy, when the King of England came himself to M. de Turenne to make the ultimate effort. The Viscount begged his Majesty to excuse him if he still insisted on the same conditions which he had sent, adding that he was sure his Majesty had the King his Master's interest too much at heart to press him any farther to make any alterations in those terms. The armies were so near, that every moment was precious, and therefore King Charles desired M. de Turenne to send once again and no more to M. de Lorrain; he yielded to do so, and M. de Gadagne was sent with the conditions in writing, and withal was ordered to tell him that he must either sign them or fight. He went, and found M. de Lorrain on the eminence near the place of execution before mentioned, where he had raised some batteries. The Duke having perused the paper which was presented to him,

called

called aloud to his canoneers to fire, but it was pretty An. 1652.
 apparent that they had been before forbid to obey. M.
 de Gadagne told him flatly that they durst not, and re-
 peated to him what he had said to him at first coming,
 That he must sign; if not, he would be attacked in an
 instant; upon which M. de Lorrain at last signed the
 treaty, and M. de Gadagne returned and carried it to
 M. de Turenne, who the moment he received it made
 his army halt, sent to demand hostages, and that the Duke
 should order his troops to march: he gave M. de Lig-
 neville and M. Dagecourt, the Captain of his Guards, as
 security for the performance of the treaty, who were to
 be released so soon as M. de Vaubecourt, who was or-
 dered to follow the Lorrainers, should send word that
 they were out of the territories of France.

The King of England, after the ratification of the
 treaty, went and viewed M. de Turenne's army, after-
 wards went and took his leave of the Duke of Lorrain,
 and then returned to Paris. He was hardly set out but
 the two Generals met, and after some cold compliments
 on both sides, they parted. This done, M. de Lorrain
 immediately caused his army to march, whilst that of
 M. de Turenne remained in battle-array; the Lorrainers
 entered in his sight a long and very narrow defile,
 where they were at the mercy of the French; but M. de
 Turenne was a more religious observer of his word than
 M. de Lorrain. The troops of the latter were no sooner
 in the defile, but the army of the Princes appeared on
 the other side the Seine, but being informed of what had
 been just before transacted, they marched to Paris.

M. de Turenne staid some days at Villeneuve S. George,
 from whence he set out the twenty-first of June, and
 made small marches to Lagni, where he passed the
 Marne the first of July, and went and encamped at La
 Chevrette, within a league of Saint Denis, where the
 Court was. Marshal de la Ferté had joined the army
 at Gorges with three or four regiments of horse and two
 of foot, whereof one was his own and the other Wall's;
 he had brought these troops from Lorrain.

The Duke de Beaufort, a great favourite with the
 populace of Paris, had joined M. de Lorrain at Vil-
 leneuve S. George with five hundred Parisians on
 horseback, who by the treaty were permitted to retire;
 but

An. 1652. some wounds, and the Count de Choeseuil, Captain of horse. The loss on the King's side was so inconsiderable; that only the Marquis de Lisbourg, Lieutenant-Colonel of Streff, was wounded with a musket-shot through the body.

After the happy success of this first attack, the enemy were pushed so home, that the King's forces coming up with the remainder of their rear-guard, consisting still of two or three hundred horse, about S. Louis's hospital, they cut them to pieces before they could rejoin the body of their Army which was retiring into the suburb of S. Antoine.

The Prince of Condé was constrained to take this step, seeing no likelihood of being able to reach Charonton, considering how vigorously he was pushed: it was to him a very extraordinary piece of good fortune, in so great an extremity, to meet so opportunely in this suburb with some good intrenchments which the inhabitants had thrown up there since the civil war began for their own security, without which his Army had been lost beyond retrieve. He had but just time enough to post his troops, so close was he followed by those of the King, whose ardour was stopt by the barricades of the street which were found ready made; and the infantry not having been able to come up as yet, gave the enemy leisure to form into order of battle in the great street.

The King, the Cardinal, and the whole Court, arrived in this *interim* on the eminence of Charonne, from whence, as from an amphitheatre, they were spectators of the whole series of this bloody scene. As soon as they saw the infantry was come, they sent orders to M. de Turenne to fall on, though neither la Ferté's foot nor the canon were arrived, and every thing wanting that was necessary for beating down the walls, filling up the trenches, and forcing the barricades. M. de Turenne sent, but to no purpose, to desire them to have a little patience, representing that he had the enemy fast, and that he could not escape him, provided the Parisians, whom it was supposed they might depend on, did not open their gates to him; that the time which was requisite for the canon to come up would not be sufficient to enable the Prince of Condé to fortify himself more; that

that by beginning the attack without the necessary implements he should run the hazard of receiving a blow, which would render abortive an enterprize incapable of itself to fail when once the canon, the pick-axes, and the other utensils for breaking ground were arrived, which now could not be long coming; but the impatience of the Court prevailed over all these arguments: even M. de Bouillon, who had newly made his peace with the Cardinal, was more urgent than any body else with M. de Turenne, his brother, his sentiment being that it were better blindly to follow the orders of a Court, than to expose himself to the censure of certain Courtiers, who were capable of infusing into the King's mind suspicions as if he meant to spare the Prince, however irreconcilable they two were at the bottom after what had passed. M. de Turenne was not as yet sufficiently in the King's favour, and in that reputation of probity he afterwards acquired, to presume to refuse obedience to orders which were not to his liking, and the King did not as yet rely on his capacity and experience in so great a degree as he did afterwards on several occasions.

The French guards and the regiment of the marine, supported by the King's gendarmes and Light-horse, attacked quite to the right the barricade of a street which terminated in the great street of the *fauxbourg*, where the market-place is; the success was answerable to the bravery of the assailants: though the walls were lined on the right and left, and the houses filled with soldiers, the barricade was forced, and the enemy chased from house to house, when the indiscreet ambition of the Marquis de S. Maigrin, who commanded the gendarmes and light-horse rendered this first advantage of no effect. He would needs share the glory of the foot, and being afraid there would be none left for him to reap, he rushed headlong into the street through the midst of the soldiers, without giving them time to make an end of dislodging the enemy, and in pushing the runaways penetrated almost to the market-place, where the Prince was in person, who taking notice of the error committed by this body of cavalry, put himself at the head of five and twenty Officers or Volunteers who were near him, charged it so briskly that it fell into disorder, crowded back upon the infantry,

An. 1652. try, and suffered the whole fire which the enemy made from the windows. Such of the King's troops as were got into the first houses seeing this confusion abandoned them; and the enemy taking fresh courage, pursued them to the outermost barricade, which M. de Turenne's presence hindered from being retaken, as all the rest had been.

S. Maigrin was not the only man who paid the penalty of his rashness by the loss of his life; the Marquis de Nantouillet, and several other persons of quality were killed on the spot; a great many of the rest died afterwards of their wounds, among whom were M. de Mancini, a nephew of the Cardinal's, a very promising young Gentleman, and Fouillon, Ensign of the Queen's guards. The two regiments of infantry had been so roughly handled, that all that could be expected from them was, to keep the first barricade which they had taken.

Turenne's regiment of infantry was employed in attacking some houses and gardens which the enemy held on the left: The two regiments of Uxelles and Carignan, which composed but one battalion, made an attack a little farther to the left, upon the walls of a garden which terminated at the great street; and on the left of all, the rest of the infantry commanded by M. de Navailles, consisting of the regiments of Picardy, Pleffis-Praslin, Douglas and Bellecense, fell upon the barricade which was towards the river near the garden of Rambouillet.

The enemy were presently drove from several posts by Turenne's regiment; but the ill success on the right hindered it from pushing farther, and it was satisfied with keeping what it had got. A squadron consisting of Clare and Richelieu's regiments, which was to have supported it, being surprized with a storm of musket-shot from the enemy, who from a wall that was just by took them in flank, and killed them a world of men, fell into disorder, and made off as fast as they could; but the Officers running after the fugitives stopt them, and in a moment made them return in good order to their post, where they behaved during the rest of the action with extreme bravery, which was the more extraordinary inasmuch as it very seldom happens that troops which have been once seized with fear make any figure the rest of

that

that day. This squadron was so mal-treated, that there ^{An. 1652.} was not a Captain but was either killed or wounded; of Richelieu's regiment there remained alive only la Loge, Captain-Lieutenant, wounded with a musket-shot through the body, of which he recovered.

The regiments of Uxelles and Carignan began the attack on their side much about the same time that the other attacks were made; the two Lieutenant-Colonels were presently killed; but this did not hinder them from going on directly to the wall, in spite of the brisk fire that was made on them; they posted themselves in the intervals of the holes through which the enemy fired. Here was renewed much such a fight as that at the last wall of the gardens in the suburb of Etampes; neither side being able to do much execution with their muskets, they rolled down the stones of the wall on one another, fired with pistols, made thrusts with their swords through the holes, and thus they went on a long while for want of tools to demolish the wall. Mean while the cavalry which supported this attack kept over-against the great street, out of musket-shot, to hinder the enemy from issuing out of the barricade which they had there, and charging the infantry which was at the wall, and it was not thought proper to make any attempt against that barricade, because being defended by the neighbouring houses which the enemy possessed, it had been a difficult matter, and of no use, to have taken it, unless the enemy had been first driven out of these houses.

M. de Navailles, on his side, carried the barricade which was opposite to him; he met with no great resistance, and dislodged the enemy from the houses which were adjoining. He at first contented himself with keeping there without pushing any farther, because he found that the enemy had directly fronting him posted in a very large square a part of their cavalry, and that there were gardens behind as also houses lined with infantry. The enemy likewise judged it would be a rash thing for them to attack the King's troops, and so determined to retire behind the houses and gardens possessed by their infantry; but M. d'Eclinvilliers, Marshal de Camp, taking their retreat for a flight, passed through the gained barricade with the cavalry which he commanded,

An. 1652. to pursue them; they at the same time faced about, and knowing that his cavalry could not come at them above two a breast, they charged it before he could form it; and when but half his men were past, they beat him, took him prisoner, and killed him several Officers and troopers; and after having pursued the rest to the barricade, they retired upon a grand trot, passing through a furious fire of the King's infantry who had seized the houses.

Just about this time M. de la Ferté's canon and infantry came up: the two regiments had orders to relieve immediately the French guards and the marine which had been so severely handled, and to keep the posts which had been gained on that side. The canon, of which there was in all but six pieces, was sent to the mills which were little more than a musket shot from the entrance of the great street, where they began to play with extraordinary success on the soldiers and baggage with which that street was filled, and which disappeared in an instant; afterwards the houses were battered which commanded the passage to the barricade; they being but slightly built every ball went through; notwithstanding this the enemy maintained themselves therein with so much obstinacy that there was no dislodging them for the present, and they still kept firing vehemently from the windows and the holes which the canon had made.

During this canonade there was heard on a sudden a great noise of small-arms from the attack where M. de Navailles commanded. M. de Turenne hastened thither, but the business was over before he arrived. Never was there a warmer piece of work for the time it lasted, nor a more violent fire. The occasion was this: M. de Beaufort had been busy almost all the morning in haranguing the Parisians, and exhorting them to open their gates to the Prince and his troops. His eloquence not prevailing he left them, and going out to the suburb he could not hear what had already passed there, the smartness of the action wherein S. Maigrin was killed, the bravery with which the Prince, and the persons of quality who accompanied him, had signalized themselves, he could not hear this without being fired with a noble emulation; he resolved to do something as remarkable, and proposed to M. de Nemours, with whom he was at variance, to retake the barricade which M. de Navailles

had

had made himself master of, as an action of the last importance to the Party. M. de Nemours approved the motion, and immediately they set themselves about putting it in execution; they were followed by all the men of quality that were yet in a condition to fight; they both put themselves at the head of a good body of infantry, and marched with great resolution and gallantry to the barricade, behind which the regiment of Picardy was posted. There was a house on each side the passage through which they were to come: The regiment of du Pleffis-Praslin was in one, and that of Douglas in the other; they nevertheless advanced with great intrepidity and courage between these two fires, which were violent and incessant, without once stopping till they came to the barricade; but there they met with so vigorous a resistance, that they could not make themselves masters of it, but were beat back with great loss. M. de Nemours received several wounds, and had a finger taken off by a musket-shot while he had his hand on the barricade; M. de Rochefoucault received a shot in the corner of one of his eyes, and the ball going out beneath the other he had like to have lost them both; M. de Guitaud received a ball in his body. There were many other persons of quality wounded and killed whose names I have forgot: M. de Flamarin was in the number of the slain, and his adventure was too remarkable to let me forget him. He had been told by certain fortune-tellers he should die with a rope about his neck, which is contrary to the custom in France, where they behead Gentlemen that are sentenced to death; however he had the misfortune to fulfil the prediction, if we may so term the ridiculous tales of such creatures, which the Almighty may, however, sometimes make use of to punish such curious inquiries, which are ever criminal. This Gentleman dropping, and being left for dead near one of the houses which the King's troops were in, the soldiers judging by the richness of his cloaths that his purse was answerable to it, had a huge mind to go and strip the body; but judging that to be too dangerous because of the enemy who were in the neighbouring houses, they bethought themselves of fastening to the end of a pike a cord with a running-knot; this they found means to get about his neck, and so drew him to them into the house, where he expired.

An. 1652. M. de Turenne at his coming up found the enemy was repulsed, and the post in a good condition; he returned therefore to the battery of the mills, notwithstanding the fire whereof, the enemy still held it out in the houses on the left of the barricade, in respect to him. Somebody discovered a place which was unguarded, by which the houses might be attacked behind; as the whole infantry were busied in the attack, M. de Turenne made his troopers dismount, who assailed the houses so opportunely and with so much valour, that of above a hundred of the enemy who had for so long a time defended them, there was not one but was either killed or taken.

In the same instant of time that the troopers began this attack, the two regiments of Uxelles and Carignan, who had continued fighting at the wall of the gardens in the odd manner already mentioned, began to get possession of some of the holes which the enemy had with great obstinacy defended. These holes were at last much enlarged without any other instruments but their bare hands, which supplied the want of levers and other tools. Whereupon the enemy imagining there was a design to force them through these apertures, abandoned the whole wall, though there was a squadron in the garden to support them. The assailants seeing this, made so violent a discharge, that the cavalry following the example of the foot, turned their backs and fled; but there being but a very scanty spot for retreating, and each striving to get away first they choaked up the passage, and there they remained a good while heaped upon one another horse and foot; they were smartly fired upon; the wall was levelled to the ground; they lost abundance of men; and those who were posted at the grand barricade at the entrance of the street, surpris'd to see at the same time the gardens on their left forced, and the fire that was made on them from the houses which were on their right, took a fright, and forsook the barricade, which the King's troops immediately seized. It was not thought fit to pursue them, because a resolution had been taken to give a general attack on all sides. Every thing was disposed in a readiness for this purpose, while the troops had time given them to breathe, and to recover themselves a little from the fatigues of so many actions, which by the stifling heat of the weather that happened that day were rendered in all senses warm. All

All things being disposed in good order, and the signal given of three canon-shot, the attack began. M. de la Ferté commanded the right, and M. de Turenne the left: The latter advancing with a large body of cavalry and infantry, had resolved to bear a little to the left towards the Bastile, and to attack a place where he hoped to find no strong barricades; but just as he was going to fall on, the Bastile fired on the King's troops, to the great astonishment of all who had flattered themselves that Paris would remain neuter, and give no shelter to the enemy. Some people had begun to suspect what immediately afterwards proved true, that the Parisians had opened their gates to the Princes; for when the barricades were attacked, the enemy made no shew as if they meant to defend them, but retreated from their posts in great order, leaving at each but a few soldiers, who as fast as the King's troops advanced towards them abandoned them, and followed their comrades into the town; the hindmost of them were pursued as far as the gates; and the Generals seeing there was nothing more to be done, came to a resolution to return to la Chevrette, where they had left their baggage, in order to refresh the troops, and thither likewise was the wounded convey'd.

There is no saying exactly how many were lost in this fight. It is thought that beside the wounded which were numerous there were eight or nine hundred killed; among the last, besides the quality already taken notice of, there were several others whose names I have forgot, as well as of the wounded. The Count d'Entrées, Marshal de Camp; Pertuys, Captain of M. de Turenne's guards; Colonel Werden, Gentleman to the Duke of York; Lifbourg, Lieutenant-Colonel of Streff; the Chevalier de la Neuville, and several others recovered of their wounds. It was reckoned the enemy had upwards of a thousand men killed on the spot, among whom was a great number of officers and men of quality; of these latter, except the Prince, the Duke de Beaufort, and the Prince de Tarante, there was not any that was not either killed or wounded.

The Prince of Condé had never better discharged the duties of a great Captain and an intrepid soldier than on this occasion; never exposed himself to so great dangers; and indeed it was his courage that at the beginning of the

An. 1652. action saved his Army from a total overthrow. He has since owned to the Duke of York that he had never been in danger for so long a time together; but that which renders his glory more resplendent, is that he had to do with M. de Turenne, who was allowed by all the world to be the most consummate General of that age; and might justly be put in parallel with the most celebrated of any former.

What determined the Parisians to refuse admittance to the Prince's troops, when they appeared before the gate *de la Conférence*, were the following reasons, which the King's faithful subjects caused to be spread throughout the whole city; that although they were utter enemies to the Cardinal, and heartily wished his destruction, yet it would be unworthy of the character they gloried in of being good Frenchmen, to suffer an Army composed partly of Spanish troops to enter within their walls; that it were an hateful sight and capable of stirring up a dangerous sedition among the people, to have the Crosses of Burgundy which were never wont to be seen but in Nôtre-Dame (church) carried in triumph through the midst of their city; that it would look as if they were already subdued by the Spaniards, and bending beneath their yolk, when nothing was to be seen but red scarves, which would recal the shameful remembrance of their having formerly suffered them there in the time of the rebellion, disguised under the specious title of a Holy League; that in fine it was contrary to the interest of this capital to receive into it an Army under any pretence whatever.

When the battle began in the suburb of S. Antoine, M. de Beaufort's harangues could obtain nothing. The Duke of Orleans imagining all was lost, caused his Palace to be shut up, and had behind his gardens his coaches in a readiness to carry him to Orleans; but Mademoiselle full of spirit and resolution, considering that the defeat of the Prince would draw after it the ruin of the whole party, went to the *Hôtel de Ville*, and made so pathetic a speech to the magistrates there assembled, that her arguments, joined to the clamour and menaces of the populace who followed her, extorted from Marshal de l'Hôpital and the Prevôt des Merchants an order to the Burghers who kept the gate S. Antoine to open it and let

Let the Prince's Army into the city. She carried this order herself, and would see it executed; and afterwards going into the Bastile, she had the canon fired on the King's troops. And thus the courage of that Princess saved the Prince of Condé and his Army.

There happened two days after this affair a great disorder in Paris, on occasion of a council which was held in the * *Hôtel de Ville*, in order to get the Duke of Orleans declared Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom; to conclude a union which should be indissoluble till such time as the Cardinal was banished France; to reinstate the Duke of Beaufort in his government of Paris, in the room of the Marshal de l'Hôpital, and to displace le Fevre from his office of being Prevôt des Merchants, and confer it on Broussel; but the very thing which was meant to strengthen the faction was one of the principal causes of its ruin. There arose on a sudden a violent commotion, insomuch that it had like to have exterminated the whole assembly. A great number of people of all conditions came pouring into the † Grève, crying aloud they would have nothing done without the Prince of Condé's approbation; that all the abettors of Cardinal Mazarin should be delivered up to them; and seeing there was no great regard paid to their demands, they set about forcing the town-house, and Marshal de l'Hôpital, backed by some resolute persons, defending the entrance of it, the populace set fire to the gate, which in a short time spread farther; they likewise fired on such as appeared at the windows, and killed several. Others being less apprehensive of the people's fury than of the flames they were threatened with, and throwing themselves upon their mercy, were barbarously murdered by them, without any distinction of party; Royalists or Anti-royalists it was all alike to the mob; and by the just judgment of God more of the latter than the former perished by their hands.

All that were suspected of having a hand in raising this sedition have equally disowned it, laying it at each other's door; and though the Prince of Condé always averr'd he was no ways concerned in it directly or indirectly, yet the whole odium of it fell wholly on him and his friends, and nobody supposed the Duke of Orleans capable of having the least share in it. This disorder

An. 1652.

* Town-House.

† The open place before the Town-House.

An. 1652. order was followed by another accident, which likewise did great differvice to the Fronde. The Duke de Nemours was killed in a duel by the Duke de Beaufort, the ties of blood not having been sufficient to appease the mortal hatred they for a long time bore each other. Whilst this bloody tragedy was acting in the very center of the Kingdom, the Spaniards laying hold of the opportunity, won back in a short time several places which they had lost in the preceding years. They took the field betimes, and meeting with no troops that could stop their progress, they pushed such as they found in their way without much difficulty.

The Court which remained some time at S. Denis, was to the last degree alarmed to hear that the Archduke, at the instances made by the Princes, was preparing to march into France in the beginning of July, with an Army of above five and twenty thousand men. After several consultations on so imminent a danger; it was resolved about the middle of July, that the Court and the Army, which was too weak to resist such considerable forces, should march within two days and retire to Lyons.

The Duke of York and M. de Turenne came to S. Denis the same day that this resolution had been taken in council. Before they went to Court, they repaired to the Duke de Bouillon's, to learn of him what had been determined: He told M. de Turenne that it was his opinion that the Court could look for safety no where but at Lyons; that the reasons which had induced it to take this course was that there was no other city where the King could be safe, it being the only considerable one that would receive him; that the Spanish forces, which they were in no condition to make head against, coming into France, it was to be apprehended that they would shut up the Court and the King's Army between them and Paris; that so long as the King's person was out of danger every thing might be hoped for, as on the other hand every thing was to be feared should his Majesty fall into the hands either of the Princes or the Spaniards; that Lyons was the place where the enemy might be opposed with the most likelihood of success, considering all the country thereabouts was entirely devoted to the King and his interest.

M. de

M. de Turenne on the contrary thought this a dangerous expedient; he said that the Court's retreating would infallibly bring on the loss of all the frontier places of Picardy, Champagne and Lorrain which held out for the King; that these provinces seeing themselves abandoned, would each of them bend their thoughts how to make up matters with the Spaniards or with the Princes; that either party would have all the time that was necessary to draw what advantage they pleased therefrom; that it was extremely to be feared lest such a situation of affairs would put people in the thoughts of dividing France among them, that part of it at least which they were already possessed of; that when once the Princes should thus have settled themselves, their forces increasing at the same time as their reputation, the Court would lose both one and the other, and be upon the point of an entire expulsion out of the Kingdom. He concluded after several other reasonings, that the wisest and safest course was for the King to retire to Pontoise with his usual guard, which would suffice, the post being easy to keep, to secure him against the attempts of the Parisians, who probably might not proceed to such an extremity, since they observed a certain decorum which still shewed a respect; that the Court being thus out of danger, he would march with the Army to Compeigne and observe the enemy's motions, and that he hoped by the advantage of that town and the rivers which surround it, he should be able to retard at least their progress if he did not put an immediate stop to it. He added, that he was sure the Spaniards, naturally suspicious and apt to be over-cautious, seeing him advancing against them, would not fail according to their usual refinements to imagine some mystery to be in this step, and to conclude we would not have dared to put it to the hazard without good grounds, and that the opinion they had of the natural temper of the nation, would make them fear lest the Princes were upon some secret treaty, of which they were to be the victims. M. de Turenne easily brought over his brother to his opinion: they went together to wait on the Cardinal, who likewise acquiesced in it, after he had weighed and conceived the solidity of it. The journey to Lyons was laid aside, and on the sixteenth of July the Court went to Pontoise: The Army marched in

An. 1652. in three days to Compiègne, and pitched their camp under the walls of that town.

The Spanish Army was advanced as far as Chauni, where the Duke d'Elbeuf suffered himself so unluckily to be shut up with seven or eight hundred horse which he had got together in his Government of Picardy, that when he imagined he could retire upon the approach of the enemy, they cut off his passage; and the place being weak he was obliged to capitulate after two days siege, on condition that his troopers should go out on foot, and leave the Spaniards their horses.

M. de Turenne had wisely foreseen that his measures would stop the enemy: After the taking of Chauni, wherein they put no garrison, they undertook no other siege on that side (which they might have done without opposition) and contented themselves with only devouring the country. It has been thought that they judged it much more for their interest to retake the places which they had lost in Flanders than to make conquests in France: They considered that the Princes would be strong enough with what succours they might send them to make head against the King, whereas should they enable them to crush him quite, that Prince might be necessitated to put himself into the Rebels hands, and so uniting the forces of both parties, might oblige them to let go their hold, and surrender every place they might have conquered, which would be too remote from the Low-Countries to be relieved; they were afraid of taking the shadow for the substance.

If these were not their thoughts, one would have imagined them to be so at least by their conduct. They returned into Flanders, took several places there, and left on the frontiers the Duke of Lorraine with his troops and a detachment of theirs, commanded by the Duke of Wirtemberg, to be within reach of the Princes whenever it might be thought proper to succour them.

As soon as the Spaniards were returned home, M. de Turenne went back again to the neighbourhood of Paris. The Army of the Princes was incamped under its walls; they were not strong enough to venture a battle, and were afraid that if they removed from that city the King's Party, which every day encreased, should come to get the ascendant; the animosity of the Parisians now subsid-
ing,

ing, they began to open their eyes, and to find they had been misled; and that which most of all conduced to recover them to their duty was the Cardinal's departure out of the Kingdom. He had disposed himself to this retreat as soon as he arrived at Pontoise, judging it necessary so to do for the King's interests and his own likewise: He thereby cut off all pretence of rebellion; his re-establishment was certain, in case the King's affairs regained the superiority; he relied on the Queen's constancy, which nothing could shake; he knew her word to be inviolable; never Princess had shewn more greatness of soul, more steadiness and resolution in the greatest dangers; all which qualities she exerted to such a degree, that no history can produce more heroic instances thereof than what were conspicuous throughout her whole conduct. It has however been thought by some that the Cardinal would have run a great risque of not being recalled had the Duke of Bouillon lived longer. His great capacity, joined to that of M. de Turenne, who was at the head of the Army, might have prepared the way for him to the Ministry. Whether the two brothers had any such design is not certain, but it was apparent they were the only persons capable of supporting the weight of affairs in so difficult a conjuncture. Be that as it will, the death of Bouillon put an end to such surmises, and quashed both the fears and hopes of such a change.

The King's Army arrived at Tillet, within a league of Gonesse, about the beginning of August; it continued there till the end of the same month; M. de Turenne conceiving this post to be advantageous for observing the motions of the Prince's Army, which still kept about Paris, and likewise to hinder the succours which the Spaniards might send to join them. He at length received advice that the Duke of Lorraine was returning a second time with his troops and the detachment of Spaniards under the command of the Duke of Wirtemberg, and that he had taken the road of Champagne and Brie, to join the Army of the Princes: He immediately marched towards the Marne; and having learnt by the way that the Lorrainers were advancing, the Army crossed the river at Lagni, and encamped at the little village of S. Germain near Cressy en Brie. M. de Turenne received orders from the Court to stay there till farther directions,

An. 1652. and to attempt nothing against M. de Lorraine unless he endeavoured to march to Paris, by breaking up his camp where he was, and that in such case he should do his best to prevent his junction with the Princes. This order was occasioned by a treaty being on foot with M. de Lorraine, who had sent his Secretary to conclude it, with a promise at the same time that he would remain where he was, and would not move forwards till either an agreement was made, or the treaty broke off. He was in hopes to amuse the Court, deceive it by his artifices, and find an opportunity either to get into Paris or join the Princes on the road, without coming to a battle. M. de Turenne, who knew him better than the Court, did not give into the snare as they did; he told M. de Lorraine's Secretary, who in passing by to go and give his Master an account how the negotiation went on, had brought him the order before mentioned, *That M. de Lorraine's promises and nothing were alike to him.* Accordingly, to shew the good opinion he had of him, he resolved to march the next day, the fifth of September, to Brie-Comte-Robert, to be nearer at hand to intercept his passage in case he should attempt to march on, as he believed he would, and according to custom break his word: He told the Duke of York in confidence, that though he had positive orders not to quit his post, yet he was so fully persuaded that the Duke of Lorraine would deceive the Court, and that it was the King his Master's interest for the Army to march, that he rather chose to hazard his head by disobeying, than give M. de Lorraine an opportunity to proceed to what he aimed at, and make a fool of him. The Army decamped in the morning; and the Quarter-masters coming to Brie-Comte-Robert, found the enemy's Quarter-masters there on the same errand, their Army being already on the march to come and incamp there that very night. They returned the same moment to inform M. de Turenne of it, who with the van of the Army had passed a defile: he immediately sent notice of it to M. de la Ferté, who that day had the leading of the rear, and desired him to come to him that they might consult together what was to be done; and he not coming quick enough he went to meet him, and found him in the defile: they resolved instead of going to Brie-Comte-Robert, to march directly

directly to Villeneuve S. George. M. de Turenne went before with his whole cavalry, ordered the infantry to make all the haste they could after him with the canon, and desired M. de la Ferté to do the same: he justly feared lest M. de Lorraine who knew the importance of the post should get there before him, and he made no question but that his Quarter-masters advertising him of their meeting with his, would put him upon taking the same measure. His conjecture was verified: notwithstanding all the speed he could make, the Duke's van reached Villeneuve S. George before him, and he thought himself so secure of that post, that he sent the Prince a letter dated from the same place, to let him know that he had made himself master of it: The Duke of York heard this afterwards from the mouth of the very Officer who carried the letter, being with M. de Turenne when a party which had taken him prisoner, brought him into Villeneuve S. George, and the man was so astonished at seeing the King's Army there, that he could not comprehend how it was possible to be.

Though the Lorrainers had got the start, were masters of the town, and past the Yeres with part of their troops, yet M. de Turenne arriving with his van on an eminence which commands the village and the rivers, drove them out and seized the bridge: Their Army was so near on the other side of this small river, that they fired their canon against the foremost squadrons of the King's troops, (when they got on the top of the mountain) whose van was more serviceable to them than expedition. M. de la Ferté arrived towards the evening with the rest of the Army; and the enemy having mist of the post, retired a league higher up along the river, over against Chateau d'Ablon, where the Prince joined them a few days after, having passed his troops over in two or three large boats which he found by chance, on the river.

Now it was that the enemy being stronger by one half than M. de Turenne, reckoned themselves sure of a victory, having him shut up between the Seine and the Yeres, and believing it would be impossible for him to escape: They knew that not having in the bread-chests above four or five days provision at most; and forage failing him, he could get none from any place, the whole country round being ruined, and they

An. 1652. they hoped to finish the war without a blow; but M. de Turenne had had the good fortune to seize at Ville-neuve S. George the very night he got there, four or five and twenty boats, which was the saving of the Army, because they served to make bridges over the Seine.

No time was lost; the first bridge was finished in two or three days with some works on the other side the Seine to cover it; and the second was finished a few days after. The troops surmounted difficulties which seemed insuperable: they had neither wood nor money; the industry and ingenuity of the officers of the artillery and the liberality of some gamesters supplied both; these latter lent three hundred pistoles, the Intendant of the Army not being able to furnish even that small sum; the other pulled down the houses of the village to make use of the beams and boards. This communication with the other side of the Seine afforded forage for the cavalry, which wanted it the very first day. The better to enable ourselves to maintain this post, we intrencht our selves on the side of Limai, which was the only place by which the enemy could attack the army; it was cover'd with a wood on its right; it had the Seine on the left; the Yeres screened it behind; thus having only the front to guard, which was over against Limai and Gros-bois, there was no more to do than to throw up lines between the five redoubts which the Duke of Lorraine had erected there, and which were still entire.

While the men were at work on these entrenchments and building bridges, the enemy's army decamp't, after having put a garrison into Ablon, and marcht towards Brie, with a design there to cross the Yeres, and so inclose the Army on every side. When they made this motion, M. de Turenne thought fit to attack the castle of Ablon, to secure a communication by water with Corbeil, from whence he hoped to get all sorts of provisions: for this purpose M. de Rennel was sent with a detachment of horse and foot and two pieces of canon; but before he reacht the castle, M. de Turenne who had seen him pass, was advertis'd that some squadrons of the enemy were discovered between the wood and Limai. He immediately sent orders to Rennel to return to the camp, and ascend'd an eminence to reconnoitre the enemy, supposing them at first to be making towards him: when he was on the top of the eminence, he perceiv'd the infantry
begin

beginning to appear; and in order to judge the better An. 1652. whether their design was to attack him immediately, he put himself, with the Duke of York, amidst the skirmishers, who made those of the enemy move further off, and gave an opportunity to take a nearer view of them. M. de Turenne who could not see very far, not trusting to his own eyes, desired the Duke of York to find out what they were doing. This Prince was the first who inform'd him they were intrenching themselves; in which he being confirm'd by several others, he return'd to the camp very much pleas'd with the enemy's not attacking his lines, which were not yet perfected: he made the men work at them without intermission and fence them with palisades; which being executed in six hours time, it was thought expedient to open the redoubts on the side towards the camp, because, as the Lorrainers had built them, it had been a difficult matter to have retaken them in case the enemy had become masters of them.

At the same time that the Prince of Condé march'd with his army to Limai, the Duke of Lorraine, with his, advanced up the Yerres and posted himself between Brie and the King's Army, which they thought to have kept block'd up, not doubting but they should in a little time either starve it or force it upon undertaking some desperate action. After the Prince had finish'd his intrenchments, which were very deep, and within canon-shot of those of M. de Turenne, his principal application was to make a bridge of boats a league below his, to interrupt his forragers, and prevent a communication with Corbeil on the other side the Seine, whilst M. de Lorraine had parties continually in the field to prevent it on the side of Brie; but before the enemy's bridge was compleated, we were masters of the Castle of Ablon, which render'd all their precautions useless, and secured by water a free communication with Corbeil: we likewise made a pretty good provision of forrage, which we brought all the way from the country between Juvisi and Paris.

The enemy having compleated their bridge, our forragers cou'd not go abroad without large escorts of infantry and cavalry, which was the more painful work, inasmuch as they were forced to go so far off they cou'd not return the same day. The Generals at length

An. 1652 hit upon an expedient which was at the same time more easie and less hazardous. Two thousand horse which were come to Corbeil after the taking of Montrond, had orders to stay there: from thence were detached every day small parties, which coursed down the river on both sides; these meeting with those from the camp which did the same thing up the river, each return'd on their own side, after giving each other an account of what they had discover'd; and when those from the camp reported that the coast was clear, we sent out the forragers, who went beyond Corbeil, and cross'd the river Essone; after which they forrag'd at their ease, pass'd the night in safety, came back again to the town, and return'd to the camp on the one or the other side of the Seine, where they were advertis'd there was no danger.

This method was pursu'd with so much punctuality and good fortune that no accident befell any of the convoys; and it may with truth be said that the French Monarchy was reduced to that extremity, that its preservation depended on each of these convoys, the loss of but one being capable of inducing that of the whole army.

During this blockade, the small parties of the King's Army extended their irruptions very far on the side of Orleans, and coursed sometimes up to the very gates of Paris, which very much incommoded that great city, whose commerce was interrupted on that side, whilst on the other the troops of the Princes pillaged it no less. The Parisians for some time endured this troublesome neighbourhood pretty patiently, on the Prince of Condé's promising to deliver them soon from it, and to put an end to the war, by forcing M. de Turenne to submit himself with his troops; but the effect not answering the hopes he had daily fed them up with, they inclin'd more than ever to the side of the Court, and resumed sentiments more suitable to their duty. They made serious reflections how blindly they suffered themselves to be devoured by strangers, without any advantage that could possibly accrue either to themselves in particular or the Nation in general, or a prospect of any thing but being the dupes of certain ambitious spirits whose sole aim was to engage them in the designs they themselves had to usurp the Royal Authority.

All the well-wishers to the Court improving these favourable dispositions, dextrously cherished the misunderstanding which began to grow between the Parisians and the Princes; the Cardinal de Retz left nothing untried on his side to foment it: the massacre at the town-house was still fresh in memory, and several disorders, which happened, giving occasion to people to discover their inclination, the incendiaries who had so often put them in motion against the King's interest, lost all their credit; which raising the dejected spirits of the King's faithful subjects, they pointed out to others the dangerous precipice down which the ambition of the Princes was going to cast them.

The prudence of the Generals having secured forrage to the King's Army, and the intrenchments being such as it would have been dangerous to the enemy to attempt to force them, there passed nothing during the blockade but frequent skirmishes which were unavoidable, on account of the nearness of the lines of each army. There happened, among others, one so considerable, that it had like to have brought on a general engagement, in spite of the Generals on both sides. The Duke of Orleans being come to see the Army of the Princes, the youth of quality who had accompanied him had a mind to shew their mettle, and went out of the lines to fire at the King's troops with their pistols: the latter seeing them come in great numbers, went out likewise to fight them: the cavalry was skirmishing in the plain, and the infantry on the same account were scattered up and down in the vineyards which run from the bottom to the top of the hill. The affair grew to be so much in earnest, and the Volunteers on each side approached so near, that M. de Turenne was obliged to detach the Marquis de Richelieu, with several small platoons of cavalry, to go and disengage them, which the Prince perceiving, did the same on his side. There were several killed and wounded on both sides. A Captain of Douglas's regiment named Trivy, who was taken, made his escape a few days afterwards, and brought M. de Turenne the news of the Prince of Condé's being fallen sick, and that he was thereupon carried to Paris, where the leading men of his faction were still using their utmost endeavours

An. 1652, vours to re-animate it with the hopes of the impending ruin of the King's Army. If they really believed what they gave out, they deceived themselves egregiously; for the longer the Army staid at Villeneuve S. George, the more it abounded in all things, which were brought it from Corbeil.

In this interval was performed a very gallant action by the Sieur Sequin, Captain of horse in Beauveau's regiment. He often went out on a party; and being now abroad with a hundred horse, he put himself in ambuscade to surprize the enemy's forragers, and having let them come and fall to work, he was going to carry them off, when discovering very near him a squadron on a rising ground, he set himself to charge these latter, supposing them to be the only escorte the forragers had belonging to them; but drawing near he found there were four squadrons more: he immediately came to a resolution; he told his men in few words, that it was too late to think of a retreat, and that they must seek their safety in their swords points. He divided them into five small bodies, each in two ranks, and fell on the enemy with so much vigour, that he put them to the rout, killed threescore of them on the spot, took fifty prisoners, and thus he defeated, notwithstanding so great an inequality, the old regiment of Wirtemberg, the Major whereof and two Captains were in the number of the prisoners.

The Court which was at Pontoise or S. Germain's, was still carrying on its intelligences in Paris, from whence it had constant advice of what passed there, and how the Parisians were discontented that the Princes kept up the war at their gates; and now a negotiation being on a good footing, the Court sent to know of the two Generals, whether they believed it practicable to disengage the Army from the post it was in without running any hazard, and to find means to join the King, in order to favour the treaty which was on the anvil with the Parisians.

Immediately upon this every thing was disposed for the Army to break up camp; twelve bridges were laid over the small river, under colour of favouring the forragers, and orders were sent to the troops at Corbeil to erect some redoubts on a rising-ground before the town, the more to confirm the enemy in a belief that our thoughts were only

ly how to make the forragers safe on all sides. All these An. 1652.
 things being done, command was given, the fourth of
 October, an hour before sun-set, that all the troops should
 prepare to march: as soon as it was night, the baggage
 was sent towards Corbeil with great silence, by the
 lowest road along the Seine; at the head of it were
 some horse and dragoons, with orders when they ap-
 proached the town, to form into order of battle on an
 eminence behind the redoubts.

When the baggage had passed the bridges, the troops
 followed them in good order: the guards and the centinels
 were not relieved till the whole was got on the other side
 the little river, and the bridges were broke to prevent
 the enemy's making use of them and following the King's
 Army, in case they had discovered its retreat; but, so
 far were they from suspecting it, they had that very
 night resolved to attack the next day the regiment of
 Nettencour, which with a guard of forty horse was in a
 work which covered, on the other side the Seine, the
 heads of two bridges. The better to effect this, they
 had got ready great floats of wood, which they let drive
 from a league above in the middle of the river, to the end
 that the shock these would give to the bridges might
 carry them away. The thing had success; Nettencour's
 regiment going to cross over, as it was directed to do,
 found they were broke down, and M. de Turenne being
 made acquainted therewith, ordered it to repair to Corbeil
 along the river, not judging proper to retard, for this
 accident, the march of the troops; it came without
 any accident to Corbeil, and join'd the Army. The next
 day, a little before it was light, the enemy's soldiers be-
 ing come to attack the work, were surprized to find it
 abandoned; but they were much more so at the King's
 Army being vanished: they were the first that informed
 the Generals of this: it was too late then, and had they
 known it sooner, they could have done it no great harm;
 because after the Army had marched somewhat better
 than a league, the situation and nature of the ground
 was so favourable to us, we had no longer any thing to
 fear. On one side we were covered by the Seine, and by
 the forest of Sennard on the other: the space between both
 was not so broad but that the Army could fill it, so that
 it was impossible for the enemy to break into it or attack

An. 1652. it in flank, and the nearer we came to Corbeil, the narrower was the ground. All the troops got thither before sun-rise; and tho' they were not to stay there above one night to rest themselves, they made intrenchments palisaded to prevent a surprise, in case the enemy should take a fancy to fight. The next day, being the sixth of October, in the morning, we marched to Chaume, where we arrived in the evening, designing to go and cross the Marne at Meaux, and afterwards join the Court either at Pontoise or S. Germain. This was a painful and dangerous day: the enemy might have attacked the Army if they would. We marched on in such a manner that in a quarter of an hour's time the whole Army might have been in battalia: the van-guard moved in two columns; the first squadron at the head of the column of the left was the first of the first line, and that at the head of the right column was the first of the second line, according to order of battle. We kept the customary distances, as if we had been on the point of fighting; the infantry followed the cavalry in the same order; the first line of infantry followed the first of cavalry, and the second in like manner: the gendarmes marched according to their post between the two lines of infantry, and the other wing of cavalry followed the infantry in the same order; so that if the enemy had appeared, the Army would have been ready to have received them by turning to the left. The artillery and bread-chests marched on the right of the infantry, and the baggage on the right of the whole. The enemy having attempted nothing that day, we afterwards marched with less constraint to Presse, Tournay and Quincé; and on the eleventh having crossed the Marne near Meaux, we encamped the same night at Boretz, from thence marched to Montlevéque and afterwards to Courteuil, where we were cover'd by the river there.

This retreat, so surprizing to the enemy, completed the ruin of their affairs, with the Parisians, who being weary of bearing the burthen of a war which was quite sinking them, were every day more and more desirous to see an end put to it by the return of the King, whose friends made their use of so favourable a conjuncture. The Prince of Condé and the Duke of Lorraine, thought it was not their interest to stay any longer in the neighbourhood of Paris, since, if they did, they would lose those
few

few friends which were left them, and whom they could not preserve but by removing farther off; besides, winter was coming on, and the country was so wasted, that it had been next to impossible to subsist their troops there.

These considerations and perhaps some others which are not known, determined the Princes to quit Paris: they thought the best course they could steer was to winter their troops in Champagne and Lorrain, the Spaniards being to join them at Rhetel, to assist them to take such places as were necessary to cover and secure their quarters. As for the Duke of Orleans and Mademoiselle, it was resolved they should continue at Paris, and employ their interest and endeavours to hinder that city from receiving the King. All these resolutions were immediately put in execution; for the King's Army not as yet being got farther than Courteuil near Senlis about the fourteenth of October, that of the enemy passed by it, taking their way to Champagne.

The Court then conceived it to be their interest to return to Paris, and M. de Turenne went purposely to S. Germain to persuade them to it: he represented to them the necessity of it, that as they had a favourable opportunity of doing it they should not by any means let it slip, nor give the Parisians time to come off of the present disgust they had taken to the Princes, which their absence and the removal of their troops might cure them of. To strengthen his opinion, he shewed that there was no hopes of finding winter-quarters for the troops, if the King did not make himself master of Paris; that if this was not done they should not be able to make head the next campaign against the enemy's forces, which would be very numerous; that if Paris refused to admit the King, all the other Cities would follow its example; and he concluded, with assuring them that all depended on the good or bad success of this affair. His reasons, which are here only touch'd upon, appeared so weighty to the council, that they were approved of. The Court departed from S. Germain, and took the road over the bridge at S. Cloud, the others being broke; when it was arrived at the *Bois de Boulogne* there came certain persons from Paris who applied themselves to some members of the Council, and represented that the enterprise was dangerous, and that it was a rash hazard,

An. 1652. ing of the King's Person. These Gentlemen last mentioned took the alarm, and went to the Queen's coach in which the King was, to dissuade their Majesties from proceeding further. The coach stop'd: M. de Turenne and the rest of the Council were called, to consult what was to be done: all were of opinion the Court should return to S. Germain, there was only M. de Turenne who persisted in the first resolution and in the reasons which had induced them to take it, adding, that after coming so far, to return would equally prejudice the affairs of the King and his honour; that it would shew a want of resolution which would make the Court despicable, dishearten their friends, and encourage their enemies; that every thing was to be dreaded from a change wherein so much faint-heartedness would appear, and that he look'd upon those who were come to bring this advice either as concealed enemies, who would prevent the King's entering Paris, or as timorous souls, whose sentiments ought not to be minded.

The Queen whom it was no easy matter to frighten, and whose courage was proof against all danger, stuck to M. de Turenne's opinion against that of the whole council. She said that on so important an occasion, it were better to expose her self and her son to what dangers might occur, than to lose their reputation by an action so dishonourable as their return would be, which would utterly ruin their affairs, and that they must never hope to enter Paris again if they lost this opportunity. It was resolved to go thither: the King advanced at the head of his guards, entered the city by the gate S. Honoré, and instead of the opposition which some had endeavoured to make him apprehensive of, he every where met with nothing but acclamations demonstrating the general joy, and he was attended to the Louvre by crouds of people, incessantly crying *vive le Roy*. While his Majesty was entering at one gate, the Duke of Orleans went out at another, and Mademoiselle who was return'd into her apartment at the Thuilleries, had orders to depart from Paris, which she obeyed.

M. de Turenne returned immediately to the Army, and towards the close of the month put himself on his march to follow the enemy, who had seiz'd Chateau-Portien and Rhetel on the Aisne; where they met with

but little resistance; from thence they went and attack'd S. Meneshoult, which made a good defence; but it was at last forced to surrender on terms; there were in it besides the ordinary garrison no more than four companies of the regiment of York, who threw themselves into it before it was invested. When the Army of the Princes quitted the neighbourhood of Paris, there were sent with some cavalry of M. de la Ferté's, the regiment of infantry which bore his name, and that of York, with orders to march with all speed and throw themselves into S. Meneshoult and the places of the Barrois. The Marshal went himself to Nanci, to defend as well as he could his government, where he imagined, as indeed it happened, they designed to fix their winter-quarters.

In the march which the King's Army made towards Champagne, it encamp'd the second of November at Balieux, where it was obliged to remain one day, because the soldiers meeting on the way with abundance of new wines, they got in general so drunk that there came not to the quarters a sufficient number to mount the ordinary guard at the General's or the Duke of York's quarters. After they were got together again, we march'd the fourth to Dizy near Epornai, where we cross'd the Marne the fifth to cover our selves with this river, the enemy being then about Rhetel, where the Count de Fuenfaldagne had joined them with a considerable part of the Army of Spain, which oblig'd M. de Turenne to keep always at a reasonable distance, and behind some river or defile, that he might avoid the danger of a surprize. The sixth the Army march'd to Cheppes, where after it had incamp'd three or four days, it repass'd the Marne, and pitch'd at Vitry le Brûlé. The sixth it march'd to Vitry le François, always regulating its motions according to those of the enemy.

It was while the King's Army was making these different incampments that S. Meneshoult was taken, about the thirteenth of November: the enemy there discharged the Duke of Orleans's troops which were in their Army, and gave them leave to return into France, on condition they did not serve the King the remainder of this Campaign, nor in any other on that side the country: they were made to march to the quarters assigned them in Picardy,

An. 1652. ~~cardy, and the following year* they served in the Armies~~
on the other frontiers of France.

The enemy went afterwards and besieged Barleduc; M. de la Ferté had sent thither one named Rouffillon to command therein, with a garrison capable of defending the place longer than he did: he was nevertheless vain enough to refuse a reinforcement of five hundred men which M. de Turenne had sent to S. Dizier during the siege of S. Menchault, with orders to go to Barleduc, if the Governor had occasion for them; he thank'd M. de Turenne for the care he took of him, assured him he was in a good condition, if the enemy durst attack him, which he re-iterated when he was invested, with promises to give a good account of the place. This news was brought the eighteenth to M. de Turenne, who was at Vitry le Francois; he decamped immediately to go to the relief of it with all possible expedition; and to prevent the enemy's being informed of his approach, he repass'd the Marne at Vitry, and going along the side of the river which was on his left, he arrived by day-break at S. Dizier: there he halted six hours to rest his troops, and the moment we were going to continue our march, he received advice that the town and castle had surrendered; which made the Army halt.

This news was the more disagreeable in that it frustrated the design which had been form'd, not only to succour the place, but likewise to fight the enemy, or force them to such a precipitate retreat, that at least they would have lost their canon and baggage. Never was any enterprise more judiciously concerted; for tho' the King's Army was much inferior in number to that of the enemy, yet the nature and situation of the ground was so advantageous on that side by which we were marching towards them, that we ran no risk, the country being all woody.

M. de Turenne had six thousand foot, effective men, well disciplin'd; the Army had been reinforced with cavalry as well as infantry which had been drawn out of the garrisons of Artois, Picardy and other places which might spare them since the enemy was gone out of the heart of France. By favour of the woods, and by the quickness of the march, we might have fallen on the enemy when they would have least thought of it; neither

neither had it availed them much to have been warned An. 1652.
 of it; for the situation of the place is such, and such the disadvantage of the post in behalf of the besiegers against an Army which comes to relieve the place, that intrenchments are of no use there, and cannot be defended; the woods extend in length within a league of the town; there is between the wood and the castle a spacious plain, level to which stands the castle, and the upper town is on the edge of a descent which leads to the lower town; in the bottom which is narrow and between two little hills, runs a small brook, and the declivity on each side is sharp and difficult; so that the King's troops would have only had to do with an enemy which were on their side the brook, and would have past their time very ill between the Army which had attacked them and the castle, and between the wood and the castle, and their retreat could not have been made without so much confusion that they must have tumbled over one another in heaps.

When M. de Turenne formed this design, he supposed he should find the enemy's whole Army together, and did not know, as he learnt afterwards, that Fuenfaldagne with the greatest part of his troops was retired, being ignorant of the strength of the King's Army, and believing the Prince of Condé and the Duke of Lorraine to be strong enough to possess themselves of the Barrois and there settle their winter-quarters. So glorious a blow was mist thro' the indiscretion of M. de Roussillon, who suffer'd himself to be stript of the four best companies of his garrison in the lower town, tho' it was defended with a very good wall, and surrounded with a ditch full of water: he might at least have held out till there had been a breach in it; but the enemy became masters of it the very day they came before the place, and not thinking fit to make their attack on that side, they raised the next day a battery on the plain-side against the castle, and scarce had it begun to play, but the Governor without so much as staying till a breach was made in it, desired to capitulate, and agreed to march next day out of the place.

M. de Lorraine lost at this siege M. Fange, a Lieutenant General and the best officer in his whole Army; he was killed the night after the taking the lower town: he

An. 1652. he supp'd with the Prince of Condé in a house pretty near the upper town, and making a debauch he got so very drunk; that in a fit of fool-hardiness, he went out at the back door, with a napkin about his head, to make himself the more distinguishable, and to give the fairer aim to be fired at by the besieged; the Prince of Condé and the Chevalier de Guise ran after him to bring him back; but before they could get up with him, he received a musket shot which killed him.

The quick taking of Bar le duc gave the enemy time to seize Ligni, Voyd and Commerci; because M. de Turenne being ignorant of Fuensaldagne's being gone off, did not dare to approach the enemy too near: we remained therefore two or three days at S. Disier, during which they made these new progresses; and these three places having but weak garrisons, could make little or no resistance.

The King's Army advanced from S. Disier to Stainville, where it was joined by a reinforcement of a regiment of cavalry of three hundred troopers, and a regiment of infantry of twelve hundred foot of the Duke of Lorraine's troops, the regiment of cavalry and the independent company of the Earl of Bristol. Altho' these troops, all but the independent company, were but new levies incapable of doing great service; the number of them however gave some reputation. It was at Stainville, and not before the five and twentieth of November, that we heard of the Count de Fuensaldagne's departure; upon which M. de Turenne resolved to offer the enemy battle, and in case they declined it, oblige them to turn out of their winter-quarters, in which they thought themselves so well settled, that they had already made the repartition of them: the event will shew how much they were mistaken; for when we advanced towards them the next day, they found themselves so little able to maintain themselves therein, that not daring to look M. de Turenne in the face they on a sudden broke up camp, crost the Meuse near Voyd, where the Prince was advertised we were marching towards him, and leaving the river on the left made the best of their way to Luxembourg: we followed them so close, that oftentimes the King's Army arrived at noon where they had lain the night before. Thus were they chased till the thirtieth, when

when we arriv'd, in the morning, at S. Mihei: it An. 1652. was not thought proper to pursue them further, since ~~being~~ being under shelter of their own country, they were out of danger.

And now M. de Turenne thought of nothing but how to refresh his Army, especially the infantry, which had been much harass'd by so many toilsome marches, besides being pinch'd for want of bread. The enemy whom we had continually pursued, had eaten up the country every where; the bread-chests were empty, and it was impossible for the commissaries of provisions to procure any at that time. M. de Turenne sent to demand some of the inhabitants of S. Mihei, who having made a difficulty of obeying, on a pretended impossibility of furnishing a sufficient quantity at a day's warning, he found himself obliged, rather than let his Army perish with hunger, to order his infantry, gendarmes and canon to enter the town, and to distribute his cavalry into the circumjacent villages; altho' we stayed there but a little time, it did the troops a great deal of good; but M. de la Ferté having been informed of this, came to Nanci, which was ten or twelve leagues off, to entreat M. de Turenne to withdraw, holding it for so great an affront his taking quarters in that town, that he did not forgive it him in a long time, and this misunderstanding was afterwards very prejudicial to the King's affairs. We were necessitated to depart the day after the arrival of the Marshal, whose anger increasing on the complaints made by the inhabitants against certain soldiers, he followed the troops in their march, attended with his guards, at whose head he charged the lingerers as if they had been enemies; and thus continuing to lay about him quite to the quarters of the gendarmes, who were not yet in order or on their march, one of the Earl of Bristol's company, named Manwaring, who did not know him, seeing how violently he dealt his blows, took him to be the enemy, and presented a pistol at his belly, but happily for both it mist fire: the poor gendarme was wounded in five or six places, and lay for dead on the ground, but he recovered. Berkley, Cornet of the same company, came off better; by the great noise which the Marshal made he imagined as well as Manwaring, that the enemy were entered the town; he advanced with

An. 1652. with his pistol in his hand to the corner of a street; but knowing the Marshal, he immediately lowered the muzzle of it, and saluted him, and as he was known to the Marshal, he escaped better than the gendarme.

We arrived in the evening at a small village, called Villotte; the next day we marched to Tronville, between Bar and Ligni: in the evening was sent a detachment of cavalry and infantry with canon, and all things necessary for attacking this last place; a battery was presently raised within less than half-musket shot of the walls; trenches were thrown up on the right and left to cover the infantry, and an epaulment for the security of the cavalry; all these works were perfected before sunrise: the batteries began then to play, and before night there was a reasonable breach; the difficulty was how to pass the ditch which was full of water, and not only deep but so broad, that the rubbish of the breach was not enough to fill it: nevertheless they gave the assault, and what with boards, planks, ladders and long beams, they passed the ditch, and got to the breach, which the enemy instantly abandon'd and retir'd into the castle, which was stronger. The next day M. de Turenne marched with his troops to Bar-le-duc, leaving M. de la Ferté with his at the siege of the castle of Ligni.

The same night that we arrived at Bar a battery was erected against the lower town, under cover of some houses which were almost on the edge of the ditch, there being but a very little space between them: the canon began firing in the morning, and tho' they were small and but a few, no more than two twelve-pounders, one eight and two six pounders, yet the pieces being reinforced and capable of being double-loaded, M. de Champfort, Lieutenant of the Artillery, made so good a use of them, that by sun-set there was a good breach.

The regiment of Picardy was to give the assault under the command of M. de Tor the eldest Lieutenant-General of France, and the only one in this Army. The breach was just by the gate on the right, as you go in, which was only flank'd with two small round towers on the side: we chose to batter this place preferable to any other, that we might not be impeded by filling the ditch, and because any where else we must have made a wider breach, which would have taken up more time than we

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cared to employ there; whereas in this place we had An. 1652. the conveniency of passing the ditch over the bridge belonging to the town, and of leaping down below, where was the draw-bridge of the wicket, from whence we could slip along the wall to the breach, which was not far off.

Every thing being thus disposed, M. de Turenne made two or three discharges of his canon against the tower of the gate, which alone defended the breach, and the ruins whereof would have rendered the attack more easy. M. de Tot who had orders to begin it, instead of making some men march immediately and staying with the body of the detachment himself, having, as he was wont to do, drunk a little too much for a Commander, he followed the Serjeant who led the head of the attack; and as he was leaping from the small wicket-gate, he was killed with a musket-shot. This place was fatal to drunkards: but the Duke of York must do this justice to the Nation as to own that poor M. de Tot was the only French officer he ever saw drunk in all their Armies. This accident caused no delay: the assailants passed in file thro' the wicket, and pushing their way up to the breach in spite of the fire of the enemy whom the canon could not dislodge from the tower of the gate, they not only carried the breach, but drove the besieged likewise from the barricades which they had made behind and in the streets, pursuing them quite to the upper town.

An accident which befel the Governor, whose name was Despillar, conduced very much to the taking of this lower town: not imagining we would make the assault that night, he continued in the upper town; but the noise of the attack having obliged him to come thither, and ordering out two hundred men to strengthen those who defended the post, his horse fell under him as he was going down to the lower town, and bruised his leg so violently that he was forced to be carried up again. We did not lose many men in this assault: besides M. de Tot, there was no person of distinction killed; except the Marquis d' Angeau; a Volunteer; M. Poliac, first Captain of Picardy, who commanded the regiment in the absence of the Major Officers, received a musket ball in his shoulder; and Godenviller, Captain in the same
3 regiment,

An. 1652. regiment, received one in his belly, but they both re-
covered.

Cardinal Mazarin arrived in the camp that day, and brought a reinforcement of troops which had been drawn out of divers places, and were commanded by the Duke d'Elbeuf and Marshal d'Aumont. The Cardinal saw the lower town taken, which served but little towards the taking the upper town and castle, which we attacked merely for the putting our infantry under cover there, the weather being too severe to encamp: We found in it abundance of wine and bread, which we stood in great need of. As for the cavalry, it was sent into good quarters in the country, and near adjoining to the town.

Although it was a very hard frost the Prince of Condé resolved to attempt the relief of the place: We had timely notice of his marching, and it was concluded by the Cardinal and the Generals, that M. de Turenne and M. de la Ferté should march and meet the enemy with the greatest part of the cavalry, about three thousand foot and six field-pieces, and that the Cardinal should follow them at some distance, while Messieurs d'Elbeuf and d'Aumont with the rest of the troops should stay and carry on the siege.

Information was brought that the enemy were coming by the road of Vaubecourt which is about five leagues from Barleduc. The King's Army marched towards them; M. de Turenne leading the van, advanced as far as Condit, which is not above a league and an half from Vaubecourt: The moment that the foremost troops entered Condit in order to lodge there, advice came by a party which had taken some prisoners, that the Prince of Condé was just arrived at Vaubecourt, where he was to stay that night, not knowing we were so near. M. de Turenne sent instantly to acquaint M. de la Ferté with this, and to let him know that he was of the opinion they ought to hasten and fall forthwith on the enemy, whom they should certainly find in great disorder; that the quarters being filled with wine and all kinds of provisions, the Commanders would be hard put to it to get their troops together, and make the troopers mount, and that their surprize would be so great in finding themselves attacked at a time when they imagined the King's Army to be a great way off, that a victory might be obtained
 with

with ease. But Marshal de la Ferté, instead of consenting to this proposal, came himself to tell M. de Turenne that he did not think it adviseable to undertake an affair of so great importance without the participation of the Cardinal, who was not far off, and that he was of opinion he should be sent to, and his consent had before they did any thing. M. de Turenne was forced against his will to take this course: an express was dispatched away to the Cardinal, to inform him *vivâ voce* of the glorious opportunity that offered; he instantly sent back his consent; but tho' he was not at the distance of above a league or two at most, the opportunity was lost; for at the very moment that we were marching to the enemy, another party brought word that there was reason to believe the Prince was decamped, for that the town was all on fire, and the advanced guard not to be seen. As we moved on we found that Vaubecourt indeed was on fire; and another party brought news that the enemy were retiring with extreme precipitation; whereupon M. de Turenne turned back with his troops in order to put them into their quarters, not thinking it proper to proceed any farther. The next day we learned by the inhabitants of Vaubecourt that the Prince of Condé having been informed of M. de Turenne's approach had beat a general march and founded to horse, and that seeing the little haste his troops made to leave so good a lodging he caused each corner of the town to be set on fire, to make them turn out the quicker. This narrow escape made him more circumspect afterwards; he did not think it convenient to stay any longer in that country, seeing that the King's Army was numerous enough to carry on two sieges at once, and come and meet him at the same time with half the troops.

When we were assured that the enemy had entirely quitted the country, M. de la Ferté returned to Bar with most of the infantry, and a part of the cavalry, and M. de Turenne put the rest into quarters at Contrusson, Revigny aux Vaches, and other villages which were not above four leagues from Bar. The Cardinal took up his quarters in the village of Fains, within a league of the town; there he staid during the siege, which lasted no long time after the Prince of Condé was retired. The besieged however suffered two breaches to be made

An. 1652 before they desired a parley; at the first, which was thought practicable, the soldiers when they mounted to storm it, found that there was, on the other side, the depth of a pike which they could not leap over, and which could not be discerned without the town. We were obliged to raise a new battery towards the castle, where after having made a pretty considerable breach, the besieged capitulated, surrendered the upper town and the castle, and became prisoners of war. This was about the middle of December. The unserviceableness of the first breach mentioned above may be an instruction to Governors of places how to make them the more defensible. Art may do that elsewhere which Nature did here; for if a wall is reasonably strong and has a good foundation, they may cut, behind the place which is battered in breach, a very deep and steep ditch which will make the breach useless to the besiegers.

Among the troops which M. de Lorrain had left in garrison at Barleduc was an Irish regiment of foot, who seeing themselves in danger of remaining a long time prisoners of war, their Colonel dying the day the place surrendered, the Lieutenant-Colonel, who escaped, sent to offer his service to the Duke of York, in case he could obtain of the Cardinal that the regiment should have their liberty; which being granted, the two companies which it contained, with all the officers, were incorporated into that Prince's regiment which was at Ligni, whither they were sent.

After the taking of Barleduc, Marshal de la Ferté's troops marched to Ligni to hasten the taking of the castle, the siege whereof went on but slowly while the other lasted: We began to batter in breach, but before it was made wide enough, ball failing, the besieged fortified the top of it with a strong palisade: Then M. de la Ferté set the miners on at the same place where the ruins of the wall favoured his lodgment; in a little time the mine was ready to play; and the regiments of York and Douglas were commanded to make the attack as soon as it should have had its effect, and the regiment of la Ferté had orders to support them. The Count d'Entrées who commanded the attack, moved forward without staying till the smoke was gone to see what effect the mine had; they passed upon the ice over the ditch

ditch which was very broad ; when they came to the breach they perceived, but too late, that the mine had demolished no more of the outer part of the wall than just to the place which the besieged had been fencing with palisades ; there was no going forward, so the troops were called off ; but what added to the misfortune, the ice broke under the soldiers feet ; the greatest part of them fell into the ditch, which gave the besieged an opportunity to make a terrible fire on them. Thus for want of a little patience to see the success of the mine, the regiment of York lost four Captains, some Lieutenants and Ensigns, and about a hundred common soldiers ; and that of Douglas, two Captains and near fifty common soldiers, besides the wounded. That night the miners were set on a second time, and the next day, the two and twentieth, the castle capitulated, and surrendered on the same terms as Barleduc.

The Cardinal, whom this run of success made more keen, was desirous to push on, and finish the campaign by the taking of S. Menchoult. After having left good garrisons in Ligni and Barleduc, and repaired the breaches of both, as much as the season would allow, the Army set out from Contruillon the seven and twentieth, and arrived the next day at Sommyeure, where it remained till the thirtieth. It froze so hard the day that we arrived at Sommyeure that the troopers were obliged to walk a foot to warm themselves ; thirty or forty of the common soldiers perished that day with cold ; for as soon as any of those which were not well clothed fate down to rest themselves, the cold seized them so that they could not possibly get upon their legs again. The Duke of York saw several thus frozen to death, and many more had undergone the same fate if the Officers had not taken care to set on horseback such as they saw ready to sink, and had them carried to the next town, where several were saved by giving them brandy or other strong liquors. What rendered the cold more sharp and piercing was the marching in those vast plains of Champagne, where there was not the least shelter against a bleak north-east wind, which blew full in our face ; and this was what did indeed hinder the besieging of S. Menchoult.

An. 1652. M. de Turenne represented to the Cardinal the difficulties that would attend the undertaking it in such severe weather, that it was impossible to find cover for the foot there as at Bar and Ligni, or forage for the horse thereabouts, since there was no suburb, and the country had been eaten bare by the enemy; that the place being strong and provided with a numerous garrison, it would require a siege in all the forms, and that instead of ending the campaign gloriously, they would be in danger of ruining the Army entirely, and raising the siege shamefully.

An. 1653. The Cardinal at length yielded to these reasons: The Army marched towards Rhétel through Mliocour and Grivy; and the first day of the year 1653 passed the night at Attigny, which is situated on the river Aisne, which we crossed the next day to pass to *Saux aux Bois*. We found it would have been almost as difficult a task to attempt Rhétel as S. Menchoult; a resolution was therefore taken to fall upon Château-Porcien, two leagues below, because there we should meet with the same conveniences as at the siege of Barleduc, there being nothing but the castle in any posture of defence, and the town which we reckoned upon carrying at once, being able to contain and cover a sufficient number of troops to form the siege of it.

M. de Turenne arrived the sixth of January at Son, where he put into quarters and in the circumjacent villages the greatest part of the horse and part of the foot. It was but a league and a half from Château-Porcien, and was the fittest post that could be to prevent any succours being thrown into the place. The Duke d'Elbeuf and Marshal d'Aumont were charged with the care of this siege. Marshal de la Ferté established the quarters for his cavalry at to prevent succour likewise; and the Cardinal took up his at Balhan. The Duke of York not having been present at this siege, no particular account of it will find a place here; we shall only mention what passed in the quarters before-mentioned, where the service was hard, on account of the approach of the Prince of Condé, who came to endeavour to raise the siege. In order to hinder his doing this, all the cavalry which was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Son, had orders to march to the siege every evening, stay there all night, and come back

to their quarters after sun-rise. Marshal de la Ferté's cavalry did the same, and this fatigue lasted as long as the siege, which by good fortune was not very long. The town being presently taken, the miners were set to work without delay at the castle; when the mine was ready, the Governor, whose name was Dubuiffon, capitulated, and agreed to surrender the place in four days, if it was not relieved in that time. The enemy understanding this, advanced as far as Chaumont to attempt the relief of it. It was believed we should really have come to an action the last day; the parties brought intelligence that they were marching to attack the King's troops, which were therefore drawn up in battalia in the pass over the plain above the castle; there they staid till noon, when news came that the enemy was retired, and an hour afterwards the castle surrendered according to the capitulation; which was more honourable to the garrison than it would have been at another time, on account of the rigour of the season, which made us wish to have the place at any rate, the whole Army being extremely fatigued, and all the adjoining country quite ruined. The infantry suffered most: they could not be regularly supplied with bread; the Commissary of Provisions had not been able to lay in any store in any of the neighbouring villages, and the soldiers were forced to eat horse-flesh, and other bad food, and particularly cabbage-stalks, which they called the Cardinal's bread.

Notwithstanding this, when they thought they should go into winter-quarters, after having crossed the Aisne the thirteenth, and been cantoned at Poilcours and the villages thereabouts, afterwards at Prouilli between Rheims and Fismes, where they staid about two or three days, the Cardinal ordered that the Army should return towards the Aisne, which they passed the twentieth at Pont-a-ver, to go and retake Vervins, which the Spaniards had seized the summer before, and put a garrison into it. The place was not strong enough to hold out a siege; but it was a good quartering-place, and capable of annoying the country round about it, which made the Cardinal unwilling to quit the field till it was taken. Never did the common soldiers, or indeed officers, march to an enterprise with more reluctance and murmurings: After hav-

An. 1653. ing born all the severity of a most violent hard frost; they could not but be very much dissatisfied to suffer the fatigue of a thaw, in crossing an uneven country, whose clay-soil likewise rendred the ways unpassable, especially between Pont-a-verre and Laon where the baggage was set fast in the clay; and though, after they had surmounted these difficulties they came into a more open champion country, yet the continuation of the thaw rendred the ways equally bad every where. This march ruined most of the equipages and occasioned the loss of a great part of the baggage and a good number of horses.

We arrived the five and twentieth at Voulpaix, within a league of Vervins. The Duke of York, who followed M. de Turenne every where, going along with him to take a view of the place, and being advanced very near with a Gentleman the better to make his remarks, he met with a small party of cavalry belonging to the place which he thought belonged to the Army, and did not perceive his error till the enemy, being come within pistol-shot, fired just as he was going to join company with them; but their over hastiness gave him and the Gentleman that was with him time to get away.

The next day were detached about a thousand foot and two hundred horse to begin the attack of the place whose garrison consisted of nine hundred men, six hundred foot and three hundred horse. M. de Bassécour, a Colonel and a brave man was Governor of it. The besiegers lodged themselves the first night under cover of the houses and gardens which are just by the town; the next day about evening they raised a battery, which obliged the enemy to capitulate; the conditions were to march out of the place with arms and baggage.

This small siege cost few or no men; though it was of a very short continuance, still the Army grumbled at their not being sent, after the taking of Chateau-Portien, directly into winter-quarters; and when the enemy, according to their custom, railed at and inveighed against the Cardinal from the top of the walls of Vervins; the soldiers instead of taking his part made no answer but *Amen* to all their curses and imprecations. The twenty-eighth in the morning, M. de Turenne having seen Bassécour with his garrison march out, and having taken pos-

session of the place, marched the Army to Creci-sur-serre An. 1653 and from thence to Laon, from whence all the troops were sent into their winter-quarters; and the Cardinal, the Generals, and all the persons of quality took their way to Paris, where they arrived the third of February. Thus ended this long campaign in which M. de Turenne acquired immortal glory, by more than once saving the Monarchy by his counsels, his conduct, and his valour.

The last campaign having been so fatiguing and so long, that of this year could not but begin late: But tho' the King's Army had gone the last into winter-quarters, and most of the troops had been distributed into Poitou, Anjou, la Marche, and other provinces as remote, it was nevertheless beforehand with the enemy, and laid siege to Rhetel before they knew it was got together.

This town is seated on the river Aisne, which waters part of Champagne, and having flowed through those plains, the most spacious of any in this part of Europe, loses itself and its name in the river Oise. The place was considerable then on account of the passage it gave the enemy into this province, and a facility of coursing up to the very gates of Paris, and extending the contributions a great way. Though the Prince of Condé had entrusted the government of it with the Marquis de Persan, a very brave officer, and that the garrison seemed to be sufficient, yet it was not so in proportion to the importance of the place, and the danger it was in of being attacked; a thousand men more would have rendered the siege very difficult, and at least enabled it to hold out long enough to have given an opportunity of relieving it.

M. de Turenne profiting by this oversight of theirs, ordered the outworks to be briskly attacked the first night, when the enemy least expected it. The Governor and chief officers who were there on purpose to observe where the besiegers would make their approaches, were so astonished at seeing themselves attacked on every side, and with so much vigour, that they were not able to make any great resistance; the outworks were carried, and the Governor narrowly avoided being taken before he could get into the town.

Though its ditch was a good one, and the works high, yet they being only of earth, and the palisades only fixed on the

An. 1653. parapet, where they were least necessary, the besiegers matched to them with the better will, inasmuch as being once got to them, the advantage would be equal to attack or defend, and the greater number would prevail; however, we lost there several soldiers and some officers. But the besieged whose only hope lay in the defence of the outworks, had lost courage after they were driven out of them; we afterwards raised batteries so near the walls, which were none of the strongest, that in a short time were made in them two breaches, which obliged the besieged to capitulate the eighth of July. They marched out the next day with their arms and baggage, and were conducted to the nearest Spanish garrison. The Army staid two or three days to repair the breaches, and having provided the town with all things necessary, and left a good garrison in it, they marched towards Guise upon being informed that the enemy had appointed their rendezvous to be thereabouts. Being encamped the eleventh near Noircourt we understood by an express from the Governor of Rocroy, that a part of their Army which was marching to the rendezvous, was cantoned in several villages about Chimay, Glajon, and Terlon, on the other side the Ardennes; the Generals resolved to march to them with all the troops, and some field-pieces, not leaving above five or six hundred men to guard the baggage. M. de Turenne who led the van made all possible haste, but when he was got to Nost almost at the end of the forest, he learned from some prisoners whom a small party brought to him, that the enemy had had notice of his design and of his marching: It was therefore thought best to go back again to Noircourt, and having spent three days in this march we rejoined the baggage the fourteenth.

The whole Army marched the seventeenth to Haris, and thence to S. Algis, where the King of France and Cardinal Mazarin joined it. The five and twentieth it encamped at Ribemont, and we learnt that the Spanish Army, at least thirty thousand strong, with artillery and provisions suitable, being assembled near l'Arbre de Guise, was marching to enter France. A council was held in the presence of the King and the Cardinal to deliberate on what measures were to be taken against so powerful an Army, that of his Majesty not being above
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fix thousand foot and ten thousand horse. Several advised Ann 1653.
 to put all the infantry, except a detachment of a thousand
 men, into the frontier towns, with some cavalry, and that
 the rest of the cavalry and the detachment of infantry should
 be always at the heels of the enemy to carry off their
 foragers, intercept their provisions, and fatigue them
 so as they might not be able to lay siege to any place;
 others on the contrary were of opinion not to separate
 the Army, but to keep it together and defend the passage
 of the rivers, if they advanced into the country; that
 it might be of dangerous consequence to suffer them to
 take their way to Paris, which was but just reduced to
 the King's obedience, whilst Bourdeaux was still in re-
 bellion.

M. de Turenne proposed a method different from both
 the other; he apprehended the first to be dangerous, because
 when the forces were divided the enemy might easily
 chase what few there would be in the field; undertake
 at their ease what siege they pleased, and intrench them-
 selves so that before we could get together all the troops,
 it would be no longer possible to force them: that any
 diversion which might be attempted to be made by at-
 tacking any of their places, would be fruitless, since they
 would have time enough to finish their siege, and come
 and relieve the place, which the King's troops might
 be employed about, how inconsiderable soever it might
 be. As for the second, that it was impossible to defend the
 passage of the rivers against an Army so superior in foot,
 that such a step would intimidate the troops which would
 be afraid of being forced in their posts, and that it would
 have a yet much worse effect in Paris and the Pro-
 vinces; that his opinion was, that they should by all
 means keep the Army entire, and watch the enemy as
 narrowly as possible, in such manner that we might a-
 void a battle; that by this means we should hinder them
 from forming any siege of consequence, because they
 would not dare to divide their forces, and before they
 could intrench themselves and have made their bridge
 of communication we might fix upon the properest place
 to attack them; that he did not believe they design-
 ed to enter very far into the country, because the King's
 troops had it in their power to cut off their convoys, with-
 out which it would be impossible for them to subsist.
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An. 1653. These counsels of M. de Turenne were followed, and the Court being retired, they were immediately put in execution.

The Spaniards presently advanced between the Seine and the Oise, and came and incamped at Fonsomme and Fervaques. They passed the first of August in sight of the King's Army, marching towards Ham, the river Somme on their right, and having encamped at S. Simon and Clarfres, they spent a whole day in passing the defiles. M. de Turenne, on their approach, put the Army in battalia; and seeing they passed on farther, he marched it along the river near which it was, as far as Mayot hard by la Fere. The next day was wholly spent in making bridges for our infantry, and passages for the cavalry, with a design to cross that river, if the enemy advanced farther into the country: we learnt the next morning that they were still marching forward. M. de Turenne would himself observe what rout they took before they cross the river, and being advanced with a thousand horse the better to dive into their intentions, he sent orders afterwards to the whole Army to follow him and march along the river: it incamped the third of August at Fargnier, being sufficiently covered by woods on the side of the enemy, and upon advice that they were advanced to Roye, the King's Army marched to Noyon, where it arrived the fifth. We there heard that Roye had been taken and plundered; there was none but Burgers in it, who however defended themselves, nor did they surrender till after the batteries were erected, and that the canon fired. The ninth the Army advanced to Magny, where the country being very woody and close, there was nothing to be apprehended there. M. de Schomberg was sent with the gendarmes, to the number of two hundred and fifty horse, and a hundred foot to throw themselves into Corbie: three hundred men were likewise put into Peronne, and these were the only detachments which were sent into any of the places all the campaign.

Information came that the enemy was approaching Corbie, whereupon we posted our selves the tenth at Eperville, near Ham; scarce were we arrived there when we heard that the Count de Megen was to go the next day from Cambray with three thousand men to escorte to the Spaniards, between Peronne and Corbie, a great
convoy

convoy of provisions, pioneers, and all the ammunition necessary for a siege. The Army decamped a little before sun-set, cross'd the Somme at Ham, and marched all night with a purpose to intercept the convoy. To make the more haste the cavalry went before, except a very few which were left with the infantry, who had orders to follow with the artillery and baggage. The cavalry arrived at Peronne by break of day: we drew thence the three hundred men which had been thrown into it, and all besides that the garrison could spare, and marching on towards Bapaume we halted within two or three leagues of that place, and sent out parties towards Cambray to reconnoitre the march of the convoy; but at noon they brought an account that it was gone back again into the place, upon the enemy's having had notice, soon after they were set out, that the King's troops were making towards them. At the same time we learned that the Spanish Army was advanced towards the Somme near Bray, upon which we returned to join the infantry at the village of Manancourt, where runs a small brook which passes by Mount S. Quentin, and falls into the Somme near Peronne: there we encamped that night, and having advice the next day, the twelfth and in the morning, that the enemy were laying bridges over the river, along which they were incamped, it was thought fit we should retire a little back along the same brook, to Alefne near Mount S. Quentin, with a resolution however that in case the enemy cross'd the Somme, the Army should be posted a little above Manancourt, in a place which the Generals had pitched upon to put it in order of battle as soon as the enemy should draw near. Tho' the thing was thus concluded on between them both, it was altered by the one without waiting for the opinion of the other. M. de Turenne, according to his custom, went out of his quarters the thirteenth by sunrise, slenderly attended to visit the guard of cavalry which was on the other side of the brook, and not meeting there with any tidings of the parties he had sent out in the night to bring him an account of what they might discover relating to the enemy's motions, he went to Peronne, there to detach parties on the other side the Somme, not believing it possible for the enemy to advance towards the King's Army without having notice

AN. 1653 of it by Bapaume, or by some one of his parties. They had however made so good speed that their van had passed Bapaume before day-break, so that it was not possible for the parties who found themselves intercepted on all sides, to give any notice. M. de la Ferté's advanced guards gave the first alarm, which put this Marshal's spirits into such a hurry and flutter that instead of marching to possess himself of the ground which had been agreed on the day before, he made the left wing, which he was to command, march through the right wing, and go towards Peronne, whilst this latter began to advance towards the ground which had been pitch'd upon for them, as before mentioned. Things were in this disorder when M. de Turenne returned from Peronne, who finding M. de la Ferté was ranging his left near Mount S. Quentin, he made his right wing advance to join it, it being too late to march to the appointed post, because the enemy was by this time very near it, and advanced with so much the greater joy, in that they knew their advantage in meeting with the Army of France in a plain, where they could not avoid fighting. And indeed, they would have been infallibly beaten, had they staid there; for tho' the order of battle was admirable, according to the new method, the second line being at a proper distance from the first, there being a good body of reserve of twelve squadrons and two battalions behind all, and the left wing being drawn up at the foot of Mount St. Quentin, yet the enemy being greatly superior in number, they might have taken the right in flank, the first squadron of this wing not being above pistol-shot from a little hill, from the top of which the enemy being possess'd of it might have maul'd that whole wing with their canon and small arms, and afterwards have charged it in flank.

M. de Turenne was not the only man that was aware of the danger; the whole right of the Army was struck with an extreme consternation at it, and never was there seen a more universal dread of being beaten. He hastened immediately as soon as he perceived it, to M. de la Ferté, to tell him that if the Army continued in that situation, it would be absolutely ruin'd; that he was resolved to march up to the enemy to the top of the hill, since they could not any where be in a more disadvantageous

tagéous spot of ground than where they then were; that An. 1653. there was no other way to revive the soldiers drooping spirits, and intreated him to follow him. He instantly returned to his right, at the head whereof he presently mounted the hill, and being got to the top of it with the foremost squadrons, he sent M. de Varenne, an old officer, of very great experience, who had served under him in all his campaigns in Germany, and in whom he very much confided, to go and view the ground to which they were to march. Scarce were we advanced a mile when he brought the General word that he had discovered a very advantageous post which was not far off. Thither went M. de Turenne, and found it indeed to be such a one as the enemy would not dare to attack him in. There was on the right a brook which comes from Roiset, and falls into the Somme a little above Peronne; the left was bounded by a mountain so steep that there was no going up it either on horse-back or on foot, and the distance between both could not contain above twenty or thirty squadrons. There was in front a little valley, and on the side of the brook a water-course which the cavalry could not pass without great difficulty; the nearest village was called Tincour or Buire.

The difference of the post made an alteration in the countenance of the soldiery; they resumed their usual cheerfulness, and the enemy would not have attack'd them there with impunity; for tho' they were almost two to one, we instantly fell to work on five *redans*, each of which would have contained a hundred men, and the whole Army were so posted that the enemy must have sustained the fire of thirty pieces of canon before they could have set eye on the King's Army, which being behind could have charg'd them at their own option with either cavalry or infantry in a spot of ground so narrow that the right wing commanded by M. de Turenne formed four or five lines, which supported each other, while M. de la Ferté who had his left ranged along the top of the mountain, might have seconded the right in case of necessity.

It was about two or three a clock in the afternoon when we began to see the Spanish Army marching in battalia, and advancing thro' the extremity of a wood
which

An. 1653. an enemy. This extraordinary diligence of his, as well as that of M. de Beaujeu, kept Guise from being besieged.

The Spaniards being thus baffled in their measures, it was not thought expedient to proceed any farther; after the late alarm the Army kept itself more than ever on its guard, and the enemy being encamped at Caulain-court, and M. de Turenne understanding that the forragers had got a habit of crossing the brook, behind which their Army was, and that they went towards Ham with slender guards, he ordered M. de Castelnau to go with a thousand horse and try to surprize them. He set forwards in the evening with ten squadrons, and marched to Ham, where being arrived, instead of going on he stopt at the gates till day-break, when he sent through the town two small parties to go out for intelligence; himself followed them, and being informed that the enemy were forraging, he sent orders for his cavalry to advance; but before it had passed the town, and could get up with them, they took the alarm at seeing the parties, and made the best of their way to the camp, not having lost above twenty or thirty men. Thus the scheme which had been so well contrived by M. de Turenne, failed of success through the fault of the Commander, who, though a gallant man in other respects, and a good foot-officer, knew not how to conduct cavalry.

Instead of returning to the camp as he should have done after missing his blow, he advanced into the plain within half a league of the enemy's Army, and there halted a long half hour. This oversight exposed the detachment to the danger of being inevitably defeated, if the enemy had taken the advantage of it as they might have done: There was not one single officer, nor so much as one common trooper, but what dreaded the consequence of it: The plain was so open, that the Spaniards could have counted them to a man, and have seen at least that for a league and half behind there was no body to support them, and there was nothing could hinder their passing the brook. M. de Castelnau, having staid there so long without any necessity, retired, and laid in a village an ambuscade of a hundred horse, which was entirely ill-judged, it not being likely that the enemy would suffer their men to cross the brook after so late
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an alarm. Mean while M. de Turenne, uneasy at his An. 1653. tarrying so long, went himself with four or five squadrons and about four hundred foot, passed through Ham, and advancing beyond, disposed his troops in such a manner as to favour M. de Castelnau's retreat, in case the enemy had push'd him; but it was not long before he saw him returning in a better condition than he expected.

The King's Army staid in this camp till the first of September, when we had intelligence that the enemy had decamp'd from Caulincourt to go and lay siege to Rocroi, and that a large detachment of cavalry was gone before to invest it, and prevent any succours being thrown into it: the garrison was not strong, and the place being situated in a small plain surrounded with a wood, the first comer may easily hinder any other from passing to it, and so it was in vain to attempt the relief of it.

It was resolved while the enemy were besieging Rocroi, the King's Army should lay siege to Mouson. We passed the Oise at la Fere, and arrived the ninth of September at Remilli, within a league of Mouson. The next day we cross'd the river below the town, and each took his quarters; M. de Turenne below, and M. de la Ferté above: the cavalry of the former extended on a line from the river to the top of a mountain, a little out of canon-shot of the place, and he himself incamped with his infantry and gendarmes in a small valley within half canon-shot; and in a bottom yet narrower and nearer the town, he posted the two regiments of York and Guienne, and had the trenches opened the same night: M. de la Ferté began his approaches at the same time; but his troops posted themselves a little farther from the place than those of M. de Turenne.

Mouson stands on the Meuse, between Stenai and Sedan; it has a bridge covered by a horn-work, the town is fortified with a good old wall, flank'd with round towers, some of which are pretty big, and that towards the mountain more so than the rest: it has a very good dry ditch, which almost every where is well fenced with palisades in the middle, and the outer side is faced with freestone; that side of the town which is farthest from the river being commanded by a mountain, is defend-

An. 1653. ed by an *envelope* of three or four bastions and a half-bastion, and on both sides as far as to the river, there are several half-moons and other out-works.

The garrison consisted of about fifteen hundred foot and two or three hundred horse: the Governor was an old German Colonel, named Wolf. Most of this garrison had been put into the place by the Count de Briol, one of the Prince of Condé's officers, whom he had detached as he was marching to Rocroi, with a body of troops, to throw themselves into Mouson, Stenai, Clermont and S. Meneshout, all which belonged to him, not doubting but the King's Army would besiege one of them; and Briol judging by its march they would go to Mouson, contented himself with augmenting the garrison of it, and kept the rest of the troops which had been given him, to provide for the security of the other places.

The approaches were carried on the first night pretty far, and with but small loss, by the regiment of Picardy, and a battery was raised of five or six pieces of canon. The next night, the regiments of la Feuillade and Guienne mounted the trenches, and forwarded them considerably: at the same time, a regiment of infantry which was posted in some houses near the bridge, had orders to attack the horn-work which cover'd it; the enemy thought fit to retire, and the work was carried without trouble or loss. Turenne's regiment took their turn the third night; they push'd on the trenches so far, that the night following the regiments of York and Palluau got to the edge of the ditch of the out-works, and set the miners to work at the face of the demi-bastion of the *envelope*, after having cut away the palisades of the ditch: the miners work'd till noon, and then called out for candles and drink, otherwise they could work no longer. A sergeant of York's carried both to them, by favour of a brisk fire of the small arms which was made while he went and came back again. The regiment of Picardy mounted the trenches the second time in the night between the fourteenth and fifteenth. That day the Duke of York going to the head of the works, accompanied by Messieurs d'Humieres and Crequi, and some others, during the short time they stay'd in the first battery, a canon-ball from the place went between three barrels of powder without setting fire to it,

it, which might have blown up every thing that was in the battery; but the danger was so soon over, that we had not time to be apprehensive of it. M. de Turenne taking notice that the besieged did not make so smart a fire from the *envelope* as at first, imagined they had but few men there, and that they designed to abandon it, upon an apprehension that the mine was ready to play; he order'd a Sergeant, with some soldiers, to mount, when it was dusk, by the place where the fence of pointed stakes had been broke down by the canon, and to observe whether the enemy were abandoning the *envelope*: the Sergeant went thither, and brought word that the enemy were retired as M. de Turenne had imagined. We fired on the few which were remaining there; upon which they withdrew into the town. The besiegers immediately seiz'd the ditch of the *envelope*, and contented themselves with making places of arms for lodging themselves, and with firing on the town: the enemy fired furiously that night from their walls; but without much execution, the besiegers being under cover.

There came to the camp the next day a battalion of six companies of the regiment of guards, commanded by M. de Vautourneu; they mounted the trenches, according to their particular privilege, the same night, relieving the regiment of Picardy: M. de Castelnau, who was at that time the only Lieutenant General in the Army, was, according to custom, to command; the guards refused to obey him, insisting they were not to be commanded but by the General: M. de Turenne being made acquainted with this contest, went thither to endeavour to settle it; but finding Vautourneu obstinate, he intreated M. de Castelnau to retire to his tent, telling him that having been very much fatigued the night before, he wanted repose, and that he would remain in his stead in the trenches: Castelnau obey'd; M. de Turenne remain'd; and not being willing to decide the controversy, he dispatch'd away a courier to inform the Court of it, who ordered the guards to obey the Lieutenant-General; and this order being arrived before it was their turn to mount a second time, there was no further dispute about the matter: this contest was an advantage to the King's service; the guards standing upon the point of honour and being encouraged by the General's pre-

An. 1653 fence, advanced their works very much: they not only made a *blinde* along the bottom of the ditch of the *envelope*, by means of some palisades which they found there, extending themselves directly as far as the great tower, but they likewise made a lodgment from the place where the ditch of the *envelope* join'd it self to that of the town as far as the half moon on the right, which the enemy abandon'd, and from whence they had an intention to pass in the ditch of the town in order to apply the miners to its wall.

Hitherto the besiegers had advanced with pretty good expedition and success; but they found, in descending the ditch of the place, more difficulties than had been thought of. The next night they endeavour'd to carry on the works with the usual dispatch, by making a lodgment close by the palisades which were in the middle of the ditch; when they thought it perfected, the enemy drove them out with a storm of grenades and a shower of fireworks and ordinary fire so thick and incessant that it was impossible to stay in it. This ill success did not discourage the besiegers: they obstinately persisted in the resolution of lodging themselves; but two whole nights were spent therein to no purpose. When the work was finish'd, the enemy threw such a quantity of fireworks and combustible matter, that they destroyed all that had been done. The besiegers were obliged to think of some other less dangerous expedient: they aim'd the next night at making a descent into the ditch, by obliquely pushing a trench from the place where they were lodged; but they found themselves exposed to the fire of a canon which the enemy fired from so low a flank, that our artillery could not dismount it; and besides, when the besiegers were got half way, they met with the fence already mentioned, which stop'd them at once, even without the assistance of the canon from the flank which tore them to pieces, and which as soon as it was light, ruin'd all the blinds which had been made. Thus recourse was to be had to the old method, of digging a well in the lodgment which had been made in the ditch of the half-moon, to descend by this means into the bottom of the ditch: the besiegers worked at it with all imaginable application, and endeavour'd to apply the miners to the wall of the town, by favour of the *madriers* so contrived,

trived as to be fire-proof: these were push'd on close to the wall; the miners began to work there, having on each side of them barrels filled with earth, to preserve them from the musketry of the flanks, whilst the *madriers* screen'd them from the fire, stones and granades which were continually thrown; all which would not have been able to dislodge them, if the enemy had not thought of a new invention, by fastening a bomb to a chain which they let down close to the *madriers*, which by this means were all blown up according to the wishes of the besieged, who afterwards threw such quantities of fire, that the miners were burnt.

The miners on the other attack had no better success: M. de la Ferté for the greater haste had set them to the body of the place before there was any lodgment made close to the wall to secure them; the enemy discover'd them, and stifled them with the smoke they made at the mouth of their hole, which was by this time so deep, that the fire could not reach them. All the time of this siege there were such continual rains and violent storms, that they oftentimes over-set the blinds, and threw down some parts of the trenches, which were almost every where full of water, and there seldom past three hours without rain.

When we began to dig the well in the ditch of the half-moon, we at the same time set on the miners to the foot of the great tower, under cover of the *madriers*: they had better fortune than the first; they made a lodgment; but before their chambers were perfected they sent to let M. de Turenne know that they heard the enemy counter-mining, and that they would be at them in a few hours, and a great deal sooner than they could finish; they were ordered to put some barrels of powder in the hole they had made, and to stop it up as well as they could; which was accordingly done. M. de Turenne propos'd only to ruin the countermine of the besieged, and well knew that that would not bring down the tower; and as the powder was to have its effect behind, he order'd those who might be in any danger to get farther off, and retir'd himself with such as accompanied him, to the first battery, which was within half musket-shot of the tower. The mine was fired and had all the effect that had been expected from it; it only enlarg'd the hole

An. 1653. which the miners had made, killed, as we learnt afterwards, the enemy's counterminers, and threw several huge stones with as much force as a canon could have done: some of them struck against the battery behind which M. de Turenne, the Duke of York and others had shelter'd themselves, and they saw several of them fly a great way beyond it. The miners were afterwards sent back to their hole, with a serjeant to defend them, and six soldiers, who lodg'd themselves there without any danger: this was executed in the day. When it was night, it was thought proper to open the well, which was dug level with the bottom of the ditch of the place, for it required too much time to continue digging it as far as the wall; its depth secured it from the canon and small arms, and it was believed that there was nothing to fear but the grenades, the fire-works or common fire; but scarce was it uncover'd, but the enemy perceiving it by the light of some fires which they had kindled, to see what was doing in the ditch, they rolled from the top of the walls, along two timbers which they had fastened together, a bomb, which falling into the opening of the well, killed four or five men who were there at work, and gave such a violent shock to the lodgment which was above where M. de Turenne, the Duke of York, some officers and many volunteers then were, that they believed in a moment's time it would be utterly ruined: however it subsisted, but it was a quarter of an hour before the workmen could go thither again, because of the smoke and dust. And tho' the besieged continued to fire incessantly on it, and to throw an infinite number of grenado's, all kinds of fires, and bombs from time to time, of which not any fell so true as the first, yet did the besiegers push on the trenches as far as the palisades which were in the middle of the ditch; but the prodigious quantity of fire which fell without intermission, oblig'd them to cover the well with boards, fascines and earth for the security of the workmen. When the besiegers were got to the foot of the palisade, they were obliged to hide themselves under-ground, to avoid the fire which the enemy threw without ceasing, and at last they apply'd the miners to the body of the place.

We

We lost that night a great many men; M. de la Feuillade was wounded in the head with a grenade. A musket-ball having pierced thro' the lodgment, glanced upon M. d' Humiere's head, passed thro' a pioneer's leg, and at last struck upon the Duke of York's boot without doing him any harm. M. de Turenne staid all this night on the spot, and it is certain that if he had not been present the thing would not have succeeded.

M. de la Ferté had on his side so far advanced his attack, that his mine being ready the next day, they sprung it in the afternoon. M. de Turenne with several of his officers and volunteers went out of curiosity to see what would be the effect of it, but he did not go into the trenches. The mine had been made at the angle between the tower and the wall; and the intention was to fetch down not only the angle, but likewise those parts of the wall and of the tower which were nearest it. When it blew up and the smoke was gone off, we found it had only demolish'd the angle and the wall, and that the tower which had only a crack made in it was still standing; but upon firing six canon-shot at once from a battery which was on the edge of the ditch, that part of the tower fell and appeas'd the wrath of M. de la Ferté, whose impatience had given great uneasiness to the Chevalier de Clerville the Engineer who had the direction of the attack. The tower not having fallen at the first, put the Marshal into a rage; he threatened the poor Engineer, who got clear of the Marshal only by beating down with canon what the mine had already shook of the tower. The breach being a good one, a lodgment was made on it in the night; which, together with two mines ready for springing at M. de Turenne's attack, determin'd the Governor to beat the chamade the next morning; he sent some officers to draw up the capitulation, and it was agreed he should march out the next day with his garrison, arms and baggage, to be conducted to Montmedi.

This siege lasted seventeen days from opening the trenches; few men were lost at it, but abundance of horses, because of the badness of the weather and that the ground where we were encamped was a deep clay. No person of quality was killed but the Vidame of Laon, M. de Turenne's nephew, the Count de Rouffi's

An. 1653. second son, who received a musket-shot in the head as he was mounting the trenches. The quickness with which the French push on sieges and take places is chiefly owing to the pains which their Generals take; whereas the Duke of York has observed that the Spanish Generals leave the matter to a *Sergent de bataille* or some other inferior officer, by whose advice, and, in a manner, by whose eyes they govern themselves. M. de Turenne would see every thing himself; he would go and take a view of, in person and very near, whatever town he resolved to besiege; he always mark'd out the place where the trench must be open'd, and was present at the doing it; he order'd on which side of the town the main attack was to be, and would go thither regularly morning and evening; in the evening to settle what was to be done that night, and in the morning to see if his orders had been followed, having always with him a Lieutenant-General or a Major-General who was to command the trenches, and whom he informed of his intentions: he would return a second time to the trenches after supper, and there remain a longer or a shorter time, according as his presence was requisite. The General's diligence necessarily excites all the officers of an Army to a great application to what is their duty. M. de Turenne had not so much as an Engineer at his attack here: when he had them in other sieges, he only used them as so many inspectors over the works: most of the officers knew how to carry on the trenches and make a lodgment: there was a Captain of miners who had the care of conducting them according to the orders which were given him. The Duke of York has found, not only by his own experience, but also by that of the most skilful in the art of war, that a General ought never to rely entirely on any Engineer whatever for the carrying on the trenches, because it is not reasonable to believe that a man who is to be there every moment, will expose himself as much as officers, who going thither but in their turn, are more easily fired with an emulation and are ambitious to advance the works; not to mention that they acquire thereby a greater knowledge in every thing that relates to a siege. The late Prince of Orange who followed a quite contrary maxim, in trusting solely to his Engineers, and employing his
Officers

Officers only in the defence of his trenches, had but few An. 1653. Officers that thoroughly understood how to besiege a place, unless there chanced to be a person whose application and ingenuity supplied the want of practice; and thus but few Officers have ever gained much experience among the Hollanders, and the able men who have served with them have learned what they knew in other countries.

There were no lines of circumvallation made at the siege of Mouson; that would have taken up too much time, and have given the enemy leisure to finish the siege they were about, and then to have come and fallen on the King's troops before they had finished theirs. The little river Chiers covered the King's Army on the side of Luxembourg, and put it out of the enemy's power to throw any succours into the place: the very day on which it was taken, which was the twenty seventh, the army marched to Amblemont to endeavour to raise the siege of Rocroi: it advanced as far as Varnicourt where intelligence came that the town had surrendered.

After these two sieges, there happened nothing considerable between the two armies during the rest of this campaign. Besides that the season was too far advanced to undertake a siege of any consequence, the Spaniards had suffered more before Rocroi than the French before Mouson. M. de Turenne still watched them very narrowly; so that they wholly employed themselves in marches and counter-marches, in consuming the forrage on their frontier, and the French did as much on the other side the Somme.

While we were thus keeping the enemy in play, the Court having got together some troops, besides those of the King's household and some others detached from the Army, they ordered S. Menhoult to be besieged. M. de Navaille commanded the King's household troops, M. de Castelnau the troops which M. de Turenne had sent, M. d'Uxelles those which had been detached from M. de la Ferté's regiment: but although Navaille and d'Uxelles were, in the main, persons of as great abilities as any Lieutenant-Generals in France, and that M. de Castelnau understood perfectly well the business of a siege, yet they could never agree, and the Cardinal was obliged to send Marshal du Pleissis-Praslin to command

An. 1653. mand there in chief; after which the siege was carried on with greater success than before. M. de la Ferté with the greater part of his horse marched to hinder the Duke of Lorraine from throwing succours into the place, upon receiving notice that he was advancing on that side with his Army.

M. de Turenne having encamped his troops behind the Somme between Roye and Corbie, the Duke of York seeing the campaign at an end on that side, took his leave of M. de Turenne in order to go to the siege of S. Meneshoult; but being obliged to pass by Châlons on the Marne, where the Court was, he was there detained on so many different pretences, that notwithstanding his impatience to be gone, the town capitulated before he could set out. This Prince accompanied the King of France to the castle of Ham, two leagues from S. Meneshoult, whither he went with his Majesty, to see the approaches and the breach which had been made in the body of the place before it beat the chamade.

The end of the FIRST BOOK.



MEMOIRS

O F

The DUKE of YORK.

BOOK SECOND.

Of the Wars in FLANDERS.

THE Army of France, commanded by M. de An. 1654. Turenne, and Marshal de la Ferté, was not assembled soon enough to hinder the Spaniards from besieging Arras: they invested this place the third of July with an Army of thirty-two thousand men, and all things necessary for an enterprize of that importance. It is highly probable that the information they had received of the weakness of the garrison, determined them to go upon this siege; but it was not so weak but that the Governor made a shift to defend the outworks, as large as they were.

The two Generals detached about a thousand horse to throw themselves into the place: S. Lieu got in first with about two hundred troopers, and passed through the Prince of Condé's quarters the first or second day after it was invested. Two days after, the Baron d'Equancourt did the same at the head of three hundred horse thro' the Duke of Lorraine's quarters; and the Chevalier de Crequi with the remainder opened himself a passage, a few days after, thro' the Spaniards quarter, before their lines were finished: no endeavours were used to throw any infantry in, because the flat country all round

An. 1654. round the town would have easily exposed them to the
 ————— view of the enemy.

Another reason for their going upon the siege of Arras, was that the French having begun that of Stenai, the enemy hoped to finish theirs before the other was at an end; and that it would take up so many troops, that we should be in no condition to interrupt them. And indeed the King's Army was so weak, that not daring to expose itself in an open country to an Army so superior, it kept near by Peronne till about the sixteenth of July, when advice came that the enemy had almost finished their lines. The Duke of York arrived there before it began its march, to serve as Lieutenant-General under M. de Turenne, and took his day and did duty according to the date of his commission, as the youngest General Officer serving in that Army.

We encamped the first day of our march at Sains near Sauchi-Cauchy between Cambrai and Arras, about five leagues from the latter. The next day we marched to Mouchi-le-Preux. M. de Turenne took this indirect tour to cover himself with a certain rivulet, to the end that if the enemy moved towards him, he might avoid fighting. He had the precaution, at his coming to the rivulet which was within half a league of Mouchi, to order the Army to remain there in order of battle, and not to cross it till towards night. He went with some horse and dragoons to reconnoitre the ground he intended to encamp on, and observe whether the enemy meant to attack him. We passed the rivulet very late, and worked all night to intrench ourselves, with so much application, horse and foot, that we were by next day in a pretty good posture of defence: but when the lines were finished, there was nothing more to fear. The post was a very advantageous one; the front suitable to the number of the troops; the rivulet covered the left and the Scarpe was on the right; and even tho' the enemy had come to attack the Army before it was intrenched, we were in a capacity to receive them notwithstanding the inequality of number; because we had that good opinion of the valour of our troops as not to fear them, since they could not take us in flank. The Duke of York
 has

has since heard, both in Flanders and other places, An. 1654. the Spaniards very much blamed for not attacking the French the first day they took that post. Some have pretended that the Prince of Condé proposed the doing it; but this is not very certain: whether it was so or no, we marched with the same precaution as if we were sure of the enemy's intending to fight us.

M. de Turenne had his quarters at Mouchi, where was the greatest part of his infantry: his cavalry was encamped on two lines, and extended with the rest of his infantry as far as the rivulet. M. de la Ferté had his on the right quite below, towards the Scarpe at the village of Peule, near which one part of his infantry encamped: the other was at Mouchi, and his cavalry on two lines between the one and the other village: the body of reserve was in its usual place behind M. de Turenne's quarters which were in the middle of the whole. Mouchi is an eminence which overlooks and commands a bottom where, on one side flows the Scarpe, and on the other runs the rivulet, so that the enemy could not approach by day, without sustaining the fire of all the artillery which was planted on that eminence; and for the better securing the two extremities of the lines, we had there posted some infantry as well as in the centre between the wings of cavalry.

When the lines were finished, we sent out almost every evening large parties of horse to prevent convoys coming to the enemy; for altho' at their arrival before Arras, they had plenty of all kinds of provisions, as much as Armies are wont to have at such a time, yet so large a body of troops was continually in want of something or other; whether it was that their powder failed them, or whether they were desirous of a superfluity of provision. As soon as ever the King's Army came to Mouchi, the enemy continually detached parties to fetch some from Cambrai, Douai and other places near: we in vain sent our parties to intercept them: we never had the good fortune to surprize them, because the country was too open. The parties were seldom less than a thousand or twelve hundred horse under the command of a Lieutenant-General: those detached from M. de Turenne's Army posted themselves commonly

An. 1654. between the enemy's camp and Bapaume, in some valley or other place where they could not easily be discovered. We had on all sides small advanced guards continually upon the scout; and centinels every where to prevent a surprize. M. de la Ferté whose parties went out between the enemy and Lens, took the same method; but had no better fortune than the others.

Nevertheless, one of the enemy's convoys miscarried by a strange accident. One night, as M. de Turenne was visiting with the Duke of York the advanced guards, they perceived a sudden and violent flash of light, like that of gun-powder; it seemed to be in M. de la Ferté's quarters; but as we advanced that way to learn what it might be, the centinels who were on the eminence of Mouchi, and who had seen the same thing, said it was a great way farther in the plain than they imagined it to be, and that it must be somewhere near Lens. The next morning our doubts were solved, and we were informed that an entire regiment of cavalry of a hundred and twenty troopers going from Douai to the enemy's camp, and all the Officers as well as troopers, carrying each a bag of powder behind them, besides fourscore horses loaded with granadoes, which were led by peasants on foot, had been all burnt, and not any one of them could tell how the accident happened. It was a melancholy sight to see those poor creatures come in that miserable condition, their faces hideous and disfigured, and the rest of their body burnt to such a degree that but very few recovered. Some of our parties who had hastened where they had seen the fire, brought to the camp all the men who had any sign of life in them, some horses that were less burnt, and a pair of kettle-drums which belonged to that regiment.

The Duke of York, being afterwards in Flanders, met with a Lieutenant of horse, who gave him an account how this accident happened. This Prince having asked the Officer how his face came to be burnt; he answered, it was with gun-powder, at such a time, near Arras; and being farther questioned about the particular circumstances of it, he said that being in the rear of the regiment he perceived a trooper who had in his mouth a pipe of tobacco lighted, upon which he ran to him,

him, whipt it out of his mouth and flung it upon the ground, and then giving the trooper a blow or two with the flat of his sword, the fellow being drunk drew his pistol, and presented it at him; upon which he leaped suddenly from his horse, for fear of the consequence, and the trooper at the same time firing at him, set fire to the bag of powder which was upon his horse, which blowing up communicated the fire to the trooper's bag, and so on successively throughout the whole regiment; but he being on the ground, escaped better than any of the rest, of whom the greater part were killed on the spot, but he came off with having only his face, hands, and some other parts of his body burnt.

The Marquis de Richelieu one day met with a convoy of the enemy's commanded by the Count de Lorge; but the Count forced his way thro' the troops of the Marquis, beat him, took three or four of his Captains, lost not above a dozen horses loaded with powder, and recovered the besiegers lines with the rest. Another rencounter happened which was much more unfortunate, on account of our losing M. de Beaujeu, Lieutenant-General: he was on a party with eight hundred horse, and having had intelligence that the enemy designed to bring a convoy into their camp thro' the road of he went thither, arrived there by day-break, much about the same time as did a body of the enemy equal to his own, commanded by M. Droot, a Colonel, who did not know the French were there; and M. de Beaujeu's troopers having alighted from their horses and waiting to hear news of the convoy, without knowing that Droot was so near them, found themselves attacked so suddenly and so roughly, that the two first squadrons were overthrown before they could get on horseback. Beaujeu was killed as he was going to put in order the squadron which was nearest, which the enemy in like manner defeated; and had it not been for Beauveau's regiment which stood their ground and beat the first squadron of the enemy which had made the disorder, the whole party had been entirely ruined. This advantage gave the others time to get into order and to receive the attack, which was not extremely vigorous, Droot having been wounded at the attack of Beauveau's regiment. The enemy being ignorant of the strength

An. 1654. strength of the party they had to do with, thought it advisable to retire; the French had no inclination to pursue them, and would have thought themselves happily off, had not Beaujeu been killed. The number of the killed and wounded was but small on either side. There was more disorder than mischief, and it may be said that on this occasion both parties were beaten.

The Duke of York being out on a party in his turn carried off another of the enemy's. As he was returning to the camp, he learnt by a small detachment which he had sent out, that a hundred of the enemy's horse had put themselves in ambuscade a little before day-light in an adjoining village: he instantly marched that way with his whole party, and approaching as near the village as he could without being discovered, he sent some troopers to decoy them out of their ambuscade, with orders to retire as soon as they should advance to charge them; which they executed with so much address, that the enemy found themselves quite engaged amidst the King's troops before they were aware of it, so that not one of them got away.

Whilst all these things were passing without the two camps, the enemy having finished their lines the fourteenth, opened the trenches the same night, pushed on the siege with all possible diligence, and pressed the place so warmly, that for all the vigorous resistance made by M. de Mondejeu who was the Governor of it, and who was seconded with all imaginable bravery by Messieurs de S. Lieu, Crequi and Equancourt, the Spaniards gained ground every day. The of August they were entire masters of Guiche's horn-work, and the Governor often sent out messengers to give information of the condition of the place, some of which arrived in the camp: one of them having swallowed the letter which he was intrusted with, wrapt up in a bit of lead, to the end that if he was taken nothing might be found upon him, and coming when we were very impatient to know how matters stood, the poor man not voiding the lead, tho' he had several purges given him, M. de la Ferté called out in a passion, *to rip up the rascal's belly*; the poor fellow hearing him from the door where he was, was so frightened, that he voided his lead that instant,

lead that instant, and the news contained made us defer An. 1654. the attacking the lines, till the troops were arrived which ~~————~~ were before Stenai.

Arras was not so hard prest as some of the enemy's letters which had been intercepted had made us believe; they wrote into Flanders that they should be masters of the place by St. Laurence's day at furthest: which joined to the news which we had at the same time that the siege of Stenai did not go on so fast as had been hoped, and that thus there was no likelihood of our having the troops which were there employed before that day, had made the Generals take a resolution not to wait for them, but attack the lines without them.

We continued on this footing the preparatives, to make use of them when it should be thought proper, and the squadrons and battalions were ordered to furnish themselves each with a certain number of fascines and hurdles within two days: this provision was made, because the enemy had dug before the ditches of their lines, six rows of holes of about two foot diameter and three foot deep, to hinder the cavalry from coming near them, and we were in hopes with these hurdles to render these holes useless: but, as I just now said, our fears were dissipated by the news we received from the Governor of Arras, and, by those we had the next day from the camp before Stenai that the place would soon be taken.

The . . . of August advice came that Marshal d'Hocquincourt who succeeded in the command of the Army after M. Faber had taken Stenai, was advancing, and wanted to know whether he might join the main Army, or whether he should encamp in some other place; upon which answer was sent him that M. de Turenne with fifteen squadrons would meet him, and that if he would advance with his cavalry to a certain place, they would go together and take a view of a post on the brook of Crincho near Rivieres, where it was to be hoped that by intrenching a little, Marshal d'Hocquincourt's Army would be in safety.

The two Generals met the seventeenth of August, at the place appointed; but instead of going to take a view of the post, on notice which they had that there was going to the enemy a great convoy by the road of S. Pol, under the command of M. de Boutteville, they

An. 1654. marched that very instant with all their cavalry to intercept it, and sent orders to M. d'Hocquincourt's infantry, canon and baggage, which were then at Bapaume, to march with the utmost diligence towards S. Pol by the way of Buquoy, along the woods, because they had no cavalry to support them; but coming to S. Pol we learned that the enemy having been apprized of the march of the King's troops, had marched back the convoy to Aire. The two Generals did not think it expedient to go farther: but that they might not quite lose their labour, they resolved to seize on S. Pol, (where the enemy had left four or five hundred troopers) but to wait the coming of the infantry in order to attack it, the post being of consequence. It was by S. Pol that the enemy brought most of their convoys safe to them. This Town served for a place of refreshment in the continual intercourse there was between their Army and their garrisons round about. It was of great moment to take it, and it cost but very little time or trouble; for as soon as the infantry and the canon were come up, and the batteries raised, the enemy capitulated, and if I don't mistake, were made prisoners of war.

The next day, which was the nineteenth, the Army returned towards the lines, and encamped at Aubigny, where being arrived early, M. de Turenne, according to his custom, took a squadron or two of cavalry, and marched towards the enemy's lines; being got near an old Roman camp, which the people of the country called Cæsar's camp, where the Scarpe and a little brook join, he found the enemy had an advanced guard there, which being retired on the other side the brook gave him an opportunity of observing at leisure this post, which was not above two canon-shot from the lines. He found it so fit for his design, that he proposed to M. d'Hocquincourt to seize on it, as finding it much preferable to that of Rivieres. The next day he marched thither: M. d'Hocquincourt, to be the safer there, caused a line to be drawn from the river to the brook, and finding the enemy had posted about five hundred men in the abbey of mount S. Eloy, which was overagainst him, on the other side of the river, he resolved to attack it the next day, notwithstanding the nearness of the besiegers lines; to the end that being master of it he might strengthen them

so much the more. For this purpose, he very early in the morning crost the river which was not deep in that place, and ranged his troops in battalia between the Abbey and the lines, except the infantry which was commanded for the attack. The enemy at first made a shew as if they would defend the outer walls; but upon approach of the infantry, they abandoned them, retiring within the Abbey which was inclosed by an old wall very strong, and flankt with round towers. We immediately made in the out-wall *embrasures* for the canon; but when we found it to be too far off to do sufficient execution, we raised a small battery nearer, but it was not much better than a *blinde*: thither we drew some heavy canon which in a few hours made a breach. Mean while the French guards and Swillers, by the benefit of an alley of trees, and of the walls of a small garden, stealing within pistol-shot of the foot of the chief wall, they set the miners to it, to whom were carried whilst they were lodging themselves some boards to cover them: and that they might work with more safety, the guards and Swiss advanced openly for the space of half a quarter of an hour, making a brisk fire on the holes of the chief wall of the Abbey, thro' which the enemy fired, and afterwards retired with little or no loss. The regiment of the *Marine* at the same time found means to lodge itself by favour of a small cause-way close by the tower, which the canon was battering, which obliged the enemy to capitulate, and to yield themselves prisoners of war. M. d'Hocquincourt after this retired to Cæsar's camp, and M. de Turenne returned to his camp with his fifteen squadrons and two companies of dragoons.

He resolved by the way to reconnoitre the enemy's lines on that side. He marched thither directly from mount S. Eloy, and being got within half canon-shot of them, he coasted them at the same distance along the Scarpe, till he had viewed them as much as he thought necessary on that side; mean while the enemy kept a great firing with their canon; there was never a squadron but lost two or three men, without reckoning horses; and some old Officers murmured at their being thus exposed for nothing, as they imagined; this was the only time as long as the Duke of York served in the Armies of France, that he heard M. de Turenne

An. 1654. motive of it: but such artifices were not capable of shaking M. de Turenne's steadiness, and their weakness confirmed him but the more in his resolution. He convinced those who insisted upon a bare trial, that instead of saving their reputation they would in effect do quite the contrary, since by making only a false attack, it would be visible to every body that they had no desire or design to fight, and they would be justly blamed for unprofitably sacrificing two or three hundred men which might be lost therein. He represented that by pushing the affair in good earnest we should attack no one part of the lines with fewer than fifteen battalions in front; that some of these would not meet with any opposition, or at most from a small number of men scattered up and down, who not being capable of making resistance, they might enter the lines, and give an opportunity to the troops next to them, who should not have been able to force the party they attacked, to enter at the same place, and there make a way for the cavalry; that in case the attack were made in the night time no one of the enemy's quarters durst come to assist another; that each fearing for it self because of false attacks, no one would venture to quit its ground or at most would only aid its next neighbour till break of day, before which we should have made a passage thro' their lines; that the only thing he was apprehensive of was lest some accident or some disorder should happen as we were marching towards the enemy; but that he was sure, if we were but once formed in the places were he proposed to make the attacks we could not fail of forcing them; that which gave most weight to so many substantial reasons, was that the Court was absolutely for having the relief of the place attempted: it was at last fully concluded on, notwithstanding all the artifices and reluctance of those who set themselves against it. The day pitched upon was the eve of S. Louis, and tho' none but the three Generals knew of it, the whole Army had orders to keep themselves ready, to provide themselves with fascines, hurdles, and all things necessary for this undertaking. Publick Prayers were put up at the head of each battalion and each squadron for several days; never was there in an Army so many tokens of a true devotion, so many Confessions and Communions.

For.

For a few days before the attack M. de Turenne lost no opportunity of discoursing with the Officers about the measures which they should take, and the resistance they might probably meet with. He instructed them how to conduct themselves, according to the different exigences and accidents which might happen; he more especially recommended to them to keep their soldiers in good order, after they should be got within the lines; not to let them advance too fast, because that would be the most ticklish moment of all, the very crisis of the whole affair, also to observe a close attention, and an exact discipline; there being more danger of being driven out of them than there would be trouble to get into them, because they must expect that all the enemy's forces from the quarters next the place which should be forced would there fall upon the assailants; that they must not think of going directly to the town, but on the contrary must march along the lines, and drive the enemy out of them before they went to their friends. One may be allowed to suppose that it is from such like discourses of the Generals, historians are wont to put into their mouths prolix and pompous speeches just before they give battle, when they least thought of any such thing: whereas these familiar discourses, such as M. de Turenne held with the Generals and Officers seem far more useful, and are the more instructive inasmuch as there is leisure both for making objections, and for solving them. The Duke of York can witness that this was M. de Turenne's way, but he knows not whether the other two Generals took the same method on their side.

All persons of quality at Court capable of drawing a sword, would share the honour and danger of so grand an action. Two days before, some of those who had dined in M. d'Humiere's tent with M. de Turenne, where likewise was the Duke of York, desired they might see the enemy's lines: upon which M. de Turenne got on horseback and was hardly out of his lines, but there was seen a party pursuing one of the enemy's which had fallen on the forragers who were returning to the camp. M. de Turenne having taken notice of them, ordered these Gentlemen to get between the run-a-ways and their lines in order to stop their way and keep them from getting in, and commanded at the same time the advanced guard

An. 1654. to support them; but the enemy being well mounted reached their guard before they could be overtaken; and being still pursued, they re-entered their camp and abandoned some soldiers who were cutting fascines in a little wood within half canon-shot, and who were made prisoners. M. de Turenne took this opportunity to observe that part of their lines which he had not yet seen; but he cou'd not stay there long, because of the vehement fire of their canon and the haste with which the enemy were seen to get on horseback: this was the Prince of Condé's quarters. M. de Turenne retired and marched to the Castle of Neuville S. Vat, a league off, in which we had some infantry; and going down the hill, we perceived at the distance of about a league the escorte of the forragers consisting of a dozen squadrons, commanded by M. de l'Islebonne returning to the camp; and seeing at the same time some of the enemy's cavalry come out of their lines, M. de Turenne turned a little out of his way and marched towards M. de l'Islebonne to whom he had sent orders to come to him in all haste; hoping, if the enemy advanced, to be able to regale them: for besides the squadron of the guard, he had likewise with him about three-score and ten Officers and Volunteers; but the enemy remained on the top of the hill within reach of the canon of their lines. The Prince of Condé came thither himself with about fourteen squadrons, and M. de Turenne seeing that he followed no farther, sent orders to M. de l'Islebonne to return to the camp, dismissed the squadron of the guard to their post, and went himself with the Officers and Volunteers to the Castle of Neuville. He was not gone far before some scouts were detached from the hill where the Prince of Condé still was, in order to gain the top of another eminence on which M. de Turenne was marching, with intent to discover what forces he had behind him; which M. de Turenne having taken notice of, and not being willing the enemy should see he was supported by nobody, he ordered half a score Volunteers to go up to them: Messieurs Germain, Berkley, Biscara, Trigomar were of this number: the rest of the troop squadroned on the mountain and faced the enemy: but the young Volunteers not content with doing what they were ordered,

dered, followed those few troopers farther than they should, even to the bottom which was between them and the enemy. The Prince of Condé detached immediately a squadron which was the regiment of Estrées at the head whereof was the Duke of Wirtemberg to cut off their retreat; which obliged M. de Turenne to detach his little squadron to bring them off: he dispatch'd messengers after M. de l'Islebonne to fetch him back again, and sent the same orders to the squadron of the guard. This was all that could be done to disengage the Volunteers; but in order to save them, it was necessary to charge the Duke of Wirtemberg, whose squadron was defeated, notwithstanding the inequality of number. He was pursued down into a little meadow and up a small eminence, where his troopers wheeling about, made a discharge of their Carbines which put a little stop to the pursuers, some of whom were killed. The enemy took fresh courage and charged a second time with so much vigour, that the little squadron gave way, was push'd and forced to turn their backs. The squadron of the guard who as they were returning to their post had seen the beginning of the action, came to their assistance; immediately the Duke of York and M. de Joyeuse put themselves at their head to make them charge the enemy in flank, but scarce had they begun, but the whole squadron fled and left them both engaged, together with two or three of their domesticks: just in that moment, M. d'Arce a man of quality having had his horse killed under him, endeavours were used to get him off; the Duke of York called to him; but seeing a horse which was not mounted, he did what he could to catch him, in doing which he lost so much time that though the Duke and M. de Joyeuse did their utmost to save him, it was to no purpose, and by being too long obstinately bent upon freeing him, they were in great danger of being taken prisoners themselves, and not without much difficulty got away. M. de Joyeuse had the misfortune to be wounded in the arm by a musket-shot, of which he afterwards died. The Duke of York escaped without any hurt; my Lord Germain had like to have been taken in endeavouring to save a Gentleman named Beauregard, whose horse had been killed; he would have taken him up behind him,

An. 1654. him; but his horse not caring to carry double, fell a capring and rearing himself up till he threw him. Germain bid him hold by his stirrup, and so he drew him a little way from the enemy; being pursued so closely, he was obliged to leave him, and Beauregard was taken prisoner. M. Berkley help'd to save M. de Castelnau, whose horse having received five wounds, had much ado to carry him from among the enemy, which Berkley observing, he dismounted and gave him his horse, mounting that of Castelnau's page and got off very narrowly. We were pursued half a league by the enemy, till M. de l'Islebonne arrived at last with his twelve squadrons; the enemy who perceived it had time to retire without being obliged to run. Besides d'Arce and Beauregard, there were others made prisoners, and almost all the pages which carried their masters cloaks; but there were but few killed or wounded.

All things being ready for attacking the lines, it was resolved to make the principal push at the quarters of Fernand Solis, as being the weakest and farthest from that of the Prince of Condé. This quarter was to the north above the town and joined that of the Count de Fuenfaldagne. To favour this design, M. de Turenne had ordered three false attacks in three different places, and they were to begin an hour before day-light the five and twentieth day of August. In order to execute this great undertaking, M. de Turenne and M. de la Ferté began to pass the Scarpe with the vanguard of their troops, through M. de la Ferté's quarters. As the sun was now setting, it was M. de Turenne's day to lead the Army, and though they had a good way to march to get to the place designed for the attack, there happened not the least confusion. The first line of infantry passed over the bridge which was on the left of the whole and the nearest to the enemy: the cavalry which was to support it, passed over the bridge which was below on the right of that: over the third bridge, the body of reserve of the cavalry and infantry; and over the fourth bridge passed the artillery with all things belonging thereto. In this manner facing only to the left the Army found it self in battalia ready to charge. Each battalion had its pioneers and its detachments at their head, and each trooper had behind him two fascines

cines to carry to the infantry, when they should have occasion for them. The baggage had orders not to stir out of the camp till it was broad-day-light: there was no troops left in the camp, and the baggage was to follow in the best manner it could.

This march was made with so much order and exactness, that we arrived precisely at the place and hour that we were to join M. d'Hocquincourt with his troops. We halted but once all the way, and that but for a little while. We gave not the least alarm to the enemy that could make them perceive we were marching, and the musketeers carefully conceal'd their lighted matches. The Duke of York had the curiosity to advance to a proper distance from the foot to try if he could discover any of their fire, but could not perceive the least glimpse of any. As for the order of battle, we shall chiefly enlarge on what relates to the troops led by M. de Turenne. He equally disposed of the eight Lieutenant-Generals between the cavalry and the infantry, each of which had four: he posted three of them in the first line of infantry consisting of five battalions. The Count de Broglio commanded Picardy and the Swissers, which were the two battalions of the right: M. de Castelnau led Pleffis and Turenne's battalions which had the left, and M. du Passage that of Feuillade which was in the center of the cavalry who were to support them, to the number of about twenty-four squadrons; M. de Bar led the right behind M. de Broglio, the Duke of York was on the left behind M. de Castelnau, and M. d'Eclinvillers was in the middle; M. de Roncherolles was at the head of three battalions which made the body of reserve of infantry, and that of eight squadrons of cavalry was under the command of M. de l'Islebonne.

M. de la Ferté who had put himself on the left had a line of six battalions, two lines of cavalry behind, and his body of reserve was only cavalry. M. d'Hocquincourt who was on the right had four battalions supported by a line of cavalry, behind which was a second line of infantry of four other battalions with some cavalry on the wings, and a small body of reserve which consisted but of three or four squadrons.

There were to be three false attacks: the first composed of M. de Turenne's troops was of two battalions of the

An. 1654. the regiments of York and Dillon and six squadrons, the whole commanded by M. de Tracy who had orders to get as near as possible to the Prince of Condé's quarters without being discovered, not to charge till he heard that the attack was begun on M. de Turenne's side, and then to march directly to the barrier on that side which he had been shewn some days before, and to endeavour to open himself a passage to get into the town. The false attack of M. de la Ferté's troops, commanded by M. de la Guillottiere was to fall on the Count de Fuenfaldagne's quarters with two battalions, six squadrons, two troops of dragoons and two pieces of cannon. That of M. d'Hocquincourt was the least, not being above four squadrons commanded by M. de S. Jean who was to make the attack on the side of the Duke of Lorrain.

M. de Turenne being arrived at the rendezvous, he there found M. d'Hocquincourt in person, who told him his troops would arrive immediately, and beg'd him to defer the attack a moment: M. de Turenne answer'd he could not wait, seeing they were so near the lines, that the enemy could not fail of discovering them very soon, and desired him to follow him as fast as possible, when the troops should be arrived; and his own being ranged, he led them himself on horseback to the attack.

It was a fine night, the weather calm and serene: the moon, which had shone during the whole march, went down just as they arrived at the place designed: it had scarce disappeared, but the night grew very dark and there sprung up a breeze of wind which blew somewhat fresh and hinder'd the enemy from either seeing or hearing any thing. They knew nothing of our march, till we were within half a canon-shot of their lines. Then it was that the infantry in order of battle discovering all at once their lighted matches, these occasioned an illumination the more resplendent, as the wind blowing them, made the matches blaze amidst the darkness of the night, and as the soldiers who marched in close order chanced to jostle each other, the fire issued from them more abundantly, and the wind driving the sparks about added not a little to the light. As soon as the enemy perceived it, they fired three canon-shot and put up their lights along the line. The infantry
presently

presently made their attack; but had not their officers An. 1654. led them on resolutely, and the cavalry at their heels oblig'd them to exert themselves, they had not acquitted themselves with that bravery which till then the Duke of York had all along been eye-witness of; for never had they shewn so great a reluctance as on this occasion; they marched on however without once stopping to the foot of the lines, when they did not meet with that opposition they had expected. The five battalions in a short time became masters of the place which they attack'd. Such as were appointed to make passages for the cavalry fell instantly to work: each squadron, after having carried fascines to the edge of the holes which were before them, where the infantry took them to fill up the two ditches, wheeled about and went and put themselves in order of battle forty paces behind, waiting till the passages were opened before they advanced. In this *interim*, one came and whispered the Duke of York on the left of the attack, that M. de Turenne was wounded and that things did not go well on the right; hereupon, to encourage the infantry and let them know that the cavalry was near them, this Prince ordered the kettle-drums and trumpets belonging to the squadrons at whose head he was, to beat and sound; which was afterwards done by the rest of the cavalry, and much heightened the courage of the infantry; but his squadron and that next him suffered for it; for the enemy who were in a *redan* on the left, made a violent fire that way where they heard the noise, and the kettle-drummer of the squadron where he was, was killed the first. Then it was that M. de la Ferté, who had not put his troops in order so soon as M. de Turenne, began his attack: but whether he had less good fortune, or whether he met with more resistance, though the officers had with a great deal of resolution led up the infantry to the very ditch, they could not break into the lines, but were repulsed, took to their heels, and sought for shelter among the cavalry which the Duke of York commanded.

The disorder was very great, the officers on the one hand complaining that they had been forsaken by their soldiers, and the latter conceiving they had only followed their officers who had not done their duty. What

An. 1654. is certain is, they were beat and the cavalry were great sufferers by their ill success; for the light of the matches of the infantry drew upon the troopers the whole fire of the musketry of the enemy much more violently than before. Mean while the infantry of M. de Turenne's attack having finish'd a passage for the cavalry, and the regiment which bears his name, having found a barrier which opened and which saved it the trouble of making another passage, M. de Turenne who was informed of it, order'd M. d'Eclinvillers to pass first with four squadrons which the Duke of York was to support: he enter'd in with the three first, and as the fourth was likewise entering, those who had beat de la Ferté's infantry coming along the line, arrived at this barrier, and seeing none but this squadron entering, gave them a volley of musket-shot and threw a vast many grenado's: and Bodervitz a German Colonel who commanded it and his Major being wounded, this squadron was repulsed and the enemy shut the barrier against the Duke of York, who not being able to pass, marched to the right along the line, till he found another passage by which he entered at the head of the regiment of Turenne's cavalry, which upon this occasion made but two squadrons; and finding the enemy's huts in a flame, which Bout-de-bois a Colonel of la Feuillade's, had very seasonably bethought himself of setting fire to, he advanced farther to see by means of this light, whether the enemy were still in battalia behind. They had there, indeed, some cavalry, but it was so dark neither side could discover the other, and this Prince pass'd close by them, with two squadrons without being seen, but the third which was of Beauveau's Regiment fell on them, beat them and took their Colonel who was the Marquis de Conflans. Immediately after, day-light began to appear; the Duke of York still advancing, penetrated quite to the contravallation, where finding no passage to the town, he kept along the side of it, having it still on his left, and met with no passage till he came to the river above the town which separated the Lorrain quarters from those of Fernand Solis, and finding that no body had yet enter'd the Lorrain quarters, he alter'd his mind and judg'd it not amiss to pass over the bridge and go thither; this he undertook with the two

two squadrons of Turenne only, the rest of the troop which were to have followed him having lost their way. He advanced to Prince Francis Lorrain's tent without any opposition, and it was only from thence that he began to discover four or five squadrons of the enemy in order of battle on an eminence within musket-shot; whereupon he made a halt till succours came to him, ranged his two squadrons on one front which took up the distance which was between the tents and the lines, and sent three or four persons to look out for the cavalry which he mist and bring them to him. While he was waiting for them, the Duke of Buckingham came and ask'd him why he would not push the victory and charge that body of cavalry which was before him: this Prince reply'd, that he had no mind to receive a disgrace by exposing himself rashly; that that body of the enemy which he saw, was double his number, besides what might be behind the eminence on which it was posted; that if he advanced and was beaten, the enemy would make themselves masters of the bridges which he had just passed over, break them down, and thereby preserve themselves and baggage; that if they came and charged him where he was, it would be a pretty equal match, because they could not take him in flank, besides that he had the advantage of the ground: in a word, that he every moment expected some horse, and that when they came, he would go and charge the enemy. Buckingham's importunities availed nothing; the Duke of York continued thus some time in the face of the enemy, and no tidings of the cavalry which he staid for. Mean while some of his troopers withdrew from the rest and fell on Prince Francis's tent, where, besides his plate, they found in cash one month's pay for his troops. This had like to have proved a dear purchase: for the other troopers hearing the noise their comrades made when they were taking this money, quitted their ranks one after another to go and partake of the plunder, in despite of all the prohibitions and menaces of their officers who alone stay'd by the Duke of York; which happening in the sight of the enemy, he expected every moment to be charged and beaten. Being in this perplexity, and seeing no one return of those he had sent to fetch the cavalry, he thought it necessary to go for them

An. 1654. them himself; he recommended it to M. de Montailleur
 a Lieutenant-Colonel of Turenne's to make good his post
 on the eminence till he returned, then hastened away and
 on the other side the bridge found the second squadron
 of Villequier going to the town; he stop'd it, and, put-
 ting himself at the head of it, went back again; but
 scarce had the hindmost of the squadron pass'd the bridge;
 and the foremost begun to form at the end of a small
 causeway, when the cavalry which he had left to face
 the enemy hastened down the eminence in disorder;
 which struck such a terror into Villequier's squadron,
 that they presently turn'd their backs, and nothing could
 stop them. The Duke of York finding himself thus a-
 bandon'd, and seeing four squadrons on the other side
 of the bridge, he repass'd it, thinking to return
 and bring them into the Lorrain-quarter; but be-
 fore he could conduct them to the bridge, Marshal
 d'Hocquincourt was arriv'd there with all his cavalry and
 several squadrons of the two other Armies which began
 to pass it: he judg'd there would be horse enough on
 that side, and instead of following them, march'd on
 the other side between the contravallation and the town
 towards the Count de Fuensaldagne's quarters with his
 four squadrons, two whereof were gendarmes, com-
 manded by M. de Schomberg, and the other two
 the regiment of Gesvres under M. de Querneux.
 Being arriv'd on an eminence from whence he could
 see all round him, he discover'd on another eminence
 between the two lines several squadrons of horse in bat-
 talia which faced directly the place where he was. The
 Duke of York took them at first for enemies; but seeing a
 squadron in red cloathing, he chang'd his opinion and ima-
 gined they were either the King's light-horse or gen-
 darmes; upon which he march'd towards them in or-
 der to join them, judging by their countenance that
 they were facing the enemy, whom he could not, him-
 self, discover, there being on his left a rising ground
 which hinder'd the seeing them: but when he was got
 down one eminence and was going to ascend the other,
 an officer came and told him, from M. de Turenne, that
 he must come and join him that minute, and that those
 whom he took for friends were enemies that faced him,
 and that he had great need of being reinforced. The
 Duke

Duke of York returned the way he came, join'd very timely with his four squadrons M. de Turenne, who had but three with him, and a battalion of rallied men whom either the enemy, or greediness of plunder, had separated, and who were good for nothing but to make a shew.

It is here proper to relate how that General found himself in this posture, and what it was that brought him to this place. M. de la Ferté having been repulsed in his attack, entered, as hath been already said, by a place that others had passed before, and intending to do something considerable, he put himself at the head of ten or twelve squadrons, partly his own troops and partly those of M. de Turenne. By this time it was broad day, and he march'd between the two lines towards the Count de Fuenfaldagne's quarters: he advanced at the same time with some infantry of his own troops and of those of M. de Turenne, among which was the battalion of French guards, which was part of M. de la Ferté's Army; but he was coming in very great disorder along the line of contravallation. There was in the plain some of the enemy's cavalry in order of battle, which did not stir a step; M. de la Ferté perceiving them, came down from the eminence where he was, in order to attack them: M. de Turenne who arrived in the mean while at the place which la Ferté had just quitted, was extremely concern'd to see him advance thus, and would fain have stopt him, but it was too late; all he could do was to stop two battalions which were following him, and to rally that of the guards: he said to those who were about him, he was very much afraid la Ferté would be beaten, and that afterwards he himself should find it very difficult to maintain the ground where he was. The thing happened as he had foreseen: M. de la Ferté was beat; and at the same time that the enemy charged him, they detach'd some horse to disperse the infantry which was between the lines; they cut most of them to pieces, took several officers of the guards; but they did not pursue their advantage, nor so much as make the least shew of being inclin'd to advance to the eminence where M. de Turenne was, but on the contrary retir'd into the plain from whence they had set out to charge M. de la Ferté.

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Affairs stood thus, when the Duke of York joined M. de Turenne, who order'd him to advance between the two lines, and extend his squadrons on the left of those which were there in order of battle. M. de Turenne related to him all that had just happen'd, and told him he was apprehensive that the enemy, if they could get together some foot, would come and give them employment, there being little stress to be laid on those which they had with them: he afterwards asked him where he had been, and what was become of his regiment of cavalry; the Duke gave him an account of every thing that had happened to him and others with whom he had fal'n in. In this instant, about seven pieces of canon were brought into the lines, and very seasonably join'd M. de Turenne, together with some squadrons, and we fired on the enemy with good success. Nevertheless he was not freed from his uneasiness, still being in apprehension of the enemy's coming with some infantry; for seeing the little order his cavalry kept, and almost the whole infantry in confusion, and busied in plundering to that degree that he had but few men with him that made any kind of appearance, it was not without cause that he dreaded a change of fortune, in case he should be beat with those few troops; but this uneasiness lasted not long after the canon had begun to fire; for whether the enemy found the place where they were not tenable, or whether for some other reason they thought it not proper to stay there; about half an hour after the first canon-shot, they retired: their infantry however shewed themselves once, but presently disappear'd, and this a little before the cavalry retired.

The Duke of York was afterwards informed by persons who were with the Prince of Condé, who was the man that made M. de Turenne so uneasy, and the only General of the enemy's side that did any thing considerable, that he had a design, if he could have light of two battalions of infantry, to have charged us, as M. de Turenne had apprehended; that he had got together those which we saw just appear; but that when they came within the distance of our canon-shot, it was impossible to make them go forward. It is a thing worthy of remark, that those two great men, without being informed that they were in presence of each other, guess'd it

from each other's conduct. M. de Turenne was positive that the Prince of Condé was on the other eminence; because any man but that Prince would have push'd the troops he had beaten, in another manner: the Prince of Condé said the same thing of M. de Turenne, and that any other man in that situation would certainly have charg'd him.

This very consideration hinder'd M. de Turenne from pursuing the Prince of Condé when he retired, and from pressing him in the rear; he contented himself with what had pass'd, and declin'd making any further trials of his fortune, seeing his main design was executed; but M. de Bellefonds with some cavalry of the garrison of the place, had not the same discretion; he had a mind to make some attempt on the Prince's rear-guard, whilst he was crossing the river to get into the Arch-duke's quarters, and was so warmly received, that he was obliged to retire with loss. The Prince pass'd on at his ease; the rest of the troops took warning by this ill success, and ventur'd no more to charge him. After he had pass'd through M. de Turenne's old camp, he rallied his scattered troops behind the brook, and march'd to Cambrai. The Arch-duke and the Count de Fuensaldagne escap'd to Douai with only a squadron, or two at most; they pass'd through the midst of the baggage, where the Arch-duke was known by several of M. de Turenne's domesticks, and had but one squadron been left there, in all probability he had been taken prisoner.

M. d'Hocquincourt's troops did not arrive at the rendezvous till day-light began to appear: he attack'd the lines on the right of the place where the Duke of York had enter'd, and met with little or no resistance: the principal business of his infantry was to make a passage for his cavalry, at the head of which the Marshal enter'd, and march'd directly to the bridge, which he pass'd in order to enter the Lorrain-quarters, after the Duke of York was gone out of them. Most of the cavalry of both the other Armies follow'd him, and he found no opposition till he came to the brook, which separated the Lorrainers quarters from the Prince of Condé's; there he found M. de Marfin in order of battle on the other side with several squadrons, who stop't him a good while: the enemy had some infantry or

An. 1653. carabineers who defended the passage so long, that most of the infantry of that quarter had leisure to get off; and when the cavalry which was come out of the town obliged M. de Marfin to retire, he did it with so much order, that he marched out of the lines without being broke, still making use of his infantry or of his carabineers, as he had done at the brook: in going out of the lines, he posted them behind, from whence they fired on Hocquincourt's cavalry, which not being led in good order, was kept in awe by the enemy's fire, under cover of which Marfin retired in good order, and joined the Prince of Condé just as he was rallying his men, as is before related.

About the time that M. de Marfin was making his retreat, M. de Mondejeu, Governor of Arras, coming out of the place, some old Officers who perceiv'd him, desired he would please to put them in better order, for that M. d'Hocquincourt and the other General Officers who were there, had been a little defective in their duty; but he absolutely refused it, saying he was only come thither as a volunteer; that it was not reasonable for him to pretend in any manner to share the glory of that day with those to whom alone it belonged to conduct their troops; that for his particular, he had acquired reputation enough in defending the place, and that he was only come with a design to serve those who had with so much bravery relieved him.

It remains to give an account of what passed at the false attacks; those of M. de la Ferté and M. d'Hocquincourt followed their orders punctually, and nothing considerable befell them, only the former had the best part of the booty which was found in Count de Fuen-saldagne's quarters which it was to have attack'd. That of M. de Turenne was not so fortunate; M. de Traci who commanded it, pursuing exactly his orders, met with a very different fate; for he having been ordered to march without noise into a bottom within half cannon-shot of the lines and there to remain without undertaking any thing, till some time after M. de Turenne should have begun his own attack, of which it was supposed he would have heard the noise; it happened quite otherwise, because the wind was contrary and very high; he could hear nothing, and when day-light came he

he imagined some accident had hindered the execution of the design; he resolved however to continue some time in his post, and at length saw some cavalry which he imagined the enemy had sent out for intelligence: shortly after, he perceived one or two squadrons which he took for the advanced guard going to its post; but seeing a greater number going out, he thought he was discovered by the enemy, and that they were coming to fall on him; upon which he ordered his two battalions to make the best of their way into the castle of Neuville, which was nigh at hand, and with his cavalry he retired towards Bapaume: he had gone a great way before he found his mistake; the infantry which had retired into the castle perceived it sooner than he did; they observed that most of the cavalry of the quarter of Lorrain, and several of that of the Prince of Condé were retiring by the way which leads to Cambray: they detach'd the Aid-majors of every regiment, with fifty men each, to skirmish with the enemy in their passage; but being too far advanced, the enemy's cavalry surrounded them and killed them every man.

It cannot be very exactly said what number were killed on either side; by what appeared in the lines the number did not exceed four hundred; no General was lost; nor any Colonel but M. de Puymarais, who was of the horse: he was the son of M. de Bar Lieutenant-General, and was a very gallant man. But few Captains were killed. The squadron of Eclinvillers which had behaved itself so ill two or three days before, when M. de Joyeuse was wounded, was handled roughest of any; it was one of those M. de la Ferté had with him when he suffered himself to be beaten; and, it is probable, being resolved to recover its reputation, it then charged so vigorously, that the rest having given way before it, it suffered much more, and most of its officers were killed on the spot: the number of the wounded was not great; M. de Turenne received a contusion and a musket-shot on his armour, and had a horse killed under him. I do not remember that, except M. de Broglio, who had his thigh shot through with a ball, there was any of the Generals wounded, and but a few subaltern officers. The volunteers escaped very well; none were dangerously wounded but the Marquisses Brevauté and la Clotte;

An 1654. and they indeed died of their wounds: they were with the Marquis d'Humieres, who was briskly attacked by a squadron of the enemy: Biscara and some others were very much wounded, as also the Chevalier de S. Gé and other officers of his regiment.

On the side of the enemy, there was only one of their Generals wounded and taken, and that was the Baron de Bryolle, one of the Prince of Condé's Major-Generals: he was a brave old man, who altho' he had the misfortune to be taken in fighting against his Sovereign, yet shewed a few days before he died, that he was not a rebel in his heart, but only so by chance: he sent for his son, who had been taken prisoner with him, told him some few hours before he expired, how he had been drawn into a bad cause, and commanded him as he valued his blessing, never to suffer himself to be seduced, under any pretence whatever, to take arms against his King: this exhortation of a dying father so sensibly affected him, that he declared he would be a good and faithful subject; upon which he was set at liberty.

There were about three thousand prisoners taken; fifteen hundred were made prisoners in the quarters of Lorrain: they were in a redoubt, where they were surrounded; sixty three pieces of canon of all sizes were taken in the lines, as also every thing appertaining to so large a train of artillery; all the baggage of the enemy was taken: the soldiers had a great booty, all the General Officers of this Army being serv'd in plate, and each being obliged to have abundance of attendance and furniture, without which there was no subsisting in so large an Army; the quantity thereof was so considerable, that when the Army cross'd the Scheld sometime afterwards under Cambray, there were reckoned upwards of seven thousand carts and covered waggons, tho' the Army was not then above twenty thousand men, whereas when we forced the lines, it consisted of fourteen thousand foot, eleven thousand horse and four hundred dragoons.

The day after that the town was reliev'd, the Duke of York was sent with two thousand horse to Peronne, where the Court was, to escorte it to Arras, where it staid some days, during which the Army incamp'd in the enemy's lines: we made use of their huts, and we found

found so large a quantity of forrage which the enemy An. 1654. had laid up, that there was no occasion to go abroad for any all the time we staid there.

The last day of August, the Army marched towards Cambray, incamp'd at Sauchi-Cauchy, and the Court returned at the same time to Peronne. The third of September the Army march'd to Thun S. Martin, where it cross'd the Scheld over a bridge which was laid there. The next day it advanced to Saulfoi, half way between Cambray and Valenciennes. The day following it incamp'd at Kievrain, and the sixth it fell upon Quesnoi, between Valenciennes and Landrecies: Here was a Governor; but the garrison was small, the place of it self not strong: its outworks had been demolish'd after the Spanish way; which is to put a place only out of a condition of defence, and to leave it capable of being easily re-inftated. This town surrender'd the next day; men were immediately set on work to repair the outworks; new works were added; and leaving a strong garrison in it, we marched to Bavay, and the eleventh of September arrived before Binche, which surrender'd the same day, there being none but Burghers in it. We staid there till the twenty second, only to eat up the country, and give time for fortifying Quesnoi.

During these marches, M. de Turenne gave the Lieutenant-Generals more employment than they had been ever used to; till then, none but he whose day it was, was in motion; and the rest only attended the General; but he now ordered that in like manner as he whose day it was, marched at the head of the cavalry of the van, he that should have been relieved should also march at the head of the infantry, and he which had been relieved before him, at the head of the other wing of the cavalry, which made the rear-guard; thus there were every day three Lieutenant-Generals upon duty. He found this order so easy and beneficial, that the Duke of York took notice he constantly had it practised all the remaining time that he continued with him in the French service. He further cautioned them, that when they should arrive at a defile, or a brook, they should not stop, till those which were before them were got to the other side; but that they should make to themselves a particular passage on the right, or on the left, always ob-

An. 1653 serving to post the van-guard between them and the side by which the enemy might come. He thus could make longer marches; and from that time we always passed the defiles by three places at a time. The enemy's Croats were very troublesome during this whole march, it was dangerous to go aside the least that could be: they had sometimes the boldness to thrust themselves two or three into the ranks, and whenever they could do it they carried off some one. People were surprized during this march that so victorious and so considerable an Army, did not go upon some important siege this year; but they did not reflect that the season was very far advanced, and that tho' Quesnoi was not of itself considerable, yet that place very much favoured the designs which were laid for the next campaign, for which M. de Turenne had already formed his plan: it was a bold design the proposing to keep that place, situated in the heart of the enemy's country, and it was what render'd the scheme of the operations of the following year more easy to execute, and particularly the siege of Landrecies.

The enemy re-assembled under the canon of Mons the remains of their Army, from thence they continually detached parties to disturb the forragers of the Army of France, whilst it continued at Binche; but M. de Turenne took so good care therein, that they did no great hurt, tho' their Croats were incessantly hovering about the camp, and laying continual ambuscades: they wanted but a little of carrying off, one day, a guard of cavalry which had been advanced towards Mons: it consisted of four squadrons posted behind a brook, and had a small guard of thirty troopers on an eminence on the other side. The Duke of York going to visit this guard, found that four other squadrons were relieving it; he passed the brook at the head of the detachment which was going to relieve this small guard, and being arrived at his post, there were seen about thirty of the enemy's troopers coming from a wood which was on the left; but when they were within half canon-shot, they turn'd back, as if they had been afraid of being pursued. M. d'Humieres and some other Officers of the same guard who were somewhat advanced, began to gallop after them, and those that were nearest the

the Duke offered to pursue the enemy, and seeing the others running after them, they ran too without asking if he approved of it or no; upon which he rode thither full speed, and when he came up with the foremost of them, he had all the difficulty imaginable to restrain their ardour; they grumbled and complained that he hindered them from carrying off the whole party; but he assured them that by restraining them, he had saved them from an ambuscade, and that it was not likely the enemy would have come so near, had they not designed to decoy them; and indeed, scarce had he stopt them, when the enemy turned upon them and endeavoured to bring them to an engagement by skirmishing; but when they saw there was no good to be done, they retired to Mons, and in a moment after, we saw two hundred horse follow them who had hid themselves in a little hollow way, behind a wood which was not far off, and where the enemy intended to have surprized them. M. d'Humières and the other Officers thanked the Duke for not having suffered them to go farther; for had they gone on, tho' ever so little a way, they had most of them been taken prisoners, because the grand guard which was on the other side the brook, could never have come time enough to have brought them off; the defile for passing the brook, and the village beyond which the small guard was posted being so long, that the business would have been over before any body could have come to their relief.

I forgot to mention that when the Army set out from Arras, the other two Marshals had left it. M. de Turenne after having consumed the forrage round Binche, thought fit to return to Quefnoy before the rainy weather came on, which would have made the roads very difficult for the canon to pass, as also the vast quantity of baggage which followed the Army; he marched to Maubeuge, the country between Binche and that place being more open and not so streightened with defiles as the road to Bavay, where he would continually have had at his heels the Prince of Condé, which would have given him the more uneasiness as it was of dangerous consequence to make a false step before him; and it was to be feared lest the Army having him on its wings, he might find some opportunity in its march to attack it to advantage.

M. de

An. 1654. M. de Turenne the day when he decamped caused his baggage to march at day-break with six or eight squadrons, and M. de la Ferté's dragoons, which marched at the head or on the wings, as necessary required. Hardly had they begun to move, when he followed them with his vanguard; and in order to be less exposed to any insult, he marched with more order and precaution than he had ever before done: his march was so disposed that he could at any time in an instant put himself in order of battle without the least confusion.

On the right of the whole marched the first line of the wing which had the van that day, on the left was half of the first line of infantry, on the left of which was the second line of cavalry of the wing which made the van; on the left also marched the other half of the first wing of infantry, on whose left was the other wing of cavalry and the second line of infantry; and lastly on the left of the whole, was the body of reserve of cavalry; so that he marched in front four battalions and five squadrons, each file or column being battalions and squadrons.

The heavy canon was in the vanguard, and some small pieces in the rear. When we came to any defile, the rear-guard faced about with its field-pieces while the van was filing off, which having passed, faced likewise about, leaving a space sufficient for the others which were to follow, to draw up in order of battle as fast as they got out of the defile; the van continued in this order till all were passed, and then the whole Army moved at once to proceed in their march. After they had advanced a little more than a league, about forty squadrons of the enemy were seen approaching on the right: the bulk of this cavalry advanced within canon-shot, with a small brook however between them and us: they contented themselves with sending over their Croatsians, with a squadron or two to support them; the Croatsians drew so near, that several soldiers went out of their ranks, and got into the intervals of the cavalry to skirmish; notwithstanding this they kept following us, till the army arrived at a pass very near Maubeuge, still hoping to find an opportunity of giving us some disturbance; but M. de Turenne took so much care, and regulated his march with so much precaution, that tho' the Prince of Condé was in

in person at the head of this cavalry, he could never put so much as a single squadron into disorder; he pressed a little upon the hindmost troops at this passage near Maubeuge; but seeing the extreme quickness with which they turned upon him, and the good order they continually kept, he retired and let them alone, despairing to reap any advantage from this march; he did not pass the defile for fear of exposing himself indiscreetly, and returned to his camp. It was night before we reached Maubeuge; and tho' the camp was marked out between the town and the woods, the extreme darkness of the night and the confusion of the baggage occasioned much disorder in incamping, and the more for that the tract of ground was but of small extent. No body could view the quarters which were designed him; and it being out of M. de Turenne's power to help it, he posted two or three battalions between the baggage, on the side where the enemy might come, watched all the night long with them himself, and as soon as ever it was light, he put the Army again into its former order; and the same day, which was the three and twentieth, it marched to Bavay. A whole regiment of the enemy's Croats pursued a small party quite to the vanguard, and so far engaged it self, that they ran the risk of being all taken: the two foremost squadrons made after them and pursued them so warmly, that they found no way to escape but by striking into the woods; several quitted their horses to save themselves; notwithstanding which they lost more men and horses on this occasion than they ever did before or after on any other.

The Army being arrived at Bavay, it was employed to demolish the walls of this small town, which the inhabitants had abandoned when first it incamped there. Four ancient Roman ways center at this place: it is not above three or four leagues from Quesnoi, and might have been troublesome, if the enemy had put any troops into it in the winter. From Bavay the Army marched to Baudignies and encamped near Quesnoi, where it rested till the eight and twentieth, when it marched to Cateau-Cambresis, after having consumed the forrage about Quesnoi. While they remained there, the works of it were perfected, and the magazines filled with all things necessary, so that the enemy would have found
it

An. 1654. it very difficult to undertake any thing there when we
 ——— should be gone into winter quarters.

Whilst the Army lay encamped at Cateau-Cambresis, a guard which covered the forragers had like to have been routed. The Count de Renel who commanded it was taken prisoner at the first onset, as he was putting in order of battle the foremost squadrons which the enemy had broke; and if the rest, which were old troops, namely la Valette, Grammont and others, had not sustained the charge vigorously and with great intrepidity, they had all been cut to pieces, and the forragers in great danger: but tho' they saw their commander taken, and their foremost squadrons routed, they marched resolutely to the enemy, forced them to retire without attempting any thing further, and brought back the forragers to the camp without having lost a man. The party which had attacked them was come out of Cambrai, the forces were much upon an equality; and if the enemy had made a right improvement of their first advantage, they might have defeated the whole escorte, and have made as many of the forragers prisoners as they could have carried off. This incident obliged M. de Turenne to use more precaution afterwards to secure them; for the following two or three days he would go himself and cover them in the same place where M. de Renel had been taken: he took with him twenty squadrons, two battalions and four field-pieces, in hopes that the enemy would come thither again with the same number as before. He was not mistaken in his conjecture. A short time after he had posted his troops for the security of the forragers, six squadrons were perceived issuing out of a wood hard by, where they had lain in ambuscade: they came upon a grand gallop as if they had intended to fall upon two or three squadrons of gendarmes, who were posted in a small hollow way, between the woods and a village where several forragers were making up and loading their trusses. M. de Turenne was himself in this village with a great part of his cavalry and a battalion of infantry; but there being a small passage between him and the place where the gendarmes under M. de Schomberg were posted, if the enemy had attacked him briskly he must have been beaten before any body could have come up to his

his assistance. Considering therefore the danger he was in, he conceived there was no possibility of getting off otherwise than by putting on a bold look; he made directly up to the enemy, who seeing him march with so much resolution, and not being able to discover what numbers there might be in the bottom from whence he came, thought it probable there were troops behind to support them, and so they immediately retired again into the wood. M. de Schomberg was very glad of it, and halted on a small eminence without attempting to pursue them, not being strong enough, and it being impossible for him to know whether the enemy had not other troops in the wood. More troops were sent to strengthen him, and there he remained till the forragers had made an end, and every body began to return back.

Never after this did the forragers go without large escorts: the enemy did nothing to disturb them, and the care which was taken of the convoys which were sent to Quesnoi hindered the Spaniards from entertaining any thoughts of cutting them off. The Duke of York had the command of the last which was conveyed into that place while the Army was at Cateau-Cambresis; it continued some weeks more on the frontier there, where we took the two Castles of Anvillers and Girondele not far from Rocroy: we demolished them and retired into winter-quarters the season being so far advanced that there was no danger of the enemy's making any attempt upon Quesnoi.

This campaign began with the siege of Landrecies. An. 1655.
As soon as the French invested this place, the enemy posted themselves between it and Guise, with design to deprive them of their communication with their own country; but the forecast of M. de Turenne, who had timely filled the magazines of Quesnoi with all things necessary for a siege, put it out of the Spaniards power to hurt him much. The convoys went to and fro between Quesnoi and the camp without trouble or danger, and all the inconvenience was that some Officers and Volunteers could not repair to the Army. The Duke of York who had been detained by business, was of this number: so no particular account of this siege can be here given, nor any very exact detail of this whole campaign, he having lost a paper which would have been a great help
to

An. 1655. to his memory in divers things which at present he has forgot.

He staid at la Fere waiting for the opportunity of some convoy which might favour the impatient desire he had to be present at this siege; but it had been too dangerous to attempt to pass: none but M. de la Feuillade durst venture, and he was desperately wounded and taken; his bad success put others out of conceit of following his example, and made them lay aside all thoughts of going to the Army, till the enemy decamp't, which they did a day or two before the place surrendered.

This siege was an easy one to the soldiers. The besieged contented themselves with making a defence according to the usual form. They attempted nothing vigorous, and the French lost fewer men than could well have been expected in a siege of that importance. The besieged capitulated as soon as a breach had been made in the face of a bastion by a mine, and whether or no a lodgment was made, I have forgot; no Officer of note was killed but M. de Traci Mestre de Camp, who, as the eldest, commanded the German cavalry.

After the town was surrendered, the Army staid some days to fill up the trenches, and to repair the breach and the out-works. Mean while the enemy retired to their own territories between Mons and Valenciennes behind the rivers, and not thinking themselves in a condition to venture a battle, they only proposed to themselves to watch the motions of the French, and hinder them from going upon any other siege of consequence.

When the Army was ready to decamp, the King and Cardinal came to it; the Army went down along the Sambre to la Buffiere, a little town within the jurisdiction of Liege, a league from Thuyn. After spending some days in this march, and resting one or two at la Buffiere, it returned the same way it came, and passing by Avennes invested la Capelle; afterwards this not being thought a place of importance enough, that design was laid aside and the Army passed the Sambre and advanced into the Province of Haynault as far as Bavay, where it arrived the eleventh of August: this place is between Mons and Quefnoi. It was intended to advance farther into the country, and to pass on to Haisne; but upon viewing the passages, it was found that

that the enemy had made therein large intrenchments and parapets, and at proper distances redoubts and platforms three or four hundred paces from each other, running all along the river from S. Guislain as far as Condé. The enemy have a singular advantage for making such intrenchments in Flanders; for besides their troops which they employ therein, they likewise clap on their peasants, who with their spades and other tools which they know how to handle in throwing up their ditches, will dispatch abundance of such sort of work in a few days and make them of a great depth and of a vast extent; that which added to the difficulty of forcing these, was the difficulty of getting near the river itself, the country being very low and full of ditches; and unless new passages were made, there was no other way but the cause-way which led to the bridge of Hainne. However, in a council which was held in the King's presence, wherein assisted the Cardinal, M. de Turenne, the Marshals de la Ferté, Villeroi, Grammont, and du Plessis, and to which likewise the Duke of York was called, it was just going to be resolved on to force a passage at the bridge of Hainne; the Cardinal having represented how glorious it would be to execute it, and to have passed the river before the face of a formidable Army: but M. de Turenne's opinion, who was against this undertaking, prevailed, either through the personal respect they bore him, or thro' the force of his arguments: he shewed the difficulties of it in such a light as made it appear the enemy had a double advantage; adding, that indeed they might be forced, but it would cost too dear; that the saving the men was not the only consideration which obliged him to be against this enterprize; that he believed, without hazarding so many soldiers lives, it might be executed by passing the Scheld a little below Bouchain; that Valenciennes might be left on the right; that they might march to Condé and there pass the Scheld a second time; that thus they might take the enemy in flank, and the large intrenchments of the Spaniards would become useless to them. These reasons, to which he added a great many more, brought over the Cardinal and all the rest of the council to his opinion: immediately we marched from Bavay to Bouchain, and the enemy having

An. 1655. ing intelligence of it, they marched at the same time towards Valenciennes.

The thirteenth about noon the Army arrived at Neuville on the Scheld: the same day the enemy crost the river at Valenciennes, and posted themselves very advantageously, having their right covered with the woods of S. Amand, and the town on their left: they had before them an old line on mount Azin which reach'd from the town to the woods; and instead of disputing the passage of the river, they fell to work in repairing this line, which the next day was in a good condition of defence. Mean while the French Army past the river over a bridge of boats, and the fourteenth in the morning marched towards the enemy, having left some troops with the baggage to secure it against parties from the garrison of Bouchain; but all this was but lost labour.

The Duke of York has been since informed by some Officers who were then in the Spanish Army, that they propos'd to defend this post; that the Prince of Condé was against marching thither at all, unless they design'd to maintain the post, when they were at it; that he flatly told the Spaniards he would not move a step, if they would not let him defend it; that they gave him all the assurances he could wish that he should do so; that he foretold them the French would infallibly march to them, when they were in that post; and that then it would be too late to think of retreating, since that would expose the Army to an entire overthrow; the Spaniards still insisted upon it and promised to defend the post. Indeed we found them in it, and our parties brought an account of the manner of their encampment: we marched towards them as soon as the army was put in order of battle, and being got within a league of their intrenchments, we halted for the cannon and ammunition to come up.

Mean while M. de Turenne marched with a Squadron or two to take a view of their lines, and approached them within canon-shot. The enemy fired their heaviest pieces at him, which confirm'd him in the opinion he had that they meant to defend this post. He order'd M. de Castelnau to march with his flying-camp made up of about twelve squadrons and two or three battalions, and post himself on the right of the enemy in the high road to S. Amand, in order to attack them in flank
when

when he should attack them in front. Scarce was M. de Castelnau got to the place appointed, but he perceived the enemy were retiring towards Condé; and upon his sending advice of it to M. de Turenne, he had orders to fall on their rear and retard their march, if it was possible, to the end that he might have time to come himself with the body of the Army. It was not known the enemy were retiring but by the intelligence which M. de Castelnau gave of it, because the ground which was between the two Armies being an eminence on which they had raised their lines there was no seeing any more troops than they were minded to shew.

It is not unlikely that as soon as the Archduke and the Count de Fuensaldagne knew that the French had passed the river and were marching towards them, they repented of their having engaged so far. However that were, they resolved to return to Condé and cross the river there: they took this resolution without consulting the Prince of Condé, and the first notice he had of it, was by an Adjutant who came and told him the Archduke was retiring, and desired he would take care of the rear-guard and cover the retreat, tho' it was the Spaniards turn to do it; and, that they might be the less incumbered, they conveyed their heavy canon into Valenciennes, and took with them only some small field-pieces.

If M. de Castelnau had done his duty, as he might have done, by following his orders, the Prince of Condé would have been reduced to great extremities: it is certain it was not for want of courage but conduct. He marched so hastily, that being arrived at the bridge of Beverage, where a brook which comes from the woods falls into the Scheld on the other side of Valenciennes, and where M. de Marfin was posted with some squadrons of horse and dragoons, he did not wait for his infantry, but endeavoured with his cavalry alone to force the passage. He attacked the bridge twice or thrice, and having been repulsed with some loss, he found himself constrained to wait for his infantry. When the enemy saw his infantry approaching, they retired and left him master of the bridge, and he passed over it. M. de Turenne at the same time with his van-guard came up to M. de Castelnau's rear, and sent several repeated orders to him to press towards the enemy and hinder their march as

An. 1655. much as possible in order to get up with them: but M. de Castelnau suffered himself to be amused by some of the Prince of Condé's Officers, who being in the rear of their troops and seeing him advance at the head of his, desired to speak with him upon honour: to which having consented, because they were his old acquaintance, he ordered his troops to halt a little, and while they were complimenting one another, the Prince of Condé hastened his troops forwards, and Castelnau was duped; a fellow who was left behind on the top of a small hill having given the Officers the signal, they took leave of the Lieutenant-General and galloped after their troops. This unseasonable piece of civility gave the enemy time to cross the Scheld before we could come up with them. M. de Turenne arrived some time after at the place where M. de Castelnau had ranged his troops within canon-shot of the river, beyond which he saw the enemy's Army in order of battle near Condé. M. de Castelnau gave him an account of what had passed, and added that the enemy's last squadron had been obliged to swim over the river to make their escape: this mistake occasioned some ill blood between the Prince and M. de Turenne thro' an accident which fell out some days after.

The enemy broke down the bridges after they had passed the river, and marched, to the best of my remembrance, the same day in the afternoon towards Tournai. The French army incamped that night at Frane near Condé, and the next day men were set to work to make bridges a league below this town, in order to attack it, as soon as they were finished. It was at first resolved that the troops commanded by Messieurs de Castelnau and Uxelles should be solely employed in this siege, whilst the two Marshals with the rest of the Army covered it and made head against the enemy.

They began according to this scheme to make the approaches; but the first night met with such resistance, the great number of men in the place making up for its weakness, that the two Marshals being advertised that there was too much work for so few troops, came themselves to push on one of the attacks, leaving the other to the care of Messieurs Castelnau and Uxelles.

The

The besieged had burnt the houses of a small suburb An. 1655. which was before the gate: but not having had time to level the walls of it, they served for a very favourable shelter for opening trenches a little more than half a musket shot from the place. A battalion of guards mounted them the first night; it was commanded by Vautourneux, the oldest Captain of the ten companies: and at the Lieutenant-General's attack mounted the regiment of

The next night a Swiss battalion mounted the trenches at one attack and the regiment of at the other. The works were carried on on both sides to within pistol shot of the town, and we lost at least as many men that night as the foregoing. The following night, another battalion of guards relieved the swiss at the Marshal's attack, and at that of the Lieutenant-General's the regiment of a fault was committed at the former which occasioned the loss of a great many men. It was M. de la Ferté's day, and going in the evening to the trenches to see how things went on, he imagined they were near enough to make a lodgment at the foot of the palisades, which he judged, as well as all the other Officers, to be on this side the ditch, on the edge of it. He ordered them to make a lodgment there; they set about it as soon as it was night; but they arrived at the ditch without finding any palisades there, and discovered that they were on the *berme*: the men however passed the ditch, which was neither deep nor broad: they endeavoured to lodge themselves on the *berme* at the foot of the palisades: here they met with a great resistance; and after having lost abundance of Officers and soldiers, they were fain to retire and content themselves with making a lodgment on the edge of the ditch. We ought not to wonder at this mistake, the ditch being narrow and the palisades being usually fixed along the *banquette* of the covered way, they were supposed to be there; and it had been a very difficult matter with the best eyes in the world, to judge at a certain distance the precise place where the palisades were planted. The Count de Henning, Governor of the place, demanded next day to capitulate, it was agreed he should march out the day after with arms and baggage. So he evacuated the place the nineteenth with about two thousand foot and some horse.

An. 1655. During this Siege M. de Buffi-Rabutin, Colonel of horse, was sent to escorte the forragers with seven or eight squadrons: he posted them on the other side the Scheld before the villages where they were foraging. Towards night, when they had almost done, and most of the forragers were returned to the camp with their trusses, Buffi espying two squadrons of the enemy, had a great mind to charge them, to which he was likewise excited by several volunteers and persons of quality who were with him, among whom were the Prince de Marillac and the Count de Guiche: he marched towards them with all his squadrons; the enemy retired in great hurry; and when he had almost overtaken them, they turned suddenly about, and at the same time were seen coming out of a bottom, where they had lain in ambuscade, twelve or fourteen squadrons of the enemy. Buffi, as well as the rest, was so surpris'd that they had no other course to take but to cry, *to the defile*: there was no help for it: all the squadrons of themselves fell into the same way of thinking and cried out to one another, *to the defile*: they quitted their ranks, ran full speed and rallied at the defile: the enemy contented themselves with what they could take in the pursuit, and did not press upon them very far. This was the best cavalry in the French Army, consisting of old Officers and veteran troopers; and had they taken any other course, the loss would have been much more considerable: no more than a hundred troopers, or thereabouts, were lost and a standard or two of the royal regiment, which having been taken by the Prince of Condé's troops, he sent them back to the King by one of his trumpets; but his Majesty would not receive them, and the troops which had lost them marched without any standard the rest of the campaign.

Much about this time it was that a letter which M. de Turenne had wrote to the Cardinal was intercepted, wherein he gave an account of what had passed in the Spaniards retreat near Valenciennes. The Prince of Condé into whose hands it fell, having read it, wrote a letter to M. de Turenne, full of harsh language and sent it to him by a trumpet. He mentioned among other things that if he had not known his hand writing, he should have thought the relation which he had sent to the Cardinal to have been drawn up by a Gazetteer instead

instead of a General; and concluded with this reproach, An. 1655. that if M. de Turenne had been at the head of his Army, while he himself was in the rear of his, he would have seen quite the reverse of what he had written, since not one of his troopers had been forced to swim the river to make his escape.

M. de Turenne was piqued at reading this letter, and told the trumpet he should not have taken upon him to deliver such papers as that; and warned him that if ever he committed the like fault again, it was not his livery nor his character should exempt him from the punishment he deserved; that he would let him depart this time, tho' he deserv'd to be made an example of for presuming to bring so abusive a scroll. It is thought that it was not long before the Prince knew that M. de Turenne had written no more than what he had been told by M. de Castelnau; however, from this time there ceas'd to be between them that complaisance which is always observed between persons of such quality, who command against each other: they no longer lived with that mutual civility, as they had done before; and till the conclusion of the peace they were never sincerely reconciled.

After the taking of Condé, where a sufficient garrison was left, the Army march'd the twentieth to S. Guislain, and laid siege to it. M. de Turenne took up his quarters in the village of Horn, and M. de la Ferté his on the other side the river. The King and Cardinal came to this siege, and lodged in the castle of Bossut, a little below the town on the same river. This place is naturally strong, being in a very low country, and the river of Haisne passes through it, so that it can lay most part of its neighbourhood under water, as the enemy now did, which very much incommoded the trenches. It was likewise very difficult to make the lines of circumvallation, because there was no laying the bridges of communication without a world of trouble; the trenches were filled with water, when we approach'd the place; the water being as high as the ground, there was no possibility either to dig it or make use of it by way of cover, so that the approaches were, properly speaking, nothing but *blinds* of fascines: however, in spite of all

An. 1655. these obstacles the place was carried in three days after
 ——— opening the trenches.

When the Generals arrived at their quarters at Horn, it was so dark a night that they knew not till morning that they were no farther off the town than a small canon-shot, which awakened them very easily; and the houses which had been marked out for them being but slightly built, they were soon dislodged, particularly M. du Passage, who was obliged, as likewise were many others, to go in search of some that were out of the reach of the canon. The Duke of York was the only person that ventur'd to remain in his house, which being almost within musket-shot of the place, they fired no canon at it, supposing no body would lodge there, and he continued very safe in it all the time of the siege.

The French guards, as the eldest regiment in the Army, mounted the trenches first, according to custom. There happened in this siege a dispute between M. de Montpezat, the oldest Lieutenant-General, and the Master of the Ordnance; on the former's sending his orders to the other to deliver some utensils which he wanted for carrying on the trenches, the first night that they were opened, the Master of the Ordnance refused to obey, insisting that he was only to receive orders from the General himself. M. de Montpezat complaining of this the next day, the contest was decided in favour of the Lieutenant-General; as long as the other continued in the Army he ceased to act as Master of the Ordnance, but had a brevet of Lieutenant-General given him, and he served in that quality only.

There were but few soldiers lost in this siege: I do not remember any considerable officer was killed. The Chevalier de Crequi and M. de Varenne were wounded, and some others, as M. de Chavigny Aid-Major of the regiment of guards, who afterwards became a priest of the pratory; the Chevalier de Crequi's wound, which was in his head, tho' very dangerous, yet was not mortal, and he recovered of it; Varenne received his in his thigh at M. de Turenne's attack, as he was in discourse with the Duke of York. The approaches were in three nights time push'd on to the edge of the ditch, and the next day, which was the five and twentieth, the Governor

governor of the place Don Pedro Savali desired to capitulate. An. 1655.

While the Army of France was employed in this siege, the Spaniards divided theirs. The Arch-duke and the Count de Fuenfaldagne, with most of the Spanish infantry, and some cavalry posted themselves at Notre Dame de Halle; the Prince of Condé with most of his troops at Tournai, the Lorrainers at Ath, and the Prince de Ligne with four or five thousand men at Mons. The season was so far advanced, it was not thought proper to go upon any thing farther: we remained some days in the same quarters we had taken up at the siege of S. Guislain. The Court departed a few days after that place was surrendered. While the Army continued here, diligence was used to fortify this place and Condé at the same time; and in order to prevent the enemy from besieging these two places in the winter, we consumed all the forrage, and eat up the country round about: we sent out no detachment to cover the forragers less than two thousand horse, and always with a Lieutenant-General: M. de Turenne went with them himself sometimes; tho' the enemy were constantly upon the watch, they never carried off above a man or two, and those commonly *marauders*. To check the Croats who were most troublesome, M. de Turenne ordered three or four of the best mounted officers should be detached from each squadron to accompany the forragers, to the end, that as soon as they espied them they might join themselves twenty or thirty together, which would be sufficient to disperse these scouts. The forragers by this means found themselves not so much exposed as before, and we carried off a good many Croats.

The last forrage that was made was the greatest of all, and the most dangerous: we were forced to go as far as Chievres and the Abbey of Cambron: the first place was not above a good league from Ath. The Duke of York commanded the troops which escorted it: as he was obliged to march thro' the midst of the enemy's quarters, and very far from the camp, he had assigned him forty squadrons, five battalions and two pieces of canon: the Duke used all possible precaution. He sent out before day a party of horse to a large wood thro' which he

An. 1655. was unavoidably to pass, with orders to stop the forragers there, and hinder them from advancing farther, till he came up with the troops which he commanded: this was executed, he passed across the wood, and drew them up in battalia in the plain before the forragers were in the wood; here he left a battalion to hinder any party from the garrison of Mons from surprising them when they should be loaded. He forbid the forragers to straggle or march faster than the escorte, and ordered them to follow in the same front, on the right and left of the squadrons: we march'd in this order till we got within a league of Chievres. There might be about ten thousand forragers, most of them with their scythes in their hands, their Officers at their head, forming a front of about a quarter of a league: but when they came in sight of a country which had not been forraged, it was impossible to hinder them from breaking their ranks, and forraging in all the hurry imaginable; which the Duke observing, he left in the plain where he then was near a village, the rest of his infantry, and some squadrons with the two pieces of canon, and with most of his cavalry as fast as they could trot he rode after the forragers, and while they were at work he posted himself before them, between Chievres and Brugelet to cover them on the side of Ath, and sent the Count de Grandpré with the cavalry on the other side, with orders to post himself at the village of Leuse to secure them from the parties which might come from Mons.

It will not be amiss here to mention the great regularity and justice which is observed among the forragers. He that comes first into a field or a meadow has an undisputed right to it, and no other is to come so near him as not to leave a sufficient space for him to make up his truss, and load his horse; and whoever comes first to a barn, or to a hay-cock, he is not to be interrupted, nor may any other take the least part of it, till he has done, so the first comer is first serv'd. There happen'd an alarm about noon, occasion'd by M. de Rochepair, who was returning to the camp with a party of a thousand horse without having done any thing; we thought at first they had been enemies: the Duke of York desir'd him to stay with him, thinking he might have occasion for him.

All

All the forragers having loaded their horses, we returned to the camp without any other loss than of about half a score, who having past the brook of Cambron contrary to an express prohibition, were carried off by a small party of the enemy. The Duke of York was afterwards informed by the Prince de Ligne, and some other officers of the Spanish Army, that they had resolved to fall that day on the forragers of the Army of France, and had for that purpose appointed a rendezvous for the cavalry which was at Tournay, Mons and Ath: but that we made so much noise in going out of the camp with the forragers, that some of the Prince de Ligne's parties brought him word that our Army was upon the march, that he sent advice of it to the troops which were assembled at the rendezvous, and that they returned into their quarters, fearing they should be met with by the vanguard: this mistake, in all probability, sav'd the escorte from a very great risk; they would have been hard put to it to have got off if that whole body of cavalry had attacked them.

A few days after, the whole adjoining country being ravaged, the Army passed the river, and encamped at Outrage the fourteenth of September. The nineteenth it march'd to Leuse, where it staid as long as was requisite for consuming the forrage thereabouts, and in the mean while we took the castle of Briffeil, the garrison whereof would not surrender till they saw a battery of canon rais'd. It was afterwards thought proper to go out of the enemy's country, and we march'd the six and twentieth to Pommereuil hard by the bridge of Haisne. Next day, having cross'd the river, we encamp'd at Anirt on the Haisneau, about a league from Keuvrain, which is on the same brook. This quarter and the parts adjacent had been so ravaged, that the very first night we were forced to go a foraging two leagues only for straw: it seem'd as if we could hardly subsist there three days, nevertheless we staid a fortnight without being in want of any thing. This was owing to M. de Turenne's forecast, who being at Leuse, had order'd a provision to be made there of as much grain as not only loaded the waggons of the Army, but every trooper had a sackfull besides which he carried behind him on horseback; this it was which so long subsisted the Army in

An. 1655. in a bare country where we did not forrage above three times: the Duke of York again commanded the last, and was obliged to go as far as the neighbourhood of Bouchain, before he could meet with any thing; and most of the forragers brought nothing but straw.

Having finished the fortifications which were added, to Condé and S. Guislain, and filled their magazines with all kinds of provisions, the Army march'd the twelfth of October to Barlaimont, and the twenty second to the Abbey of Marolles; we thought to abide there some time, but upon advice that some of the enemy's troops were coming that way, it was judg'd best to march to Vandegies-au-bois, where M. de Turenne received orders to march to la Fere, upon the Court's having discover'd that Marshal d'Hocquincourt was in treaty with the Prince of Condé, to deliver up to him Ham and Peronne, of which he was Governor; and coming to Mouy the fourth of November, M. de Turenne received orders from the Cardinal to leave the Army, and come to the Court at Compiègne, to consult what course to take, in case Marshal d'Hocquincourt did not accept the offers which the King had made him, but should introduce the enemy into those two important places.

M. de Turenne departed, and left the command of the Army to the Duke of York: he was the only Lieutenant-General who staid in it, all the rest having leave to quit it; there being no likelihood of any farther action. Thus the Duke had the command of the Army at the very time that the peace between France and Cromwell was concluded and publish'd, and that by one of the articles thereof, he, by name, was to be banish'd the Kingdom. The Army staid some days at Mouy: the Duke received orders the tenth to lead it to Mondécour, between Noyon and Chauni. M. de Turenne, after that, by an accommodation made with Marshal d'Hocquincourt, the Court was freed from its uneasiness on that side, return'd to the Army the fourteenth and gave the Duke of York leave to quit it.

The Cardinal received him at Compiègne perfectly well; he excused himself for making a peace with Cromwell by the absolute necessity of it for the good of the State and security of the Crown; he told him that he had

had not concluded a league with Cromwell but purely An. 1655.
 to hinder the effect of that which the Spaniards had proposed, by which they offered to assist him to take Calais, in order to leave it in his hands; that it was expedient to ward off the consequences of so dangerous a treaty, by making up matters with him; but that notwithstanding the clauses which had been inserted against the Duke in the peace which had been concluded, he should always find the King in the same sentiments of esteem and friendship for him. He owes this justice to the memory of the Cardinal, to confess that he would have been a very injudicious Minister, if he had not, in so delicate a conjuncture, engaged Cromwell in the interest of his Master, who would have had room to be very much dissatisfied with him, if he had let slip this important opportunity.

The Duke departed the twenty third for Paris, whither the Court returned soon after. The Cardinal, that he might not reduce him to the melancholy necessity of quitting France, considering how near a relation he was of the King, and grandson, as well as he, of Henry the fourth, dispatch'd a messenger to desire Cromwell to consent, that he might continue to serve in the Armies of France; the Minister was likewise afraid that if the Duke of York went out of the Kingdom, the Irish which were in the service would follow him. Cromwell consented to his serving, provided it was in Italy or Catalonia, not thinking it to be at all for his interest that the Duke should be in an Army to which he was to send a considerable body of English troops; and it was proposed to the Duke of York to command in quality of Captain General under the Duke of Modena, who was Generalissimo of the French Troops in Italy.

When the Court was returned to Paris it was signified An. 1656.
 to the Duke of York not only that the King was desirous to retain him in the service; but that if Cromwell refused his consent to the proposals which had been made to him on that head, this Prince's pension should be still continued and paid him in like manner as before whatever place he retired to, provided he did not serve against France. He, afterwards, accepted of the offer which was made him to
 serve

An. 1656. serve in Italy as Captain-General, under the Duke of Modena; Generalissimo of the troops of France and Savoy in Piedmont; he had a strong inclination to acquire more and more experience in the art of war, and the tender affection upon all occasions shew'd him by his aunt the Dutches of Savoy, made him take this course with the more pleasure, he retaining a most grateful sense of her kindness, and she passionately desiring to have him with her

An. 1656. In the beginning of February

on the news that the King of England was gone from Cologne into Flanders, all the Irish Colonels who had serv'd in the Armies of France under M. de Turenne & M. de la Ferté, wrote to the Duke of York to assure him that they were ready, like good subjects and men of honour, to do whatever he should order them: he thank'd them, but recommended to them by no means to suffer their soldiers to pass into Flanders either singly or in companies, tho' the Spaniards should solicit them to it, on occasion of the King's retiring thither, and to preserve their regiments entire, as well for the service of his Majesty, when he should want them, as for their own advantage, and also for that their soldiers could not disperse themselves so long as he should be in France, without occasioning great prejudice to his private affairs, and he added that when it was a proper time to make use of their offers, he would let them know it.

When it was publicly known that the King of England was not only in Flanders, but had sign'd a treaty with Spain, every body supposed the Duke of York would withdraw thither too. This Prince was us'd to discourse freely of his affairs with M. de Turenne, who advis'd him to write to the King his brother, and represent to him that having served in France, received his education there, and contracted friendship with the most considerable persons both in the Court and Armies, whose credit might be one day usefully employed for the advantage of his Majesty, he conceived it to be for his service to suffer him to remain in France, whereas if he quitted it, he would hazard both the losing of his friends and the interest he had there; that he did not think

think he could do him any great service in Flanders, An. 1656.
 where it was sufficient for the Spaniards that they had
 his Majesty and the Duke of Gloucester with them;
 besides that there was no mention made of him in the
 treaty his Majesty had made with the Spaniards, and
 that they had not express'd any desire he should be a-
 mong them; that if they should afterwards demand him,
 his Majesty might secretly consent he should stay in
 France, and outwardly appear angry at him for his seeming
 disobedience; that this would satisfy the Spaniards, and
 the connivance would be known only to the person who
 should carry the proposal and bring the consent.

The Duke of York was highly pleased with this ad-
 vice, communicated it to the Queen his Mother, who
 approved of it, and he resolv'd to send Charles Berkeley
 to propose it to the King his Brother; but the King,
 far from yielding to the Duke's request, immediately
 sent him an absolute order to come to him in Flanders
 with all possible speed. He instantly obeyed; and the
 Court of France consented to it

The beginning of this Campaign was very glorious to An. 1657.
 the Prince of Condé. As he was making the review
 of his cavalry at la Bussiere on the Sambre, from whence
 he was to go to the general rendezvous of the Army,
 he had intelligence brought him that M. de Turenne and
 M. de la Ferté had laid siege to Cambray, which he
 knew had but a weak garrison: he march'd immedi-
 ately without hesitating, to relieve it, before the French
 could be informed of his march, and had perfected their
 lines. He took his measures so that he arrived in the night
 time; and tho' the French were on horse-back and in
 good order, he made himself a passage thro' the two
 lines of cavalry, which were in his way, and which were
 unable to stop so considerable a body of troops, whose
 sole business was to penetrate to the town; which was
 executed with very little loss. He arrived at the coun-
 terscarp, and the Count de Salazar, Governor of the
 place, so little expected this succour, that the Prince of
 Condé was a long while at the palisade before they o-
 pened the barriers to him; this surprise was the more
 agreeable to him, because he himself was no great sol-
 dier, his garrison was weak, and if he had not been re-
 lieved

An. 1657. lieved just then, he was going to abandon the town and retire to the citadel. This place was usually well provided with men, and what occasioned its not being so now, was an opinion which the Spaniards had that Cromwell sending six thousand men to join the French, they designed to attack some place on the Sea-coast. So they strengthened all their garrisons on that side, and the Cardinal having been inform'd that that of Cambray was weak, conceived the occasion to be so much the more favourable for taking it as he had had for a long time a strong passion to become the Bishop and Prince of it; and in truth had not the Prince of Condé suddenly and accidentally resolved upon relieving it and as expeditiously effected it, the place had been taken: for if he had been at Brussels, when the Spaniards had notice of the siege, the French might have finish'd their lines before the other could have consulted and concluded on the means to have raised the siege of it. M. de Turenne who had reckoned upon the usual slowness and gravity of the Spaniards, was extremely surpris'd at the Prince of Condé's quickness; and having learnt by some prisoners the number and quality of the troops which were entered the town, he thought fit to raise the siege, and sent advice of it to Court. The Prince of Condé having left a sufficient garrison in it, returned to Brussels and sent the rest of his troops to the general rendezvous which was near Mons.

This ill success quite broke the measures which the French had taken for this campaign: they abandon'd the design of taking in hand any other considerable siege. They divided their Army; M. de la Ferté with one part of it went and attack'd Montmedi, and M. de Turenne with the other march'd towards the Sea to join the English infantry which was landed, after which he returned to his former station to have an eye on the motions of the Spaniards, who quitted on the nineteenth of June the neighbourhood of Mons to go and incamp on the Sambre a little above Thuyn. The two and twentieth the Army pass'd the river; the next day they incamp'd in the neighbourhood of Philippeville, making as if they would relieve Montmedi. M. de Turenne made haste to get the start of them; but their design was only to amuse and deceive him by falling upon
Calais

Calais which they had hopes of carrying in a few hours An. 1657.
 by means of the weakness of a certain particular place which they were made acquainted with. The Spaniards conceived this design even before the departure of the Arch-duke, who had sent some engineers in disguise to find out the defects of the place. They had not as yet been able to attack it for want of a proper opportunity; at length they thought they should succeed, and had taken their measures so judiciously that the enterprize seemed infallible; it was conducted with so much secrecy, that the enemy had not the least suspicion of it. When they quitted Mons they had left a body of cavalry behind, which with the infantry that might be drawn from the neighbouring garrisons, was sufficient to begin the business.

Having thus drawn M. de Turenne towards Montmedi, the Army of Spain suddenly turn'd back and began to march towards Calais the six and twentieth. Don John, the Prince of Condé, and Caracena went before with the cavalry by the nearest way; and left the Duke of York and Marfin with the infantry to follow after as fast as possible. The baggage and canon marched farther into the country: the Prince de Ligne had been pitch'd upon for the execution of this enterprize; and that he might have the chief management of it, he was sent a day before the Army march'd to put himself at the head of the troops which had been left behind for this purpose. The Duke of York marched the first night as far as Tilli with the infantry; the twenty seventh he arrived in the suburb of Mons, the twenty eighth he reached Brussels, the twenty ninth having passed the Scheld at Tournay, he went and incamped at Pont-a-Bouvines: the thirty first he marched along the walls of Lille, crossed the Lys at Armentieres and incamped at Nieukerke. The next day, being the first of July, he arrived at Hasebrouk and the second at Arques within a league of S. Omer, where arriving he proposed e'er night to be before Calais, but he received a letter from Don John acquainting him that the enterprize had failed, and ordering him to stay at Arques till he heard further from him. The Prince de Ligne had gone out of Gravelines as soon as it was night to put the design in execution

An. 1657. cution at low water, by seizing on that part without the walls which was contiguous to the Key, after which the place might have been master'd in less than twelve hours: but he arrived half an hour too late, and the water was so high that it was impossible to pass, and he was forced to go back again without doing any thing but giving a great alarm to the town, and shewing the Governor where it was the place was weakest, which he afterwards took care to fortify in such a manner as to deprive the Spaniards of all hopes of ever being able to surprize it.

This long march having proved fruitless, the cavalry and infantry join'd each other again at Querne within a league of Aire the fourth of July, and the cannon and baggage arrived there a day or two after. The Army march'd the sixth to Bouré not far from Lillers, continued there some days and went and incamp'd the twelfth at Broüai, next day at Lens; then at Reu on the Scarp, and the fifteenth at Sauchi-Cauchy between Arras and Cambray, and having lain in camp there till the twenty first, it march'd to Marcoin.

While time was thus lost in making so many fruitless marches, M. de la Ferté went on with the siege of Montmedi which made a better defence than he had expected, the place being strong and having a good garrison in it. M. de Turenne on his side watch'd the Spaniards motions, yet without removing far from the siege, to hinder any succour from going into the place. The Army decamping from Marcoin the twenty seventh, march'd to Catelet, the next day to Fervaques, the twenty ninth to Origni on the Oise where it staid but one day: it incamp'd afterwards at Eglancourt till the eighth of August when it march'd to Feron; the day following it pass'd on to Macon hard by Chimai, and the tenth to Aublin, a league from Marienbourg, where advice came of Montmedi's being taken: it defended it self with such bravery and so obstinate a resolution, that it surrender'd not till the enemy were lodged in a bastion and had rais'd thereon a battery of six canon. We learnt at the same time that M. de Turenne was marching into Flanders, to undertake a siege there: it was necessary to march again the fourteenth, and till the twentieth we made no stop: on that day we arrived
at

at Calonne on the Lys within a league of S. Venant An. 1657.
 which M. de Turenne was besieging, and the lines where-
 of were already so far advanced that this consideration
 and the disproportion of forces by no means allowed
 of any endeavours to relieve the place. We only stu-
 died how to cut off the enemy's provisions and pre-
 vent the passing of a convoy of four or five hundred
 waggons which were to go the next day from Bethune
 to their Army. To do this, it was thought proper to
 decamp and post our selves at Montbernens on by which
 place they could no way avoid passing. The country
 thro' which we were to march being very woody and
 full of hedges and ditches, the pioneers were order'd
 to march with their spades and hatchets at the head
 of each regiment, to make way for them, that the Ar-
 my might enter in battalia into the plain which was not
 more than canon-shot distance from the enemy. We
 were ready to break up camp at the dawn of day, and
 yet did not march till noon: the reason of this dilato-
 riness is so much the harder to guess at, in that the
 success of the design depended on dispatch: Don John
 of Austria was reminded of this; and the Duke of York
 represented to him that the least delay would give the
 convoy an opportunity to enter the lines; but whatever
 could be said to quicken him, the Army stirred not till
 noon. The Prince de Ligne General of the horse was
 at the head of the right, the Prince of Condé at the left,
 and the Duke of York who had been desired by Don
 John to act that day as *Mestre de Camp General* led the
 Infantry. Don John and Caracena marched before with
 their three troops of Guards, till arriving at the borders of
 the plain, they would needs, according to their custom,
 take an afternoon's nap.

The Army could move but slow in a country so full
 of inclosures; however the Duke of York had but one
 close more to pass to get with the infantry into the
 plain, when he espied the enemy's convoy, which com-
 ing down from Montbernens march'd in all haste to
 reach the lines. The Duke having now passed the last
 hedge, ranged his infantry in order of battle, and seeing
 that the Prince de Ligne was likewise in the plain with
 four or five squadrons, he sent him notice of the con-
 voys approaching, and that he need only march and

An. 1657. seize it, the enemy having but three squadrons to guard it, he answered he saw the thing as well as he, that it was the easiest thing in the world to carry off the convoy, but that he durst not attack it without orders from Don John, or the Marquis de Caracena. The Duke went himself to the Prince de Ligne, conjured him not to lose so fine an opportunity by being over-scrupulous: but his reply was, that he knew not how far the Spanish severity went; that by falling on without orders, it might cost him his head, especially if he did not succeed, nay, if he met with but the least ill fortune. The Duke rejoin'd, that there was no bad success to be apprehended, that M. de Turenne might indeed order out some cavalry, but he would not venture his infantry out of the lines. He added, that if the Spaniards should call him to account for this action, he would take the whole blame of it on himself, and that he might justly alledge for an excuse that he did it only in obedience to him, since he acted that day as *Mestre de Camp General*: but all these reasons had no effect on the Prince de Ligne; and so the opportunity was lost. The convoy, being sensible of their danger, quickened their march, and when most of the waggons were got into the lines, the three troops of guards came and join'd the Prince de Ligne, with orders to attack the convoy; he only took with him the troop of his own guards. The Duke of York sent his thither; but the four first, conducted by the Count de Colmanar nephew to Caracena, who was young and unexperienced, march'd so precipitately and in such disorder, that if the enemy's three squadrons had resolved to dispute the ground with them, they might have beat them. Berkley, Captain of the Duke's guards, who saw their wretched management, followed them in good order and was of great service to them; for the three French squadrons having been broke they pursued them with the same imprudence with which they had march'd up to them, and threw themselves with them pell-mell within their lines, the barrier of which the enemy had not had time to shut: but they came out much faster than they went in, and fled without stopping, till they reach'd Berkley's troops, who was advanced within musket-shot of the lines. Then they rallied again

gain and were grown so prudent and flegmatic, that without insisting on the post of honour which belonged to them, they left to Berkley that of making the rear-guard, and they returned in this order and rejoined the Army which they found in battalia in the plain within canon-shot of the enemy, where after it had staid some time, it retired thence and went and incamp'd at Montbernenfon. The enemy lost not a single waggon of their whole convoy: they had indeed some men killed, others wounded and some taken prisoners. The Marquis de Renty, a man of Quality, and Quierneux who commanded the regiment of Gesvres, died of their wounds. An. 1657.

Having mist this convoy, and the enemy being too strong for us to entertain any hopes of forcing their lines, it was consider'd what we should do to oblige them to raise the siege, or what place we could attack and take before they had ended it: the thing was deliberated in a council of war which was held the day after we arrived at Montbernenfon. It was resolv'd to go and besiege Ardres, but the execution of it was put off till the five and twentieth, lest the enemy not having yet opened the trenches, should lay aside that enterprize and come and force Don John to fight whether he would or no. This delay which was grounded on a weak reason, was very prejudicial; M. de Turenne lost no time, and had the trenches opened the very night that we got to Montbernenfon. The Army departed thence the twenty fifth in the morning, and arrived at Ardres the twenty seventh before noon. We applied our selves first to settle the quarters so as to hinder succours from entering the place, wherein we knew there was not above three hundred foot. That day was lost and the night too in working at a circumvallation, which, in every body's judgment, was very useles; whereas had the place been attack'd that night, in all probability it had been carried.

This slowness of the Spaniards engages me in a digression which will not be improper in this place, to lessen our wonder at the errors we have already seen them commit and those which will follow. Don John observed when he was in the field the same formalities as if he had been at Brussels; he was every where alike difficult of access: he was sleeping as I said before as well as the Marquis de Caracena close by the plain when

An. 1657. the convoy was passing, and their domestics who saw it coming down the mountain as well as the rest of the Army, dur't never wake them to let them know it; but what is still more surprising is, that Don John and the Marquis who were both men of excellent good sense; wit and bravery, could stick so close to formalities which they knew to be prejudicial to their master's service and their own reputation. The Marquis was a very good Officer, had served long; had risen gradually and owed his fortune to his merit; and if Don John had not had the disadvantage, if one may say so, to be brought up as a Son of Spain, he was endowed with qualities capable of making him a great man: but the scrupulous adhering to formalities spoiled all. When the Army march'd, they never went to the head of it unless the enemy was in fight. When the troops were half got out of the camp, they mounted their horses, march'd at the head of their three troops of guards, directly to the quarters which had been mark'd out for them, without troubling themselves about the Army, or taking a view of the ground, or knowing where the quarters of the other Generals were; consequently, in case of an alarm, or on the enemy's approaching, they knew neither the incampment; nor even where the main-guard was, or the advanced guard. Don John's custom for the most part was when he arrived in his quarters, tho' ever so long before night, to go to bed; there he supp'd and would not rise till morning. When the Army was not upon a march, he seldom went out or got on horseback.

But to return to the siege of Ardres, a council of war was held in the Marquis de Caracena's quarters; to consult in what part they should attack the place. When the Generals were assembled, they were all taken up to the top of a high tower, from whence they were desired to view the place with prospective glasses; and without examining the thing more narrowly, they came to a resolution that the Spaniards should attack a half-moon between two bastions; that the Duke of York should make his attack at the bastion on the right; and the Prince of Condé at that on the left, and that no time might be lost, matters should be so contrived as to set the miners to work that same night to the town wall.

: The Duke of York and the Prince of Conde not contenting themselves with having viewed the place from the top of the tower, went and took a nearer survey of it. Neither Don John, nor the Marquis went personally to view their attack; they only sent a *Major de Bataille* to bring them an account of it, it not being the custom for Spanish Generals to expose themselves on such occasions. All things being in a readiness, the attacks were begun in the evening upon a signal from Don John's quarter. The besieged not having hands to defend their outworks, we advanced without trouble to the foot of the ditch, where we made a lodgment before we attempted to set the miners on. The Duke of York's regiment was employed at that Prince's attack; the Lord Muskerry who commanded it had a Captain and some soldiers of the other battalions to strengthen it. The Duke took care to send him fascines and whatever was necessary; and going afterwards to visit the works with the Duke of Gloucester, he found that the Lord Muskerry had put every thing in good order; that he had almost finished his lodgment on the edge of the ditch over-against the point of the bastion, and that he had already lodged the body of the battalion in the ditch of the ravelin which covered the point of the bastion. The Duke of York thought it time to set the miners to work; but perceiving by the light of the moon that there was water in the bottom of the ditch he sent a Serjeant to sound it, who brought an account that this water was not so deep as to hinder the miners. He ordered them to go down into the ditch with a Serjeant and some soldiers to carry the *madriers* by favour of which they were to lodge themselves. Day-light beginning to appear, he with the Duke of Gloucester retired and went back to their quarters. We shall not enter into the particulars of the other attacks, but only say that having had the same success, and having set on the miners, we made no doubt but the place would have surrendered in less than four and twenty hours. Somebody went and told Don John and the Marquis de Caracena, who were in their coaches behind their attacks out of the reach of the canon, that the Prince of Condé and the Duke of York were gone to visit the works; Don John answered, *No hazen ben, They don't do well.*

In the morning a little after sun-rising, we had intelligence of the taking of S. Venant and that M. de Turenne.

An. 1657. was advancing to relieve Ardres. Immediately upon this a *Junto* was assembled, and it was resolved out of hand to raise the siege. The difficulty was how to withdraw the troops from the attacks; we had not had time to make the works and trenches for the communication, so that they could not go out of them without being exposed. The first thing we did was to bring off the miners, which was executed at the Duke's attack by the care of the Lord Muskerry, who, before he acquainted the Officers who were with him with the orders which he had received, ordered notice to be given to the miners to come away in the best manner they could, and that to favour their retreat he would cause a brisk fire to be made on the besieged. He made the soldiers believe that he called them off because he had had intelligence that that place was countermined, and they got to the lodgment by favour of a smart fire of the small arms, without any ill accident.

He afterwards declared the order which he had received, and commanded them when he should give the word to retire with all possible diligence to the place which he appointed them out of musket shot, where they were to rally. The Duke of York on his side commanded thirty troopers with a Lieutenant to go as near the place as they could without exposing themselves, till he should see the soldiers returning from the attack, and then to gallop among them to carry off the Officers or soldiers who should chance to fall. The Duke of York followed them to see his orders executed, and found that as his soldiers were retiring from the attack, the Lieutenant and his troopers kept quiet behind a hedge within musket shot of the place; the Duke galloped up to the Lieutenant to repeat to him the order which he had given him; he obeyed, and to make amends for his fault, marched up to the edge of the ditch: and though the besieged made a smart fire, none of the Officers but Captain Keith and but few soldiers were wounded, none of whom died, which was no less fortunate than it was extraordinary. Some miners were lost at the other attacks; and when the troops were retired from all parts with but small loss, we sent away the baggage to Gravelines, and the whole Army followed. This march was extremely fatiguing. When we arrived on the border of the flat country, we were obliged to halt till the canon and baggage was on the only dyke or causeway which leads from

from Polincove to Gravelines, which the great rains had rendered almost impracticable. The rain which continued without ceasing, the storm, the darkness of the night, the way deep and heavy, and the frequent halts we were forced to make, quite tired the troops, and put them into so great a disorder, that it was impossible for the Officers to hinder the soldiers from dispersing themselves and looking out for cover where they could find it. In the morning there were not ten men in a body of any one regiment; all that could be done was to re-assemble them the next day. The thirtieth the Army incamped at Broukerke; that of France had their share of the bad weather the night that they marched into the plain of S. Omer to come to Ardres, when the Spaniards raised the siege of it. The thirty first we past the Colme, and put the troops into quarters at Dringam and villages adjoining, to recover them a little from so many and great fatigues. The country was so strait and full of inclosures that it had been very difficult to incamp there in order of battle, but the enemy were so far off there was no danger. The second of September we marched towards Mont-Cassel; and the troops having been cantoned in the villages round about we staid there till the seventh, when having learned that M. de Turenne was about la Motte-aux-bois, we caused the Army to march to Wormhout, where we had news on the twelfth that the French had taken la Motte-aux-bois, and were a second time drawing near our army, which repassed the Colme the day following with a resolution to defend the passage of that river along which we incamped. The Spaniards were posted from the fort of Link to very near Spicker. The Duke of York's post extended itself from the place where their quarter terminated, to Bergue S. Vinox, and from thence the Prince of Condé's to Bergue itself. We broke all the bridges, and made works behind the fords till the seventeenth, when we were informed that M. de Turenne was advancing to take us in flank, having passed the Colme above Link. Most of the regiments of native Spaniards were immediately detached with some cavalry to throw themselves into Gravelines. The three Italian Regiments of Don Tito del Prato who commanded them were sent to the fort of Mardyke, and the rest of the Army retired behind the canal which goes from Bergue to Dunkerque. The Prince of Condé having his

An. 1657. quarters at Bergue, Don John at Dunkerque, and the Duke of York at Oudekerk, the canon were planted all along the canal, where we found batteries ready raised to our hands.

A day or two after the Spaniards had quitted the Colme, the French arrived before Mardyke and besieged it. This was in pursuance of the treaty made with Cromwell, whereby they engaged to put him into possession of some maritime place in Flanders, and Mardyke was the only one they could attack in so advanced a season, considering the care which had been taken to provide Grave-lines and Dunkerque with every thing necessary for a long and vigorous defence.

The French, as soon as they arrived before Mardyke, fell to work on their lines towards Dunkerque and on their approaches toward the fort. The forage having been consumed all round, they were forced the next morning to go in search of some in three large farm-houses not above half canon shot from the Spaniards intrenchments, and which had been preserved by the interest which the proprietors of them had with some Officers of the Army: there was even a guard extraordinary placed to keep them from being touched. He that commanded this guard could not but know, when he saw the French drawing near with some horse and foot, with what design they were coming; but according to the Spanish custom, he retired without daring to set fire to the farm-houses, because he had no orders for it. The canon of the lines having fired when the enemy's van approached, the Duke of York, who had his quarters within half a mile of the place, hastened thither, and found them already at work to cover and intrench themselves in case they should be attacked: and meeting with the Prince de Ligne, who that day acted as Mestre de Camp-General, he asked him what he designed to do, and whether he intended to let the enemy forage quietly before his face. He answered as usual, that without orders from the Marquis de Caracena or Don John, he durst undertake nothing: and upon the Duke's replying to him that before those orders could arrive the French would be intrenched and neither they could be dislodged nor the forage burnt; he answered, that it was very true, but he could undertake nothing without positive orders. The Duke told him he would then go him-
self

self and attack the enemy with his own troops, desiring him only to cause his line to be guarded with his infantry; but he made answer again that the bridge being in the Spaniards quarter, he could not let him pass there, because if there was any thing to be done, the Spaniards were to do it; and thus all that was proposed came to nothing. While orders were expecting from Dunkerque, the French continued foraging without any disturbance, save from the canon which kept firing on them, and with their noise brought the Prince of Condé from Bergue. The Duke of York forthwith informed him of what had passed between him and the Prince de Ligne: at which he was not at all surpris'd, and assured the Duke that when he had served with the Spaniards as long as he had done, he would be accustomed to see them commit many material faults without wondering at them. The enemy after they had foraged as long as they pleas'd, retir'd, and left behind them about a hundred horses which the canon had killed. How many men they lost I know not; but not one dead body was found, they having either carried them off, or buried them on the spot in some place which could not be discovered.

Two or three days afterwards, the fort of Mardyke surrendered, and, in pursuance of the treaty made with Cromwell, was the next day put into the hands of Reynolds; and in a short time after, the French having repaired the breaches and levelled the lines, retir'd into quarters of refreshment and to places where they might forage in their own country. The Spanish Army remained incamped where it was, and a report was given out that we should retake Mardyke. The badness of the air had caused so general a sickness, that except those who were natives of Spain, but few Officers or soldiers were exempt from a fever, and more than one half were at the same time incapable of doing any service. The troops which the Duke of York commanded fared the worst; of all the Officers or Volunteers of Quality, or of his own Household, the Duke was himself almost the only person that escap'd the distemper. The Duke of Gloucester left the Army, sick; and the Prince of Condé was so very ill that the Physicians were afraid he would not get over it. Not long after, the King of England came to Dunkerque to sollicite Don John about some private affairs, and to put

An. 1657. put him in mind of some promises he had made to his Majesty relating to England.

The English, who were in Mardyke laboured in repairing the old fortifications about the fort, which was the easier for them to do, in that the ditches had not been filled, and but a small part of the parapet levelled. Don John having intelligence thereof, resolved to march thither one evening with the whole Army, and demolish in one day the works which they had been no less than a month in raising. This was rather out of ostentation and to make people believe he intended to retake the fort, than in hopes it would signify any thing in the end. The day being fixed for this expedition, he marched out of Dunkerque in the evening at the head of the Army, accompanied by the King of England: it was so very dark we were obliged to use flambeaux. The enemy, who perceived us, concluded we were either coming to scalade them or at least besiege them, and took measures to defend themselves, by lighting up their lanthorns round the fort. When we were got within somewhat less than cannon shot, the army put out their lights. His Majesty, Don John, and the Marquis de Caracena halted with the cavalry, while the infantry went forward: the Spaniards, commanded by Marshal de Bataille, marched to that part of the outworks which looked towards Dunkerque, the Count de Marfin with the Prince of Condé's infantry, to that towards Graveline, and the Duke of York at the head of his, posted himself between them both. When we drew near the fort, the enemy made a continual fire from their canon and musketry, and the small frigates which were in the ditch fired also without ceasing. The infantry suffered but little thereby, having at first got under shelter of the old outworks; but the balls which went over their heads, fell among the cavalry, and kill'd a great many both men and horses. His Majesty advancing to see what the infantry were doing, the Marquis of Ormond who attended him had his horse killed under him with a canon shot. Each corp, as they arrived at their post, set on their workmen with some detached soldiers to support them; but the ditch being too deep on the Duke of York's side, he was obliged to order them to go round by the Spaniards attack: mean while he had it filled up with fascines, and made a passage whereby to support them,

them, in case the enemy fallied out on them. In the moment that the pioneers began to level the works, the detached soldiers made an incessant fire upon the enemy, which continued till about day break, when the outworks being razed, we drew off in good order, and arrived at Dunkerque when it began to be broad day. The enemy were, no doubt, more surpris'd at our retreat than at our approach; and they so little expected we should leave them, that after the Spaniards were quite gone the garrison continued firing. There was not above twenty troopers, one Captain of Gloucester's regiment and three or four common soldiers killed, and about eight or ten wounded. The English in the fort, as we afterwards learned, had but one man killed; and they were so strongly perswaded we were going to besiege them, that they dispatched away an express to M. de Turenne to inform him of it: he drew together his troops which were in quarters of forage, and put himself on his march to come and relieve them; but upon receiving advice that the Spaniards were retired, he went back to his quarters.

Some days after this, an attempt was made against the English frigates which were in the ditch: the design at first was to burn them; but that being found to be too difficult, a resolution was taken to surprize the two biggest *the Rose* and *the True Love*, mounted with six or eight canon each. For this purpose twelve sloops were equipped which went out when the weather was perfectly calm. Don John sent notice of it to the King and the Duke of York, and they went along the shore, attended by all the persons of Quality and prime Officers, to see how the enterprize succeeded: there was a kind of fog abroad. Being got over-against the frigates, a sailor in one of them hailed one of the sloops in English: the sailor receiving no answer, and seeing another sloop coming to board the frigate, he gave the alarm, and fired a canon at her which broke one of the rower's legs; this accident together, with a few musket shot at the same time, struck such a terror among the sloops that they shamefully retired without daring to proceed any farther in their enterprize.

The King of England having finished what he had to do with Don John and the Marquis de Caracena, went to Bruges, and afterwards to Ghent and Brussels. The Duke

An. 1657. of York remained at Dunkerque to command the Army there. The people were still fed with hopes that Mar-dyke would be retaken, in order to obtain more easily a considerable subsidy from the Province of Flanders; and to make the thing more probable, large stores were laid in of fascines, gabions and every thing else necessary for a siege. However, there was an order to send the troops on new-year's day into quarters, and the Duke who had remained at Dunkerque all that time, returned to Brussels a few days after Don John and the Marquis de Caracena were arrived there.

An. 1658. In the beginning of the spring, nothing was thought of at Brussels but preparations for the Campaign, and as the season advanced the Spaniards made it their business to store and strengthen the places that were the most exposed. We were informed on all hands that the French would this year go upon some siege of consequence: the Spaniards were very uneasy; for not having infantry enough to supply all their towns, they were obliged to leave some of them with weak garrisons. The King was very urgent with them to reinforce that of Dunkerque, acquainting them with the advice he had received from England, that the first undertaking would be the siege of that place; that Cromwell strongly solicited the French to it; that every thing was getting ready for this purpose both in France and England; and that some intercepted letters which he had in his hands confirm'd him in the belief of those advices. His Majesty did not content himself with only once giving them notice of these things, but he every week repeated it upon the continual accounts he received from England to the same effect: but the Spaniards laid no stress at all upon these advices, believing them to be false, and only reports rais'd with a design to make them ungarrison Cambray, or some other inland towns. They were likewise so very much alarmed at the enterprize on Cambray the year before, that all the King's reasonings could not prevail over their fears, so great was their prepossession that the Cardinal still had the same views on that place, and that nothing could make him alter his design, whatever engagement he might be under to Cromwell, unless the place were so well provided as to make him despair of success.

This

This opinion and many arguments more plausible than An. 1658. rational made them believe Dunkerque would be in no danger this year. So they neglected to put a good garrison in it or the ammunition that was necessary; and distributing at the same time the greatest part of their infantry into Aire and S. Omer, on the frontiers of Haynault; and reinforcing the garrison of Cambray with a considerable body of horse and foot, they overlook'd Dunkerque to that degree, that they even left unperfected two forts with four bastions each, which they had begun on the canal between Bergue and that town, which might have render'd the siege of it much more difficult, seeing the enemy must have been oblig'd to take one of those two forts before they could lay siege to the place in form.

One cannot forbear making this remark, that of all the fortifications of this kind, or intrenchments made by the Spaniards for defence of rivers, they were never seen to reap any benefit by them; either because they never compleated them in time, or had not hands enough to defend them, or else the French by unforeseen marches, came and attack'd them in flank, as hath been related in the year 1655. It is indeed a very difficult thing to make in that country any such works as may afford much advantage: for the Army which is superior and master of the field, will always, with a little patience; find means to force the passes, or enter by some other place into the enemy's country; from whence it follows, that a General ought not to place his whole confidence in such like precautions, tho' there are occasions where they may be necessary.

The French, according to their custom, were first in the field this year, and in their march to Dunkerque, made prisoners of war the Duke of Gloucester's regiment in Cassel, whither it had been imprudently sent (the place being no way defensible) by M. de Bassécour, Marshal de Bataille, who commanded all the troops thereabouts. He at the same time order'd the Duke of York's regiment of foot of about five hundred men, with some other thin regiments, and some cavalry which were in quarters at Hondscotte, to go and throw themselves into S. Omer, which he believed the enemy intended to besiege: but when by their march

he

An. 1658. he found their design was on Dunkerque, he strove, but too late, to throw succours into that place; all he could do, was to get in himself with a few horse.

The Marquis de Lede, Governor of the place, threw himself into it much about the same time, with a world of difficulty: he had been at Brussels to solicit succours of men and ammunition, and he was yet there, when first he heard the news of the French marching to Dunkerque. And now the troops which were at Nieuport, Furnes and Dixmuyde (for which places the Spaniards had been in fear, without any reason) were order'd to march to Dunkerque, except the King of England's regiment of foot, of about four hundred men, which was at Dixmuyde: but they could not get into the place, it being by this time block'd up, and the Marquis de Lede found himself besieged therein: its strength lay in its large out-works which were only of earth and easy to approach: the garrison was no ways proportionable to the vast extent of ground it was to defend: it consisted but of a thousand foot and eight hundred horse: there was but a very little powder or other stores. The certain news of this siege being carried to Brussels about the end of May, did not a little stun the Spaniards, especially when they found there was no hopes of throwing any relief into the place by Sea, the English Fleet commanded by General Montaigne having shut up the entrance of the Port. The only means remaining to save this town, was to draw the Army together: for this end it was resolved in a council of war, wherein assisted all the General Officers, that the general rendezvous should be at Ypres. Orders were sent to all the troops to hasten thither: and the seventh of June the Army and the Generals were there. On the ninth they encamp'd at Nieuport, the next day between Odekerk and Furnes, where Marshal d'Hocquincourt arrived: he was newly come from France thro' Hedin. This town after the Governor's death had revolted at the instigation of the King's Lieutenant and his brother-in-law: they had called the Spaniards to their assistance, and agreed to deliver up the place to them, in consideration of a certain sum, which was paid them, and the Spaniards took possession of it. Marshal d'Hocquincourt had for a long time held a secret correspondence with the

the King's Lieutenant on account of the design he had An. 1658.
 formed to revolt, and to draw over to him most of the
 gentry and populace of the Vexin and the lower Nor-
 mandy: but these plots were discovered before he could
 bring them to bear; such, for the most part, is the fate
 of enterprises of this kind: he was forced to seek his
 safety in flight, and there, whither he fled, he met his
 death. It is believed that if this campaign had not gone
 so cross with the Spaniards, there would have been an
 insurrection in those parts.

To return to the motions of the Spanish Army; it
 was resolved on the eleventh in a council of war,
 in which were present Don John, the Prince of Con-
 dé, the Marquis de Caracena, the Marshal d'Hocquin-
 court, the Prince de Ligne, (Don Stephen de Gamara
 and the Duke of York by some accident not being
 there) that on the thirteenth they should march to the
 downs (sandhills) about Dunkerque with the whole Army
 as near as possibly they could to the enemy's lines; there
 to incamp, in order to attack them when opportunity
 offered; that on the twelfth all the General Officers
 should march with two thousand detach'd soldiers to re-
 connoitre the ground, and mark out the camp.

But before we proceed further in this narrative, it is re-
 quisite to relate what passed in the council of war, be-
 cause most of those who were at it have endeavoured
 to clear themselves, denying that they either gave the
 advice which was put in execution, or consented to the
 resolution which was there taken. The Duke of York
 had what follows from a person who was of this coun-
 cil, and who as well as the rest, was desirous to unde-
 ceive such as might believe he was one that consented
 thereto. When all the General Officers had taken their
 seats, Don John opened to them the occasion of his call-
 ing them together, which was to consult about means to
 relieve Dunkerque. He represented to them the condition
 of the place, and the necessity of making the enemy raise
 the siege forthwith; and having enlarged upon these two
 heads, he proposed marching the Army to Zudcote, and
 incamping in the downs as near as possible to the ene-
 my, in order to watch a fit opportunity of attacking
 them to advantage. This proposal was followed with a
 long silence; and no body rising up to oppose it, Don
 John

An. 1658. John said: "Since I see you approve of what I have
 _____ "proposed, let us now consult about the manner how
 "and the time when we shall march thither." Afterwards it was resolved to go the day following and reconnoitre the lines and the ground whereon to encamp.

The Generals were sent the twelfth, as had been concluded on, with four thousand horse, and some detached foot to reconnoitre the lines of the besiegers, and to pitch upon the ground for incamping the Army. We halted at Zudcote to mark out the camp: then the Duke of York, the Marquis de Caracena and Don Stephen de Gamara crossed the downs with some cavalry as far as the Sea-shore, while M. de Boutteville went with the Croats along the high-road between the downs and the meadows, advancing so near the enemy's guard of cavalry that they skirmished with them, and obliged them to give ground, whereby they had an opportunity to reconnoitre their lines.

As he was returning to make his report to the Generals, he met Marshal d'Hocquincourt who earnestly desired him to return once more, and charge the enemy's guard of cavalry. In vain did M. de Boutteville tell him that he had made all the observations that could be desired; that he had even brought away with him some prisoners taken in the downs: all he could say had no effect on the Marshal; he insisted so strongly on the thing that Boutteville could not refuse him. This obstinacy not only exposed him to danger, but drew all the General Officers a great distance from their troops; for the Prince of Condé, seeing him go to the lines, followed him; Don John understanding that the Prince was marching thither, did the same, and the Duke of York, tho' he had with the Marquis de Caracena made all the observations that could be made, upon his being told that these Gentlemen were going to the lines, gallop'd after them, and came up just as M. d'Hocquincourt was pushing the enemy's advanced guard, and making them give ground. It was in this action that Henry Jermin on the side of the Spaniards, and the Marquis de Blanquefort (M. de Turenne's Nephew, now Earl of Feverham) on the side of the French, were both wounded in the thigh. Marshal d'Hocquincourt was advanced within musket-shot of a redoubt, when the
 enemy

enemy appeared on an eminence a little on this side of An. 1658. their lines; and in the very moment that the Duke of York join'd him, a musket-ball from that redoubt struck him in the belly and killed him on the spot. We retired, the enemy advanced, and the Prince of Condé not being sure of being able to carry off the body, made haste to take out the papers that were in his pocket. A Gentleman of the Marshal's desired the Duke to face about to the enemy and thereby enable him to carry off his master's body: the Duke did so, and made head against the enemy; the body was carried off with great trouble and difficulty: the enemy might have hindred it, if they had exerted themselves to the utmost; and all the General Officers would have run a great risk of being made prisoners. They had no body with them but the Croats who were incapable of supporting a very brisk charge, and they were above a mile from the main body of their troops. The Marquis de Caracena came with three troops of guards to succour them: but the danger was over: he blamed them for their rashness in exposing themselves. We returned to the Army, but so stunned with the misfortune which had befallen Marshal d'Hocquincourt, that without thinking any more of reconnoitring the enemy's lines, and even without so much as speaking of the manner how we should attack them, we retired by the way of Furnes.

The next day the Army march'd to the place appointed for their incampment. Their right was towards the Sea, their left along the canal of Furnes; the infantry made a line before the cavalry which extended from those downs or sand-hills which were nearest the Sea to the ditches which run along the canal. The cavalry was on two lines behind the infantry; the baggage was left at Furnes, the artillery was not yet arrived, nor all the tools for breaking ground; scarce was there powder sufficient for their infantry; thus unprovided of whatever was most necessary for a battle, we incamp'd at less than twice the distance of a canon-shot from the enemy's lines.

The van of the Army arrived in the camp about eleven in the morning. We were afterwards informed that it was night before M. de Turenne could believe that the Spaniards so much as designed to come and in-

An. 1688 camp there; but at last a prisoner was brought to him who convinced him that they were actually there, upon which without a moment's hesitation, or consulting any body, he resolved to march the next morning and fight them. He sent orders to his troops to hold themselves ready, and to the English who were at Mardike to come and join him. They marched all night, as having a large compass to fetch, and arrived at break of day at the place which had been appointed them.

While the French were preparing in good earnest to give battle, the Spaniards were as quiet in their camp as if they had been at a great distance from the enemy. No body was forbid foraging in the evening, as is the custom till the General's pleasure is made known; and the General Officers so little suspected the enemy's design, or so very much affected not to fear them, that the Duke of York being at supper that evening with the Marquis de Caracena, and expressing his dislike of their manner of encamping without lines or the least thing to cover them, and his fix'd belief that if the French did not attack them that night, they would infallibly give them battle next morning; the Marquis and Don Stephen de Gamara answered, *that it was what they desired*; to which the Duke replied, *that he was so well acquainted with M. de Turenne, he could promise them they should be gratified in their desire*. Accordingly the next morning about five, the advanced guard came with an account that they had seen some cavalry march out of the enemy's lines, and supposed them to be coming to attack the Army. It was forthwith ordered to arms, and the Generals went to take a view of the enemy. The Duke of York got the first to the advanced guard, and having pushed as far as the Vedettes (horse-centry) he saw plainly and distinctly that the enemy's Army was marching out of their lines: their cavalry with four field-pieces advanced along the high-way between the downs and the meadows; the French foot marched on the left, having levelled some parts of their line as much as was necessary for a battalion to march out in front; and farther on the left near the ~~the~~ advanced the English, whom the Duke knew by their red cloathing. He forthwith returned to inform the Generals of all these circumstances, and before he reached the camp, he met Don John, who asked him what might be the design of the French, the Duke answered

answered him, that they were preparing to give battle. An. 1658.
 Don John said, he could not believe any such thing, and that they only meant to carry off the advanced guard. The Duke assured him that it was not the custom of the French to march with so large a body of infantry consisting of the French guards and Swissers, the regiments of Picardy and Turenne whom he knew by their colours as well as the English by their red cloaths and with so large a body of cavalry and artillery at their head, purely to force a grand guard. The Prince of Condé coming up the same instant, related to Don John the same particulars that the Duke of York had done, and seeing the Duke of Gloucester there, he asked him whether he had ever been in a battle; the Duke answering *he had not*, then said the Prince, *in half an hour's time you will see how we shall lose one*. We could now no longer doubt of the enemy's design: all the General Officers repaired each to his post to fight them just where we were, having the advantage of the ground, which we had lost if we had advanced any further.

The infantry, to the number of about six thousand men, divided into fifteen battalions, were all on one line, except two regiments. It extended itself from a high sand-hill near the Sea quite cross the other sand-hills as far as the meadows which are close by the canal of Furnes. The native Spaniards had the right of the whole: Don Gaspard Boniface's regiment was posted on the highest sand-hill near the Sea; that of Don Francis de Meneses which was behind, faced the Sea, to hinder the enemy from attacking them in flank: on Boniface's left was the regiment of Don Diego de Gomez then commanded by Don Antonio de Cordova: on his left followed the regiments of Seralvo, those of the King of England and Lord Bristol which made but one battalion; then that of the Duke of York commanded by Muskery. There were behind these two battalions the regiments of Richard Grace and Lord Willoughby making but one battalion, which served for a reserve: on the left of York's regiment were three Walloon regiments, a German battalion consisting of four regiments, and on the last sand-hill towards the canal of Furnes followed the German regiment of Guilau and the Prince of Condé's first regiment of infantry; and the

An. 1658. others which made up three battalions were ranged between the downs and the canal, in the meadows on the side towards the high-way. All the infantry which was posted on the sand-hills had a great advantage, in that the enemy could not come at them but by ascending those sand-hills with a great deal of fatigue; of eight thousand horse which should have been there, there was above half a forraging which did not return till after the defeat. The Spanish cavalry was on two lines behind the infantry among the sand-hills; that of the Prince of Condé was behind his infantry between the sand-hills and meadows: as there were several places where there could not be drawn up above three or four squadrons in front, I cannot say precisely in how many lines it was ranged, and in this posture it was that we waited for the enemy.

Their infantry was on two lines of seven battalions each; the first commanded by M. de Gadagne Lieutenant-General, was composed of a battalion of French guards which had the right, and marched along the downs on the side towards the high-way; then a battalion of Swiss guards marching on the sand-hills; then the regiment of Picardy and that of Turenne which was the last of the French troops of this line, which line was terminated by three English regiments, the last of which extended it self to the downs next the Sea, and before each battalion of this first line marched the forlorn hope.

There were five or six squadrons between the two lines of this infantry and their right wing consisting of as many squadrons as the ground could contain, marched along the high-way where the downs ended, commanded by the Marquis de Crequi Lieutenant-General, and in a great many places there were not above three or four squadrons in front: four pieces of canon, as hath been already said, were at the head of the cavalry of the right. The left wing of their cavalry commanded by M. de Castelnau, marched along by the Sea, with two field-pieces; and several light frigates of the English fleet approaching as near the coast as the tide wou'd permit, made an incessant fire from their canon on such of the Spanish troops as they could descry on the sand-hills.

The

The English commanded by Major-General Morgan, An. 1658. began the attack; General Lockart being with M. de Castelnau, at the head of the left wing. A little before they charged, Don John sent to desire the Duke of York to go to the right, and take particular care of a place whither he saw the English advancing; he accordingly marched thither, and took with him, out of the troops of the middle of the line where he was, only his troop of guards, and a hundred detached men from the regiment next him, with two Captains and some Subalterns to reinforce the native Spaniards. He posted them near Boniface, where he judged the main push would be made: he thought it likewise of the greater consequence to maintain that post, inasmuch as it was not only the highest sand-hill, but the most advanced of any other, and commanded all the adjacent ones. This was all the Duke was able to do before the English made the onset: they advanced with a great deal of confident courage, but with so much heat that they left the French a good way behind, and might have paid dearly for their temerity, if a right use had been made of their imprudence: but those who might have taken advantage of this fault, whether they did not take notice of it, or had some reason best known to themselves, they sent no cavalry to take them in flank, and so let the opportunity slip out of their hands. It was Lockhart's regiment which charged Boniface's Spaniards; Fenwick who was Lieutenant-Colonel of it being got to the foot of the sand-hill, and finding it very steep, made a halt to give his troops time to breath, in order to ascend afterwards with more vigour. While they were thus preparing themselves, their forlorn-hope opening to the right and left, to make room for them to mount the sand-hill, made an un-intermitted fire upon Boniface; and the moment that the regiment moved to the attack, they gave a great shout. Though the Lieutenant-Colonel received immediately a musket-shot through the Body, which made him drop, yet the Major, one Hinton, led on the battalion, which made no stop till they were within a pike's length; and notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the Spaniards, who had the advantage of the upper ground, and were fresh, whereas the English were fatigued and

An. 1658. almost out of breath with climbing the sand-hills, Boniface was driven down, leaving on the spot seven Captains, out of eleven which he had; as also Klaughter and Farel, the two Captains of the detachment which the Duke of York had joined to that regiment, and several reform'd Officers, most of them pike-men. The English, besides their Lieutenant-Colonel, lost a good many Officers and soldiers. After they had rested themselves a little, they moved down the sand-hill; which being observed by the Duke of York he went to charge them with his own guards and those of Don John; but being got within a pike's length, he found that the nature of the ground was such, that he could not break them without extreme difficulty. He nevertheless try'd his fortune, but without success, he was repulsed: all those who were at the head of his troop, were either killed or wounded; and had it not been for the goodness of his armour which saved him, he had been left dead on the place. The Officers of his troop had better fortune than those of Don John's; except Berkley, who was Captain of the former, no Officer of it was wounded. The Count de Colmenero, who was Captain of the latter, was the only Officer that got clear of the affair without any accident; all the other Officers were either killed or wounded, and the guards so roughly handled, that the Duke could never make them rally again. He got together forty of his own men, who were still in a condition to fight: with these he marched to Boniface's regiment, where Don John and afterwards the Marquis de Caracena had endeavoured to rally the fugitives; but not being able to do it, they were retired. When the Duke was got to this regiment, his first efforts were ineffectual towards stopping it. He espied one Elvidge, a Lieutenant of the King of England's regiment, who was of the English detachment with which Boniface had been reinforced. He asked him what was become of his Captain; he answered, he was killed together with most of his soldiers, and that himself was the only Officer that remained unwounded. The Duke order'd him to stay with him, and assemble his soldiers. He called out aloud to tell them the Duke was there. All that were within hearing came and joined him. The Duke at the
same

same time seeing the Major of the Spanish Regiment, An. 1658 he called him, and said to him, that his soldiers ought to follow the example of that handful of Englishmen he saw there, and that it was base in the Spaniards to run away while the others kept their ground. This reproach stopt them, and they presently got into order. The Marquis de Caracena arriving in this interim asked the Duke of York why he did not charge the enemy with his cavalry; he replied, he had done it already, but had been beat. He added, that the enemy in their present posture, could not possibly be attacked, and shewed him at the same time from behind an adjoining sand-hill, that what he said was right.

The Marquis thereupon retiring, Lockhart's regiment advanced, not indeed directly, but by fetching a compass on the left, and we lost sight of him, by reason of the unevenness of the ground and an intervening sand-hill: but scarce had the Duke reassembled Boniface's regiment, and the few horse which were left him, but the English battalion appeared on the same line with the Spaniards on their right, and there was but one sand-hill between them. The Duke faced to the Sea; and marching at the head of his infantry, he saw as he arrived on the top of a sand-hill that the English were coming up on the other side of it. The Duke immediately order'd the Major of Boniface's regiment to charge them in front, while he with his forty guards attacked them in flank; which he did so briskly that he enter'd the battallion, did a great deal of execution among them and drove them to the last sand-hill on the Sea-shore. Boniface's battalion, tho' they saw the English broken, did not charge them, but discovering from the top of a sandhill that the whole Army was routed, turn'd their backs and fled as fast as they could, however, very few of them escaped.

It is a remarkable thing that when the English battalion was broke, not a man of 'em ask'd quarter or threw down his arms; each defended himself to the last, and we were in as great danger from the but-ends of their muskets, as we had been from their fire. A soldier aim'd a blow at the Duke of York, and had infallibly knock'd him down, if he had not broke the force of it, giving him a cut on the face with his sword which

An. 1658. laid him on the ground. His brother the Duke of Gloucester who had followed and seconded him throughout the whole fight with a bravery worthy of his ancestors, having by some accident which I have now forgot, dropt his sword out of his hand, a certain Gentleman whose name was Villeneuve, the Prince de Ligne's Gentleman of the horse, who was by him, seeing the sword fall, forthwith dismounted, took it up and gave it the Duke, who, with his pistol in his hand, defended him till he was got on his horse again: but immediately afterwards this poor Gentleman received a musket-shot through the body; he was carried out of the throng, and had the good fortune to recover of this wound.

A French squadron being enter'd into the downs while the Duke of York was charging the English, he found himself obliged to retire forthwith: they were going to take him in flank, and had infallibly cut off his retreat had not the Prince de Ligne just then charg'd them. He did not indeed rout them; but having stop'd their progress, the Duke of York's retreat was thereby facilitated, and afterwards the Prince de Ligne retired himself.

Boniface's regiment was not alone unfortunate: all the other regiments of native Spaniards found themselves inclosed by the cavalry. The English did not march directly to them and charge them as they should have done. Two of the English regiments seeing the resistance which Boniface made, contented themselves with marching on the flank, and with firing as they passed on in their march up the same sand-hill which Lockhart's regiment had mounted, on the other native Spaniards.

While these things were doing on the right, along the Sea side, the left wing was no less roughly handled. The four field-pieces which the enemy had brought up by the high-way did terrible execution both on the horse and foot. The French guards and the Crown-regiment which was commanded by M. de Montgomery were drawn out of the second line by M. de Turenne, placed on the right of the guards in the meadow, and attacked three small battalions of Spaniards between the sand-hills and the canal, who after a small resistance, fled. The French cavalry, not to let this disorder go unim-

unimproved, advanced before the infantry, making as large a front as the ground would permit, being conducted by the Marquis de Crequi; but the Prince of Condé's horse came and charged them so vigorously, that they were forc'd to retire behind the infantry, who advancing in good order, hindered the Prince from pushing this advantage farther. The enemy were thus beat back no less than three times; but there was a necessity at last to give way, because the French cavalry was supported by their infantry, and that of the Prince of Condé had abandon'd his. The Prince retired after having done all could possibly be done by him both as a General and a Soldier, inasmuch that in the third attack he was in imminent danger of being taken.

As for what pass'd on the Prince of Condé's right among the sand-hills that were between him and the native Spaniards, Guiscard's regiment did not keep their post to sustain the attack of the Swiss, they discharged their pieces while the enemy were at too great a distance. A part of them betook themselves to flight, and the four battalions which were next them did the same without waiting for the enemies nearer approach. This infamous piece of cowardice, and Boniface's defeat, struck such a terror into the cavalry which was behind, that the greater part ran away without once seeing the enemy; the Officers in vain endeavour'd to stop 'em: but those few who stood their ground discharged their duty with great bravery, as will be shewn in its place.

The regiment which followed the three abovementioned, was that of the Duke of York: it maintain'd its post somewhat longer than its neighbours on the left; but a voice being heard from behind, that the infantry should make the best of their way off, this battalion broke its ranks, the soldiers forsook their Officers, and took to their heels. Colonel Grace seeing this disorder, thought it concerned him to think how to save his regiment; he faced about, retired in three divisions, and thus keeping his men in good order, he had the good luck to reach the canal of Furnes, along which, he made his retreat, without losing a single man: but the regiment of York had a very different fate; tho' M. de S. Roch with his regiment of cavalry, had charged and beat the Cardinal's Gendarmes, killing with his

An. 1658. own hand Du Bourg who commanded them, those who should have supported him having abandon'd him, and seeing other squadrons coming to charge him, he was forced to retire as well as he could. The cavalry who pursued him, soon after came up with York's regiment, of which not a single man escaped, except my Lord Muskery who commanded it. Much about the same time, Michel an old German Colonel of horse with his squadron charged Turenne's battalion, but could make no impression upon it; it sustained his attacks with so much order and firmness, that Michel was killed with most of his Officers, and his regiment repulsed, without any other loss on the side of that of Turenne, but only of Lieutenant-Colonel Betbese, who was slain at the head of his pike-men by a pistol-shot. Except these two regiments, I do not remember there was any other of the Spanish cavalry that did their duty in this battle.

To return to the Duke of York, he cast about to make his retreat when he saw himself surrounded on every side by the French cavalry, without any troops to oppose them; and not knowing any thing of what might have passed on the left, where the Prince of Condé was, he resolved to go thither: he had not above twenty horse with him, the rest of his guards being retired with the Lieutenant, after we had quitted the English. This small number contributed more than any one thing besides towards his escape; they were not enough to fear the enemy's scouts or stragglers, nor enough to engage the enemy to observe them: many so fully believed him to be of their own people, that as he was marching he met four or five troopers who attacked one of his Officers, named Victor, a Lieutenant; the Duke took them for some of the Prince of Condé's horse, and cried out in French, *Let him go, he is one of our Englishmen*; upon which they let him go, returned him his sword which they had taken from him, and retired, in a belief that the Duke was one of their Officers. They belonged to the Army of France: both sides were in a mistake, and the Duke was not sensible of his, till Victor told him afterwards that they were the enemy's men. The Duke continued his way, and had the good fortune to pass through the Army of France; on a full trot, till he joined Colonel Grace and his regiment before

before he had crossed the Downs; and passing close by the regiments of Turenne and Picardy, he found when he arrived at the high-road along the Downs all the Prince of Condé's troops routed. An. 1658.

The Duke of York had much ado to make his escape; for the croud of run-aways being very great in the village of Zudcote, through which the high-road lay, he saw no means of disengaging himself but by taking another road on the outside of the village. M. de Morieul, a Colonel of the Prince of Condé's troops, whom the Duke met with as he quitted the Downs, by not following his example, was taken a moment afterwards. The Duke got again into the high-road on the other side the village, where he found Don John, the Prince of Condé and the Marquis de Caracena; we were obliged to face about, to give time to Don John to mount another horse, his own being lamed by some accident; after which we spurred on a-main and stopped no more till the enemy ceased their pursuit.

All the General Officers, except Don Stephen de Gamara, behaved themselves with a great deal of bravery the whole time of this battle. Don John staid so long, that he ran the risk of being taken, and the Marquis did not escape without abundance of difficulty. A trooper of the enemy's laid hold on his horses bridle before he was out of the Downs; but the Marquis having struck him a blow on his eyes with his cane, the trooper was so stunned he let go the reins, and gave him leisure to make off. I have already mentioned how vigorously the Prince de Ligne charged the enemy; but I do not recollect how he escaped; and as for Don Stephen de Gamara who commanded as Mestre de Camp-General, he never ceased whipping and spurring till he got to Nieuport.

We have hitherto said nothing of the battalion which was made up of the King of England's regiment and that of the Earl of Bristol, and it were a piece of injustice to the former to pass over in silence the following particular. They were posted, as hath already been said, on the left of the native Spaniards: when all were put to the rout on their right and left, that part of the battalion which the King's regiment composed, all Englishmen, stood unmoved, though all the soldiers of Bristol's regiment, who were Irish, took to their heels, as did also their Officers, when they found they could not stop them, except Stroud

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An. 1658. an Englishman who was Captain-Lieutenant; he came and joined himself to his countrymen whose Lieutenant-Colonel and Major had likewise abandoned them as the Irish had done; the former under pretence of going for fresh orders, and the other for something else as frivolous. The Lieutenant-Colonel met with his deserts; for some stragling French troopers lighting on him, they shot him in the face with a musketoon, the ball whereof went in beneath his eye and came out at his neck, and it was not without the greatest difficulty that he escaped: he was dismounted, but meeting by chance with one of the Duke of York's guards an Irishman, and the only man who had behaved himself ill on this occasion, he delivered him from his perplexity. All these accidents made no impression on the King of England's regiment; they kept their ground without any concern, though they saw pass by on their left the whole first line of the Army of France, and on the right Cromwell's English Auxiliaries. M. de Rambure who commanded the second line, advancing with it at the head of his regiment, was about to attack the King of England's regiment; but seeing it alone, he advanced a little way before his troops to offer them quarter; the Officers answered that they had been posted in that place by the Duke, and were resolved to maintain themselves there as long as they could; he told them, their resistance would be to no purpose, since their whole Army was routed; they answered again, they were not to believe their enemies; upon which he offered, if they would send an Officer or two, to take them up to a sand-hill, from whence they might themselves see that he told them nothing but the truth. Captain Thomas Cook and Captain Aston were detached; they were led to an eminence, from whence they saw that there were none but themselves left of the whole Army: they went and made this report to the regiment; upon which they offered to lay down their arms, on condition they should not be put into the hands of the English nor be stripped or so much as searched, which was granted them; and M. de Rambure having engaged his word, which was exactly observed, they surrendered, and found themselves in much happier circumstances than the other regiment which had abandoned them, of whom the greater part were killed, the rest taken and stripped.

There were not above four hundred men slain in this battle on the side of the Spaniards, the chief of which were the Count de la Motterie, Colonel Michel, most of Boniface's Captains, one of Saralvo's, another of Gornéz's, Don Francisco Romero, with two or three of his Officers. Of the King of England's troops, three Captains, some Lieutenants and Ensigns, and some Brigadiers of the Duke of York's guards. The Prince of Condé lost no man of Quality but the Count de Meille, Lieutenant General, and few Captains. Of the Spaniards, were taken the Marquis de Seralvo, Ristbourg, Conflans, Belleveder, the Prince de Robec, Don Antonio de Cordova, Don John de Toledo, Don Joseph Manriquez, Don Louis de Zuniga, the Baron de Limbec, Darchem and Baynes, all either Colonels of horse or foot, M. de Montmorency, Captain of the Prince of Ligne's Guards: most of them were taken purely by having been abandoned by their troops, and because they would not run away along with them. There escaped but few Captains and subaltern Officers of the regiments of native Spaniards who acquitted themselves gallantly; but of their cavalry they lost not Officers in proportion. Of the regiment of York, my Lord Muskery was the only Officer that escaped, and of the soldiers there came off not above twenty: the King's regiment was wholly taken, and but a very few returned of the Earl of Bristol's regiment, but he did not lose above five or six of his guards.

As for the Prince of Condé's chief Officers, Messieurs Coligny and de Bourteville, Lieutenant-Generals, were made prisoners with Meille who died of his wounds, and M. Desroches, Captain of his Guards. He lost but very few of his foot, who did nothing of any account; they were along the side of the canal, which afforded them means of running away with the more ease. His cavalry suffered not much, though they fought with a great deal of courage, and he lost not one Colonel. I know not what number of soldiers the enemy lost, it was inconsiderable: they had no Officers killed but Betbesé, Lieutenant-Colonel of Turenne's regiment of horse, Dubourg who has been already spoken of, and M. de la Berge, Major-General * of foot. Of Cromwell's English, Fen-

* A post inferior to that of Lieutenant-General, or Major-General.

An. 1658. wick and Lockhart, Lieutenant-Colonels, and two Captains were killed, and some Lieutenants and Ensigns wounded. I am obliged, in gratitude, not to forget here that M. de Gadagne, Lieutenant-General of the Army of France, who commanded the infantry, having been told, after the defeat, that the Duke of York had been taken by the English, he chose out two or three squadrons who were commanded by his intimate friends, and traversed the Downs to go to them, with a resolution to get him out of their hands by fair means or by force, had he been there; but he had the pleasure to find it was a false report. The Spaniards had happily left the canon and baggage at Furnes, where at their first arriving after the defeat they thought the loss was much more considerable than it really was: but the greatest part of the Officers of foot and soldiers made their escape out of the enemy's hands. Don Antonio de Cordova and many other Officers of distinction were of this number, those who had taken them having let them go again for a little money.

M. de Turenne after his victory returned into his lines, went on with the siege, and it was not long before the place surrendered. It would have held out longer, but that the Marquis de Lede was wounded and died a few days after. News was brought to Furnes the twenty sixth that Dunkerque had capitulated; and the Army marched the same day to Nieuport: when we arrived there all the regiments were as complete as before the battle except that of the King of England and the native Spaniards. A council was forthwith held to resolve on what was to be done: Don John proposed the posting the Army along the canal between Nieuport and Dixmuyde, and to endeavour to defend the passage of it. They who spoke next were of the same mind, nor did the others oppose it directly; but when it was the Duke of York's turn to speak he differed from them, and gave his reasons, representing that they had not a body of infantry sufficient to defend the post against a victorious Army; that the troops were intimidated by a defeat so recent; that it should be considered what straits they would be put to, if they were forced; that it would be next to impossible to secure and preserve the great towns; that the enemy would have it in their power to chuse what towns they would please to take, and that a great many other inconveniences would arise from so hazardous

zardous an enterprize. He then propos'd the dividing the Army, and the putting part of the troops in the nearest great towns that were most expos'd; that thus the town which should be attacked, might make a vigorous resistance, and defend itself at least so long that when it should be taken it would be too late for the enemy to go upon any other siege, and that whilst they were busied in forming one, there would be time to get the troops again together, and improve any opportunity that might offer itself. This proposition was canvass'd in the council, and a resolution was taken to divide the Army: the Duke of York and the Marquis de Caracena with 2000 foot and as many horse were left in Nieuport, which it was thought the enemy would besiege. The Prince of Condé went to Ostend with a body of troops sufficient to defend that strong place. Don John threw himself into Bruges with some infantry and a considerable body of cavalry, and the Prince de Ligne with the rest of the troops entered Ipres. The Duke of York going out of the council of war, the Prince of Condé asked him why he ventured to contradict Don John as he had done; he answered, he did it because he had no mind to be forced a second time to run away as at the battle of the Downs.

The troops being separated according to the above repartition, M. de Turenne came a few days after to Dixmuyde with intent to pass the canal which goes from Nieuport to Ostend in order to cut off the communication between them. Every thing was ready for laying siege to the former, when M. de Turenne received orders from the Cardinal to wait further orders before he formed this siege, the King being dangerously sick at Calais: this accident was the saving of Nieuport, there not being above a fortnight's provisions in the place when M. de Crequi arrived in its neighbourhood, so extremely negligent had the Spaniards been: but there came some from Ostend two days afterwards. In order to enable our selves to hold out a longer siege, we fell to work to make a new counterscarp, five half-moons and a *langue de serpent* beyond the canal, which took in the old outworks; this was finished in eight days time. Then we opened the sluices to drown the country; but this had not the effect we hoped because the ground about the place was higher than we took it to be; however it was

of

An. 1658. of some advantage. The Army of France remained at Dixmuyde, and M. de Crequi within canon shot of Nieuport all the time that the King of France was in danger. The Generals of the Spanish Army assembled themselves in this interim at Plaskendal, a village on the canal between Bruges and Nieuport, and resolved that as soon as the enemy's Army should quit Dixmuyde, Don John, the Prince of Condé, and the Marquis de Caracena should assemble at Bruges as many troops as could be drawn out of the places wherein the Army had been distributed, in order to observe M. de Turenne's motions; that the Duke of York should stay at Nieuport with a body of cavalry to cover, as much as possible, this place, Ostend and Bruges. The Duke in returning from Nieuport with the Marquis de Caracena, had a warm alarm which made them both gallop near three mile for fear of being intercepted before they could reach the town; it was M. de Varennes, Lieutenant-General of the Army of France, who had given them the alarm by sending out some troopers on the other side the canal to view it.

After a while the Army of France quitted Dixmuyde: but M. de Crequi stirred not from his camp. The Marquis de Caracena, in pursuance of the resolution which had been taken, went and join'd Don John and the Prince of Condé, with some squadrons and the Spanish infantry who had made their escape or redeemed themselves out of the hands of the French. A short time after, M. de Crequi retired from the neighbourhood of Nieuport to go and join M. de Turenne; but had it not been for an accident he had not returned at his ease. The Duke of York having advice about noon that he was making off the ground, he went himself to reconnoitre him, and at the same time ordered that a detachment of six hundred foot should come to him instantly in the counterscarp with all the cavalry having an intention to fall on M. de Crequi's rear. The Duke discovered that he was really decamping, that the baggage was already set forwards, and the troops moving: he sent for the foot which he had ordered to be detached, his troop of Guards, and two or three squadrons; the cavalry came, but the infantry being slow in coming, the enemy got so far from the town, before it arrived, that it would have been dangerous to attack them. Thus the design terminated in only a slight skirmish between some straggling soldiers and

and some volunteers on horseback, who, without orders, ^{An. 1657.} 1659 charged a small party of cavalry which covered the rear on the dyke. One of the Duke's Pages, named Littleton, engaged so warmly that he was taken prisoner.

The dilatoriness of the infantry was what hindered the execution of the Duke's design: a small ship laden with wine and brandy having been that morning wrecked on the coast, the soldiers went all to it at low water, and got so drunk that the Officers could not get them together by the time that was ordered.

The Duke of York not being present at any thing that fell out the residue of this campaign, no particular account will be given of it: we shall only say in few words that the Army commanded by the Prince de Ligne hard by Ypres was surprised and defeated by M. de Turenne, who cut in pieces all his infantry, and pursued them to Ypres, which he laid siege to, and took in a few days: he then marched to Oudenarde and made himself master of it: the place was not strong, but it was of great consequence. He left in it a good garrison as well as at Deynse; and in most of the places on the Lys; and thus this blow, which was given to the Prince de Ligne, did the Spaniards more hurt than the loss of the battle of the Downs; for except the taking of Gravelines, the French would have made but small progress the rest of the campaign, after the inaction wherein it had remained during the King's illness at Calais: but this second victory put them in a condition to take several places, as the Duke of York was afterwards informed by one who wanted not opportunities to know it.

Soon after the Marquis de Crequi's decamping from about Nieuport, the Duke of York marched with his troops to the suburbs of Bruges, regulating his motions by those of the enemy, and keeping always on the other side the canal, that he might not make any wrong step and inadvertently engage himself in any perplexity, taking more than ordinary care to preserve to himself a free communication with the places which had been intrusted to him. The sixteenth of September he returned to Nieuport, where he received the agreeable news of Cromwell's death. He dispatched away an express immediately to desire Don John to send somebody to take on him the command he had, it being absolutely necessary he should

go to the King his brother at Bruffels, on the alteration of affairs in England. M. de Marfin was sent to relieve him, and being arrived at Nieuport, the Duke departed from thence immediately and returned no more to the Army; the season being too far advanced when he had done his business with the King, and his attendance in the Province allotted him not being now necessary, and all the troops being retired on both sides into their winter quarters, he went and made a visit to the Princess his sister at Breda, with whom he staid some time.

Cromwell's death and the consequences which it was easy to foresee it would be attended with (his son Richard having neither the vigour, nor capacity of his father) raised the courage of the Royalists, which had been greatly dejected by the ill success of their endeavours to restore the King. They forgot all the dangers they had run; and despising those to which they were going to expose themselves, they fell to work afresh, and thought at last the happy minute was come for them to execute their design: but again their schemes miscarried; King Charles went *incognito* into Spain to Fontarabia, where the peace of the Pyrenees was transacting. The Duke of York retired to Boulogne *sur mer*. Some time after, Captain Thomas Cook brought him letters from the Queen his mother. These letters acquainted the Duke, that M. de Turenne who was near Amiens, desired to speak with him about the affairs of England. The Duke repaired secretly to Amiens, and M. de Turenne told him at his first coming, he would have gladly spoken with the King his brother: but since he had not been able to find out where he was, he would render him the same service in the person of the Duke. He offered him his regiment of foot, which he would make twelve hundred effective men, and the Scots Gendarmes to pass over into England with him, arms for three or four thousand men, six field-pieces, ammunition in proportion, and provision for subsisting 5000 men for six weeks or two months; that he would procure shipping to transport all these to England, and give passports for the marching to Boulogne and embarking there what troops the Duke had in Flanders, as fast as ships could be got; that in the mean time they should be brought to St. Omers, where they should find passports; and for the better making

making these preparations, he offered to deposit his plate as a pledge, and to employ his whole credit to raise a sum capable of carrying on the business with success: he concluded with telling the Duke in the most obliging manner that he might easily believe he had no order in this matter from the Cardinal, who was at the conference of the Pyrenees, and that what he did was out of the sincere good-will he bore to him and his Royal House. The Duke of York joyfully accepted the offer, and lost no time in chusing the place of his landing.

All these things having been thus resolved on and put in a good way, M. de Turenne gave the Duke a letter for the King's Lieutenant of Boulogne, whom he ordered to furnish whatever ships were in his Government, not excepting the fishing-smacks. The Queen his mother procured him another letter from Marshal d'Aumont to the same person and for the same purpose; and the affair was so far advanced, that the eve of the day was come when he was to embark, and the Duke of Bouillon and the Count d'Auvergne M. de Turenne's Nephews, were likewise arrived in order to accompany the Duke as Volunteers in this expedition, when he received the news of the Royalists being defeated by Lambert; upon which he left Boulogne and went to M. de Turenne at Montreuil, who having been informed of this accident, did not think it proper that any thing should be attempted in this melancholy conjuncture. He advised him to have patience and wait for a better opportunity, which would not be long before it offered, considering the embroilments and confusion which would necessarily arise in England. The Duke however insisted upon going thither, as believing the King his brother was landed in the West or in Wales; that he might possibly be in danger, in which case there was no way to bring him off, or to enable him to attempt any thing of importance, but by making a diversion; but none of these reasons could prevail on M. de Turenne to let him go over; and upon his being in the most pressing manner besought to yield to it, he replied he was sure the King was not gone over to England: and that tho' it were true that
he

An. 1657. 1659

An. 1658: he was gone thither, it was not reasonable the Duke
 1659 should hazard himself in an enterprize which did not
 afford the least appearance of success. He advised him
 to return into Flanders, and there wait for news from
 England and from the King his brother, and knowing
 that he had no money, he gave him three hundred pi-
 stoles and a passport. Thus ended this enterprize.

The End of the second Book.

E R R A T A.

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 r. bearing. p. 16 l. 36 being not above r. being above.
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 r. make. p. 67 l. 35 dele *wait on*. p. 69 l. 16 passage r.
 Du Passage. p. 91 l. 19 being persuaded r. suspecting.
 p. 99 l. 11 get out r. go out. p. 102 l. 5 we being one
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 Foul r. Toul. p. 114 l. 6 *after the word* infantry r. and
 left them in the towns he could not reassemble them, and
 a part &c. Ibid. Dele the note. p. 118 l. 35 separates
 itself r. separates its forces. p. 121 l. 5 to mount S.
 Quentin r. from mount S. Quentin. p. 127 l. 6 both r.
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